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Abstract
This dissertation is set out to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s wage and 
employment reforms against a major objective -  the revival of motivation among 
individuals to adapt to new and changing environmental demands and challenges in 
their jobs in the face of intensifying global competition and increased resource 
constraints. It extends existing motivation research in several important ways. First, 
although the reforms began as early as the late 1970s and have had a profound impact 
on the nation’s 100 million-strong industrial workforce, their dual impact on 
motivation was only empirically explored for the first time in this study due to 
extremely high research barriers. Second, since motivation research tends to focus on 
pay systems and especially rewards, this thesis also represents the first empirical 
attempt assessing the simultaneous motivational impact of wage and employment 
systems reform in the world.
Third, with the advantage of an interdisciplinary approach, I developed a research 
model that accounts for uncertainty and risks, thus setting the model apart from 
existing frameworks. By testing a primary dataset of more than 1,000 units of analysis 
on the proposed framework of Environmental Perception and Adaptive Motivation 
against leading theories, I was able to establish that the proposed model is a superior 
and, indeed, more fitting framework for predicting individuals’ motivation to adapt to 
new demands and challenges in their jobs in a fast-changing and turbulent workplace. 
These results in turn lend confidence to my concluding argument for the future role of 
risks in motivation research.
With gratitude to God, the Eternal Father:
I wanted a PhD. He gave me humility.
If uncertainty and risks allowed us to walk in faith and draw closer to God, 
perhaps we could learn to not be bothered so much by their presence.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
This chapter consists of two components. Section 1.1 provides an overview of the 
research question and the theoretical background of the research framework. Section 1.2 
presents the sectional summaries of the thesis, which is organized into five parts 
consisting a total of 10 chapters.
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1.1 Overview 
R esearch Q uestion
My research, entitled, “Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks: Evaluation o f the Effects 
o f China s Employment and Wage Reforms”, is aimed at exploring the individual-level 
impact of the accumulative employment and wage systems reform over the last two 
decades. Although the reform approach has been incremental and experimental, the 
reform measures represent some of the most extensive and radical changes in 
employment and wage policies. First, the reforms affect China’s 100 million-strong 
“army of workers” (zhigong duiwu), representing the largest industrial workforce of a 
nation to ever to join the WTO. Second, they brought about an unprecedented level of 
instability and turbulence in the organizational setting of the state enterprise. In essence, 
these changes involve a fundamental shift from lifetime employment and need-based 
egalitarian pay to jobs that can be terminated and wages that are increasingly based on 
skill, responsibility, and results.
The “Long March” in Search of an Answer
The idea for this thesis, or more accurately, the wage reform aspect of it, began to 
germinate in the latter part of 1990s when public debates about the use of incentives in 
the Chinese industry intensified. I embarked on what at first glance appeared to be a 
straightforward undertaking as I sought to understand, as numerous studies in the West 
have done, the motivational impact of pay system change amongst the Chinese workers. I 
set out to fill the gap in the lack of motivational studies on the wage reform at the 
individual worker level, as studies in this area tended to explore incentives and labour 
productivity at the firm level. My biggest challenge was to overcome the barriers of entry 
to research on workers in state industry, which has principally maintained a closed-door 
policy to academic research.
I managed over a period of three years with various direct and indirect contacts from my 
former business and advisory roles in the government and associated think tanks to
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observe the motivational phenomenon in state industry, and principally at enterprises in 
the oil, petrochemical, and steel industries, dubbed the “strategic sector” (cheluhangye). 
It emerged that the original framing of my research question did not fit the evolving 
realities. In particular, it was not only the wage reform that mattered, but perhaps more 
so, the employment reform. And it was not only the opportunities of better pay under the 
“pay-for-labor” system (anlao fenpei) that mattered, but perhaps more so, the threats of 
job loss under the “competition-based employment” system (jingzheng shanggang).
This realization, which had not been captured in existing literature on Chinese business 
studies at the time, forced me to reshape my research question to encompass both the 
wage and employment reforms and subsequently engage with the examination of a whole 
new range of literature in the broader social sciences discipline to bring in a new 
perspective to help understand motivation under uncertainty and risks.
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks
Motivation is subject to varying environmental influences such as changes on the 
employment and wage scenes, and structural reform of industries. Despite positive 
developments in many industrialized countries and the quick pace of recovery in East 
Asia from its financial crisis, the global employment situation continues to pose 
formidable challenges in terms of employment insecurity and earning instability (ILO 
2001). In particular, the use of contingent labor, i.e., workers on limited duration 
contracts and those hired through temporary work agencies, have increased considerably 
since 1990 in the U.S. and in most European labor markets (Bergstrom and Storrie 2003).
Furthermore, “pay at risk” or variable pay, once a feature unique to executive and 
salesman compensation, is becoming an integral part of compensation for ordinary 
workers (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Turner 2001). Despite Pearce’s (1987) call to 
address these issues and the ‘insecurity thesis’ evident in the study of the global 
workplace (Heery and Salmon 2000), research on work motivation remains focused on 
rewards in presumably stable and secure settings. The extent to which a framework goes 
beyond stable and secure settings to account for employment insecurities and
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compensation risks in what Beck (1999; 2000) refers to as the “world risk society” is as 
important to understanding motivation in the West as among workers in the Chinese 
industry, for whom mere survival is a daily battle and adversity a prevailing condition 
under the ‘deepening of the economic reform’ (shenhua gaige).
Theoretical Background
Starting points and main definitions. In search of a theoretical framework to explain 
the Chinese phenomenon that existing motivation theory cannot explain, I adopted an 
interdisciplinary approach. I explored perspectives on uncertainty and risks by drawing 
upon the risk literature. Based on further insights from research in evolutionary 
economics, strategic management, international conflict, and negotiation, I put forth a 
view of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation”.
The proposed view differs fundamentally from the conventional perspective, which tends 
to focus on the individuals within, rather than forces of the environment confronting 
them. In particular, the existing view suggests that “the emergence of a need, desire, or 
expectation generally creates a state of disequilibrium within the individuals which they 
will try to reduce” in order to be restored to a state of equilibrium (Steers and Porter 
1991:6-7).
The existing view is helpful for understanding motivation in stable settings where 
changes are infrequent, discontinuous, and intentional. The emphasis on the individual, 
however, becomes problematic in more complex and rapidly changing settings such as 
the Chinese workplace, where the environment seems to be the source of multiple 
selective pressures that bear on individual survival and success (cf. Lane 1991). Under 
these circumstances, it seems more beneficial to explore motivation not strictly as a 
process of equilibrium restoration within the person, but from the broader view of 
individual adaptation to continuous environmental change (Nicholson 2001), in other 
words, the view of adaptive motivation.
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Following the above reasoning and based on the work of Foster (2000), Hanna and 
Freeman (1989), Klinger, Barta, and Mahoney (1975), Kuhn and Beam (1982), and Rook 
(1987), I define adaptive motivation as the motivation to adapt to new and changing 
environmental demands and challenges with the purpose o f  increasing one’s chances o f  
survival and success under uncertainty and risks.
Environmental perception. Central to the proposed framework of “environmental 
perception and adaptive motivation” are the twin concepts of “threat perception” and 
“opportunity perception”. My definitions of these concepts are based on the work of 
Boulding (1978), Cyert and March (1963), Fredrickson (1985), Jackson & Dutton (1988), 
Singer (1958), and Tedeschi (1970).
I define threat perception as the perception o f an environmental cue, situation or set o f 
circumstances as presenting a risk to the individual’s current interests in such a way that 
it is feared, i f  not acted upon efficiently, will impinge on one ’s survival.
I define opportunity perception as the perception o f an environmental cue, situation or 
set o f circumstances as presenting a potential o f working toward the individual’s 
advantage in such a way that it is hoped, i f  acted upon efficiently, will further one’s 
growth and advancement.
The proposed perspective suggests two distinct forms of motivation: (1) the motive to 
protect what one currently has (e.g., a job) is based on the fear o f  loss, which results in 
“protection motivation” (Rogers 1975; Arrow 1996); and (2) the motive to achieve what 
.one does not yet have (e.g., a promotion) stems from the hope fo r  gain, which results in 
“achievement motivation”1. The fundamental idea animating this distinction is quite 
simple; it is that employees may not necessarily be motivated by the hope for gain (alone) 
but (also) the fear of loss. What then lie at the heart of the proposed analysis of 
motivation under uncertainty and risks are the considerations of “Can I  afford not to?” 
and “Is it worth it fo r me?”
1 This is different from Atkinson’s (1964) definition of achievement motivation as a personality disposition.
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1.2 Sectional Summaries of the Thesis
As shown in Figure 1.1, the thesis is organized into five distinct yet interrelated parts and 
contains 10 chapters in total.
Part I: Introduction. Covering Chapters 1 and 2, Part I is an introduction to the 
dissertation. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research question, the theoretical 
background of the research framework, and sectional summaries of the thesis. Chapter 2 
discusses the context of China’s employment and wage reforms.
Part II: L iterature review. Consisting of Chapters 3 and 4, Part II of the thesis provides 
the review of the literature. In particular, Chapter 3 reviews the work motivation 
literature from the turn of the 20th century, with special interests in the burgeoning of 
North America-based theories of the 1960s and 1970s that continue to dominate today’s 
research. Chapter 4 reviews the research in other social sciences disciplines that 
addresses the important and pressing issue of uncertainty and risk, which is neglected in 
much of the current work motivation literature.
Part III: Model. Covering Chapters 5 and 6, Part III of the thesis deals with the 
interdisciplinary development of a research model for understanding motivation under 
uncertainty and risks. It represents the most significant contribution of this dissertation in 
that it does not only facilitate the study of employment and wage reforms on Chinese soil, 
but also enables the empirical investigation of work motivation in global organizational 
contexts that are characterized by uncertainty and risks. Chapter 5 lays down the 
backbone of the model on environmental perception and adaptive motivation. Chapter 6 
expands on the core propositions to encompass the antecedents of threat and opportunity 
perceptions in a completed model consisting of 12 variables and 21 hypotheses.
Part IV: Data. Consisting of Chapters 7, 8, and 9, Part IV presents the data of the 
empirical work of the thesis. In particular, Chapter 7 discusses (1) the methodology for 
breaking through various research barriers to evaluate the reforms, and (2) the measures. 
Chapter 8 presents the results. Chapter 9 is a detailed discussion of and reflection on the
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findings, which confirm the superior explanatory power of the proposed model vis-a-vis 
that of existing frameworks, which were also tested with the same data.
Part V: Conclusion. The Concluding chapter summaries the study, discusses its 
implications, and highlights its major contributions. Mindful of the phenomenon of 
unprecedented changes in the business environment that bear on the organization and the 
individuals within, I provide a re-examination of organizational approaches to 
motivation. In light of the prevalence of uncertainty and risks in today’s workplace and 
society at large, the chapter closes with a thought-provoking assessment of the future role 
of risks in motivation research.
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
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Chapter 2 
Context
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides an overview of 
wage and employment reforms from both a strategic and a historical perspective. The 
second section discusses specific aspects of reforms as implemented and advanced at my 
research organization. The final section concludes.
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2.1 Context of China’s Employment and Wage Reforms
As revealed by the title of this thesis, the research setting concerns China’s employment 
and wage reforms. In light of the complexity of the subject at hand, I shall approach the 
discussion in two parts. The first part is taken up in Section 2.1.1 and represents a 
strategic overview of the reforms. The second part is taken up in Section 2.1.2 and 
covers major events in the processes of the two reforms.
2.1.1 Strategic Overview
It is important to note for the analysis in this section that where references are not 
provided it is due to the fact that the information has been obtained from personal 
interviews and visits with policy makers and the like, and that the same information was 
not available in a published format in the public domain. As such, this analysis serves as 
an executive summary of the “strategy inquiry” component of my research discussed in 
Section 7.1 -  Methodology in a Research-Averse Setting.
From the beginning of economic reform in the late 1970s to “deepening of reform” 
{shenhua gaige) from the 1990s onwards, individual workers, like the enterprises they 
worked for, were confronted with an increasingly uncertain and risky future (cf. 
Ginzberg, 1985). Essentially, individuals would know no precedence and thus have no 
basis to ascertain as to where they might end up in the “mounting waves of reforms” 
(gaigede dachau), referring to the intensifying processes of natural selection and 
elimination at both enterprise and individual levels. Before setting out to analyze how 
individuals responded to the opportunities and threats brought about by the employment 
and wage reforms in particular, it is necessary to assess the immediate cause that 
prompted these reforms.
In the beginning of China’s economic reform in 1978, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
accounted for nearly 80% of gross industrial output. By 1998, their percentage of output 
by value had fallen to less than 25%. The problematic performance of the state industry
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was reflected in the increase in the number of loss-making enterprises. From 1985 -  
1998, for example, there had been a three-fold increase in the number of loss-making 
SOEs from 6,700 to 24,000 (see Field, 1992; Ma, 2000). The root of the unsatisfactory 
performance of SOEs has largely been the absence of ap economic rationale in 
enterprise management and the state’s adoption of a “closed door policy”, which 
effectively protected the SOEs from the forces of an open market. With the SOE’s being 
totally dependent on subsidies for economic survival, the exhaustion of state budget was 
an inevitable outcome.
The year 1998 saw a major turning point in the history of reforms at the enterprise level. 
In an attempt to hasten the reform process, the then Premier Zhu Ronji had set a three- 
year timeframe for SOE’s to either “fold up” or redeem themselves (sannian jiekun) by 
way of “reform, reorganization, transformation, and strengthened management” (see 
Holz, 2003; Ma, 2000; Tang, 1998). This mandate encompassed all aspects of enterprise 
management whereby employment and wage distribution were among the priorities for 
large-scale structural adjustment and correction. Although the cutoff date had since been 
re-negotiated, revised, and stretched according to the “peculiar conditions and 
circumstances of individual enterprises” (changqing), there was to be no turning back to 
the old world of enterprise welfare. In other words, this was where the highway of 
unparalleled uncertainty and risks began.
The Old and New Worlds
The change to the new world involves the transition from a planned economy to a 
“socialist market economy” (shehuizhuyide shichangjingji) in which the means of 
production would be retained by the state but the control of wages, prices, employment, 
and production would be gradually relaxed and a private sector would be allowed to 
develop in the interstices of the state socialist economy (see Clarke, 2005). A way of 
understanding what went on in the old world and how it made the transition to the new 
particularly challenging is the evolving relationships between the State and the 
enterprise, and the enterprise and its workers. In the pre-reform setting, for example, the 
enterprise was viewed not as an economic entity per se but a political establishment
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whereby supply and demand of raw materials and finished goods as well as wage setting 
and the allocation and deployment of personnel and staff were all controlled by the State.
The enterprise manager (changjingli) or head of the enterprise was responsible for the 
fulfillment of production quotas set by the State but had no say on other aspects of 
management such as strategy, business development, human resources, R & D, and 
marketing and distribution. Although managers might have a certain degree of influence 
on the internal reallocation of human resources and the types and quantities of industrial 
output to be produced, it was the enterprise’s Party Secretary (<dangshuji) who had the 
ultimate authority in prescribing its economic activities and political objectives.
Since the appointment of enterprise managers was made on the basis of political 
credentials and largely determined by their personal relationships with the State, it was 
not unusual for a manager to receive a promotion despite the fact that his enterprise was 
in the red or on the verge of bankruptcy. By the same token, the contrary could also be 
true, and that is, a manager could get a demotion regardless of his demonstrated ability 
to revive or transform an enterprise if he was after all not politically favored by the 
central government.
In the earlier stage of the reform process, politically influential managers who had a 
good relationship (guanxi) with the state would typically also be assigned “sweetheart 
deals” and have their enterprises’ success measured against a different, if not mysterious, 
set of criteria that was out of line with the rest of the industry. In sum, it seems fair to 
conclude that notwithstanding the extent of organizational performance or professional 
competence of enterprise managers, their role in relation to the state was primarily 
submissive, if  not also totally passive, except for the minority of individuals who were in 
a position to exert their influence through political means.
In the late 1990s, with increasingly grave and unrelenting budget constraints and the 
subsequent resolve of the state to deepen the reforms, dynamics of the relationship 
between the State and enterprise began to experience a sea change. Enterprises were to 
continue to submit to the arrangements of the state, but they could no longer depend on 
it for their survival. And while the power struggle between the enterprise manager and
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the enterprise Party Secretary persisted, the emphasis in management had taken on an 
evident shift from political concerns toward economic efficiency. Instead of being 
paternally protective of the state industry, the state was now seen to make an 
unprecedented move of transferring the risk of economic failure to the enterprises 
themselves. For example, the enterprise wage bill was from now on determined without 
exception by productivity rather than by headcount. In this spirit, the state might provide 
no coverage at all for redundant staff or redundant anything. As their criteria indicate, 
these measures were designed with profound attention to reducing the waste caused by 
the entrenched mentality of communist-style entitlement and non-accountability at the 
enterprise level.
Where the cycle of risk transfer led us. Since the ailing state industry had no way of 
absorbing the economic risks transferred by the communist-turned socialist-market state, 
these risks were in turn channeled, albeit reluctantly, to the industry’s 100 million-strong 
workforce. A distinctive feature of such risk transfer was the new form the relationship 
between the state enterprise and its workers took.
In the pre-reform era, workers had always been ideologically referred to as the “masters 
of the enterprise” {qiyede zhurenweng). Generations of men and women from the same 
immediate and extended families typically toiled and labored at the same enterprise. 
Their bond with the enterprise could best be described as relational (cf. Rousseau, 2000) 
in the sense that (1) the enterprise was committed to the workers to the extent that the 
latter were guaranteed lifetime employment, egalitarian wages, and cradle-to-grave 
benefits based on the communist ideology of “to each according to his needs; from each 
according to his ability”; (2) in reciprocation the workers were committed to the State, 
which the enterprise represented and acted on behalf of in multiple political, social, and 
economic capacities; and (3) the relationship was stable and deep-rooted.
It was not until the nationwide introduction of limited duration contracts in 1995 that 
workers found themselves suddenly identified by the state as “employees” (guyuan). 
Besides being imposed this new and unfamiliar identity, the workers were confronted 
with the yet more unfamiliar, and indeed shocking, reality of risks in employment and 
pay. Given that the industry had an admittedly high redundancy rate o f40 -  60% and the
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social net or unemployment insurance system was only in its infancy (Sun, 2000b), it 
seemed that such risks in their class and magnitude would certainly have a hold on the 
vast majority of the workers, whose skills were either below satisfactory standards or 
altogether non-transferable to the non-state workplace. What was uncertain but worth 
assessing from both a strategic and an academic point of view was the direction and 
extent of the workers’ subsequent response in motivation, which might hopefully, as 
reformers had intended, translate into productivity to help revive the state sector.
A critical consideration in this regard was the peculiar conditions and circumstances of 
individual enterprises” (changqing) as they had a direct and immediate bearing on the 
workers’ prospects for continued employment and pay as well as other impending risks 
they were made to bear. Particularly, enterprises that were in the red or faced with a 
forced merger or worse yet, the fate of imminent bankruptcy, would least likely see a 
positive outcome in motivation. In fact, with an emphasis on downsizing and 
restructuring whereby production would likely be severely interrupted, motivation could 
hardly be an immediate concern.
Putting the issue of motivation aside, a popular interim solution to the workers’ 
predicament, as I had witnessed on numerous occasions while roaming the streets of 
Beijing and other parts of Northern China, was for individuals to be given surplus 
materials and products by the ailing enterprises they worked for to sell and hawker off 
for profit. In more extreme cases where workers were not likewise pacified, symptoms 
of social unrest were quick to emerge. Indeed, there had not been a lack of reports and 
anecdotes in the press concerning the workers’ dramatic reactions to back pay and 
layoffs, especially in their display of anger and aggressive behavior toward enterprise 
managers and the so-called culprits of their misfortune (see Cai, 2002; Tang, 1998).
From a strategic point of view, these issues would rise above the level of the enterprise 
for want of solutions at the societal level. They are nevertheless given attention at this 
point in my discussion for two important reasons. First, what went on at the macro level 
and particularly around the workers had a profound effect on how they perceived the 
challenges in their own immediate environment. This is in line with Harvey’s (1966) 
argument that adaptive activity is "knowledge-motivated" whereby the individual is
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concerned first and foremost with searching and scanning for cues in the face of 
environmental complexity and change, interpreting them so as to know where they 
stand. Second, in order to more accurately process and decode the complex issues 
therein, as the researcher I felt the need to be able to also see the context as the 
policymakers saw it and as those affected would likely see it. Empathy then became a 
key to my understanding.
Following up on the issue of “where the cycle o f  transfer risk led us” at enterprises 
where production remained relatively normal and workers were still paid continually 
regularly, is the challenge of getting these same individuals to come to work more 
consistently daily, perform more effectively on the team, be willing to upgrade their 
skills and even take on more responsibilities, and in all, adapt to the new and 
increasingly challenging demands in their jobs.
However, incentives or bonuses (jiangjin) had since the beginning of wage reform been 
distributed more or less equally rather than made contingent on performance (see Sun, 
2000a for a review). This ironically resulted not so much in an increase in work 
motivation as an escalation in pay expectations both financially and in kind and the 
subsequent phenomenon of excessive labor remuneration across the state industry (e.g., 
see Gang & Woo, 1996; Sachs & Woo, 1997), which by 1988 were fueling both cost 
and demand inflation (Howe, 1992). The unprecedented categories and level of risks 
brought about by “deepening of reforms” and especially employment reform thus 
seemed to offer an ultimate, decisive solution to the much intended but so far little 
achieved objective of wage reform in inducing work effort solely by way of rewards.
For with the magnification of employment uncertainty and compensation risks came the 
long-awaited, and indeed even now hurried, change in the entrenched communist 
workplace mentality of “misbehavior with no consequence”. Unarguably, the 
competition-based reforms presented the biggest blow to “free riders of the former need- 
based systems” (jideliyizhe), that is, those who did not manage to reciprocate with the 
parallel conviction of “from each according to their ability” and subsequently stood to 
receive something for nothing. At the same time, the new systems also created some of 
the most heartwarming opportunities especially for those who were already convinced of
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their responsibility to contribute to the success and advancement of the enterprise and 
the state and/or the need for personal fulfillment and recognition.
Despite uncertainty and risks, the setting presented a favorable set of prospects for the 
revival of motivation. To begin with, the principle of “survival of the fittest” (shizhe 
shengcun) governing the new employment and pay systems appeared conducive to self­
regulation and discipline. But that is not enough. To facilitate adaptive motivation and
r
performance also requires the provision of organizational support to help individuals 
succeed in the face of new challenges in their jobs and not just in political advancement 
and indoctrination, as was the case before. Turning now to the chapter’s thematic section 
-  Historical Summary o f the Two Reforms, the analysis should improve understanding of 
reform and accompanying measures, covering a 20-year span from its initiation in 1978 
to its culmination in 1999.
2.1.2 Historical Summary of the Two Reforms
A central dilemma in research, as pointed out by Lounamaa and March (1987), is the 
mismatch between the analytical capabilities of the researcher and the complexity of the 
environment. For instance, the temptation to apply the same assumptions and decision 
rules that seemed valid and sensible in familiar and/or more simplistic environments, if 
not consciously resisted, could lead to the partial, if not total, misinterpretation of the 
phenomenon at hand and the drawing of hasty conclusions thereof. My strategy of 
guarding off this tendency whilst operating in the complex Chinese reform environment 
was to develop, as a prerequisite to analysis, an in-depth understanding of the major 
events in the country’s political and economic development that led to the reforms rather 
than yield to a “snapshot” approach to data processing, which could have offered the 
advantage of speed but not quality.
In line with this strategy, I shall proceed with the discussion in this section by first 
highlighting the challenges facing the country from more than half a century ago to the 
time prior to the deepening of the reforms in the latter part of the 1990s. In 1949, in 
particular, upon the end of the civil war between the Communist Party and Guomindang
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and the founding of the People’s Republic of China or “new China” (xinzhongguo), the 
pressing concerns for both the state and its people were the reestablishment of social 
order and the guarantee of “a bowl of rice” for all. It was with these issues in mind that 
the national policies of zero employment by way of low wages (Wang, 1999) or “low 
wages, employment for all” (digongzi, quanminjiuye) were contemplated.
With the implementation of these policies in the poverty-stricken setting of the new 
republic, individuals received low, egalitarian wages and meager living subsidies but 
were all guaranteed lifetime employment. Based on the Soviet model at the time (see 
Frazier, 2002; Howe, 1992), the country’s manpower planning at the national level and 
human resources management at the micro operational level were planned and 
controlled by the state. Individual workers, intellectuals, and peasants alike, simply 
answered to the call of the Central Communist Party (or hereafter simply referred as the 
“Party”) in landing a job wherever their contribution and sacrifice were needed. The 
relationship between the enterprise and its workers was compatible to that between the 
traditional Chinese parent and child -  the latter were cared for in virtually all aspects of 
their economic, social, and domestic lives.
With the enticement of political and moral incentives on the one hand and piece rate and 
bonuses on the other, morale and work motivation were said to be at an all-time high 
especially during the so-called post-war period from 1949 -  1966. As explained to me 
by a leading Chinese scholar, the workers were motivated to the extent that they 
competed with each other on the basis of giving oneself to the Party and the State no 
matter how trivial, insignificant or trying their calling might be, thus the widespread 
aspiration, “May I  be a nail that never rusts!” (zuoyigen yongbushengxiude luoshiding).
Events, however, took a dramatic turn from 1966 -  1976 during the Cultural Revolution 
or “ten-year disorder” (shinian dongluan), when the focus of activities in the workplace 
was shifted from industrial production to class struggle. Financial incentives, despite 
being nominal, were now condemned as “material poison” by the extreme left wing 
(jizuopai) of the Party. From this time up to the early stage of economic reform in the 
late 1970s and including a good part of the 1990s, individuals seemed to take on a 
remarkably different attitude toward work. In particular, negative economic phenomena,
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such as absenteeism, inefficient use of working time, reluctance to learn job skills, and 
high wastage of energy and raw materials could be observed at the shop-floor level in 
almost every state enterprise (Holton, 1990; Zhu & Dowling, 1994).
The following popular workplace jingles, “I t ’s All the Same” (yigeyang) and “Are you 
OK?” (nixingbuxing), vividly capture the spirit of helplessness and sarcasm among the 
workers as to how need-based employment and compensation systems had evolved over 
time to result in the lack of recognition for individual differences in contribution at work 
and the lack of objectivity in performance evaluation:
It’s all the same {yigeyang)
It’s all the same to work or not to work (zuoyubuzuo yigeyang)
It’s all the same to work hard or not to work hard {zuoduozuoshao yigeyang)
It’s all the same to do well or to do poorly (zuohaozuohuaiyigeyang)
Are you OK? {nixingbuxing)
Are you OK? {nixingbuxing)
You are if (the boss) says you are, even if you aren’t {shuonixingjiuxing buxinyexing) 
You aren’t if (the boss) says you aren’t even if you are {shuonibuxing jiubuxing 
xinyebuxing)
Problems such as these were in turn manifested in low productivity and efficiency. For 
example, as explained to me in interviews with the government ministries and confirmed 
the case at enterprises I had visited with (see Sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3), typically the 
production frontline would be understaffed while the supporting and backroom 
operations, overstaffed, due to differences in workload and labor intensity. At length, the 
efficacies of wage and employment policies were to be rigorously reexamined by central 
policymakers against the evolving political and economic objectives of the country. In 
particular, the prospects for an improving economic situation for the emergent socialist- 
market state would depend largely on how quickly (or slowly) various ideology-based 
adjustments in the employment and wage policies would be received or even once again 
embraced with fervor and a sense of commitment by members of its workforce.
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Incremental and experimental approach. In the following, I shall proceed with a 
chronological summary of the two reforms, beginning with wage reform, which was 
initiated at the time of economic reform in 1978. It is important to note that, due to the 
uneven economic development of geographical regions across the country and its 
industry, reform measures were typically introduced on an experimental and incremental 
basis often taking up to five to ten years, if not longer, to warm up to at test sites 
(shidian) and follow through at other select enterprises where peculiar conditions and 
circumstances of the select region, industry, economic zone, and enterprise were 
considered by policymakers as feasible to begin with and preferably also among the 
most conducive to success in implementation.
Geographically, this has special relevance for inland regions or the hinterland (see 
Nolan, 2001) and especially the “big northwestern region” (xidabei), which has been 
much less economically nourished and developed in contrast to the coastal cities or 
southern regions in general (see Minematsu, Sakata et al, 1998). The same may be said 
of industries and enterprises in the north, which were among the most severely affected 
in financial turmoil during industrial restructuring and other trying periods of enterprise 
reform (Tang, 1998). This is essentially the reason for some of the dates given 
previously and yet to be given in relation to the reforms in this analysis to appear 
indecisive on the surface, being necessarily accurately framed in a manner of speech of 
“by”, rather than “in”, a particular year or period. As such, unless the new policies were 
enforced legally and referred as “national”, one need not assume that the introduction 
represented blanket or instant coverage for all enterprises or geographical locations.
The incremental and experimental approach to wage and employment reforms is 
strategically congruent with the economic reform policy set out by the late premier Deng 
Xiaoping, who proclaimed the determined departure from a communist economy by 
boldly suggesting, “Let’s allow a portion of the population take lead in the creation of 
wealth (according to their own strengths and abilities)” (xianyang yibufenderen fuqilai) 
(Deng, 1987, 1989). As was imparted by policymakers and shared by enterprises and 
workers alike, these reforms were first and foremost about “change of mindset” 
(guanniande zhuanbian) or “thought reform” (sixiang gaige) in preparing the hearts and
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minds of individuals to change, and in particular, from need-based egalitarianism to 
competition-based adaptation and survival.
Wage Reform (ongoing since 1978)
The wage reform was launched in 1978 as an attempt by the State Council to revive 
work motivation and turn around enterprise performance, which were believed to have 
reached a rock-bottom level at the end of the Cultural Revolution. The reform has been a 
major component of China’s economic reform, which represented a clear departure from 
the totalitarian economic policy that was predicated on political priorities to the 
socialist-market economic policy that was to be geared toward the revitalization of a 
stagnant economy (Sun, 2000a).
The reform strategy for the revival of the state sector, as mapped out by Deng Xiaoping, 
the then Party Chairman and “chief architect of reform” (geigede zhongshejishi) for the 
next two decades, was to “install a competitive mechanism within the enterprise” 
{yingru jingzhengjizhi), which would mirror the dynamics of market forces and operate 
according to the reform principle of “survival of the fittest”. Importantly, it was expected 
to facilitate the conversion among workers from the former communist mentality of 
need-based pay to a new style of competition-based wage distribution.
As explicated by Liu and Lian (1994) and Takahara (1992), such approach consisted of 
three main components: (1) the advancement of autonomy in internal pay distribution at 
the enterprise level (qiyezizhu fenpei); (2) responsiveness to market supply and demand 
(shichangjizhi jueding); and (3) governmental supervision, regulation, and control at the 
macro-economic level (zhengfu jiandutiaokong). As such, throughout the period of the 
ongoing reforms, polices were targeted toward both the determination of wage bill at the 
enterprise level and the distribution of pay at the individual worker level. In both cases, 
the creation of enlarging differentials on the basis of contribution was crucial.
When the wage system was more substantially reformed in the mid-1980s, progress was 
slow. By the early 1990s, however, several significant changes had occurred vis-a-vis 
matching rewards with skills and training, effort and productivity (Warner, 1995).
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Although the enterprise wage bill remained a contractual arrangement between the state 
and the enterprise, the latter was now given a certain degree of autonomy in wage 
distribution corresponding to the enterprise’ operating conditions and circumstances.
Pay-for-labor (PFL). A common strand in the complex tapestry of reform policies and 
measures was the fundamental shift in the ideology of distribution from the pre-reform 
principle of “to each according to his needs” or “pay for needs” (anxii fenpei) to the 
reform principle of “to each according to his contribution” or “pay for labor” (anlao 
fenpei), which was adopted as a means to “unleash (labor) productivity” (jiefang 
shengchanli) and improve the living standard of the masses” (Deng, 1987).
Pay-for-labor was about rewarding contribution, which was not necessarily accounted 
for on the job, as would normally be in the case of pay-for-performance schemes in the 
west. Work contribution (laodong gongxian) in the Chinese context referred primarily to 
the skill required of and responsibility vested in a job, as manifested, for example, in the 
form of position- and skill-based pay {gangwei jineng gongzi) for manual workers. 
Among professional and managerial staff, however, pay-for-labor schemes would more 
likely involve incentive pay and performance bonuses that bore a closer resemblance to 
pay-for-performance schemes in the west (Sun, 2000a).
During the more mature stage of the wage reform when the total wage bill of the state 
enterprise became more closely linked to enterprise performance, and personal income 
in turn more closely linked to contribution at work, the term “labor” has also come to 
mean individual contribution at the individual level, as could be measured by the state- 
recommended wage system of 15 technical grades (among many other alternative 
methods). In 1990, the state issued further guidelines on the enhancement of wage 
distribution along the finer lines of position and skill levels. As the state continued to 
allow a high degree of autonomy in the actual formulation of internal wage policy and 
the administration of wages within the enterprise, the concept of work contribution at the 
individual level would translate not just into labor intensity or technical competency, but 
also job responsibility or performance.
Of the various reform policies, six are particularly noteworthy:
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1. Restoration of piece rate and incentives. Major policies of the early reform period 
from 1978 -  1983 included the restoration of piece rate and incentive schemes (liu and 
Lian, 1994). In 1978, the state council introduced an incentive guideline of 10% -  12% 
of basic wage. The following year, enterprises were encouraged to set up an incentive 
fund from retained earnings. The fund was intended for differential distribution to 
reward workers who deserved a merited pay increase. In 1981, incentives were 
recommended to increase again, this time, to 16.7% of basic wage or the equivalent of 
two months’ salary.
2. “Floating wage system”. As there was no strict control from the Party administration 
as to how or how much had to be allocated as the incentive portion of pay, enterprises 
experimented with three major categories of incentive pay or “floating wage 
systems”(fudong gongzizhi): (1) “small float” (.xiaofudong) by which 20% of the total 
wage was assigned as a floating wage to be pegged to worker contribution and enterprise 
performance; (2) “medium float” (zhongfudong) by which 50% of the total wage was 
similarly linked; and (3) “complete float” (chuanfudong) by which the floating wage 
entirely substituted the basic wage (Liu & Lian 1994). In other words, the entire 
monetary portion of pay became incentive-based. The sudden surge in bonuses without 
proper state control or self-surveillance measures at the enterprise level had quickly 
resulted in wage expenditure overtaking increases in productivity and profitability. 
Corrective measures were taken by the state Council to impose a ceiling on bonuses.
3. “Performance-related wage bill”. In 1985, an administrative fiat known as 
“(enterprise) performance-related wage bill” (jgongxiao guaguo) was introduced at the 
enterprise level to keep potential increases in the annual wage bill in line with that in 
enterprise performance. The base of the enterprise wage bill and the ratio of growth of 
wage bill to that of enterprise’ performance were to be determined by way of annual 
consultation and negotiation with the state authority.
4. “Fifteen-grade wage system”. In the same year, the original eight-grade wage 
system, which was based on eight standard technical work grades were substituted by a 
15-grade wage system (shiwuji gongzizhi). The new wage system made it possible for 
wages to be differentiated among workers within a specific technical job grade on the
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basis of changing work assignments and job responsibilities. At the same time, small 
variations in pay might also be possible for workers who achieved a different level of 
performance or contribution in the job at different times.
5. The “two below V \  In 1993, facing the industry-wide problem of upward wage drift 
(see Gang & Woo, 1996), the State Council passed a revised policy known as the “two- 
belows” {Hang diyu), which stipulated that the percentage growth in enterprise wage bill 
and worker income be kept below two main performance indicators such that (1) the 
growth rate of enterprise wage bill is no higher than that of enterprise performance; and
(2) the growth rate of average worker wage is no higher than that of enterprise 
productivity. A major provision of this new policy was that wage bill and enterprise 
performance reviews were now to be conducted by the state authority every three to five 
years instead of annually. This means that the enterprise could now formulate its year- 
to-year wage plans and policies with more autonomy and over a longer planning period.
6. “Position- and skill-based pay”. Position and skill-based pay (gangwei jineng 
gongzi) was introduced by the state in 1992. It represented a more sophisticated attempt 
to promote the concept of “pay for labor”. Under the initiative, the core wage system of 
SOEs was to be substituted by two major pay scales -one being specific to the position 
held by the employee and the other relevant to the certified skill level of the individual 
concerned. Position grades and wage level were to be mapped out by individual SOEs 
according to four criteria: (1) responsibility, (2) labor intensity, (3) working conditions, 
and (4) skill and ability required in the position held.
As greater wage differentials were to become available between employees working in 
demanding, front-line production vis-a-vis those working in secondary production and 
supporting roles, there would now be unprecedented incentives for workers to compete 
for, instead of the tendency to withdraw from demanding roles in the workplace. By 
mid-1993, more than 2000 medium and large SOEs had installed some form of position- 
and skill-based pay, making the number of employees under the new wage system a total 
of 10 million. However, due to financial difficulties, many enterprises, my research 
organization included, only adopted the new wage system years later.
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Whether pay-for-labor applied to pay according to a wage system that was differentiated 
only in terms of pre-determined level of position and/or skill, or also embodied the 
concept of accountability and on-the-job performance (laodong biaoxian) would be a 
matter of individual enterprise wage policy. Overall, the scope and intensity of linking 
pay to contribution, be it in the form of position- and skill-based pay or performance 
bonuses, would determine whether the wage reform process was propelling the 
workforce toward a reward system that was driven by competition or constituted only 
another form of need-based wage supplement. This issue would be further explored in 
the context of the research enterprise in Section 2.2 -  Uncertainty and Risks under 
“Deepening o f Reforms
Employment Reform (ongoing since 1985)
As is the case with wage reform, employment reform represented a corrective 
mechanism aimed at tackling the challenges and unanticipated issues that had emerged 
with the evolution of time under the old economic system. In particular, the lifetime 
employment system or “iron rice bowl” (tiefanwan) together with its cradle-to-grave 
benefits had caused and long tolerated the widespread and serious problems of (1) job 
inheritance (Howe, 1992) and “backdoor recruitment” (zhouhoumen) through “guanxi” 
or social relations (Bian, 1994), (2) excessive headcount and overstaffing (Gan, Tang, & 
Wu, 1997; Korzec, 1992; Wang, 1999), and (3) loss of human motivation and low work 
morale (Ding & Warner, 2001; Warner, 1996). Since overstaffing and redundancy were 
what policymakers frequently referred to as a bottleneck that slowed the progress of 
enterprise reform, it is important for the issue to be discussed in further detail.
Redundancy a threat to survival. According to industry sources and as revealed in 
local Chinese publications on unemployment and labor reform (e.g., see Gan, Tang, & 
Wu 1997; Wang, 1999) and confirmed to me in a preliminary interview with the 
Ministry of Labor and Personnel back in the mid-1990s, redundancy in industry was 
estimated at 40 -  60%, whereby the “workload of three persons was (typically) had by 
five” (sangerendehuo wugerengan). This suggests that, of the 100 million industrial 
workers at the time, almost half was “superfluous” or excessive labor (fuyu renyuan).
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The culprit of the economic ill of unchecked employment expansion could be traced 
back to the problematic approach in wage bill determination at as early a time as the 
1940s and 1950s (see Korzec, 1992 for a discussion). In particular, the pre-reform policy 
for determining the total wage bill on the basis of headcount had encouraged SOEs to 
expand their workforce beyond economic justifications. The result of such expansion 
was a community of large and medium-size SOEs whose workforce was redundant and 
unproductive (Sun, 2000b). In the setting of “enterprise town” (iqiyebanshehui), which 
was rather common, for example, in the oil industry, which I had visited, a great number 
of excess labor was deployed in the “enterprise management of social facilities” 
(iqiyebanshehui), which involved the day-to-day running and maintenance of social 
facilities and community support ranging from schools to hospitals to police stations.
Since the mid-1980s, a number of these administrative or auxiliary functions, which 
were totally unrelated to enterprise production, had been gradually transferred to the 
municipal government. At the same time, however, with an unprecedented level of 
autonomy under the auspices of enterprise reform (qiyegaige), many large SOEs had 
gone into extended businesses in which they had no expertise or competitive advantage 
(Tsang & Cheng 1999). The punishing results of these nonproductive investment and 
subsequent employment expansion activities were enormous financial losses and 
superfluous workforces to the extent that the “dysfunctional employment system became 
an imminent threat to the survival of the state sector” (see Ding & Warner, 2001: 318).
Ever toughening reform measures. Employment reform since the early 1980s had 
proceeded under the general principle that reform must free the enterprise from the state 
and the individual from the enterprise (see Howe, 1992). This would mean dismantling 
of the state labor allocation system and the development of a labor market as a new 
mechanism for labor allocation (Howard 1991, White 1987; Whyte, 1999). In time, 
albeit experimentally to begin with and incrementally at relatively more progressive 
enterprise settings, both state enterprise employers and employees would increasingly be 
in the position to strike a market-style employment bargain mirroring the kind that was 
fast developing in the non-state sector, which had the luxury of no “historical burden” or 
issue of entrenched communist workplace mentality.
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According to Ding & Warner (2001), the non-state sector totaled more than 280 million 
workers, of which (1) over 100 million were rural-status urban workers/job seekers; (2) 
over 150 million were township and village enterprise (TVE) employees; and (3) over 
30 million were foreign-invested enterprises (FIE), private enterprises, and self- 
employed workers. In time, one may expect to see the magnitude of forces of change 
facing nearly 300 million workers in the non-state sector that was to also have an 
influence on the state sector’s 100 million-strong workforce. This transformation 
process was to be only gradually realized over more than two decades and into the 21st 
century under the auspices of an ongoing series of corrective measures and policy 
adjustments aimed at counteracting forces of resistance and the slowness to change.
Western scholars who took a snapshot approach to evaluating China’s employment 
reform had at some point concluded that it was “a failure” (e.g., Korzec, 1992) or “not 
merely ineffectual but disastrous from a macro-economic point of view” (e.g., Howe, 
1992). But the true impact of what was no less than a world-class labor reform involving 
100 million industrial workers in the state sector alone and spanning more than two 
decades could only be properly assessed over time and in light of the persistence of 
central policymakers to continually combat policy loopholes on the one hand, and 
slowly but surely transforming the society at large from an inert, need-based mindset to 
one that was increasingly alertly competition-based on the other.
Transition toward market-stvle hiring and firing. As was the strategy of the overall 
economic reform, employment reform toward open hiring and firing was to be initially 
accomplished through experimental implementation in the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone (shenzhen jingjitequ), which was strategically geographically distant from the rest 
of the mainland and bordering Hong Kong, thus more receptive to and often eager for 
the introduction of market-style economic policies.
Following the successful introduction in the early 1980s of labor contracts in foreign- 
invested enterprises in Shenzhen, the practice of limited duration contracts was quickly 
extended to new employees in the state sector in seven other select regions (see Korzec, 
1992). The somewhat unanticipated outcome of partial enforcement of labor contracts in 
the state industry among new hires, as documented by Warner (1996), was the
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phenomenon of “one factory two systems” (yichang liangzhi) whereby contract staff 
were typically working hard (to secure their renewal status) while permanent staff 
simply looked on (hetonggongan, guidinggongkiari).
Another decade would go by with the state seeing a steady decline in industrial output 
and an escalation in the losses of SOEs. In 1992, with nearly a quarter of the SOEs now 
operating at a loss (see Ma, 2000) and their aggregate share in total industrial output 
having fallen since 1978 from 78% to 52% (SSB, 1997), it seemed that the state had 
been left with no choice but to take a critical step in granting SOEs the power to remove 
excessive labor and dismiss unqualified workers “when facing economic difficulties” 
(Naughton 1995). Again, this labor transition has proceeded smoothly only for newly 
hired workers but not for permanent employees. Faced with strong resistance from the 
latter, most enterprises have reportedly not been able to fully execute the power of 
dismissal (Gu 2000).
This was mainly because enterprise labor administration was still subject both to 
external plan targets and interference by local bureaux. As the new regulations only 
allowed workers dismissal in cases of infringement of regulations or imminent 
bankruptcy, no significant dismissals had taken place, and in any case, dismissal to cut 
costs remained illegal (Howe, 1992). It was perhaps only till enactment of the Labor 
Law in January 1995, which pressed for the mandatory nationwide implementation of 
labor contracts for all workers and the simultaneous establishment of a competition- 
based internal labor market within the SOE that employment reform began to see far- 
reaching and definitive results among traditional state enterprise workers.
Despite toughening measures of employment contraction by way of “competition-based 
employment” and workforce reduction, the state industry was reported to be still 
overstaffed by as much as one-third of the workforce at the turn of the century (Holz 
2003). The fact that the number of large and medium loss-making industrial SOEs and 
their losses have only fallen by about 40% between 1998 and 2000 implies that many 
SOEs are still not economically viable (Holz 2003), thus suggesting that the measure to 
shed labor was set to continue.
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“ Competition-Based Employment” (CBE). “Competition-based employment” 
{jingzheng shanggang) was a reform concept referring to the establishment of an active 
internal labor market or “internal competitive mechanism” (neibu jingzhengjizhi) 
whereby workers no longer enjoyed lifetime employment and many of the 
accompanying cradle-to-grave benefits but were required to compete for survival in the 
process of workforce reduction and enterprise downsizing. The concept of CBE was first 
contemplated and by Deng Xiaoping in 1988 (Deng, 1989) with an objective to 
“reinvigorate” (gaohuo) the state sector, which had long suffered from a lack of 
consciousness of market competition and the uncertainty and risks thereof.
As was the case with virtually all other economic and enterprise reform measures, CBE 
was cautiously installed on an experimental and incremental basis over an extended 
period of time. And it was not until 1996 that compliance became mandatory for all 
SOEs. Details of its implementation in the setting of the research organization are 
presented in Section 2.2 -  Uncertainty and Risks under "Deepening o f Reforms ".
W orkforce reduction. It is not surprising that the enforcement of workforce reduction 
measures were met with strong resistance as redundancies were a widespread 
phenomenon at most SOEs and there was not an established and secure enterprise- 
independent social safety net due to the fact that unemployment insurance was still at an 
immature, experimental stage of development (see Zhu, 2002 for a review). With a high 
redundancy rate, the mission of the SOE was to become “lean but not mean”, as social 
stability remained a priority in the process of downsizing. This exposed a real 
contradiction and an immutable conflict of interests between economic performance and 
political consideration that was inherent in the still largely state-controlled management 
infrastructure of SOEs, a landmark of the “socialist-market economy” or “market 
economy with Chinese characteristics” (fuzhongguo teshede shichangjingji).
Predicated upon these circumstances, workforce reduction strategies have inevitably 
been confined to the diversion of redundancies within (neifen), rather than away from, 
the enterprise, as it would naturally be the case in a market economy free of political 
intervention. As a matter of fact, so far less than five percent of the workforce made 
redundant at the enterprise under study had been permanently laid off without a
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subsistence allowance. Many others had simply been “diverted” by attrition in the form 
of early retirement, and extended maternity and sick leave, the associated costs of all of 
which remain to be borne by the enterprise concerned. Little progress had been possible 
in developing the tertiary sector or related knowledge-based businesses, which were in 
the position to absorb redundant workers with low or incompatible skills.
The year 1998 saw a new stream of development in enterprise restructuring and 
downsizing. The fact that the government permitted and encouraged SOEs to eliminate 
some of its poor-performing SOUs by transforming them into separate, independent 
legal entities (duli faren) meant that the performance of these establishments would be 
evaluated in all aspects of business and management rather than merely according to 
their fulfillment of a production quota. I was informed in an interview with the Ministry 
of Labor that an increasingly number of enterprises now required the ILEs to deliver 
profits or else “fold up”, thus saving themselves the laborious routine and complexities 
of executing workforce reductions.
2.2 Uncertainty and Risks under “Deepening of Reforms"
Progressively “deepening of reforms” (shenhua gaige) since the mid-1980s have led to 
radical changes in many aspects of economy and importantly, in labor relations. In 
particular, traditional guarantees of employment, wages, and cradle-to-grade welfare 
have eroded as enterprises were granted autonomy at a steady rate by and subject at the 
same time to intensifying market competition domestically and internationally. 
Economic growth has seen the rapid expansion of new forms of non-state businesses in 
which none of the traditional guarantees exist (Clarke & Lee, 2002). This development 
illuminates the unprecedented uncertainty and risks facing industry as a whole and the 
direction toward market competition state industry must converge in order to survive.
Through the window of my research enterprise, which was identified by the State 
Council as a pioneer or “dragon-head” enterprise (longtou qiye) in workplace and 
enterprise reforms, we come face to face with the category and level of uncertainty and 
risks that state enterprises and their workers must now confront in the battle for survival.
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Figure 2.1
Reward and Punishment System (jiangcheng zhidu) at The Steel Conglomerate
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“Reward and punishment system”. To analyze the uncertainty and risks under 
“deepening of reforms” at my research enterprise, which I shall refer to in this thesis as 
“The Steel Conglomerate”, I begin with a brief review of its “reward and punishment 
system” (jiangcheng zhidu). There is perhaps no typical human resource system as such 
in the rapidly drastically reforming state sector. Because of The Steel Conglomerate’s 
widely acknowledged status as a best practice enterprise, its reward and punishment 
system as presented here represents a model the state sector would aspire to emulate 
within feasible circumstances. It is important to note that the dual attention to 
administration of rewards and punishments is embedded in ancient Chinese philosophy. 
As such, usage of the term is standard in Chinese workplaces. This means that 
individuals would notice that something was deliberately left out if labor management 
policies, which involved both rewards and disciplinary measures, were simply referred 
to as a “reward system”.
Socially undesirable and even “harsh” the Chinese terminology may sound to the 
Western management scholar. But one only needs to consider the view of workplace 
governance to realize that sets of incentives and penalties which constrain the ability of 
the agent (employee) to pursue one’s self-interest at the expense of the principal 
(employer) represent the very stipulations and purpose of the employment contract (e.g., 
see Deery & Mitchell 1999; Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Wisemanl997). I argue, 
therefore, that as long as the employment relationship is governed by some kind of a 
disciplinary mechanism, which is disputably the case in the West, it is more accurate to 
refer to the management of such relationship as “reward and punishment system”.
Reform principle. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, workplace reform at The Steel 
Conglomerate was governed by the principle of “selection of the superior; elimination of 
the inferior (or slow to adapt)” (yousheng lietai). It represented an appreciably 
toughened version of the principle of “reward the diligent, punish the lazy” (jiangqin 
falan) laid down by Deng Xiaoping in the beginning of reform when attendance was a 
main issue. As more challenging issues of monitoring such as “showing up for work 
without exerting genuine effort” (chugong buchuli) and reluctance to learn new skills or 
adapt to new work situations surfaced, the workplace reform principle was revised to 
emphasize “zero tolerance” for incompetence in skill attainment and performance.
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Challenging it would certainly be especially for individuals who had managed to “hide 
in the crowd”, this new, uncompromising approach to labor management was only 
reflective of the enterprise reform principle of “survival of the fittest” (shizhe shengcun) 
as state industry came under increased scrutiny of its ability to compete and survive.
The Steel Conglomerate. Built before the establishment of the republic, The Steel 
Conglomerate was one of China’s most established and largest business conglomerates. 
It employed over 20,000 people in its core production and a substantially larger number 
in diversified businesses in Northern China where its headquarters were situated and in 
multiple locations across the country. As one of the country’s “focal-point enterprises” 
(zhongdian qiye), it has been widely publicized for its advancement in enterprise reform.
For example, it was identified by the state in the 1980s as one of the biggest successes in 
the implementation of contract responsibility system (chengbaozhi) whereby the 
fulfillment of enterprise production targets were linked for the first time to retained 
profits and wage expenditure. More recently, it was known to have introduced some of 
the most innovative policies in employment and pay, the “twin pillars” of human 
resource reform. Many of the enterprise’ characteristics were typical of the large state 
enterprise and were thus an epitome of the challenges faced by state industry in general.
The reward and punishment system was monitored by a performance management 
mechanism known as “skill and performance appraisals” (jgangwei jineng cheping), 
whereby individuals were assessed annually on their skills and monthly on their on-the- 
job performance. Their names were then queued from top to bottom and posted on big 
bulletin boards. Bottom-raters were to become automatically redundant (weizhe fuyu). 
When surveying the various measures under the reward and punishment system in 
Figure 2.1, one may be impressed that the enterprise has taken rather full advantage of 
their newfound autonomy in policymaking and the execution of reform measures in 
relation to both employment and pay to raise motivation, skill, and performance.
In terms of rewards, there seemed a fair amount of financial inducements in the form of 
position- and skill-based pay, monthly performance bonuses, and benefits. In Section
2.2.1 -  Employment Risks at The Steel Conglomerate, I shall reveal the complex realities
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 33
behind these pay components, which amounted to significant individual compensation 
risks that seemed only partially offset by additional venues for worker recognition and 
training and development opportunities not available prior to “deepening of reforms”.
Parallel to rewards, there was a series of chronologically ordered punitive measures for 
nonperformance ranging from probation to disciplinary placement to termination of 
employment. Together, these activities contributed to unmatched levels of employment 
and compensation risks that were to play an influential role in realigning the motivation 
and behavior of individuals with the adaptation and survival of the enterprise.
Toward the building of an adaptive workforce. In view of China’s then imminent 
accession into WTO and The Steel Conglomerate’s call to survive and thrive in the face 
of intensifying competition, analysis of its strategy of building an adaptive workforce is 
not only timely but also key to understanding an innovative and potentially one of the 
most advanced models of labor management. The essence of the strategy was embodied 
in the enterprise’ mission statement -  to “catch up” (ganshang) with the domestically 
competitive and internationally vibrant iron and steel businesses -  which became the 
focus of socialization and was heavily publicized at all levels of the organization.
With its portfolio of admittedly mostly low value-added products, to “catch up” and be 
in a position to challenge existing giants in the field meant that The Steel Conglomerate 
had to face at least five major challenges: (1) efficiently divert loss-making non-core 
businesses; (2) raise capital on the stock market; (3) invest in R& D to the extent that the 
product portfolio could be continually upgraded; and last but not least, (4) commit to a 
program of ongoing workforce reduction (jingjian); and at the same time (5) unleash an 
extraordinary entrepreneurial energy among survivors of its downsizing workforce.
Proactive coping strategy. In meeting its many challenges, the enterprise management 
has made a conscientious attempt to socialize its workforce with the importance of not 
only meeting its productivity and profitability targets but also championing its 
qualitative goals. In light of their peculiarity and potential impact, these goals seem to 
deserve special mention here. They were expressed by the term “yishf*, meaning 
awareness, consciousness, and alertness:
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(1) “Awareness of competition” (jingzheng yishi)
(2) “Risk consciousness” (weiji yishi)
(3) “Alertness to calamity” (youhuan yishi)
One thing in common with these goals is that they were all aimed at “awakening the 
senses” of (jingxing) members of the workforce and focusing their attention on pressing 
environmental demands and issues concerning (1) intensifying domestic and global 
competition, (2) the risks of organizational decline and bankruptcy; and (3) the need to 
adopt a proactive coping strategy of being “alert but not alarmed”.
The management’s idea was that “to be forewarned is to be forearmed”: if  members of 
its workforce would enhance their competitive capabilities in terms of skills, 
productivity, and adaptive flexibility, (which was not what the former need-based 
employment and wage systems had required them to do), the enterprise would stand a 
better chance of survival amidst increasing economic and business uncertainties.
Politics of enterprise management. The changes that came with the intensification of 
the enterprise reform was characterized by a primary shift of power from the Party 
secretary to the factory manager in the STOU’s fight to survive amidst increased budget 
cuts and exposure to market competition. This was particularly evident in situations 
where the head of enterprise or enterprise manager (changingli) was more professionally 
capable of and receptive to putting efficiency (xiaolu youxiari) before political 
credentials and social relations (guanxi) in the implementation of reform.
Although the focus of the research is on state owned establishments at the STOU level, 
it is important to reveal the issues at hand that concerned the enterprise or head office 
(zhonggongsi), as they had a bearing on the content and quality of policy-making 
involving STOUs. For example, the general manager and chief officers of the head 
office were appointed by the State on the basis of political credentials in the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) rather than their track record in enterprise management.
This means that the dominant driving force behind decision-making at the top 
management level was the political agenda of the state and not the economic interest of
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the enterprise. And as long as neither their pay nor political career was linked to the 
economic performance of the enterprise, enterprise managers were expected to continue 
to operate as government officials or bureaucrats administering the political will of the 
state rather than as business managers responding to and wrestling with pressing 
business issues and environmental demands.
Political interference in enterprise management has been acknowledged as a major 
stumbling block in the reform process. Since the beginning of the enterprise reform and 
for more than a decade, the separation of political control from economic management 
has been advocated by both political leaders and enterprise managers. However, the 
issue remained unresolved, as separation of the two would mean loss of political control 
at the enterprise level.
Operational focus of inquiry. The present inquiry is focused on The Steel 
Conglomerate’s largest second-tier operation units (STOUs), which employed a total of 
20,000 workers. The STOUs were not necessarily subsidiaries of the conglomerate as 
the majority still performed the single, traditional role of production typical of the state 
enterprise in a planned economy. For example, many of the STOUs and especially those 
in the core production of iron and steel products still operated under the principle of 
“contract responsibility system” (chengbao zherenzhi), the fundamental requirement of 
which was to deliver the annual production quota assigned by the head company, rather 
than being involved in the overall business management of the operation.
As long as the STOUs remained part of the legal entity of the head office and were not 
required or given the opportunity to keep separate balance sheets (duli heshuan), their 
management activities would be strictly controlled by it, which was in turn subject to the 
political mandates of the state. For example, a high-performing STOU might, at any 
time, be forced into a merger with a poor-performing STOU to help save the latter from 
bankruptcy. Such a practice was rather common in state industry as the state still held on 
to many of the Communist principles of enterprise management that no longer seemed 
to make sense in the country’s transition to an economic model that was to be 
increasingly more market-based. Discussion on the STOUs selected for my empirical 
study is presented in Section 7.1.3 -  Main Study.
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2.2.1 Employment Risks at The Steel Conglomerate
The employment uncertainty experienced by individuals at The Steel Conglomerate 
were commensurate in many ways with that faced by all state industry workers under 
employment reform described in Section 2.1.2, except that it was more severe. This was 
due to the fact that its reform represented one of the most advanced models.
I would focus my discussion on the STOUs of the conglomerate, where large-scale 
workforce reductions took place. One of the policies devised by the head company 
involved a non-renewal policy for all rural-status contract workers, which made up about 
30% of the core production workforce. In addition, STOUs were required to deliver an 
annual headcount reduction of five to ten per cent, depending on the head office’s 
assessment of the extent of redundancy at respective STOUs. The latter had an impact 
on all workers, including urban-status workers whose labor contracts were of a limited 
duration of two to ten years, as well as permanent workers who have been provided 
permanent, open-ended labor contracts (wugudingqi laodong hetong) according to the 
statutory requirements of the labor law for workers with a job tenure of 10 years or more.
The establishment of competition-based employment (CBE) at The Steel Conglomerate 
was earmarked by the introduction of fixed-term contracts (guding laodong hetong) for 
all members of the workforce in December 1996. Four months earlier, the enterprise had 
been selected by the state as a pilot site for the introduction of the new arrangement, 
which effectively put an end to the “iron rice bowl.”
According to the labor law provision of 1995, all state industry employees had to be put 
on limited duration contracts of two, three, five, and ten years. Under the labor contract 
system, employee and the employer would automatically be free of obligations to each 
other upon contract expiry. To lessen the blow for old-timers, individuals who had 
previously served for 10 years or more, (which made up about 50% of the workforce at 
The Steel Conglomerate), were awarded open-ended, permanent contracts. Under CBE, 
however, these individuals, like their counterparts who were on limited duration 
contracts, were all subject to regulation of competitive forces in the internal labor market.
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The sum and substance of CBE were captured in the following reform terminology:
(1) “Survival of the fittest” (shizhe shengcun)
(2) “Selection of the superior; elimination of the inferior” (yousheng lietai)
(3) “Up with the able; down with the incompetent” (nengzheshang yongzhexia)
(4) “He who hits the bottom (in performance appraisal) is redundant” (weizhefuyu)
CBE in this context suggests the reward of career advancement and promotion in one 
extreme. In another extreme, there was the potential punishment of being placed in the 
Job Transfer Center (zhuangang jidi) or JTC of the worker’s respective operation unit 
and possibly subsequently in the enterprise headquarters' Reemployment Services 
Center (zaijiuye fuwuzhongxin) or RSC which led directly to the termination of 
employment at the end of a maximum of two years.
Given limited opportunities for advancement in the organizational and the tremendous 
pressure of workforce reduction, there was reason to believe that employees were more 
exposed to punishment than to reward. According to the management of The Steel 
Conglomerate, the major objective of CBE was to awake the workers to “a sense of 
competition, anxiety, and crisis”. In this context, it may be understood that the system of 
CBE was governed by the law of elimination whereby workers went through an internal 
selection process mirroring that experienced by the enterprise itself in the marketplace.
Redundancy management, socialist-market style
In view of the concern for social stability in the socialist-market economy, redundancy 
management in China proceeded at a relatively significantly slower pace than that in a 
full-fledged market economy. AT The Steel Conglomerate, the extended period of 
transition was meant to fulfill two main objectives: (1) educate the workforce about the 
importance of awakening to a “sense of crisis” or “risk consciousness” (weijigan), a very 
much desirable attitude at a time when the business was faced with increasingly keen 
competition and tough budget constraints; and (2) facilitate the “psychological 
preparation” (sixiang zhunbei) of individuals to seek alternative employment for
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themselves or accept unemployment. As such, the process of redundancy management 
involved two phases of a cycle taking up to, but no more than, four years.
Phase 1. Workers who received bottom ratings in their work performance and/or skill 
assessment were automatically classified as redundant (weizhe fuyu) and removed from 
their current positions to an operation unit at the Job Transfer Center (JTC). At the JTC 
they received 20 -  30% of previous base pay (which accounted for 30 -  50% of total 
previous pay) in the form of a subsistence allowance and payment from performing odd 
jobs while receiving renewed skill training and moral indoctrination.
Phase 2. At the end of the two-year probation period, workers who failed to return to full 
employment at the respective operation unit would be transferred out and relocated at 
the centrally run Re-employment Service Center (RSC) of the enterprise. During this 
time they would receive a further reduction of approximately 30% in pay, continue to 
receive training and be allowed up to the expiry of their contracts or a maximum of two 
years to seek alternative employment before being terminated.
Since there was not an established social safety net for the unemployed and the number 
of redundancies involved at least 25% of the workforce at The Steel Conglomerate (and 
at least that in state industry as a whole), the state was cautious about not permitting the 
enterprise to lay off workers in too abrupt of a manner to ensure social stability. To help 
soften the blow in a progressive manner which was typical of China’s reform approach, 
the government required that these workers be put through a series of training and re­
employment activities before they were totally cut off from the enterprise and disposed 
of in the external labor market.
“Job Transfer Center” (JTC). Job Transfer Center (zhuangangjidi) represented step 1 
of the two-step redundancy management process and the first of a series of two severe 
categories of disciplinary measures under the new competition-based employment 
system. The JTC was targeted at individuals with a current “employment certificate” 
(shanggangzheng) who might fall into one of the following categories: (1) ranked 
bottom in the position and skill assessment exercise; (2) classified as over-manned
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(<chaobian) due to new arrangements in production, work design or technology upgrade; 
or 3) considered physically unfit for staying in the job.
The establishment of JTC at The Steel Conglomerate was recognized as one of the very 
first in the country. By mid-1999, all of its top five profit-making STOUs (from which 
the sample of my empirical study was drawn; see Section 7.1.3 -  Main Study) have 
established their own JTCs, each with a capacity to accommodate about 50 -  100 
redundant workers. The center functioned as a small sub-factory within the STOU. 
Work assignment typically involved temporary, small-scale production of parts and 
accessories used in main production. There were also plans to initiate longer-term 
production projects, as according to plan, an ongoing stream of workers would be placed 
there under the auspices of tightened skill and performance management.
In principle, the JTC was meant to offer an opportunity for individuals to redeem 
themselves and be placed back in normal production if  and when a vacancy emerged. 
But due to ongoing organizational restructuring and production streamlining, there was 
no guarantee that one would at any point be reinstated. Over the preceding 18 months, 
reactivation of JTC workers in regular jobs at the main production unit averaged 30 -  
50% for a combined total of more than 200 admissions at the five JTCs of the enterprise. 
The reactivation rate of JTC workers at less profitable operation units at the same 
enterprise was reportedly much lower.
Reduced employment status and wage. Workers received a subsistence wage only 
slightly above the “minimum cost-of-living” allowance (zuidi shenghuofei) stipulated by 
the municipal government and a small potential bonus contingent upon performance and 
workload. Workers at the JTC made an average of RMB400 -  500 per month, which 
represented a pay cut of 50 -  70%.
Since the head company allowed the operation unit to retain a significant portion of the 
wage savings gained from the transfer of workers from the main production unit to the 
JTC, the latter was given an incentive to plan and execute the allocation of human 
resources based on economic justifications and actual requirements in production.
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Hence, the JTC functioned as a “reserve” (xushuichi), which enabled redundant workers 
to be re-trained and on stand-by to be put back to production.
“Reemployment Services Center” (RSC). Since 1998, Reemployment Services 
Center” (zaijiuye fuwuzhongxin) has been made a compulsory set up at all SOEs. In the 
context of The Steel Conglomerate, it represented the second or final of two extensions 
of punishment policy under the new, competition-based employment system. Workers 
assigned to the RSC were those who failed to make their way back to the regular 
production line during their two-year probationary period at the JTC. Time at RSC 
involved re-training of up to two years before the eventual termination of employment. 
As such, the center represented a preparatory stage to unemployment or “a way of no 
return” for its transitory trainees.
The RSC was financed jointly by the enterprise, state or local government, and the 
unemployment insurance (UI) fund. Under the new UI system, laid-off workers received 
"three lines of guarantee" (sange quebao) at a progressively reduced rate: (1) a 
subsistence allowance for up to three years; then, (2) unemployment benefit for a 
maximum of another two years; and finally (3) a means-tested urban social relief. Rather 
than being linked to wages in previous employment (as was the case when the worker 
was at the JTC), unemployment benefit at the RSC ranged meagerly from 60% - 70% of 
the minimum wage, as determined by local governments (Zhu 2002).
As the new arrangement were not at all a good fallback position in employment or pay 
for the individuals concerned, it was expected to help significantly reduce the "excessive 
choosiness" of laid-off workers in seeking reemployment, which was manifest in the 
peculiar phenomenon especially in the 1990s of abandoned urban (state enterprise) 
positions being filled only by eager rural-status workers (gongrenxiagang 
nongminshanggang) (see Wang 1999).
At this point in discussion, it is important to reiterate that workers who were subject to 
potentially being made redundant were not exclusively limited to those who had been 
put on limited duration contracts. Rather, it also included those who were on permanent, 
open-ended contracts. This represented the toughest measure to date at the enterprise
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level to smash the “iron rice bowl” since in principle none could escape the fate of 
losing their job if they failed to meet the standards for continued employment. Indeed, 
the same blanket coverage may be said of the exposure to compensation risks.
2.2.2 Compensation Risks at The Steel Conglomerate
Wage reform at the individual enterprise level has been typical of the ways of the 
country’s economic reform -  that of an experimental and incremental nature. As the 
state enterprise navigates its way toward a new socialist-market economy, leveraging on 
the motivational benefits of pay to make workers work harder has become the subject of 
discussion among personnel practitioners and decision makers.
As discussed previously, in the early years of wage reform, the portion of pay that was 
determined by performance on the job was minimal. In the 1980s and early 1990s, for 
example, “bonuses” were paid out more or less equally to workers as a de facto wage 
supplement. For the workers then, job evaluations were haphazard, not assigned to pay 
grades or particularly geared toward performance on the job. In addition, results of 
evaluations were not effectively linked to pay. As such, workers did not perceive a 
relationship between pay and contribution at work. Measures were introduced in the 
mid-1990s at The Steel Conglomerate to systematically evaluate work performance and 
link them to pay. At the same time, up to 40% of base pay and 100% of bonuses were 
made contingent upon the fulfillment of specific job requirements.
Toughening reform measures. The most recent change in the enterprise pay system 
took place in early 1996 when the position- and skill- based pay was introduced as a 
measure to promote the concept of “pay for labor”. At the same time, the traditional 
eight-grade system, which had been in place for nearly 50 years, was revised to become 
the new 38-grade standard base pay. In 1998, a schedule of bonus points that were 100% 
deductible in the event of various unsatisfactory work behaviors (such as those related to 
tardiness and breach of safety regulations in production) was established.
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Although the set of punishable work behaviors classified for such purpose could by and 
large be measured and recorded, the system rested heavily on two assumptions that 
faltered: (1) the deductions made for having stepped over certain standards would 
eventually be reflected in the job evaluation; and (2) workers could perceive a link 
between the subsequent impact on pay. The system had reportedly not achieved the 
desired results due, as explicated by the management, to the fact that under social 
pressure, supervisors were often found to be “adding back the points” somewhere else in 
the overall job evaluation.
Given these considerations, management was determined to make workers realize that 
performance differences related directly to pay differences. The most recent reform 
measure was installed at the end of 1998 whereby instead of having points deducted, 
workers who did not meet the required standards would have their bonuses deducted. 
This measure was said to be much more effective as it became very difficult for the 
supervisor to actually make up an achievement in the individual’s work record with an 
award for something else in order to justify off-setting a previously penalized amount. In 
the worst scenario, the employee could have his entire bonus deducted. Variable pay 
deductions were simple and straightforward. Since it was distributed according to 
individual differences in contribution and work performance, it also served as the basis 
in evaluating the individual’s fitness for continued employment at the enterprise.
Pay system at The Steel Conglomerate. As mentioned above, a strong feature of the 
pay system at The Steel Conglomerate was variability. Although workers were paid 
substantially above market rates in the state sector, the variable or contingent pay 
components made up more than 40% of total monthly pay. The deductible or punitive 
aspect of pay had been enlarged to work as a deterrent against underperformance and an 
agent in transforming the pay culture from an entitlement mentality to a contingent mode.
Under the then most recent round of wage reform, which included (1) the new position- 
and skill-based pay, (2) revised standard base pay, and (3) new seniority wage, (which 
will all be discussed below), average wage at the enterprise increased by RMB92.85 
(US$10.89), RMB22.27 (US$2.61), and RMB46.31 (US$5.43) respectively, or a total of 
RMB161.43 (US$18.94), which represented an average total increase of 15% - 20%.
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Pay components. Before “deepening of reforms”, welfare provisions made up a 
significant portion of pay. But as shown in the monthly pay slip of one of its frontline 
production worker (see Table 2.1), allowances now made up a minute percentage. To 
illustrate, welfare provisions (items 7 -  9 in Table 2.1), which included seniority pay, 
general welfare subsidy, and job-specific subsidy, together now contributed to only 
12.5% of total pay. The remaining 87.5% of pay was distributed as differentiated pay on 
the basis of individual contribution, of which, RMB995.50 or 47% was variable pay 
(items 4 -  6 in table 2.1), which included bonus, attendance pay, and overtime pay.
Table 2.1
Sample Monthly Pay Slip of a Production Worker
Component Fixed/
Variable
Basis of Possible 
Deductions
Amount
(RMB)
% Total 
Pay
1 Position-Based Pay Fixed 100% deductible based 
on monthly appraisal
140.00 6.55%
2 Skill-Based Pay Fixed 100% deductible based 
on monthly appraisal
95.00 4.44%
3 Standard Base Pay Fixed Non-deductible 640.00 29.92%
4 Bonus Variable 100% deductible based 
on monthly appraisal
645.00 30.16%
5 Attendance Pay @1/day Leave (even away sick) 21.50 0.10%
6 Overtime Pay Variable 329.30 15.40%
7 Seniority Pay @3/year Non-deductible 15.00 0.70%
8 Welfare Subsidy Fixed Non-deductible 193.18 9.03%
9 Job-Specific Subsidy Fixed Non-deductible 60.00 2.80%
10 Total Pay 2,138.98 100.00%
It is important to note that position- and skill-based pay (items 2 -  3 in Table 2.1) was 
theoretically meant to be a fixed income, as was the idea of the central policy unit that 
introduced it nationwide in 1995. Management at The Steel Conglomerate has, however, 
has taken full advantage of autonomy at the enterprise level and made the pay contingent 
on monthly performance to the extent that it was 100% deductible.
“Position- and skill-based pay” (PSP). The twin components of position-based pay and 
skill-based pay components were usually referred to collectively as “position and skill- 
based pay” (gangwei jineng gongzi). As discussed previously, PSP was introduced in 
1992 by the government as a nationwide policy to help differentiate pay on the basis of
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work contribution (laodong gongxian) and provide the economic rational for individuals 
to be willing to upgrade their skills and take up demanding work roles. By now a loss- 
making enterprise due to poor performance of most of its expanded businesses, however, 
The Steel Conglomerate did not install PSP until 1995.
(1) Position-based pay component. On the position-based pay scale (see Table 2.2), jobs 
were assigned to position grade points according to four factors: (1) hardship, (2) dirt, (3) 
workload, and (4) hazard (ku, zhang, lei, xian). The focus of the position-based pay was 
on the job itself rather than the individual who filled the post. In other words, individuals 
with the same job were paid more or less the same position-based pay.
Table 2.2
Monthly Position-Based Pay Scale at The Steel Conglomerate
Jo b
ID.
Position
Grade
Point
Pay
Scale
(RMB)
Production Administration & 
Management
Job Category
1 1.0 50 Porter, custodian “3rd line” PS
2 1.2 60 Gardener, lift operator “3rt line’ PS
3 1.4 70 Guard, child-minder, graphic assistant “3rt line” PS
4 1.6 80 Tradesman, cook, inventory keeper “3rt line” PS
5 1.8 90 Chauffeur, shop floor assistant “3rd line” PS
6 2.0 100 Truck driver, conveyor bell inspector; 
automobile repairman
Clerk (shop floor AA) “2nd line” PDS, 
Clerk
7 2.2 110 Maintenance electrician, steam 
engine repairman
Grade 1 AA “2nd line” PDS, 
Clerk
8 2.4 120 Production electrician, special 
machinery operator
Grade 2 AA “2nd line” PDS, 
Clerk
9 2.6 130 Electricity control room operator 
rolling stock maintenance assistant
Shop floor & AO 
supervisor
“2nd line” PDS, 
Clerk; SP
10 2.8 140 Junior positions in main production Senior shop floor & AO 
supervisor
“1st line” MP 
supervisor
11 3.0 150 Middle positions in main production Shop floor & AO manager “1st line” MP & 
STOU heads
12 3.2 160 Senior positions in main production Shop floor & 
AO manager
“1st line” MP& 
STOU heads
13 3.4 170 AO manager & AC engineer STOU & HO DH
14 3.6 180 AO manager & AC engineer STOU & HO DH
15 3.8 190 AO manager & AC engineer STOU & HO DH
16 4.0 200 AO manager & C engineer STOU & HO DH
17 4.2 210 AO manager & AA to GM HO DH & SM
18 4.4 220 AGM, assistant PTS, 
C engineer
HO SM
19 4.6 230 GM, PTS, Deputy Chairman HO SM
20 4.8 240 HO Committee Chairman HO SM
Key: AA = administrative assistant; AC engineer = Assistant chief engineer; AGM = assistant general manager; 
AM = administration office; C engineer = chief engineer; DH = department head; GM = general manager;
HO = Head office; MP = main production; PD = production; PDS = production support; PS = production servicing; 
PTS = Party Secretary; SP = supervisor; SM = senior manager; STOU = second-tier operation unit
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(2) Skill-based pay component. On the skill-based pay scale (see Table 2.3), workers 
were assigned particular pay grade points according to their certified skill level. For 
example, skilled workers in production servicing were on grade points 1 - 3 ,  those in 
production support, grade points 1 - 6 ,  and those in main production, grade points 1 - 8 .  
While the pay scale may look normal to the outside world, it was believed to have a very 
different effect on the workers at The Steel Conglomerate. Considering that individuals 
ranging from production workers to professionals and managers had had up to only 
about 30% differentials in pay before the implementation of the skill-based pay, the 
wide spread pay differentials, from RMB50 -  175 for the workers, and from RMB80 -  
270 for the professional, and managerial staff were a major breakthrough.
Table 2.3
Monthly Skill-Based Pay Scale at The Steel Conglomerate
Job
Type
Skill Grade Point 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Skill Type Pay Scale (RMB) 50 65 80 95 115 135 155 175 195 220 245 270
P Skilled (3ra line - production servicing)
P Regular (2na line - production support)
P Highly skilled (1st line - main production)
PM Technician, administrative staff
PM Section head, engineer, economist
PM Dept, head, senior engineer, economist
Key: P = production; PM = professional and managerial
(3) Standard base pay component: Standard Base Pay (biaozun gongzi) or SBP is worth 
particular mention here for at least two reasons: (1) it made up about 30% of total pay; 
and perhaps most importantly, (2) it reflected the trend of widespread differentials in pay 
distribution. SBP had been an extension of the eight-grade pay system (baji gongzizhi) 
adopted nationwide between 1949 and 1985, and of the 15-grade pay system introduced 
in 1985. Both of these former grade systems were originally intended for differentiating 
between technical job grades.
In fact, the function of the standard base pay has now been replaced, and indeed 
magnified, by the new, position- and skill-based pay in the sense that the latter required 
an active and ongoing justification of pay based on skill level and work role. But for 
“historical reasons”, SBP remained part of the wage system at The Steel Conglomerate.
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Table 2.4
Monthly Standard Base Pay Scale at The Steel Conglomerate
Position Grade Point 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Standard
Base
Grade
Point
Pay
Scale
(RMB)
1 270
2 300
3 330
4 360
5 390
6 420
7 450
8 480
9 520
10 560
11 600
12 640
13 680
14 720
15 760
16 800
17 850
18 900
19 950
20 1000
21 1050
22 1100
23 1150
24 1200
25 1260
26 1320
27 1380
28 1440
29 1500
30 1560
31 1620
32 1680
33 1750
34 1820
35 1890
36 1960
37 2030
38 2100
Upon revision, however, the existing 100-plus SBP wage grades, which reflected an 
admittedly confusing array of former wage backgrounds of staff previously employed at 
other SOEs and government departments, were now condensed to 38 grades (see Table
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2.4). Existing wage grades were swapped (taogai) for the closest (higher) grade on the 
new wage system, which was referred to as a form of collective recognition for the skill 
and contribution of the employee. At the same time, seniority wage was introduced, 
offering an additional RMB3.00 for each year of service, payable from the fifth year. 
Within each job category, there were an average of 20 grade points, which reflected a 
further increase in pay differentials between individuals. For instance, the top rate was 
7.78 times the bottom rate. The significance of SBP was not only its widened 
differentials but also the fact that it represented the largest non-deductible portion of pay. 
In other words, it was the very component that still offered income security.
Compared o PSP, SBP made up a much more significant portion of pay, with its 
monthly pay scale ranging from RMB270.00 to RMB246.33, while position-based pay 
ranged from RMB50.00 to RMB240.00 and skill pay ranged from RMB50.00 to 
RMB270.00.
Monthly bonus and penalty calculations. There was a sea-change in the way bonuses 
were distributed in the sense that they would now fluctuate. As mentioned in Section
2.1.1 -  Strategic Overview, bonuses had long been distributed as an additional portion of 
egalitarian pay until in recent years when they became 100% deductible, and more 
differentiated, albeit in much lesser degrees than PSP and SBP.
Table 2.5
Monthly Bonus and Penalty Calculations
A B c D E F G H I
Worker Individual
Bonus
Grade
Point
Appraisal 
result 
(full mark 
= 100)
Bonus 
credit 
(A x B)
Appraisal
Bonus
(RMB)
Share of 
factory 
bonus or 
penalty
Share of 
shop floor 
bonus or 
penalty
Outstanding
Contribution
Bonus
(iRMB)
Total
Individual
Bonus
(RMB)
Bonus
Differential
(RMB)
1 1.50 105 158 566 70 0 24 660 11
2 1.60 100 160 575 50 0 24 649 4
3 1.45 105 152 546 30 0 19 645 53
4 1.40 105 147 528 50 0 14 592 97
5 1.35 100 130 467 40 0 0 507 85
6 1.30 100 135 485 0 0 10 495 12
7 1.13 100 113 406 30 0 10 446 49
Total 9.73 995 3,573 320 0 101 Average 
bonus 
= 570
Average 
differential 
= 44.43
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Table 2.5 illustrates the actual monthly bonus and penalty calculations of a production 
workgroup. Potential monthly deductions involved three types of pay: (1) position-based 
pay, (2) skill-based pay, and (3) bonus, which included two components: (a) monthly 
appraisal bonus, and (b) outstanding contribution bonus. Monthly appraisal bonus 
accounted for about 85% of the total bonus payment for most workers, except for those 
who, on rare occasions, were awarded the outstanding contribution bonus for having 
achieved technical breakthrough in the production process.
PSP deductions focused on four major aspects of work: (1) safety, (2) delivery of 
production targets, (3) discipline, and (4) leave taken. For example, the breach of safety 
regulations and the under-delivery of production targets both called for 100% deduction 
of PSP in the month concerned plus the permanent downward adjustment of position 
and skill grades by one to three grades. In the event that an employee violated a safety 
regulation, 100% of his PSP for that month would be deducted, in addition to the 
cancellation of his monthly appraisal bonus. For each day of leave taken, be it due to 
sickness or other personal reasons, RMB 1.00 would also be deducted from the worker’s 
monthly attendance pay of RMB21.50.
In view of the changes in the employment and pay systems under “deepening of 
reforms”, one may arrive at the conclusion that workers at The Steel Conglomerate were 
faced with a significantly high level of employment and compensation risks. While 
existing research in the work motivation literature almost always focused on the 
incentive effects of pay plans, it appears that the time is now ripe to expand that focus to 
include the incentive and punitive effects related to employment and pay.
2.3 Conclusion
An in-depth understanding of employment and wage reforms is critical to the proper 
assessment of their motivational effects, the focus of my empirical study. In this chapter, 
I attempted to facilitate such an understanding with a detailed account of employment 
and wage reforms at the macro and organizational levels, which in turn affected workers 
at the individual level.
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The first part of the discussion dealt with the background of and strategic 
contemplations behind the reforms in the form of a strategic overview. The second part 
focused on the unprecedented employment and compensation risks faced by individuals 
at my research enterprise during “deepening of reforms”.
The important message is that the traditional guarantees of employment, wages, and 
welfare have all been eroded as enterprises have been progressively freed from state 
control and subjected to increasingly competitive market pressures (Clarke and Lee 
2002). Overall, the analysis informed on the emergent focus of the modem Chinese 
enterprise on building an adaptive workforce, which inspired the development of the 
proposed research framework of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation”, to 
be discussed in Chapters 5 - 6 .
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review: Work Motivation
This Chapter has four sections. The first section reviews motivation research as found in 
the work motivation literature. In particular, four leading theories are discussed -  
expectancy, goal setting, equity, and reinforcement. The second section reviews 
performance-related pay as a major development on the human resources scene and the 
research evaluating its effectiveness. The third section reviews incentives research in 
Chinese industry. The last section concludes.
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3.1 Motivation Theory and Research
Over the past fifty years, research on motivation has proliferated on a massive scale 
(Pinder 1998). However, an examination of the literature indicates that the majority of 
research tended to have been conducted from a single-discipline perspective, typically 
using employment compensation as a convenient means to achieve the end of testing a 
particular theory, rather than with a view of motivation as an interdisciplinary concern 
(Gerhart and Milkovich 1992). The fact that motivation research involving individual 
workers has been undertaken mostly by industrial psychologists could perhaps be 
explained by the notion that economists had little to say about motivation and work 
behaviour -  especially from a microeconomic viewpoint (Blinder 1990).
Although lately both theoretical and empirical research concerning work motivation has 
been done in economics, the focus of inquiry remains on how firms design 
compensation contracts to induce agents and especially executives to operate in the 
principal’s interest (Prendergast 1999). The typical outcome measure is firm 
performance rather than workers’ perception or attitudinal response to human resources 
initiatives. Since the latter is more relevant to my research, I will focus my analysis in 
this chapter on research in industrial psychology and branch out to the economics 
literature only to supplement the review. As such, literature on compensation for 
executives and sales personnel, and profit- and gain-sharing plans are not considered 
immediately relevant to the present review, and will be dealt with in Chapter 4.
Review strategy. My purpose is to identify critical issues in the literature, identify the 
principles that can be deduced from existing theory, and explore a suitable framework to 
investigate the motivational impact of China’s employment and reforms. My strategy is 
to review the development of work motivation research with an open mind as to the 
reasons behind the appeal of leading theories. Following Cook and Campbell’s (1976) 
recommendation, I use the criteria of causal certainty and conceptual clarity to determine 
whether existing concepts and findings can be validated and generalized for other 
settings. I also pay special attention to performance-related pay as an increasingly 
widely used, if not fashionable, incentive device, with a view to laying the foundation 
for assessing the theoretical merit of performance-related policies in my research setting.
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3.1.1 Expectancy, Goal Setting, Equity, and Reinforcement
Since there is no universally accepted way of presenting the various approaches to 
motivation (Mitchell and Daniels 2003), I have included in the present review research 
that examines either motivation or performance as an outcome variable. Although 
motivation is not the same as performance in the sense that the latter is a result of a 
multitude of factors of which motivation is only one (Pinder 1998), it is expedient for 
me to review studies on both motivation and work performance. This is due to the fact 
that a large quantity of research that is amassed under the topic of motivation uses work 
performance as a dependent variable (Steers and Porter 1991; Pinder 1998). Since this is 
the only reason for my inclusion of performance research in my review of the motivation 
literature, such inclusion should not be taken in any way to imply my agreement that 
performance-based theory can be used to explain motivation.
Choice of theories in this review. I have included in the present review four motivation 
theories that have been most widely tested in the work setting -  expectancy, goal setting, 
equity, and reinforcement. An overview shows that rather than competing against each 
other, existing theories tend to capture different aspects of the motivation process (Steers 
and Porter 1991; Pinder 1998; Mitchell and Daniels 2003). Together, they cover an 
impressive number of what Staw (1991) referred as the “venerable features of Western 
business organizations” in his article on “the pursuit of the happy/productive worker”:
1. Tying extrinsic rewards to performance (expectancy theory)
2. Setting realistic and challenging goals (goal-setting theory)
3. Evaluating employee performance accurately and providing feedback on 
performance (goal-setting and equity theories)
4. Promoting on the basis of skill and performance rather than personal characteristics, 
power, or connections (equity theory)
5. Building the skill level of the workforce through training and development (revised 
expectancy model)
In reviewing these theories, I also highlight exceptions to their predictions, which tie in 
with a further analysis on the theme of uncertainty and risks in Chapter 4 of the thesis.
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1. Expectancy Theory
Expectancy, as first proposed by Vroom (1964), is a within-subject theory of 
occupational choice concerning two or more categorical alternatives. When later applied 
to the work setting in which the person would have already made a choice about 
occupation, the framework continues to generate predictions of motivation in a 
presumably stable and predictable environment so much so that the worker is assumed to 
have no difficulty or problem at any point in time in ascertaining the probability of his 
success concerning performance and reward outcomes. As a matter of fact, the 
cornerstone constructs of the theory, namely, expectancy (i.e, the extent to which the 
worker believes that his effort will lead to performance) and instrumentality (i.e., the 
degree to which the worker’s performance will result in one or more secondary 
outcomes) are underlined by this very assumption.
Expectancy has been most often operationalized by asking people to provide a rating of 
the likelihood that given a high level of effort, they would be able to achieve a given 
level of performance (Pinder 1998: 356 -  357). Based on the assumption that individuals 
can always ascertain the likelihood of positive outcomes concerning effort-performance- 
reward relationships, the theory proposes that workers combine these probability beliefs 
with the valence or attractiveness of expected rewards to determine the level of their 
effort. This could be particularly helpful in explaining motivation when (1) the effort- 
performance relationship is straightforward and clear-cut; and (2) incentives are 
administered in a consistent and somewhat predictable manner.
These two conditions cannot, however, be taken for granted as they probably had been 
against the backdrop of highly controlled Taylorist operational settings. For instance, the 
link between effort and performance is likely to be relatively more complex and 
ambiguous in developmental and creative roies as well as in jobs for which the level of 
resources and support fluctuate and cannot be guaranteed over time. Furthermore, the 
administration of rewards and incentives is likely to be more consistent and predictable 
for piece rates in traditional manufacturing jobs than for performance-related pay in non­
sales positions whereby rewards are often subject to profitability and budget constraints, 
among other factors that may be beyond the worker’s control.
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If objective circumstances surrounding the job rendered the workers unable to estimate 
effort-performance or performance-reward links, they would also be unable to respond 
meaningfully to Vroom’s (1964) instrumentality and expectancy scales, which were 
precisely aimed at measuring these links. And if these links are difficult to establish in a 
complex and rapidly changing environment, which is representative of today’s 
organizational setting (Antonides 1991; Foster 2000), the theory’s explanatory power 
and relevance would necessarily significantly reduce unless the notion of uncertainty
i
and risks had been accounted for in the first place.
The theory’s two major modifications, however, did not seem to demonstrate any such 
consideration. To illustrate, although the theory has been extended with the performance 
factors of ability and role clarity in Porter and Lawler’s (1968) revision; and further 
enriched with determinants of the effort-performance link (self-esteem, past experience 
in similar situations, actual situation, and communications from others) and of the 
performance-outcome link (past experience in similar situations, attractiveness of 
outcomes, belief in internal versus external control, effort-performance expectancies, 
actual situation, and communications from others) in Lawler’s (1973) model, uncertainty 
and risks remain a non-factor in these revised frameworks.
In today’s complex and rapidly changing workplace (Pettigrew and Whipp 1993) the 
discrepancy between expectancy-based explanations, (which assumes that the future can 
always be reduced to probability measures), and the potentially practically unpredictable 
nature of effort-performance and performance-outcome relationships is problematic as it 
renders the models incapable of predicting motivation under uncertainty and risks. 
Although these did not seem to be an issue during the 1960s and 1970s when a main 
management focus was on assembly line workers who were paid by piece, the theory’s 
inadequacy in explaining motivation is magnified as individuals’ concerns co-evolved 
with the workplace in latter decades and became more complex and less homogenous.
A case in point is the phenomenon of motivation despite adversity. According to 
expectancy theory, for example, we should expect the individuals’ motivation to be low 
when they experience misfortune and hardship such as company-wide wage deductions 
and the pressure to deliver increasingly demanding targets while working with reduced
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budgets and financial support. However, workers may become highly motivated out of 
desperation because they have no alternative but to put forth their best effort at work 
especially in the times of downsizing and cost-cutting, even if  effort-performance and 
performance-outcome links seem ambiguous and inconsistent.
Another phenomenon expectancy models cannot explain is low motivation despite 
favorable circumstances to succeed. Based on expectancy theory, for example, strong 
effort-performance and performance-outcome links would result in high motivation. 
However, individuals may be unwilling, albeit being able, to pursue a reward because 
doing so may put their other important interests (e.g., health and family relations) at risk. 
These phenomena and issues will be explored more extensively in Chapter 4 in a follow- 
up critique of the gaps in existing literature, which is presented in conjunction with my 
argument for the need to understand motivation under uncertainty and risks. Let’s now 
turn to the empirical research of expectancy theory.
Empirical research. Research on expectancy theory is voluminous. It is perhaps more 
beneficial to highlight key developments in the field rather than detailing all studies that 
have been conducted since Vroom’s (1994) theoretical development. Table 3.1 captures 
representative studies between 1964 and 2002 in the sense that it reveals the scope and 
variety of issues studied and highlights at the same time those that are of particular 
importance. As mentioned earlier, it is a common practice for motivation researchers to 
study work performance, rather than motivation per se, as a dependent variable.
The first two studies by Vroom (1964) and by Porter & Lawler (1968) represent the 
theoretical foundations of the theory, which were to map the course and direction for 
research for the future. Vroom argued that a person’s preference for a particular option 
over other options is determined by valence, instrumentality, and expectancy, which are 
presumably of equal weight and importance to the decision maker. Recognizing that 
there is a missing link between the motivation to increase effort and work performance, 
Porter & Lawler (1968) propose that effort, ability and role perception can together 
predict performance. Six years later, Mitchell (1974) concluded, based on a review of 36 
empirical studies between 1966 and 1974 that there was more empirical support for 
occupational choice and job satisfaction than for job effort. Mitchell also pointed out
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 56
that “no research has examined the expectancy conditions of risk and uncertainty” 
(Mitchell 1974). Acute this observation may be, unfortunately, as seen in studies in the 
next three decades, this crucial criticism was not followed through in any major study.
Table 3.1
Representative Studies of Expectancy Theory
Study Antecedent Consequence Sample Focus
Vroom, 1964 Valence, 
instrumentality, 
and expectancy
Choice of occupation Theoretical
proposition
Valence, instrumentality, and 
expectancy as antecedents of 
motivation
Porter & 
Lawler, 1968
Effort, ability, 
and role 
perception
Performance Theoretical
proposition
only
Effort, ability and role perception 
as joint predictors of 
performance
Mitchell, 1974 Valence, 
instrumentality, 
and expectancy
Occupational choice, 
job satisfaction, and 
job effort
Review of
studies
(1966-74)
No research has examined the 
expectancy conditions of risk 
and uncertainty
Schwab, Olian- 
Gottlieb, & 
Heneman, 1979
Importance and 
desirability) and 
expectancy
Job effort and 
performance
Review of
studies
(1957-75)
Expectancy theory 
“overintellectualizes people’s 
cognitive processes”
Pinder, 1984 Valence, 
instrumentality, 
and expectancy
Job effort and 
performance
Review of
major
research
Discussion of major research 
difficulties
Locke, 1991 Expectancy Intentions & goals 
and performance
Theoretical
proposition
Proposal of an integrated 
motivation sequence model of 
goals and expectancy
Rasch & Tosi, 
1992
Effort, ability, 
role perceptions
Performance Software
developers
Reward expectancy and goals as 
predictor of performance
Monge,
Cozzens, & 
Contractor, 1992
Communication 
and motivation 
variables
Number of 
innovative ideas
Manufac­
turing
employees
Communication variables as the 
true cause o f innovation
Van Eerde & 
Thierry, 1996
Valence, 
instrumentality, 
and expectancy
Performance, effort, 
intention, preference, 
and choice
Meta
analysis
(1964-90)
Expectancy as a predictor of 
intention and preference but not 
performance
Erez & Isen, 
2002
Positive affect Valence, expectancy, 
and instrumentality
Experiments Specificity of performance- 
outcome link and instrumentality
Fairbank, 
Spangler, & 
Williams 2003
Expectancy
beliefs
Participation in 
employee suggestion 
system
Proposal Motivating creativity
What is sure is that criticisms about the basic assumptions and application of the theory 
began to flood in. For instance, Schwab, Oilian-Gottlieb, and Heneman (1979) noted 
that results of a review of 32 studies between 1957 -  1975 were consistent with the 
suspicion that expectancy theory “overintellectualizes the cognitive processes people go 
through when choosing alternative actions”. The authors also confirmed that 
complicated measures of force did not aid prediction in between-subjects investigations.
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Furthermore, in a review that appeared in Steers and Porter’s (1991) edited book “Work 
Motivation and Behavior”, one of the most authoritative volumes on the subject, Pinder 
(1984) identified several major conceptual and research difficulties in relation to the 
theory. First, being purely rationally based, the theory has not been able to account for 
the fact that people have limited cognitive capacities and that much of human behavior 
is habitual and subconscious (Simon 1957; Locke 1975; Staw 1977; Mayes 1978). 
Second, the theory has mistakenly assumed that the valence, instrumentality, and 
expectancy beliefs are independent of one another (as implied in the multiplicative 
nature of the equation), whereas individuals may in fact assign more weight or 
importance to outcomes that are believed more difficult to attain.
Third, although it was intended for within-subject predications, i.e., those concerning 
single individuals, one at a time, about the decision alternatives each of them will select 
in choosing an occupation, the theory has been erroneously used to predict variation in 
motivational outcomes across individuals, which yielded only moderately valid results. 
Fourth, since the validity and reliability of valence, instrumentality, and expectancy 
scales were relatively low they could have contributed to an underestimation of the 
validity of the theory itself.
Research in the early 1990s saw various attempts in integrating or partly substituting the 
theory with goal setting. The first of such papers was by the goal setting authority Locke
(1991) himself, who proposed expectancy as an outcome variable of volition and an 
independent variable of goals & intentions and performance in an integrated motivation 
sequence model. Another major study in this direction was conducted of a rather more 
innovative sample of 335 software developers by Rasch and Tosi (1992), who found that 
performance is affected not only by goal difficulty, goal clarity, and achievement needs, 
but also by reward expectancy. Along the same lines, Monge, Cozzens, and Contractor
(1992) found that communication variables including the level of information and group 
communication but not motivation variables such as expectancy and social pressure 
cause innovation among 1,925 employees in five manufacturing firms that used the 
Scanlon Plan.
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To be in a position to conclude the status of expectancy research over four decades, Van 
Eerde and Thierry (1996) conducted a meta-analysis of 77 studies between 1964 and 
1990 and found that when applied as a main-effects, within-subject model, it can predict 
attitudinal (such as intention and preference) but not behavioral outcomes. These 
findings defy many of the previous conclusions about the usefulness of the theory in 
predicting performance, effort, and choice. But as the authors specifically pointed out, 
the direction of the effects cannot be established because the effect sizes are correlations. 
Erez and Isen (2002) addressed what was crucially mentioned by Mitchell (1974) in his 
review concerning the expectancy conditions of risk and uncertainty. Representing a 
major step in this direction, the authors concluded on the basis of two experimental 
studies that positive affect influences instrumentality only when the performance- 
outcome link is specified but not when it is dependent on chance.
Overall, it seems that research using expectancy theory alone in predicting motivation or 
performance in the work setting has by and large subsided in the 2000s except for a few 
occasional papers outside the motivation literature. For example, in information 
technology research, Fairbank, Spangler, and Williams (2003) discussed in a proposal 
the efficacy of expectancy beliefs in motivating creativity through a computer-mediated 
employee suggestion management.
2. Goal Setting Theory
Although goal setting has taken the center stage in motivation research over the past 
three decades (Pinder 1998; Donovan 2001; Mitchell and Daniels 2003), scholars are 
divided in their assessment of its theoretical basis as a performance management 
technique that works. One line of argument purports that goal setting motivates because 
it helps the commitment to performing desired behaviors or reaching desired outcomes, 
especially when people have a role to play in setting their own goals (Moskowitz, 
Gollwitzer et al. 1999). Another line of argument maintains that goal setting does not 
energize but instead directs people’s attention to and facilitates feedback on useful 
pursuits (Steers and Porter 1974).
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(A) Process-based explanations. Regardless of whether goal setting is identified in the 
existing literature as motivational or directional in nature, the argument may be said to 
be process-based, i.e., goals are effective because they enhance the worker’s 
effectiveness in getting the work done. In particular, clear and specific goals provide a 
basis for the worker to prioritize his time, energy, and resources and in so doing help 
reduce confusion and the waste of effort. While this seems to make sense intuitively, are 
there any exceptions to the rule?
Exceptions to the rule. It is important to point out, in light of today’s complex and fast- 
changing work environment, three fundamental assumptions that may provoke 
exceptions to the rule that goal clarity and specificity improve performance. The first 
assumption relates to the complexity of work and performance measurement: goal 
acceptability, i.e., the extent to which a worker is willing to accept his work goals for 
what they are. For example, a worker who believes that his work goals, however clear 
and specific, are too superficial or narrow to truly or adequately reflect performance is 
likely to reject these goals as a motivational or directional anchor in his work.
Since there may be disparity in attitude and belief between management and employees 
about what performance should mean or how performance should be measured 
especially in complex work roles, goal acceptability among employees should not be 
taken for granted in the analysis of motivation and performance. As a matter of fact, 
there is evidence in the literature that points to such lack of correspondence as a source 
of contention, job frustration, and resentment during the implementation of 
performance-related pay (Scase and Goffee 1989; IPM 1992; McLaverty and 
Drummond 1993).
Goal-setting theory also assumes a high level of goal stability and resource certainty 
while the opposite, that is, goal instability and resource ambiguity may be true especially 
in a complex and fast-changing work setting. I refer to goal instability as the extent to 
which goals are constantly being changed before they are accomplished within the stated 
time frame or period of appraisal. By resource ambiguity, I mean the degree to which 
resources required to support the goals can be guaranteed throughout the course of 
accomplishing the goals.
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The concern here is two-fold. First, contrary to the prediction of goal-setting theory, 
clear and specific goals may end up causing confusion and waste of effort if  they are 
being constantly revised, be it due to adjustment in strategic direction, changes in market 
conditions and organizational constraints, or managerial indecision. As a matter of fact, 
goal instability may also cause situations of inequity since it is unlikely that the 
subsequent waste of effort will be given any credit in performance appraisals. Second, 
the setting of clear and specific goals may be considered irrational and unfair (rather 
than directional or motivational) among the workers if the kind and level of 
organizational resources available to support them are ambiguous and non-committal.
(B) Consequence-based explanations. Since the fundamental assumptions about goal 
acceptability, goal stability, and resource certainty may not always be true, it is 
necessary to reassess the motivational merits of clear and specific goals in an 
environment of uncertainty and risks. When analyzed from the process-based view 
adopted by existing researchers, the outcome would be poor because low levels of goal 
acceptability, goal stability, and resource certainty do not generally enhance motivation.
The prediction may however be very different when the same issue is examined from an 
alternative, consequence-based view, i.e., the potential consequences of met and unmet 
goals. For example, regardless of whether goals can help workers become more effective 
by directing and focusing their efforts, as long as they translate into imminent and 
inevitable consequences when not met, then the clearer and more specific they are, the 
more likely they will motivate the workers to perform. A case in point is goals that are 
associated with deadlines, which help create a sense of urgency to comply or suffer from 
its consequences.
The fact that the research environment (as discussed in Chapter 2) is characterized by 
uncertainty and risks suggests that goal setting should be studied in relation to change in 
order to properly attribute its effects. As it now stands, the conceptual inclinations 
toward certainty and stability have limited the theory’s immediate potential for 
understanding motivation. The proposed consequence-based view, which takes into 
account the complex and fast-changing nature of today’s workplace, may thus be a
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viable alternative for exploring the impact of change on motivation not discussed in the 
existing literature.
Empirical research. The theory of goal setting is quite easily the single most dominant 
theory in the field, with over a thousand articles and reviews published on the topic in a 
little over 30 years (Mitchell, Thompson et al. 2000). Key developments in the field 
since Locke’s theoretical development in 1968 and up to 2004 are captured in Table 3.2. 
The presented collection of studies reveals the scope and variety of issues studied and 
highlights at the same time those that are of particular importance. As mentioned earlier, 
it is a common practice for motivation researchers to study work performance, rather 
than motivation per se, as a dependent variable. This is especially the case for goal 
setting theory as virtually all empirical studies address work performance and other 
work behavioral outcomes as the outcome variable.
Locke (1968) proposed that goals lead to task motivation to produce more quantity. An 
early discussion by Steers and Porter (1974) explored the potential impact of goal 
acceptance on performance. Numerous studies that followed tended to focus on the 
nature of goals that drive that motivation. For instance, Lathan and Baldes (1975) 
showed that setting concrete and measurable goals could lead to increased load per truck 
based on net weights of 36 trucks among some 50 forestry truck drivers at six logging 
operations. Locke, Shaw, Saari, and Latham (1981) reviewed the results of 48 studies 
conducted between 1969 and 1980 and concluded that specific and challenging goals 
lead to higher performance than easier, do-your-best goals and no goals, if assigned 
goals are accepted by the person. The moderating role of accepted goals is consistent 
with Steers and Porter’s (1974) earlier discussion concerning its impact on performance.
Based on results of a toy assembly experiment involving college students, Latham and 
Steele (1983) expanded on this important finding by showing that specific and difficult 
goals were significantly related to performance regardless of whether they are set 
through employee participation or assigned by management. Further support for this 
argument was found in other studies (see Locke and Latham 1990 for a review). What is 
unclear is the extent to which such findings could be generalized for tasks that demand 
the fulfillment of not just simple and straightforward but multiple and complex goals.
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Table 3.2
Representative Studies of Goal Setting Theory
Study Antecedent Consequence Sample Focus
Locke, 1968 Goals Task motivation Theoretical
proposition
Goals and productivity
Steers, 1974 Goal acceptance Performance Discussion Goal acceptance
Latham & 
Baldes, 1975
Specific, 
difficult but 
attainable goal
Productivity over a 
12-month period
Forestry
truck
drivers
Concrete and measurable goals
Erez, 1977 Feedback (as a 
moderator)
Performance Discussion Task-relevant feedback
Locke et al, 
1981
Specific goals Performance Review of
studies
(1969-80)
Specific and challenging goals
Latham & 
Steele, 1983
Participative and 
assigned goals
Performance College
Students
Assigned vs. non-assigned goals
Dwek, 1986 Adaptive
motivation
Goal attainment Discussion 
of existing 
research
Goals and adaptive motivation
Wood, Mento, 
& Locke, 1987
Task
complexity (as 
a moderator)
Goal effect on 
performance
Meta­
analysis of 
studies 
(1966-85)
Task complexity
Locke & 
Latham, 1990
Participation in 
goal setting
Performance Discussion Participation in goal setting
Weingart, 1992 Goal difficulty 
and task 
complexity
Group performance 224
college
students
Group goals
Mitchell et al, 
1994
Goals Performance Psychology
students
Goals and skill acquisition
Roney, 
Higgins, & 
Shah, 1995
Framing of 
goals
Persistence and 
performance
Discussion Goal framing and performance 
on anagram tasks
George-Falvy,
1996
Jointly set goals Performance Discussion Jointly set goals and performance 
on complex tasks
Brown, Cron & 
Slocum, 1997
Anticipated
emotions
Work behavior Salesmen Positive emotions
Donovan & 
Radosevich, 
1998
Goal
commitment (as 
a moderator)
Performance Meta­
analysis
Goal commitment
Schweitzer, 
Ordonez, & 
Douma, 2004
Reward goals 
vs. do-your-best 
goals
Unethical behavior Laboratory
experiment
Side effect of goal setting
Seijts et al, 
2004
Learning goals 
vs. performance 
goals
Performance Simulation Integration of literature on 
situational and dispositional 
goals
Fried & Slowik, 
2004
Role of time in 
goal setting
Goal achievement Conceptual
Discussion
Integration of time into theory
Research in the late 1980s began to see deeper efforts in understanding the impact of 
goal setting on task complexity and in the context of adaptive motivation. For instance,
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Dweck (1986) suggested that the adaptive (“mastery-oriented”) motivational pattern 
promotes the setting, maintenance, and attainment of personally valued and challenging 
goals in learning. In an effort to explore the impact of goals on different tasks, Wood, 
Mento, and Locke (1987) conducted a meta-analysis of 125 studies between 1966 and 
1985 and concluded that goal-setting effects are strongest for easy tasks and weakest for 
more complex tasks. In other words, difficult and specific goals could decrease 
performance on complex and novel tasks.
Three other streams of research that explored the moderators of the goal difficulty- 
performance relationship were concerned particularly about (1) performance feedback,
(2) goal commitment, and (3) the role of time. In contrast to the consistency of evidence 
for the performance effect of task-relevant feedback (Frost and Mahoney 1976; Erez 
1977), the effect of goal commitment, seems inconclusive across studies (Donovan and 
Radosevich 1998). Concerning the issue of time in goal achievement, Fried and Slowik 
(2004) proposed in a conceptual discussion that managers in knowledge-based industries 
may strategically assign specific goals or follow the “do your best” approach, depending 
on whether employees are working in the exploration state versus systemization stage.
Roney, Higgens, and Shah (1995) also found that goals framed positively (rather than 
negatively) improve persistence and performance on anagram tasks. Furthermore, 
George-Falvy (1996) showed that jointly set goals are more effective than assigned 
goals on complex tasks because they encourage strategic development. Along these lines, 
Weingart (1992) indicated that group goals influence performance through their effect 
on effort, planning, and tactics. And in an attempt to distinguish the impact of goals and 
self-efficacy on performance, Mitchell, Hopper, Daniels, George-Falvy, and James 
(1994) concluded, based on an experimental study of 224 undergraduate students, that 
goals are a better predictor of performance than is self-efficacy later (than early on) 
during skill acquisition.
Other interesting aspects about goal setting research are that scholars have begun to 
examine the positive emotions associated with goal attainment on the one hand, and the 
side effects of goal setting on the other. In particular, Brown, Cron, and Slocum (1997) 
proposed that anticipated emotions associated with goal achievement help predict
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behavior and sales. This finding is in line with the research of Horn and Arbuckle 
(1988), who found that mood had induction effects on goal setting and performance in 
young children. On a different note, Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma (2004) found in an 
experiment employing 154 undergraduate students that subjects who were given mere or 
reward goals overstated their productivity significantly more often than those who were 
asked to do their best. This is consistent with the findings of a simulation study based on 
events in the cellular telephone industry by Seijts, Latham, Tasa, and Latham (2004) 
concerning learning goals. In particular, the authors found that a specific learning goal 
led to higher performance than did either a specific performance goal or a vague goal
3. Equity Theory
Equity is a social comparison theory whereby equity judgments are made concerning 
one’s input and outcome versus comparable others (Adams 1963). People hold beliefs 
about the value of their contributions and how well these contributions are being 
recognized or rewarded. In particular, people compare how well they are being treated 
with how well they believe others are being treated. Some people also compare their 
equity situation with their expectations when they first started the jobs (Pinder 1998). No 
matter what people are comparing to, the nature of their response to inequity is 
corrective in nature; it underlies the initiation of change of some sort to correct a 
situation of disequilibrium. In other words, it proposes change in the worker’s attitude 
and behavior as a consequence of inequity but by itself, equity theory does not discuss 
change or the uncertainty and risks thereof as a determinant of motivation.
As proposed by the theory, the goal of reactions to inequity is to restore equilibrium. 
What has not been explored, however, is what may happen if the individual is aware that 
this goal is not likely to be met by reacting negatively to the situation. Indeed, there have 
so far only been arguments in the literature about why people react to inequity. The 
notion of why people do not react to inequity, however, has not been explored, except in 
terms of the equity sensitivity construct (Huseman, Hatfield et al. 1987). By stereotyping 
people and putting them in “boxes” of different individual sensitivity levels to inequity, 
the concept is helpful in explaining response to inequitable situations across individuals. 
But this is only the tip of the iceberg. In the following section, I attempt to explore other
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exceptions to the rule in understanding response to inequity, including situational and 
individual factors that may not be as routine or “programmed” as the concept of 
sensitivity construct suggests.
Exceptions to the rule. It seems sensible to explore, in light of today’s complex and 
fast-changing work environment, the various conditions that may provoke exceptions to 
the rule that workplace inequity reduces motivation. The conditions I shall discuss below 
include political sensitivity and the protection of professional image at work, both of 
which may be referred to as situational factors. The common thread that runs through 
these potential violations to equity theory’s predictions is self-protection and 
preservation. Contrary to the assumption of equity theory that individuals safeguard or 
advance their interests by reacting negatively to inequity, I explore conditions under 
which people advance their interests by not reacting negatively. In other words, it may 
be helpful for us to explore reaction to inequity as a subjective choice rather than an 
automatic response provoked by disequilibrium.
Political sensitivity. Political sensitivity concerns the delicacy of situations in which 
ambiguous issues need to be handled carefully as they may cause conflict and upset 
those in power especially under unfavorable labor market conditions (cf. Hartley, 
Jacobson et al. 1990). One way of exploring the potential impact of political sensitivity 
on response to workplace inequity is by observing organizations as political systems in 
which individual members learn to become aware of “conflict-prone areas, to read the 
latent tendencies and pressures beneath manifest actions of organizational life, and to 
initiate appropriate responses” (Morgan 1993).
Political sensitivity and its manifestation of enlightened self-interests may have an 
important role to play in helping to explain the potential lack of negative response to 
inequity under acute situations of employment uncertainty and compensation risks. For 
example, a worker may choose not to react negatively to favoritism if he accepts the fact 
that since he is not particularly favored by the boss, a realistic way for him to increase 
his chances of continued employment in a downsizing environment (cf. Mowday 1991) 
is to put forth his best effort at work. Similarly, a person may value a harmonious 
relationship with members on his team to the extent that he prefers to accept the
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disequlibrium experienced in inequity in pay. As such, the chosen reaction may reflect 
rationally based considerations and personal philosophy toward peace and long-term 
interests vis-a-vis contention and the idea of “getting even”.
Protection of professional image. Another possible violation of equity theory predictions 
of motivation is that individuals may choose not to react negatively to inequitable 
situations if they are consciously aware of the risk of being identified as troublemakers, 
or seen as ungrateful, calculative, and petty in an organization that emphasizes 
teamwork or promotes extra-role behavior. This idea is different from the equity 
sensitivity construct in the sense that the individual may not be consistently desirous of 
or concerned about maintaining a similar image at home or among his personal friends.
It is possible for the individual to view the dynamics at work and at home or among 
friends differently. For example, as an employee, the person is likely to view himself as 
being subject to the influence of the management or others who are in power and as a 
result, believes that he has a lot to lose (e.g., contract renewal and career prospects) if he 
did not live up to their expectations. On the other hand, he may perceive himself as an 
equal or the one who is in power within this family and personal circles and as a result, 
feels uninhibited to fight for his rights in reacting to personal issues of inequity.
Notwithstanding the risks associated with adjusting one’s work effort (Pinder 1998) 
(whether downward of upward) or resorting to dysfunctional actions such as thefts and 
other forms of subterfuge or maneuver (Greenberg 1990; Greenberg 1993), the notions 
of political sensitivity and protection of one’s image at work have not been considered 
in any of the existing frameworks of distributive justice (Adams 1963), procedural 
justice (Cropanzano and Folger 1991), and interactive justice (Moorman 1991).
Empirical research. Table 3.3 presents representative studies of equity between 1963 
and 2005. It reveals the scope and variety of issues studied and highlights at the same 
time those that are of particular importance. Research in the field may be systematically 
classified into three categories -  distributive, procedural, and interactive justice. These 
three categories also seem to have developed along a chronological dimension, with
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distributive justice being the traditional line of inquiry, and procedural justice and 
interactive justice as the more recent extensions of equity-based research.
Table 3.3
Representative Studies of Equity Theory
Study Antecedent Consequence Sample Focus
Adams, 1963 Distributive
justice
Work motivation Theoretical
proposition
Inequity as a state of 
disequilibrium
Adams, 1968 Distributive
justice
Work motivation Piece-rate
workers
Impact of hourly overpayment
Lawler, 1968 Distributive
justice
Productivity and 
work quality
Discussion Expectancy-based explanation 
concerning overpayment
Martin, 1987 Distributive &
procedural
justice
Pay satisfaction 
& organizational 
commitment
Financial
services
employees
Effects of distributive vs. 
procedural justice
Greenberg,
1990b
Distributive
justice
Theft Employee
survey
Inequity and dysfunctional 
behavior in response to pay cuts
Cropanzano & 
Folger, 1991
Procedural
justice
Direction of 
motivation
Review of 
32 studies
Direction towards destructive 
(retaliation) or constructive 
activities
Konosky &
Cropanzano,
1991
Procedural
justice
Commitment and 
performance
Laboratory
employees
Procedural justice and 
performance
Huseman, 
Hatfield, & 
Miles, 1987
Individual
sensitivity
Reactions to 
equity/inequity
Theoretical
proposition
Individual differences in 
reactions to inequity
Moorman,
1991
Interactional
justice
Organizational 
citizenship 
behavior (OCB)
Manufacturing
workers
Interactional justice and OCB
Mowday, 1991 Pay inequity Reactions to 
inequity
Review of 
17 studies
General support for theory
King & Miles, 
1994
Equity
sensitivity
Reactions to 
inequity
Discussion Scale construction and 
measurement
Schminke, 
Ambrose & 
Cropanzano, 
2000
Organizational
structure
Justice perceptions Workers 
in profit and 
non-profit 
organizations
Organizational structure and 
design and fairness
Aryee, 
Budhwar, & 
Chen 2002
Trust (as a 
mediator)
Justice perceptions Public sector 
employees
Trust and interactional justice
Lamertz, 2002 Social
relationships
Justice perceptions Telecom
employees
Social relationships and fairness 
perceptions
Ambrose & 
Cropanzano 
2003
Procedural and
distributive
justice
Organizational 
commitment and 
turnover intentions
Review of 9 
longitudinal 
studies
Stages in time when impact pf 
was most influential
Simons & 
Roberson, 2003
Aggregate equity 
perception
Organizational 
commitment and 
turnover intentions
Dataset of 
4,539 hotel 
employees
Attitudinal and business-unit- 
level outcomes
Tekleab, 
Takeuchi, & 
Taylor 2005
Mediating role 
of contract 
violation
Social exchange 
and employee 
reactions
Longitudinal 
study of 191 
university 
employees
Extension of the chain of 
relationships injustice research
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First and foremost, Adams (1963; 1968) sought to predict the behavioral response to 
situations of inequity by proposing that people will evaluate the fairness of their 
situation in an organization based on a comparison of the ratio of their own inputs and 
outcomes with some referent other’s ratio of inputs and outcomes. When these ratio 
comparisons are not equal, people find themselves in a disequibrium and are motivated 
to change the situation by modifying their inputs and outcomes, changing their referent 
other, distorting their perceptions, or quitting (Mitchell and Daniels 2003). Adam 
published a study in the same year on piece-rate workers and reported that overly high 
hourly rate produced greater quantity while overly high piece rate produced higher 
quantity but lower quality.
Research in the following decade focused largely on distributive justice in the form of 
underpayment of rewards and its behavioral consequences (Evan and Simmons 1969; 
Pritchard, Dunnette et al. 1972). Not withstanding that research seemed to demonstrate 
encouraging evidence for the theory, other researchers question at the same time if 
expectancy and equity theories cannot be integrated as one theory as they seem to 
address the same expectancy issue. For example, Lawler (1968; 1973) argued that 
consequence of the hourly payment condition could be explained equally well by 
expectancy theory.
As a matter of fact, speculations that equity theory can be incorporated into expectancy 
remain unresolved even up to this era (Lawler and Suttle 1973; Mowday 1991). As far as 
the effect of pay inequity is concerned, based on a review of 17 studies on the quantity 
and quality of output between 1963 and 1970, (Mowday 1991) indicated that there is 
general support for the theory but cautioned that additional research is needed to extend 
predictions from the theory beyond simple questions about reactions to pay.
Research on equity began to encompass a second dimension in the 1980s, i.e., procedural 
justice. For example, Martin (1987) argued on the basis of a study of 1,685 financial 
services employees that both distributive and procedural justice determine pay 
satisfaction, while procedural justice alone determine organizational commitment. As 
summed up in an excellent review of 32 studies on procedural justice research between 
1965 and 1990 by Cropanzano and Folger (1991), field studies in general showed that the
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amount people receive affects outcome satisfaction, whereas procedures (and the related 
actions of authorities) affect organizational commitment.
In particular, it was argued that procedural justice predicts the direction toward 
destructive (retaliation) and constructive activities (organizational citizenship behavior/ 
OCB) such as improvements in dependability, cleanliness, waste reduction, and 
willingness to help train new workers. Some of the important studies in this area include 
those by Greenberg (1990; 1993) on employee stealing in the name of justice. Moorman 
(1991) studied the effects of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice among 225 
industrial processing and manufacturing workers and concludes that interactional justice 
(but not distributive or procedural justice) is closely associated with organizational 
citizenship behavior. At the same time, advancement was made on the construction and 
measurement of the equity sensitivity construct proposed by Huseman, Hatfield, and 
Miles (1987). Noteworthy studies in this area include those conducted by King and Miles 
(1994), and King, Miles, and Day (1993).
Research in interactional justice continued to flourish in the 2000s. This is particularly 
true for studies on the antecedents and mediators of justice. For example, Schminke, 
Ambrose, and Cropanzano (2000) reported in a study of 209 workers in 11 profit and 
non-profit organizations that organizational structure and design (in terms of 
centralization, formalization, and size) play a more prominent role in our thinking about 
organizational fairness.
Furthermore, Aryee, Budhwar, and Chen (2002) concluded, based on 179 supervisor- 
subordinate dyads in a public sector organization, that whereas the distributive, 
procedural, and interactive dimensions of justice are related to trust in organizations, only 
interactional justice is related to trust in supervisor. Finally, in a study of 115 telecom 
employees, Lamertz (2002) proposed that fairness perceptions are significantly associated 
with peer fairness perceptions, and social relationships with managers are positively 
associated with perceptions of interactional fairness.
Three more recent studies are noteworthy. First, Ambrose and Cropanzano (2003) 
reported, based on a review of 9 longitudinal studies involving a total of 360 individuals
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in three surveys, procedural justice was most influential prior to and soon after outcome 
decisions were made while distributive justice was most influential one year later. 
Second, based on a dataset of 4,539 employees at 97 hotels, Simons and Roberson (2003) 
found that aggregate perceptions of procedural and interpersonal justice were linked to 
organizational commitment and turnover intentions as well as on business-unit-level 
outcomes such as discretionary service behavior. Lastly, based on a longitudinal study 
examining a sample of 191 university employees, Tekleab, Takeuchi, and Taylor (2005) 
found strong support for the mediating role of psychological contract violations in the 
relationship chain involving justice perception, perceived organizational support, and 
turnover intentions.
4. Reinforcement Theory
Reinforcement is a theory of behavioral learning and modification that emphasizes the 
effect of scheduling. Its purpose is to reinforce or increase the frequency of desirable 
behavior and correct or eliminate problematic behavior (Skinner 1969). In particular, it 
proposed the intermittent administration of reward and punishment events to be most 
effective. Unlike expectancy theory that predicts motivation based on eventualities of 
future rewards, reinforcement theory makes predictions on the basis of past events of 
reward and punishment.
While the theory is derived from experimental .roots that enable the total control of 
reward and punishment events, it is perhaps unlikely for human behavioral learning to 
take place in precisely the same manner as could be manipulated for birds and animals in 
a laboratory setting. A major difference between the real-life vis-a-vis controlled 
laboratory setting is that the circumstances surrounding the administration of rewards 
and punishments in real-life are not static and cannot easily be held constant for the 
behavioral reactions to reward and punishment to mechanically repeat themselves as is 
possible in a laboratory setting.
What has not been discussed in the theory is the potential impact of the change of 
circumstances surrounding the administration of rewards and punishments on the 
behavioral response to these reinforcers. As far as rewards are concerned, an essential
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set of circumstances that is often ignored by both the theorists and management 
practitioners alike is the conditions attached to organizational rewards (e.g., working 
hours, level of stress, degree of uncertainty concerning resources available to accomplish 
a task, etc.).
Workers may, however, be conscious of the fact that behind each reward there are 
possible conditions attached or that “there is no free lunch”. So if rewards and their 
conditions constitute a deal of sorts, it is possible that workers do not look at the rewards 
as the same “deal” if the conditions attached to them have been altered. For example, a 
reward that requires a certain level of effort during normal working hours might be 
considered a good deal. However, the same reward, when requiring input during 
unsociable hours or working with uncooperative parties, may be considered an ordeal. A 
critical question concerning the effects of rewards not addressed by reinforcement theory 
is: “Will repeating the same organizational reward (e.g., bonus) achieve the same level 
o f success in encouraging a specific behavior i f  the conditions attached to such a reward 
are no longer the same? ”
In a somewhat different manner, the reinforcement effect of punishment may also be 
affected by the change of circumstances. An important aspect of such change concerns 
the justification for organizational punishments. A case in point is pay reduction, which 
may, at different times, be courted by different managerial justifications (e.g., 
unsatisfactory work performance, declining company profits, initiative to cut cost to stay 
competitive, etc.). The variations in the justification for organizational punishments may 
not be uncommon in a downsizing and cost-cutting environment.
Since using justifications such as reduced company profits to cut wage and supporting 
resources at work indicates that employees have little influence and control, it may end 
up causing feelings of confusion, helplessness, and stress (Averill 1973; Thompson 
1981; Greenberger, Strasser et al. 1988) than facilitate the behavioral learning proposed 
by reinforcement theory. An important question concerning the effects of punishment 
not addressed by the theory is: “ Will repeating the same organizational punishment 
(e.g., reduction in pay) achieve the same level o f success in discouraging a specific 
behavior i f  the justification for such a punishment is no longer the same? ”
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What may further confound the behavioral learning effects of organizational rewards 
and punishments are the workers’ life circumstances (e.g., financial situation, demand on 
time for family, condition of health, etc.), which are expected to change over time. Life 
circumstances are likely to affect personal attitudes and preferences in decision making 
of important life issues (Mishan 1975; Morgan and Duncan 1982; Larrick, Nisbett et al. 
1993) such as work vs. leisure, pay vs. job satisfaction, and stress vs. health. The fact 
that individual life circumstances are neither generalizable across members of the same 
workforce nor immediately observable to the management suggests that the 
reinforcement dynamics of an organizational setting could be far more complex than an 
experiment-based theory is designed to capture.
As reinforcement theory assumes the complete controllability of circumstances 
surrounding the administration of rewards and punishments as well as the 
programmability of behavioral outcomes based on the repeat of past reward and 
punishment events, the notions of uncertainty and risks that are essential to the 
understanding of motivation in a changing environment are ignored in the framework. 
What, however, can be identified as a unique and significant contribution of the theory is 
its discussion of both rewards and punishments.
Although punishment occurs frequently on a day-to-day basis in organizations and may 
be more effective in eliminating behavior than has traditionally been believed (Pinder 
1998: 423), the notion of motivating with both rewards and punishments has been taken 
seriously only within the framework of reinforcement theory. A wedge is open here for 
the analysis of influences of punishment on work motivation and behavior. Unlike 
research reviewed above under the other leading theories, research on reinforcement 
theory does not only deal with rewards but also punishments. However, reinforcement 
studies tended to involve either reward or punishment rather than adopt a parallel 
approach to considering both reward and punishment (see Table 3.3 for a summary.)
Empirical research. Table 3.4 captures illustrative studies of reinforcement between 
1953 and 2003. Rather than being exhaustive, the aim of this collection of research is to 
reveal the scope and variety of issues studied and to highlight at the same time those that 
are of particular importance.
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Table 3.4
Representative Studies of Reinforcement Theory
Study Antecedent Consequence Sample Focus
Rogers & 
Skinner, 1956
Rewards and 
punishments
Behavioral change Proposition Consequences and behavioral 
change
McGregor,
1960
Punishment Behavioral change Discussion Proposal of the “hot stove rule” 
to effective punishment.
Aldis, 1961 Rewards and 
punishments
Behavioral change Discussion Application of theory to work 
settings.
Dowling,
1973b
Positive
reinforcers
Behavioral change Delivery
employees
Impact o f positive reinforcers
Luthans & 
Kreitner, 1974, 
1975
Negative
reinforcers
Recurrence of 
problematic behavior
Proposal A general sequence for 
behavioral contingency 
management
Marholin & 
Gray, 1976
Punishment Reduction in cash 
shortages
Employee
survey
Punishment and behavioral 
change
Ford, 1981 Punishment Sick leave taken Employee
survey
Effects of negative 
reinforcement and punishment
O’Hara, 
Johnson, & 
Beehr, 1985
O.B. Mod. Behavioral change Review of 
40 studies
Immediately consequences and 
behavioral change
Andrasik, 1989 O.B. Mod Performance and cost 
reduction behavior
Employee
survey
20 applications of O.B. Mod
Stajkovic & 
Luthans, 1997
O.B. Mod. Task performance Meta­
analysis of 
125 studies
Financial and non-financial 
intervention
Luthans & 
Stajkovic, 1999
Positive
reinforcement
Performance Discussion Positive reinforcement and 
performance
Komaki, et al. 
2000
Positive 
and negative 
reinforcement
Behavioral
modification
Review of 
126 studies
Positive and negative 
reinforcement and behavioral 
modification
Smither et al, 
2003
Executive
coaching
Behavioral change 1,361 senior 
managers
Inpact of working with an 
executive coach
Reinforcement theory, as put forth by Roger and Skinner’s (1956) groundbreaking study 
proposes that desirable consequences of reward increase the likelihood of a desirable 
behavior being repeated and the undesirable consequences of punishment decrease the 
likelihood of an undesirable behavior being repeated. Along these lines, McGregor 
(1960) proposed what he referred as “the hot stove rule”, which emphasized the 
following features for punishments to be effective: (1) immediate; (2) contingent upon 
behavior; (3) intense (meaning not too severe but not without some pain); (4) Consistent, 
(5) impersonal; (6) informational; and (7) an alternative to the punished act should be 
available (e.g., moving away or avoiding them in future).
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Moving away from pigeons and laboratory testing, Aldis (1961) and Nord (1969) are 
among the first to suggest application of the principles of operant conditioning to the 
organizational setting. As discussed in the following overview of studies, the idea of 
giving reinforcement only when the correct or desired response is made (rather than 
every time the stimulus is presented is the case in classical conditioning) became very 
popular for the next two decades. The approach was called organizational behavioral 
modification (sometimes referred to as O. B. Mod, organizational behavioral 
management, or applied behavior analysis) (Pinder 1998). As a matter of fact, Luthans 
and Kreitner (1985) referred to O. B. Mod as “the most systematic efforts to apply 
reinforcement theory” in the work setting.
It is necessary to note at this point that early studies seem to be more faithful to the 
theory in the sense that both the consequences of rewards and punishments are tested. 
But as soon as the theory is applied to the work setting, it looks almost as if the 
researchers were determined to study either rewards or punishments but not the impact 
of both on behavioral change. This deviation from the theory has been strongly criticized 
by Komaki, Coombs, and Redding (2000) in their comprehensive review of 
reinforcement research. Just to cite two notable examples of the lack of pairing of both 
rewards and punishments, Luthans and Kreitner (1974) and Kreitner (1975) proposed a 
general sequence for behavioral contingency management to correct problematic 
behavior in an organizational setting, focusing only on negative reinforcers.
This focus in study was shared by Marholin and Gray (1976), who examined the impact 
of the policy of deducting cash shortages from the cashiers’ own daily salary as a 
deterrent to inattentiveness and other forms of undesirable behavior at the till. However, 
Ford (1981) was unable to draw definite conclusions about the effects of negative 
reinforcers in his study of organizational measures aimed at reducing sick leave.
Studies emphasizing positive reinforcers. Dowling (1973) showed that positive 
reinforcers such as goal setting, praise, and constant feedback helped saved an estimated 
$3 million in waste reduction over a three-year period at Emery Air Freight. On the other 
hand, Andrasik (1989) reported inconclusive findings on the effectiveness of O. B. Mod 
interventions in achieving quantitative cost savings and favorable cost-benefit returns in
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20 applications studied. However, a recent study by Luthans and Stajkovic (1999) 
dismisses the confusion referred to by Andrasik in his study and concluded that 
performance improved by 17% on average for both manufacturing and service 
employees when money, feedback, and social recognition are all used.
Other important studies include reviews and meta-analyses of existing research. Three of 
them are highlighted here. Firstly, O’Hara, Johnson, and Beehr (1985) concluded, based 
on a review of 40 studies on private companies conducted between 1969 and 1983, that 
immediately pleasing or displeasing consequences generally improve organizational 
behavior in absenteeism, employee safety, customer service, theft reduction, and the 
conservation of raw materials. Conclusions on the positive effects of O. B. Mod were 
also drawn by Stajkovic and Luthans (1997) in their meta-analysis of 125 studies 
between 1975 and 1995. In particular, they reported that financial and non-financial 
intervention produced strong effects in manufacturing firms but non-financial 
interventions did not do so well in service firms.
Last but not least, Komaki, Coombs, and Redding (2000) concluded, in the most 
comprehensive review of reinforcement research to date, which involved 126 studies 
between 1969 and 1998, that the use of positive reinforcement is much more prevalent 
and the results much better than negative reinforcements. In light of the tendency to 
focus on either positive or negative reinforcement in these studies, the authors cautioned 
that punishment events need to be paired with positive reinforcement in future research.
It seems that interest in reinforcement research in the work setting has significantly 
declined in the 2000s, due perhaps to the popularity of goal setting and justice research. 
One of the studies that seem to bear the closest resemblance to the notion of 
reinforcement involves the examination of a sample of 1,361 senior managers by 
Smither, London, and Vargas et al (2003). The authors found that managers who worked 
with an executive coach were more likely than other managers to set specific goals, 
solicit ideas for improvement from their supervisors, and receive improved ratings from 
direct reports and supervisors.
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3.1.2 Causal Uncertainty and Between-Concept Ambiguity
My review has been anchored toward the examination of the concepts and assumptions 
of existing motivation theory and the presentation of key empirical studies so as to 
illuminate the range and variety of research thereof and to shed light on what we now 
know and what boundaries we may need to push to advance our knowledge in the field. 
In this connection, there are two issues I wish to specifically address in reviewing 
collectively at this point the theory and empirical evidence of expectancy, goal setting, 
equity, and reinforcement. First, I wish to tie in the discussion with the purpose of my 
review, which is to identify a suitable framework for my study of the impact of China’s 
wage and employment reforms on work motivation. In particular, I wish to find out how 
existing theory and research can help me explain motivation in an environment of 
change. Second, I wish to assess the validity of the causal relationships reported in the 
empirical studies and the extent to which they can be generalized for other work settings.
The empirical aspect of my review is aimed at assessing the causal relationships found. 
In particular, I seek to examine the extent to which the accumulated findings in a 
research area provided support for their theoretical positions. Cook and Campbell (1976) 
outlined three necessary conditions for a causal relationship to exist between two 
variables: (1) the cause must precede the effect in time; (2) the treatments must co-vary 
with the effect; and (3), there must be no other plausible alternative explanations of the 
cause and effect relationship. So in order to conclude that the causal relationships 
maintained by existing research do actually exist it requires there be little uncertainty or 
ambiguity concerning these issues.
Uncertainty of causal relationships. As shown in the empirical studies and the meta­
analyses conducted of them, virtually all four theories reviewed have received support in 
the organizational setting, save for reinforcement theory, where the requisite pairing of 
reward and punishment events in empirical studies still leaves much to be desired. This 
observation was shared by some of the most prominent reviewers of the motivation 
literature (e.g., Pinder 1998; Ambrose and Kulik 1999; Donovan 2001). In addition, 
Mitchell and Daniels (2003) noted that it is clear that all of the perspectives of existing 
motivation theories have some validity.
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What is however uncertain is the causal relationship between motivation and 
performance. While all four frameworks are being referred to in the literature as 
“motivation theory”, the investigation of motivation as either a dependent or an 
independent variable was not evident. For example, expectancy theory appeared to 
increasingly focus on performance as the outcome variable since Porter and Lawler’s 
(1968) introduction of a performance-related model. Also, goal setting theory has relied 
heavily on task performance as the primary dependent variable while equity research 
typically examined attitudinal responses such as job satisfaction and commitment and 
negative behavioral responses such as theft, retaliation, and sabotage. Lastly, 
reinforcement theory and O. B. Mod were aimed at correcting problematic behaviors, 
with no particular mention of the link to motivation.
Ambrose and Kulik (1999) and Kanfer (1990) are among those who expressed the 
greatest discomfort about organizational researchers writing empirical articles predicated 
on motivation theories without using the central construct of “motivation”. The former 
observe that research on motivation since the 1990s in particular is largely done through 
the ‘back door”. That is, researchers have other goals in mind, such as studying task 
performance on work teams or discretionary and extra-role behaviors, rather than 
studying motivation. The paradox is that motivation research has largely abandoned the 
concept of “motivation” and replaced it with specific measures of employee behavior 
(e.g., task performance and organizational citizenship behavior).
But as pointed out in the introduction of the present review, performance is not the same 
as motivation and cannot be treated as such. Indeed, performance theory differs from 
motivation theory in that prediction of performance requires consideration of additional 
factors including individual differences variables such as abilities and task 
comprehension, and environmental factors such as situational constraints and task 
demands (Kanfer 1990). It may seem to make sense if the distinction between 
motivation and performance is ignored in studies assessing task performance in simple, 
straightforward, or controlled settings. But it becomes unacceptable for the distinction to 
be disregarded in research that investigates performance in novel or complex tasks, on 
work teams, and other ambiguous and challenging situations.
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Since increased effort or motivation does not guarantee performance under any of these 
conditions, performance or the lack of it cannot be attributed to the direction, strength, or 
persistence of motivation. The implication of this is significant especially for the most 
popular “motivation theory” of this era -  goal setting, which set out to predict 
performance on the basis of a technique, the adoption of which then became 
instrumental in generating propositions concerning goal clarity and difficulty and the 
outcome in performance. In doing so, researchers seemed to have worked backwards in 
theoretically justifying a technique, rather than taking the crucial step of conceptualizing 
the link between motivation and performance in the first place.
Ambiguity between major concepts. Evaluating existing research by addressing the 
ambiguity that exists between major concepts illuminates an issue of major concern and 
that is, the condition that “there be no other plausible alternative explanations of the 
cause and effect relationship” (Cook and Campbell 1976).
Relationship of equity to expectancy. Lawler (1973) argued that expectancy theory 
could explain the results of equity theory if perceived equity were explicitly recognized 
as an antecedent of the valence of outcomes. Although Lawler did not provide further 
guidelines on treating perceived equity as such, others such as Campbell and Pritchard 
(1976) have concluded that equity considerations could be subsumed under the broader 
expectancy theory on the basis that both theories are somewhat ambiguous and are thus 
open for the reconciliation of competing predictions As pointed out by Mowday (1991), 
although the two theories do not really appear to be in conflict, it is unclear whether this 
reflects genuine similarity or the ambiguity with which the theories are stated (see 
Mowday, 1991 for a review).
The lack of conceptual clarity between the two theories is undoubtedly a major obstacle 
in identifying their unique contributions, regardless of whether the more useful debate is 
to (1) identify the conditions in which individual behavior is guided by equity and 
expectancy considerations, as has been suggested by Adam (1968); (2) conceptualize 
equity as one of the factors affecting valence of outcomes, as has been proposed by 
Lawler (1973); or (3) distinguish the two theories by their distinct dependent variables,
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for example, job satisfaction and commitment for equity theory and task performance for 
expectancy theory.
Relationship of goal setting to O.B. Mod. Latham and Locke (1979) described goal 
setting as a simplistic straightforward and highly effective technique for improving 
performance. They argued that the then popular technique of behavior modification is 
“mainly goal setting, plus feedback, dressed up in academic terminology”. The authors 
however did not spell out how goal setting as a basic technique can be a method on 
which most other methods depend for their motivational effectiveness, nor for that 
matter in what way the theoretical contribution of goal setting may supercede or be 
distinguished from that of O. B. Mod. or reinforcement theory.
In a subsequent article, Kreitner and Luthans seemed to confront Latham and Locke, 
albeit indirectly, by pointing out that conflicting findings on goal setting still crop up 
regardless of the fact that it has been proven that people who have goals or objectives 
(preferably difficult and measurable ones) consistently outperform those who have no 
goals, and those who are instructed to do their best, and that “management by objective” 
(MBO) is known as both a failure and a success. In sum, they concluded that many 
conceptual systems’ are being “dressed up in appealing terminology, but remain 
prescriptively ambiguous on how they effect psychological changes” (Kreitner and 
Luthans 1984). Unless this fundamental theoretical issue is effectively tackled, the 
ambiguity between goal setting and O. B. Mod. is likely to remain unresolved.
An important question that emerges is, if both sets of authors suggest that the other is 
hiding behind some dressed-up terminology, what exactly are their respective concepts 
in abstract terms, and how can they be theoretically distinguished from each other? A 
major benefit of returning to the abstract level in assessing causal relationships is that 
one is not limited to researching on the technique per se, be it goal-setting or O.B. Mod., 
but is required to explain why the technique causes the effects in the first place. This 
also means that the researcher would have to articulate the specific conditions in which 
these effects can reliably repeat themselves. In so doing, it would no longer be an issue 
as to what terminology may be used to describe a technique.
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Perhaps Mitchell and Daniels’ (2003) call to address the unexplored causal link between 
goal setting and goal striving can inspire a higher level of intellectual debate in this 
regard. As much goal setting may manifest in the form of top-down mandates imposed 
upon, rather than developed in consultation with the employee, goal striving seems to 
suggest (more) initiative and self-regulation on the part of the employee, and thus 
potentially more relevant in an environment of change.
Given today’s downsizing organizational setting, it will not only be helpful but 
necessary to explore whether it is the carrot (as proposed by both goal-setting and O. B. 
Mod.) or whether it could (also) be the stick that drive the motivation in goal striving. 
Future analysis in this direction will allow us to refocus on examining the construct of 
motivation (not performance) and its antecedents, and reinstate the principal status it 
deserves in what is now only loosely collectively referred to as “motivation literature”.
3.2 Research on Performance-Related Pay
Under certain conditions, reward systems have been shown to motivate performance 
(Vroom 1964; Lawler 1971; Lawler 1987). Perhaps the key decision in the design of a 
reward system is to whether it will be based on performance and if  so, how and to what 
extent. To declare that pay is unrelated to performance would be to give up a potentially 
important motivational tool and perhaps condemn the organization to a lower level of 
performance (Lawler 1987). This may be true especially in organizational settings where 
moral incentives are not the only motivational tool. For instance, in the reform setting of 
my research enterprise, where both ideology- and instrumentality-based incentives were 
emphasized, pay was expected to bear on motivation and performance.
Among the many different types of reward or pay systems (see Prendergast 1999 for a 
review), “performance-related pay” (or “pay for performance”) is given special attention 
in the present review for three reasons. First, the pay scheme is being heralded as the 
most often-reported development on the pay front since the 1980s (Cannell and Long 
1991; Crowe 1992). Over the past two decades, there has been an explosion in both 
private and public sectors of performance-related pay in varied combinations of
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individual, team-based, and skill-based schemes that increasingly tighten the link 
between employee performance and organizational objectives (OECD 2005). The fact 
that a practice is being widely discussed could mean that in future more implementation 
will occur (Blinder 1990). Second, performance-related pay is one of the most 
researched areas of merit pay using the individual worker as the basic unit of analysis. 
Third, performance-related pay is a major component of the reward system of my 
research enterprise.
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Before reviewing the literature on performance- 
related pay, which emphasizes the use of extrinsic incentive to motivate, it is helpful to 
address a controversial issue in the field of motivation, and that is, whether such 
incentives should be used to motivate workers in the first place. Since extrinsic 
incentives may influence intrinsic motivation, numerous studies have emphasized how 
the former could positively or negatively affect the latter. These studies have laid the 
foundation for further debate on the conditions in which incentives could work.
According to Brief and Aldag (1977), extrinsic work motivation can be characterized as 
a “regulated or instrumental experience” and intrinsic work motivation, a “self-fulfilling 
experience”. Research on cognitive evaluation theory (Deci 1975; Deci and Ryan 1985; 
Phillips and Freeman 1985; Deci, Koestner et al. 1999) has suggested that contingent 
extrinsic incentives may reduce intrinsic motivation. In a meta-analysis of 20 studies 
between 1971 -  1985, Wiersma (1992) is able to conclude that extrinsic reward 
decreases intrinsic motivation if seen to be controlling and increases intrinsic motivation 
if seen to be providing competency information.
Despite this finding, adversaries such as Kohn (1993) argued that the use of incentives is 
not only morally flawed, but can only cause temporary behavioral change. McKenzie 
and Lee (1998) presented a more balanced view in arguing that if used wisely, incentives 
can help direct competition in constructive ways, prevent shirking and increase 
productivity, as well as encourage groups to better coordinate their efforts. This 
suggested that the motivational effects of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards are additive. 
When viewing incentive systems, it seems beneficial for one to be open-minded about 
their potential addictive and subtractive effects on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
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W hat is performance-related pay? The label “performance-related pay” (or “pay for 
performance”) covers a broad spectrum of compensation systems that can be clustered 
under two general categories: merit pay plans and variable pay plans. They can be 
further distinguished along two dimensions. The first represents design variation in the 
level of performance measurement -  individual or group -  to which payouts are tied. 
The second represents design variation in the plan’s contribution to base pay -  some are 
added into base pay, some are not (Milkovich and Wigdor 1991). Regardless of whether 
it is merit pay or variable pay, a key feature of performance-related pay is that it is 
usually linked to some kind of appraisal of performance (Cannell and Long 1991).
It is important to bear in mind that performance-related pay is only one of several 
dimensions of employee compensation. Other dimensions, as explained by Milkovich 
and Wigdor (1991), include pay competitiveness with the marketplace, benefits, cost-of- 
living considerations, and others. The effects of performance-related pay are therefore 
dependent in good measure, among other things, upon this larger compensation context.
According to Milkovich and Wigdor (1991), all pay for performance plans are designed 
to deliver pay increases to employees based, at least in part, on some measure of 
performance. They suggested that pay for performance may offer several potential 
benefits. For example, they can support the organization’s personnel philosophy by 
helping to communicate the organization’s goals to its employees. At the same time, 
they can support a certain level of performance that is consistent with the organization’s 
mission. Furthermore, they can help ensure consistency in the distribution of pay 
increases. They can also positively influence individuals to achieve goals that are 
rewarded (see Milkovich and Wigdor 1991 for a review). Lastly, pay for performance 
schemes can be also used as a change agent (e.g., Lawler III 1985; Wilson 1995; Risher 
1999) in bringing about new attitudes and behavior by making reward contingent.
3.2.1 Theoretical Justifications and Empirical Findings
Opashl and Dunnette (1966) remarked that although money was generally agreed to be 
the major mechanism for influencing behavior at work, less research and theory had
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been pursued in compensation than in almost any other field related to management. 
They argue that this lack of research contributed to practitioner use of faddish 
compensation systems with little empirical support (for more recent versions of this 
theme, see Abrahamson 1996; Rynes and Gerhart 2000). In particular, Rynes and 
Gerhart (2000) pointed out that one cannot be a true expert on subjects such as 
motivation and performance unless he has a firm understanding of the role of 
compensation in influencing these outcomes.
Theory based notions that provide an underlying rationale for incentives are relatively 
recent (Peach and Wren 1992). This can be said to be especially the case for 
performance-related pay. Although discussion about linking pay to performance at the 
individual worker level began as early as the 1970s (see, for example, Lawler 1973; 
Jenkins 1986) and dozens of studies on performance-related were conducted during the 
following decade (see Jenkins 1986 for a review), it was not until the 1990s that 
theoretical justifications for the this method of payment were seriously attempted.
Theoretical Justifications for PRP
There appear to be three main theoretical justifications for performance-related pay, 
namely, expectancy, goal setting, and behavioral modification. For instance, Milkovich 
and Wigdor (1991) proposed that by design, pay for performance plans that focus on the 
individual most closely approximate the ideal motivational conditions prescribed by 
expectancy and goal setting theory. Assessing pay for performance plans from a 
historical perspective, Peach and Wren (1992) suggested that the theoretical argument of 
the pay plans may be drawn from expectancy and behavioral modification approaches.
On a similar note, Martin (1994) suggested that the theoretical and moral arguments for 
the pay plan can be drawn from the rational economic assumptions underling classical 
liberal economics, the work of writers such as Frederick Taylor, and psychological 
theories of motivation that stress the role of pay such as expectancy theory and behavior 
modification approaches. Based on Lawler’s (1971) claim that the expectancy theory 
can encompass most of the main psychological theories linking work motivation to 
performance, and the suggestion that the theory is very close to the models used by
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economic theory such as Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Lazear (1995), Marsden and 
French (1998) argued that expectancy theory alone could probably explain the impact of 
pay for performance plans.
Although the theoretical justifications for pay for performance summarized above do not 
seem to conflict with each other, there seems to be a problem concerning the lack of 
structure concerning the various arguments put forth by the experts concerned. To 
illustrate, none of the justifications was stated in more than two or three sentences in 
their original text. It may therefore be more technically accurate to refer to them as 
“theoretical sketches” rather than full-blown theoretical arguments. Despite the growing 
use of a whole range of such schemes, the lack of theoretical sophistication and clarity 
behind performance-related pay might have contributed to its true impact being “largely 
a mystery” (Marsden and Richardson 1994; Marsden and French 1998).
Bearing in mind the negative consequences that have been associated with the 
introduction of performance-related pay schemes over the years (see, for example, 
Weitzman and Kruse 1990; Marsden and Richardson 1994; Marsden and French 1998), 
the greatest challenge for practitioners and researchers alike may be to effectively isolate, 
and subsequently replicate, the success factors of the pay plan (cf. Hopkins and 
Mawhinney 1992). My approach to assessing whether the frameworks suggested by 
performance-related pay experts -  goal setting, expectancy, and behavioral modification, 
are sufficient for explaining the scheme’s motivational impact is taken in two steps. 
First, I shall examine the empirical research that contextualizes the theories used. 
Second, I shall discuss the operational difficulties involved in the plan’s implementation 
and assess whether they could have been predicted by these theories.
Empirical Findings
Table 3.5 captures representative studies in the field between 1973 and 2005. As is the 
case with research in the motivation literature in general, the dependent variable of pay 
for performance studies happened to be performance rather than motivation on most 
counts. It is also interesting to note that research in the 1990s seem to provide increased
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support for the visionary remarks about the unintended results of pay for performance 
plans that were made by compensation scholars in the 1970s and 1980s.
Table 3.5
Representative Studies of Performance-Related Pay (PRP)
Study Antecedent Consequence Sample Focus
Lawler, 1973 PRP Motivation Discussion Job reduction beliefs and plan 
acceptance
Jenkins, 1986 PRP Performance Review of 
28 studies
PRP and performance of clerical 
and production tasks
Pearce, 1987 Contingent pay Performance Discussion Organizational context and 
compensation theory
Blinder, 1990 Pay Productivity Review of 
research
Employee risk aversion to 
pay variability
Ehrenberg,
1990
Incentives Effort Review of 3 
PRP articles
Explicit or implicit incentives 
and motivation
Milkovich & 
Wigdor, 1991
PRP Performance Theoretical
justification
Expectancy and goal setting 
theories and PRP
Hopkins &
Mawhinney,
1992
PRP Performance Theoretical
justification
Expectancy and behavioral 
modification and PRP
Latham & 
Huber 1992
PRP Performance Review of 
research
Situational factors and PRP
Peach & Wren, 
1992
PRP Performance Historical
review
Which performance to reward
Marsden & 
Richardson, 
1994
PRP Motivation Inland
Revenue
employees
Motivation deteriorated with 
PRP
O’Neil, 1995 PRP Performance Review of 
studies
Lack of theoretical justification 
and conflicting evidence
Marsden & 
French, 1998
PRP Performance Case study Goal setting vs. PRP
Prendergast,
1999
PPR Performance Review of 5 
PRP studies
PPR improved output
Eberts,
Hollenbeck & 
Stone 2002
PRP Student GPA Case study 
of 2 high 
schools
Merit pay increased staff 
retention but not student grade 
point averages
Deckop, 
Merriman & 
Blau 2004
PRP Withdrawal 
intentions, pay 
satisfaction, OCB
127
university
students
Consistency between risk 
preference and “control by pay”
Heneman & 
Werner 2005
PRP Performance Discussion Environmental conditions and 
PRP
OECD 2005b PRP Public sector 
efficiency
14 OECD 
countries
More pay for better performance 
in the public sector
For example, back in the early 1970s, Lawler (1973) predicted that employees are less 
likely to accept the plan and thus be motivated by it if  they believe it will result in job 
reduction. Furthermore, Pearce (1987) pointed out that compensation theory, and in 
particular that which deals with contingent pay, needs to account for uncertainty,
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interdependence, and complexity in the organizational context. In an effort to counteract 
employee risk aversion to variable pay, Blinder (1990) proposed that mixing variable 
pay with a base wage will make increased variability in pay more acceptable. He also 
suggested that the pay plan be made conducive to a cooperative corporate culture to help 
reduce shirking.
Accounting for both explicit and implicit rewards, Ehrenberg (1990) suggested, based on 
review of three concurrent articles, that the provision of either kind of incentives for 
high levels of performance can motivate increased effort level. Heneman and Werner 
(2005) stressed that environmental and organizational conditions such as a competitive 
internal labor market and a progressive organizational culture are crucial to success of 
performance-related pay. On a similar note, Latham and Huber (1992) confirmed, based 
on their review of existing research, that situational factors such as organizational 
support and latency concerns such as individual preferences for rewards need to be 
identified and controlled for the pay plan to be maximally effective.
As far as empirical studies are concerned, there seems to be no lack of encouraging 
empirical support for pay for performance. It is however important to note that such 
evidence is usually tied to task simplicity and straightforwardness. For instance, based 
on a review of 28 studies, Jenkins (1986) concluded that linking pay to performance can 
lead to an average of 30% performance increase for clerical and production tasks. 
However, when implemented in more complex or less specified task and organizational 
environments, for example, as is the case with the service industry and administrative 
work in the public sector, the pay plan seems to yield inconclusive findings.
Unfortunately, as pointed out by O’Neil (1995) there was (and still is) an absence of 
studies concerning financial incentives and jobs with a strong component of cognitive, 
problem solving, and heuristic qualities (e.g., management and development roles). 
Hopkins and Mawhinney (1992) also noted that most of the field studies of 
performance-related pay have been conducted with such poor methodology that little can 
be safely concluded about their results.
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A study of 2,423 Inland Revenue employees in the U.K. by Marsden and Richardson 
(1994) revealed, based on the frequency tabulations of survey questions predicated on 
expectancy and goal setting theories, that motivation deteriorated with performance- 
related pay. In particular, the authors note that although the staff supported the principle 
of the pay plan they judged it to be unfair in operation. In a follow-up case study of six 
departments of the U.K. public sector, the authors focused on the expectancy framework 
in trying to explain the impact of the pay plan. In a latter report, Marsden and French 
(1998) developed and tested an expectancy-based framework and concluded that “the 
chief mechanism that caused a substantial minority of staff to work harder seems to be 
through improved goal setting rather than performance-related pay”.
More recently, case studies of two American high schools by Eberts, Hollenbeck, and 
Stone (2002) found that merit pay increased staff retention but had no effects on student 
grade point averages and daily attendance rates. Based on 127 sets of simulated 
employee/supervisory surveys involving university students, Deckop, Merriman, and 
Blau (2004), the degree of consistency between risk preference and “control by pay” 
affected withdrawal intentions, contingent pay satisfaction, and organizational 
citizenship behavior. These results suggest that the use of pay for performance as a 
control mechanism should consider employee risk preference, and that this concern 
should apply broadly in the organization, not just at the executive level.
Conflicting findings. What can be gathered so far from the review of this literature is 
that the empirical findings are not only varied but also conflicting especially concerning 
the pay plan’s effects. It seems that organizations that are hesitant to implement the pay 
plan can choose to believe in the findings of case studies and individual-level data, 
which seem to generally suggest the pay plan’s limited effects. On the other hand, it 
appears that firms who wish to implement the pay plan can to a certain extent choose to 
believe in the firm-level data, which seem to suggest more encouraging results.
For example, based on the review of five pay for performance studies conducted 
between 1994 and 1998, Prendergast (1999) showed that pay for performance have 
strong effects on output in the private sector. The same effects have however not been 
seen in the public sector according to a report of up to 20 years of implementation of the
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pay plan in 14 OECD countries including Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Korea, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzeland, and the 
United Kingdom, which concluded that the impact of PRP on public sector efficiency 
and staff motivation is rather limited and that “the pay plan will never replace a good 
comprehensive performance management strategy” (OECD 2005b: 1, 85).
O’Neil (1995) argued that the conflicting evidence is attributed to conflicting views 
about and lack of established theoretical justification for PRP and subsequently called 
for “more definitive and robust evidence” across all applications of the structures of the 
pay plan. Indeed, it may be time to consider Peach and Wren’s (1992) stance, that is, not 
focusing the debate on whether or not to reward performance, but how and the kind of 
performance to reward. Unfortunately, both of these aspects seem to be beyond the 
scope of the theories that have been so far identified as suitable for the evaluation of 
performance-related pay. The confusion and indecisiveness surrounding the 
effectiveness of pay for performance plans seem to be due to the lack of commitment of 
motivation researchers to develop and stick to a tightly engineered research framework 
that they say they believe in. In the following section, I shall explore some of the 
complexities and their implications.
3.2.2 Review of Impact, Objectives, and Motives
Research showed that performance related pay has been introduced for a multitude of 
reasons such as individualizing industrial relations, improving recruitment and retention, 
and promoting culture and organizational change (Cannell and Wood 1992; Williams 
1998). In the public sector particularly, its introduction is “overwhelmingly seen by 
government” as a way of signaling to civil servants the need for change in the way 
people work, and as a way of indicating to citizens that performance is regularly 
assessed in public administration (OECD 2005b). Insights on implementation and 
operational difficulties may be gained from Heneman and Werner’s (2005) merit pay 
framework, which emphasized the many individual, organizational, and environmental 
factors that may influence the effectiveness of PRP schemes, and thereby revealed the 
complexities and challenges involved in achieving success with the pay plan.
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On a practical note, based on contributions from Cannell and Wood (1992), (Geary 
1992), Kessler and Purcell (1992), Kessler (1994), and Pearce (1987), Williams (1998) 
illustrated 15 categories of operational difficulties associated with performance-related 
pay. These aspects could in turn be summarized in five points: (1) balance between 
short-term performance measures and long-term goals; (2) individual vs. team 
performance; (3) indefinable nature of performance measures in some jobs; (4) 
subjectivity in performance judgment; and (5) potential damage to intrinsic motivation. 
But as Williams pointed out, that there are such a multitude of operational difficulties 
suggests that failure in implementation and operation is much more likely than success.
So why would organizations still want to introduce performance related pay to reward 
and motivate employees if the evidence of its success is so scarcely credible? As pointed 
out by Williams (1998), the real aim behind the pay plan may be rather different than an 
organization would normally publicize to its employees -  such as managing the wage 
bill, cutting labor costs, reducing the workforce, and intensifying individual 
accountability. This leads to the consideration of the validity of assumptions behind 
performance-related pay schemes and the theories used to evaluate them.
Employer motives behind PRP. Although existing motivation literature appears to be 
biased toward the assumption that the employer is concerned about the “happiness and 
productivity of the worker” (Staw 1986), the personnel economics literature has no 
qualms about pointing out that (1) the employer “wants the worker to work to 
exhaustion” (Blinder 1990); and (2) its motive behind incentives is to control and 
regulate labor costs (Milkovich and Wigdor 1991).
These views are by no means isolated from findings in the industrial relations literature, 
which acknowledged that “workers in capitalist societies find themselves in relations of 
exploitation and domination in which many of their most significant interests conflict 
with those of the employer” (Kelly 1998: 126). Based on the Worker Representation and 
Participation Survey (WRPS) involving 1,000 employees or more each in Britain, 
Canada, and the U.S., Freeman and Rogers (1999) also found that, notwithstanding 
employee involvement (El) initiatives, workers “believe that management is unwilling to 
share power or authority with them” (Freeman and Rogers 1999: 155).
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In light of the processes towards individualization and union exclusion, it seems all the 
more likely for new ways of conducting employment relations to be more tolerated or 
accepted and managerial policies and prerogatives “more aggressively and 
enthusiastically pursued than in the past” (Deery and Mitchell 1999: 38). The rise in 
managerial unilateralism in which the bilateral determination of wages and working 
conditions is fear will be increasingly replaced by managerial fiat helps to explain why 
human resources management regimes are often referred as “management control 
systems” (Deery 2002; Deckop, Merriman et al. 2004).
Allowing for these developments and dynamics, it seems inevitable that subjective 
performance standards and employer rate cutting make incentives objects of suspicion to 
the workers (Hopkins and Mawhinney 1992). A relevant question is, whether the 
employer’s desire (or the lack of it) to help employees succeed in being rewarded 
prevails at all times and under all circumstances. A perspective that may offer practical 
insights on the issue is labor market conditions, i.e., whether it is generally a job seeker’s 
market or an employer’s market. In the following, I will explain why it is helpful to 
distinguish between these two conditions.
Job seekers’ market (1960s -  1980s). Compared to the downsizing era of the 1990s 
and beyond market conditions in the 1960s -  1980s may be said to be more of a job 
seeker’s market (Tilly 1996). With the availability of additional labor being considered 
an important factor in the acceleration of economic growth during periods of prosperity 
in the post-war era, the government was prepared to invest in human capital (Denison 
1974; Van der Wee 1986). Likewise, employers were also eager to attract and retain 
labor. Under these conditions, a relevant pattern of motivational design can be identified 
at major corporations that essentially depended on the enticing effects of rewards such as 
bonuses and promotions (Barber and Bretz Jr. 2000). As reflected in first-generation 
performance-related pay schemes launched during this period, the firm’s motivation 
strategy was mainly development-based and typically aimed at the creation of a 
committed workforce (O'Reilly 1989; Baron and Kreps 1999).
Employer’s market (1990s -  present). Although the issue of an employer’s market is 
more complex than may be considered within the scope of the present review, there is
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evident to suggest such phenomenon in many parts of the world, especially outside 
North America and the U.K. Notwithstanding unemployment has fallen in 2004 in some 
areas compared to the 10-year average of 1992 -  2002 (e.g. from 8.1% to 5.6% in 
Australia, from 9.0% to 7.2% in Canada, from 7.0% to 3.9% in New Zealand, and from 
7.4% to 4.7% in the U.K), on average, 50% of the Asia/Pacific region that had very high 
unemployment in 1993 remained in the same position in 2003. The equivalent figure is 
about 65% in North America, and 80% in Europe (OECD 2005a). These suggest that for 
many workers bargaining power has weakened or remained weak. This may be the case 
for years to come especially at “lean and mean” organizations where large-scale cost 
cutting has become a routine (Auer and Speckesser 1998; Kozlowski, Gully et al. 1999).
With ongoing organizational restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, and downsizing, it 
seemed inevitable that many employers would be in a hurry to streamline and make a 
significant portion of their workforce redundant. Against the backdrop of these sweeping 
and somewhat persistent changes, a different pattern of motivational design can be 
identified across a wide section of the economy (i.e., private, public, and non-profit) that 
no longer emphasized or invested as substantially as before in rewards. Instead, 
motivational strategies tended to stress the deterring effects of punishments such as 
termination and non-renewal of limited duration contracts (Sun 2001a).
As have many performance-related pay plans in this age been badly received (see 
Williams 1998), so has the motive behind them been seriously questioned (see Mitchell, 
Lewin et al. 1990). Indeed, it seems that the motivation strategy of the organization has 
shifted more toward a control based and often signals the survival of the fittest (Ingram 
and Clay 2000). Although events supporting the fundamental change from a 
development-based to a control-based approach to motivating employees seemed only 
widely publicized and documented in the business press (Tichy and Sherman 1993), 
their immediate relevance to the choice of theory for empirical study cannot be ignored.
For instance, if these events consistently suggest a “change of heart” of the employer 
from wanting to create a happy and productive workforce to streamlining and 
downsizing against the will and expectations of the workforce, would reinforcement and 
goal-setting techniques achieve the kind of effects proposed by the theories? And how
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should empirical results that are based on theories assuming only benevolent motives of 
the employer be interpreted?
3.3 Research on Incentives in Chinese Industry
The purpose of this section is to review research that evaluates the extent to which 
reform policies of the 1980s and 1990s (as discussed in Chapter 2) succeeded in 
stimulating motivation and performance in Chinese industry. The widespread perception 
of state enterprises as being inefficient highlights the importance of this review. 
Nonproductive enterprise investment (Tsang & Cheng 1999) and managerial 
incompetence (Holz 2003) notwithstanding, tendencies that undermined enterprise 
efficiency and productivity at the individual level were rampant in terms of absenteeism, 
inefficient use of working time, reluctance to learn new skills, and high wastage of 
energy and raw materials (Holton, 1990; Zhu and Dowling, 1994; Warner 2001).
From a policymaking perspective, if reforms are to make further progress, the impact of 
earlier initiatives on rectifying undesirable enterprise and individual behaviors needs to 
be identified unambiguously. From a research point of view, the question of whether 
wage matters, which tends to be the focus of existing empirical work, should continue to 
be studied alone (rather than alongside employment issues) in order to properly assess 
the motivational impact of reforms also need to be answered.
Studies in this review. Although there is now a growing body of literature on human 
resource management in China, most of it derived from quantitative empirical studies 
and focused relatively heavily on multinational corporations (MNCs), joint ventures 
(JVs), and SOEs. Data were often obtained through interviewing and/or surveying 
managers but less so through workers themselves (Cooke 2005: 206). This seems to also 
apply to studies on incentives. As a matter of fact, apart from one individual-level 
empirical study by Sun (2000a), all other relevant studies I have managed to find 
involved firm level data.
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Table 3.6 captures representative studies in the field between 1989 and 2004. While 
selected studies of motivation research (see Tables 3.1 -  3.4) and of PRP (see Table 3.5) 
in the foregoing sections of this chapter are representative of hundreds (and in the case 
of goal setting research, more than a thousand) of other studies in the field, studies in 
Table 3.6 represent a much smaller pool of research estimated to be in the order of 
dozens. Another problem is that, although empirical studies in this area seem to adopt 
sophisticated analytical procedures, many lack a strong theoretical underpinning, and are 
thus not able to adequately support their suggestions for the causal relationships found.
Moreover, there is an average gap of 8 -  12 years between the temporal focus and time 
of publication of the studies. Considering that the reforms have gone on for more than 
20 years since the late 1970s and have had a profound impact on the nation’s 100- 
million strong workforce, which has been continually substantially reduced (see Section
2.1 for a discussion), the scarcity of studies is a major concern. These unusual outcomes 
may be attributed to extremely high research barriers in Chinese industry, which will be 
further discussed under Research Strategy in Section 7.1.1. Meanwhile, let us proceed 
with the review of the studies.
It is important to note that, notwithstanding the potential motivational effects of 
employment reform, which involved “reform shocks” (Holz, 2003) such as 
nonrenewable contracts, competition-based employment, and massive layoffs, there does 
not seem to be any empirical study on the subject. This phenomenon might largely be 
attributed to the fact that the study of motivation in the West has traditionally been 
biased toward the investigation of pay and neglected the important role of employment.
Although dependent variables of the bulk of research on incentives in Chinese industry 
concern performance and especially enterprise and managerial performance, these 
studies are reviewed here for the same reason those involving worker performance 
(rather than motivation) are included earlier in the chapter -  there has been a general 
lack of studies on the subject of motivation at both individual and firm levels, studies on 
performance thus seem the next relevant, albeit not the most appropriate, category of 
research that may shed light on the issue of motivation.
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Table 3.6
Representative Studies of Incentives in Chinese Industry
Study Antecedent Consequence Sample Focus
Wong, 1989 Differentiated
bonuses
Worker productivity Case study Income-increasing/production 
cost decreasing behavior
Jefferson & Xu, 
1991
Non­
performance- 
based bonuses
Worker
productivity
13 SOEs & 
7 COEs
Link between compensation and 
labor productivity
Groves et al, 
1995
Managerial
incentives
Enterprise sales and 
profits
> 600 SOE 
managers
Emergence of managerial labor 
market
McMillan &
Naughton,
1996
Managerial
incentives
Productivity
improvement
769 SOEs Managerial incentives
Zhuang & Xu, 
1996
Bonus payments Productivity and 
profitability
800 SOEs Profit sharing
Yao, 1997 Incentives Productivity SOEs Effects of bonus payments and 
labor quality
Hay & Liu, 
1998
Bonuses Cost-efficiency 386 SOEs Effects of production autonomy 
and profit-related incentives
Nugent,
Perrigne, & Qiu
Bonuses Productivity 200 TVEs Market competition and bonuses
Parker 1999 Wage increases Productivity 20 SOEs Nonproductive investment and 
wage drift
Shirley & Xu, 
1999
Performance
contracts
Enterprise
productivity
> 400 SOEs Failure of proper implementation 
and monitoring of managerial 
performance contracts
Yang & Han, 
1999
Increased total 
wage bill
Profitability and 
labor productivity
300 SOEs Unwarranted income expansion
Chen & Lin, 
2000
CEO incentives Firm performance 167 listed 
companies
SOE-tumed shareholding 
companies
Coady & Wang, 
2000
Incentives Efficient allocation 
of labor
Earnings
data
“Bonus sharing”
Sun, 2000a Distribution of 
“Bonuses”
Work motivation 550 SOE/ 
JV workers
Egalitarian vs. differentiated 
bonus payments
Xu, 2000 Performance
contracts
Enterprise
performance
> 500 SOEs Managerial incentives
Fleisher & 
Wang, 2001
Efficiency wage Productivity 
enhancing behavior
442 SOEs, 
200 TVE’s
Profit-sharing
Lane, Feinberg, 
& Broadman, 
2002
Bonus systems Performance Panel data Effects of bonus systems and 
ownership types
Holz 2003 Incentives Productivity 3 1 - 1 9 0
SOEs
Effects of competition and labor 
remuneration
Liu & Otsuka, 
2004
Managerial
incentives
Enterprise efficiency 108 SOEs & 
TVEs
Ineffectiveness of piecemeal 
reform of SOE management 
system
A logical approach to presenting the studies is according to the way they tie in with the 
reform objectives of rectifying undesirable behavior on the one hand and promoting 
performance on the other. Accordingly, the review is organized into two main themes: (1)
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the effects of wage reform on profitability and performance; and (2) the unintended 
consequences of reform policies.
Effects of wage reform on profitability and performance. One theoretical issue that 
underlies much of the discussion of industrial profitability (or productivity) in the 
incentives literature is corporate governance. Before we proceed with a discussion of the 
studies in this review, it is necessary to acknowledge the complexity of the agency 
problem in Chinese industry: (1) managers act as agents of government bureaucrats, and 
(2) government bureaucrats act as agents of the State. In practice, control mechanisms 
are lacking in both instances, and incentive mechanisms for the agents are poor or non­
existent (see Holz for a detailed discussion). This suggests that agency variables that 
may be readily measured in advanced economies are unlikely to yield any worthwhile 
results in the current setting. This helps to explain why such variables are seldom 
reported or measured in studies on incentives in Chinese industry.
The majority of representative studies reviewed here relate to the effects of wage reform 
policies, with seven focusing on bonus payments, six on managerial incentives, and two 
on the outcomes in work motivation and behavior. Since the beginning of wage reform 
and revival of bonuses in the late 1970s, scholars have been concerned with the extent to 
which incentives in Chinese industry mimicked those observed in market economies. 
Findings in general suggest certain positive effects of incentives and other reform 
policies but the significance of these effects seem to vary across studies, suggesting that 
some SOEs were more determined than others to revamp the entrenched egalitarian pay 
culture and replace it with managerial incentives and differentiated pay in the 
communist-turned socialist-market workplace.
Revival of worker bonuses. Studies pointing to the positive outcomes of revival of 
worker bonuses seemed to be relatively in abundance compared to those pointing to the 
defects in its actual implementation. For example, based on survey data of 13 SOEs and 
seven collective-owned enterprises (COEs) collected in 1987 in Wuhan, Jefferson and 
Xu (1991) found a strong link between worker compensation and labor productivity and 
concluded that the efforts of authorities to restrict wages, bonuses, and in-kind payments 
to workers have shown some success.
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In line with this, Zhuang and Xu (1996) also found, based on a sample of 800 SOEs for 
the period of 1986 -  1991, that bonus payments to workers have positive effects on both 
total factor productivity and profitability, and that additional profits generated from 
improved productivity are greater than the bonus payments. Based on a dataset of 1980s 
enterprises, Yao (1997) found that profit sharing and bonus payment are correlated with 
improved labor productivity. Furthermore, results of Nugent, Perrigne, and Qiu’s (1999) 
study on a sample of 200 large township and village enterprises (TVEs) for 1985 and 
1989 suggested that bonuses and market competition enhanced productivity.
Using a panel data of 386 state manufacturing enterprises for the period 1983 -  1987, 
Hay and Liu (1998) found that, despite institutional constraints that distort the rational 
demand of the firm for input factors, reforms in production autonomy and profit-related 
bonus incentives did lead the firms to respond to both changes in factor prices in the 
directions predicted by cost minimizing theory and produce more efficiently. Fleisher 
and Wang (2001) also reported, based on an urban sample o f442 SOEs in 24 cities of 12 
provinces and a rural sample of 200 TVEs in 10 provinces, strong indication of 
productivity-enhancing wage behavior among enterprises in all ownership categories.
Consistent with these findings, based on two large panel surveys on enterprises spanning 
most of the 1980s and 1990s, Lane, Feinberg, and Broadman (2002) reported that 
flexible labor market strategies such as those involving bonus payments seem to 
significantly enhance sales growth and labor productivity. Lastly, Holz’s (2003) study of 
3 1 - 1 9 0  SOEs for the period of 1986 -  1999 showed that at least throughout the 1990s, 
both market competition and labor remuneration were crucial in explaining profitability.
Encouraging these may seem, the positive findings concerning enterprise profitability 
should not be taken at face value for at least two reasons: (1) it is not clear as to how 
much of the incentives actually strengthened and the manner in which these incentives 
were distributed to have actually produced a positive effect on worker productivity (Sun 
2000a); and (2) inequalities of profit distribution are commonplace in the Chinese 
setting due to pervasive price distortions and the lack of a level playing field for 
enterprises to compete one against another (see Kueh 1999).
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Managerial incentives. In most Chinese enterprises, managerial salary seldom depended 
on entrepreneurial ability, managerial responsibility, or past and current performance; 
instead, it may depend on seniority, educational background, and professional titles 
(Chen and Lin 2000), and positioning in the political hierarchy. There has been 
increasing recognition among researchers, practitioners, and policy makers in China that 
in order to improve the management efficiency of state enterprises, the role of chief 
executives as entrepreneurs needs to be duly taken into account (Liu and Otsuka 2004). 
Change in this aspect, albeit slow, seems to have taken place in a selection of state and 
publicly owned companies. For example, based on a sample of more than 600 enterprise 
managers for the period of 1980 -  1989, Groves, Hong et al (1995) found that 
managerial contracts and were linked to enterprise sales and profits.
Furthermore, McMillan and Naughton (1996) cited total labor productivity growth of an 
average annual rate of 4.5% for a sample of 769 enterprises in four provinces between 
1980 and 1989, and attributed the improvement to three factors: (1) changes in the way 
the industrial bureaus controlled the state-owned firms; (2) changes in the firms’ internal 
organization; and (3) the “strengthening of managerial incentives”. Based on a panel 
dataset of more than 500 SOEs, Xu (2000) found that performance improved with 
various reforms policies such as appointing new managers and increasing competition 
and enterprise autonomy in wage determination. In addition, Chen and Lin’s (2000) 
study of a sample of 167 listed companies showed a positive relationship between sales 
growth and long-term investment with CEO’s total compensation.
These positive results may to a great extent be directly attributed to the increased 
adoption by industrial bureaus of the “managerial selection by auction” system, which 
resembled a competitive leasing procedure by which the incumbent is chosen on the 
basis of promised profit delivery, merit o f the business proposal, and the bidder’s 
management track record. The fact that the incumbent is required to sign a management 
contract and put up a security deposit that would be automatically forfeited if he failed to 
perform suggests that punitive measures are now being used in Chinese industry to drive 
motivation and performance (see Groves 1995 for a discussion).
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The encouraging findings about managerial incentives are however not to be taken as the 
rule, for there are studies that reveal contradictory findings. The value-added of these 
studies is that they highlight the discrepancies of the current system that have not been 
accounted for in other studies. For example, Shirley and Xu (1999) found, on the basis 
of a sample of more than 400 SOEs, that managerial incentives do not improve 
productivity and may even reduce it when managerial performance contracts are not 
executed with sufficient force and determination by local governments and governing 
bodies. As the authors rightly pointed out, while China seems to be a good place for the 
study of managerial performance contracts because no country has ever used them on 
such a scale or with such a variety of enterprise (mostly in the competitive sector), it 
seems that the political economy of performance contracts merits further study.
Furthermore, based on the panel data of 108 SOEs and TVEs for the period of 1995 -  
1999, Liu and Otsuka (2004) found no evidence that the inefficient management systems 
of SOEs have been improved by (1) changes in the system of reward to chief executives 
and by (2) the reform of the enterprise system from the state-owned system to 
shareholding companies and joint ventures. Addressing the sensitive but nevertheless 
practical issue of state control of industry, the authors’ main criticism is that piecemeal 
reforms are far from being adequate.
Work motivation and behavior. Regardless of the fact that reforms were directed as 
much to the enterprise as to individuals in them, there have been but a few studies on 
assessing the effects of reform policies on individual motivation and behavior. Two 
studies are noteworthy. An earlier case study by Wong (1989) found, on the basis of a 
Shanghai electronics factory, that workers were responsive to the factory’s bonus system 
to the extent that both productivity and quality of work have improved. The key, as 
argued by the author, rests with the bonus allocation criteria of having contributed 
toward: (1) increasing the income or decreasing the cost of production; (2) quality 
excellence; and (3) fulfillment of performance targets.
As reviewed up to this point, previous empirical papers seeking to establish a link 
between incentives and improved productivity or performance at Chinese enterprises 
almost always found a relationship of the direction predicted by motivation theories. But
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none of them directly tested the fundamental motivation hypothesis that wage increases 
raise worker motivation. To fill this gap, Sim (2000a) made a first attempt to examine 
the direct relationship between pay and motivation based on a sample of 550 workers 
collected in 1997 at fast-moving consumer goods joint ventures of two SOEs in Beijing. 
Although motivation is higher among workers of the incentive or pay-for-labor scheme 
vis-a-vis those of the egalitarian pay scheme, only 19% of the variance in motivational 
outcome were explained by expectancy and equity theories.
These findings helped to reveal two critical issues concerning the current state of 
research on incentives: (1) existing theory did not capture the complex realities of 
reform and subsequently fell short in explaining motivation in the current context; and (2) 
as generally considered by scholars (see Cooke 2005 for a discussion), wage reform on 
its own had little impact in motivating the workforce. The first issue highlighted the 
need for a more suitable research framework, and the second, the possibility that 
employment reform had a more powerful impact on work motivation than wage reform.
Chinese language studies. Whether organized by unions or academic researchers, local 
studies on incentives tended to taken on the form of employee satisfaction surveys with 
single-item variables and reported mainly on descriptive statistics rather than any theory- 
based causation between variables. The contribution of these studies lies perhaps most 
importantly in their revelation of the complexities of the research environment. 
Generally speaking, these surveys seemed to have been modeled after some Western 
textbook, which was becoming a common local practice. At the same time, however, the 
studies also explored issues presumed to be insignificant in the West but were in effect 
of concern to individuals during reform. In particular, like many other local studies, Gan, 
Tang, and Wu’s (1997) survey in 11 SOEs inquired about the administration of “rewards 
and punishments” (jiangcheng). The issue of equity in the distribution of rewards and 
punishment was empirically explored for the first time in Sun’s (2000a) study reviewed 
above (see Section 2.2 -  Uncertainty and Risks under “Deepening o f  Reforms ” ).
Other state-commissioned studies, such as Ma’s (1994) edited series of case studies of 
the “National Team of 100 Large and Medium-Sized Enterprises” (quanguo baijia qiye) 
have also proved valuable in capturing the reform process at various key enterprises.
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Unintended consequences of wage reform policies. Four studies in this review relate 
to the unintended consequences of China’s wage system in transition. The impact of 
such consequences is believed to be more wide-ranging and substantial than that of new 
pay schemes in Western organizations in that the former involves not just the enterprise 
but also industry and is thus likely to have macro-economic ramifications.
In particular, the phenomena of egalitarian bonus distribution (or “bonus sharing”) and 
the closely related phenomenon of excessive labor remuneration are believed to be 
attributable to enterprise freedom in wage outlay and internal wage distribution (neibu 
shouru fenpei) granted by the state in 1985 as part and parcel of enterprise reform to 
enhance enterprise independence, rationality, and efficiency (Tsang and Cheng 1999). 
These undesirable outcomes remained a major concern during the earlier reform period 
up to at least the mid-1990s, when the State began to exert substantial pressure on 
enterprises to be economically self-sufficient.
Bonus sharing. Egalitarianism has long been recognized as a unique Chinese societal 
culture and continues to be a taken-for-granted assumption of fairness and equity in 
rewards (Cooke 2005). It is thus not surprising that bonuses were widely reported by 
some of the most authoritative local authors (e.g., see Liu and Lian 1994) and in 
empirical studies by others to have been shared more or less equally by individuals and 
have subsequently evolved into a de facto wage supplement for all. For example, 
examining the individual earnings data of the city of Liaoning for the years 1986, 1988, 
and 1990, Coady and Wong (2000) found distribution of bonuses in the form of a wage 
supplement at SOEs. On the contrary, they found evidence of differentiated bonus 
payments at COEs, which were by nature subject to more competition in factor and 
product markets.
Unwarranted income expansion. Parker (1999), who used data from fieldwork collected 
from a sample of 20 heavy-industry SOEs in the Nanjing for the period of 1980 -  1992, 
found that regardless of the fact that productivity changes were not correlated with labor 
and did not rise significantly over time, wages continued to rise faster than labor’s value 
of marginal product. In line with these findings, unwarranted income expansion was 
invariably proposed as an explanation for “disappearing profits” in SOEs (see Holz 2003
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for a review) and for macroeconomic instability (see, e.g., Gang and Woo 1996; Sachs 
and Woo 1997). Among other related studies, the research by Liu and Lian (1994) and 
Lin, Cai, and Li (2001), and by Yang and Han (1999) are worth particular mention in 
terms of their ability to highlight policy loopholes and conflict in policy targets that were 
believed to have led to some of the unintended consequences discussed above.
Non-level playing field competition. The issue of non-level playing field competition in 
state industry is neither new nor unusual in China’s dual-track, socialist-market 
economy where the visible hand of the state is seen on occasion to undermine workings 
of emergent market forces initiated by reform. In relation to the implementation of 
performance-related wage bill, for example, performance targets for individual 
enterprises were set by the state against previous performance. As a result, well- 
performing enterprises came under a lot more severe pressure than their poor-performing 
counterparts to out-perform themselves. While the policy had been devised with the 
interest for poor-performing enterprises in mind, it has also inevitably contributed to the 
inequitable phenomenon of "the efficient cow gets all the whipping" (bianda kuainiu) 
(see Liu and Lian 1994).
There is ample evidence in the economics and industrial psychology literatures (e.g., see 
Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 1990) on the outcome among 
individuals and teams in quota restriction and the withholding of effort for fear of being 
unfairly penalized or shortchanged for having performed (too) well. Though not 
empirically documented, it is reasonable to expect that the “efficient cows” in Chinese 
industry would have responded similarly detrimentally. In sum, as Lin, Cai, and Li 
(2001) noted, the lack of standardized performance targets was unfavorable to level- 
playing field competition, and thus counterproductive to the progress of state industry.
Conflicting policy targets. Based on a sample of 300 large and medium-sized SOEs for 
the period of 1984 -  1998, Yang and Han (1999) found the annual growth rate of the 
total wage bill averaged during 1984 -  1990 was 18.5% -  some 2.3 times higher than 
that of the period between 1979 and 1983. They also found that the reforms fell short 
significantly of targets in terms of improving labor efficiency and controlling wage 
growth, which suggested that the policy of linking enterprise performance to total wage
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bill, though sound in principle and strategy, had largely failed in implementation. This 
was believed to have produced the effect of unwarranted wage income expansion or 
“wage drift”, which in turn fuelled inflation. According to the authors, these unintended 
consequences were likely to have been caused by the conflicting policy targets for wage 
growth to fulfill three roles simultaneously: (1) realize workers' initiative; (2) determine 
the ratio between aggregate consumer demand and investment demand; and (3) 
compensate for increases in the cost of living.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Limitations of existing theory. I began this chapter with a review of work motivation 
literature with particular reference to expectancy, goal setting, equity, and reinforcement 
theories. In view of a broader and more complex work setting than the one for and in 
which relationships had been conceptualised and tested, I reassessed the theories’ 
validity by pointing out exceptions to their respective core predictions and identified 
issues of causal uncertainty and conceptual ambiguity among these theories. Together 
these concerns formed the basis of my reservations about the theories’ structural validity 
and their relevance and applicability in my research setting.
The aforementioned issues seem to not just remain unresolved but become magnified in 
the burgeoning research on performance-related pay. In particular, it appears that the pay 
scheme had been rather more conveniently accorded with expectancy, goal setting, and 
behavioral modification justifications than rigorously supported with theoretical 
specifications as to the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the pay scheme to 
produce their intended effects in the process of change.
Not surprisingly then, the true impact of performance-related pay schemes remain “sadly 
under-researched” (Marsden and Richardson 1994). Above all, it seems that the 
transition to pay for performance systems implies deeper changes in organizational and 
cultural values (OECD 2005b) than the aforementioned theories could capture. Similar 
conclusions may be drawn concerning the use of incentives in Chinese industry.
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What drives motivation, if not incentives? As generally considered by scholars and 
concluded in a recent review, China’s wage reform and its incentives had “little real 
impact in motivating the workforce, rewarding the good performers or enhancing the 
comparability of public sector pay to that of other sectors” (Cooke 2005: 68). Since an 
organization’s “reward and punishment system” comprises of two distinct components -  
wage and employment policies, if  incentives were not a (or the key) determinant, could 
the shift from lifetime employment to limited duration contracts be the real motivator?
Given that observed links in incentives and enterprise performance was out of tune with 
the macroeconomic phenomenon of unwarranted wage expansion in Chinese industry, 
and existing theories appeared inadequate in explaining motivation, it became necessary 
to assess the complexities that may shed light on the non-accountable factors in existing 
analyses. Of particular importance are (1) the political economy in which reform policies 
of linking enterprise performance to total wage bill and of managerial performance 
contracts are executed and monitored; and (2) the transitional workplace that is 
embedded in conflicting forces of communist-style entitlement on the one hand and 
market-style competition on the other. These two categories of concerns are critical to 
the understanding of effects of workplace reforms. Conceptual frameworks accounting 
for the complexities of uncertainty and risks therein thus seem to merit development.
Implications of shift in HRM. Amidst pressures of intensifying global competition, 
rapid technological changes, and increased resources constraints, the shift of emphasis in 
human resource management from the “pursuit of the happy/productive worker” (Staw 
1986) to the “call for adaptive flexibility” (Lane 1991) and the “more aggressive and 
enthusiastic pursuit of managerial policies and prerogatives” (Deery and Mitchell 1999) 
seems certain. Whether it is in relation to the Western workplace and/or the Chinese 
organization, the critical question is: “Could the forces behind motivation in today’s 
workplace be at least partly driven by punishment and the threat o f  job loss ?”
This issue will be dealt with in subsequent chapters of the thesis; first (1) in light of 
empirical support from other social sciences disciplines concerning employment and 
compensation risks for all; then (2) with the development of a proposed model based on 
the extended literature review on motivation under uncertainty and risks.
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Chapter 4 
Uncertainty and Risks
This chapter consists of four sections. Section one considers the nature and extent of 
employment uncertainty and compensation risks in today’s workplace. Section two 
reviews the literature on employment and compensation risks. In view of the 
complexities of risk issues facing workers today, Section three assesses how existing 
work motivation theory fares under uncertainty and risks. And section four concludes.
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4. Uncertainty and Risks
During simpler times in post-war America, classical models of motivation, which 
presume stability and predictability of environmental events, had served theory and 
practice well. However, due to the need to respond to more sophisticated and rapidly 
changing customer needs, intensifying global competition, and internal imperatives to 
cut costs and increase productivity, today’s task and overall organizational environments 
are becoming not only increasingly complex and demanding but also of a more unstable 
and unpredictable nature (see Scott 1976 for a historical review of the organizational 
environment). Such task and organizational contexts are theoretical anomalies -  they fell 
outside limits of the classical models of motivation and require a new model which 
projects the uncertainty and risks embedded in them.
As discussed in Chapter 3, existing models of motivation were proposed against the 
background of what Nord (1976) referred to as “unprecedented levels of economic 
growth and psychological comfort”. For more than 30 years these models had seemed a 
reasonable reflection of the relatively more structured and controlled task and 
organizational environments of the American corporation. But what was its strength 
proved also to be its weakness -  the emphasis on the structured, the controlled, and the 
rational aspects of work motivation and behavior shrouded the values upon which the 
theories themselves rested. Failure to discern these values caused two related errors in 
the analysis: (1) ignoring change in the context in which motivation theory is being 
applied, and (2) treating the current economic condition as one of growth and holding on 
to the unrealistic optimism that the organization’s goal is the “pursuit of the happy/ 
productive worker” (see Staw 1986).
The challenge of many organizations today is not growth but preservation or 
“minimization of decay” in the face of competition (Nord 1976: 708). Pessimistic this 
position may seem, it certainly applies to the reforming Chinese industry, where 
enterprises had to go through the transition from being state-subsidized to self-financing 
(McMillan and Naughton 1996). This view is also consistent with that of the 
organizational change literature, which clearly demonstrated that the current 
organizational context is one of uncertainty and risks (Drache and Gertler 1991).
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4.1 Reality of Uncertainty and Risks in the Workplace
The reallocation o f risk is the central dynamic driving today's internal labor markets.
Jacoby (1999: 10)
Development during the past quarter of a century has given rise to the sense that we 
have entered into a new economic order (Ashkenas, Ulrich, et al, 1995; Camevale, 1991; 
Drucker, 1992; Huey, 1994; Mirvis, 1993). It is claimed that the "traditional" ways of 
doing business are no longer adequate to maintain high performance (Nadler, Gerstein, 
et al, 1992) and to survive in an increasingly competitive and ever changing economic 
environment (Hammer and Champy 1994; Dunlap 1996; Volberda 1996). Paradoxical it 
may seem, the new, generally agreed-upon road to outstanding performance in an 
increasingly knowledge-based economy is with less human capital. As such, 
organizations must be as streamlined and flexible as possible. But whether such 
"contemporary" strategies truly lead to enhanced organizational performance is unclear 
(Hilmer and Donaldson, 1996).
Recent debates about the nature of economic changes have reached little consensus on 
whether or not these changes have been positive or negative for workers (Rubin and 
Smith 2001). One the one hand, many pessimistically viewed massive downsizing and 
the displacement of previously secure, skilled, and unionized workers as portents of an 
economy that provides shrinking opportunities, declining wages, and insecure future for 
the majority of workers (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Perrucci, Perrucci et al. 1988; 
Rubin and Smith 2001). By and large, scholarly research on these changes provided little 
evidence for optimism and challenges notions of change as both linear and progressive 
(Rubin and Smith 2001). As a matter of fact, productivity resurgence that is built on 
open-ended downsizing and real wage compression were criticized as ultimate recipes 
for industrial extinction (see Brown 1997).
On the other hand, the phenomenon of large-scale downsizing and workforce 
restructuring was argued by optimists such as Schumpeter (1976) as characteristics of 
capitalism’s “gales of creative destruction” that would help create a new era that seeks 
and rewards skilled knowledge workers and provide them with interesting, challenging,
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and flexible work (see Rubin and Smith 2001 for a review). If careers were to be 
considered purely in terms of the development of a person’s skills, capacities to learn, 
and self-identity, that is, personal qualities that grow best under conditions of challenge, 
then today’s turbulent environment provides far greater career development 
opportunities than one ever would have imagined in the heyday of the big blue-chip 
firms (Hall and Mirvis 1995).
It was further argued, based on theories of growth and economic progress, that since 
workers are no longer attached to a single organization throughout their working lives, 
they are able to add to their skill repertoire and move on to the next, growth opportunity 
(Arthur and Rousseau 1996). What can be settled, however, is that we live in an “age of 
insecurity” (cf. Beck 1992; Elliott and Atkinson 1998) and risk and instability have 
become defining features of contemporary work life (Heery and Salmon 2000).
Globalization and the call for flexibility. There is a widespread agreement that global 
competition imposes a flexibility imperative on firms and institutions if they are to 
survive in the long term (Benson, Debroux et al 2000). As globalization and intensifying 
competition result in the universal call for economic flexibility (see Piore and Sabel 
1984; Stafford 1989; Drache and Gertler 1991; Porter 1991; Belanger, Edwards et al. 
1994; Van den Berg, Masi et al. 2001), the sign of times seems to be a translation of 
such call into labor market flexibility (Osterman 1988; Casey, Dragendorf et al. 1989; 
The Economist 1994) and wage flexibility (e.g., Lindbeck and Snower 1988; 
Blanchflower 1991; Forslund 1994; Van den Berg, Masi et al. 2001).
According to the neoclassical economic perspective, wage flexibility is the most 
effective means of generating allocative efficiency in the labor market under highly 
competitive conditions. As a matter of fact, it is argued that a certain amount of 
employment insecurity is necessary to induce the requisite response to wage flexibility. 
Conversely, excessive labor market and/or income security renders workers more 
resistant to such flexibility (see Van den Berg, Masi et al. 2001 for a discussion).
Two essential dimensions of labor market instability are instability in employment and 
instability in earnings (Turner 2001), whereby economic risk is being transferred
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increasingly from employers to employees through contingent employment and 
remuneration, thus promoting the kind of employment relationships that is characterized 
by opportunism, mistrust, and low commitment (Heery and Salmon 2000). Despite the 
uncertainty and risks involved in applying the flexibility model in transitional and 
socialist economic settings, there is evidence that Chinese enterprises are beginning to 
pursue similar strategies, with the support of the state, to increase productivity and 
competitiveness (see Child 1994; Warner 1995; Benson, Debroux et al 2000).
The “insecurity thesis”. A key proposition of a coherent set of social studies on recent 
change in employment relations, collectively referred by Heery and Salmon and their 
contemporaries as the “insecurity thesis”, summed up the predicament of workers: 
“Employment has become more insecure and unstable in the sense that both continued 
employment and the level of remuneration have become less predictable and contingent 
on factors which lie beyond the employee’s control” (Heery and Salmon 2000: 2). These 
and other associated claims constituted a deeply critical assessment of uncertainty and 
risks facing today’s insecure workforce.
A sensible starting point for understanding their potential impact against the backdrop of 
an insecure workplace is to explore the two dimensions along which insecurity is 
defined: (1) the increased risk of involuntary job loss and unpredictability of earnings 
which can be measured through a combination of indicators, including job tenure, 
compulsory redundancy, the incidence of contingent contracts and the use of variable 
pay; and (2) the cognitive and affective attitudes of employees toward the uncertainty 
and risks associated with employment and earnings (see Heery & Salmon, 2000).
The following subsections -  employment risks for all and compensation risks for all - 
represent objective assessments of the extent of employment and compensation risks in 
today’s workplace that is in line with the first defined dimension of insecurity quoted 
above. These discussions should help lay a foundation for the development of a 
theoretical perspective that is capable of capturing the cognitive and affective attitudes 
of employees that are highlighted in the second, above-defined dimension of insecurity.
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4.1.1 Employment Risks for All
“Everybody is going around on pins and needles wondering i f  they'll be the next. We are 
all reminded o f what's happening every day. We have rows and rows o f empty cubicles 
and desks. ” (An AT&T employee quoted on in Time, February 16, 1987: 38).
Over the past two decades, the most dramatic changes in the labor market have been 
marked by a notable rate of unemployment and increased insecurity with concerned 
expressions of fear by employees and self-employed workers alike (Beynon 1997). 
While employment risk traditionally refers to the chances of losing the current job 
involuntarily and of securing a new job (Gregg, Knight et al. 2000), it may be extended 
to refer also to the risk associated with underemployment. In light of the growth in 
contingent and casual work, this extended interpretation is consistent with Beck’s 
prediction about the merge of the future into “a new system of flexible, plural, risky 
forms of underemployment” (Beck 1992: 144).
In the 1980s, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the U.S. workforce was faced 
with a massive scale of workforce reduction. Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986), in 
particular, stated that “threats of large employment losses” had become the 
environmental pressures that set the stage for significant changes in collective 
bargaining in industry. Toward the turn of the century, as unemployment rate has 
steadily decreased to an encouraging four per cent (ILO 2001), the extent of workforce 
reduction and fear of job loss may no longer apply in many sectors of the U.S. economy.
The same appears true for the U.K., as large-scale workforce reductions in the 1980s and 
1990s seemed to have subsided and unemployment rate dropped to a low five per cent in 
2000 (Dickens, Gregg et al. 2003). But with low levels of employment protection in both 
countries (OECD 1999), which gives firms increased agency to not employ individuals 
on permanent, open-ended contracts in view of economic uncertainty, workers are set to 
remain vulnerable to the risk of unemployment (Bergstrom and Storrie 2003). Indeed, 
even for Japanese firms, which were hailed for their tremendous success especially in 
the 1980s due, among other factors, to its lifetime employment policies have begun to 
bow to the pressures of flexibility in labor management (see Oaklander 1991).
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Unemployment figures. Given the current economic conditions, unemployment seems 
relatively under control in the U.S. and U.K. But employment risks seem to have 
magnified around the globe between 1990 -  2000, with high, (near-) double-digit 
unemployment rates in: (1) most other advanced industrialized countries such as 
Belgium (10%), Finland (11%), France (14%), Germany (9%), Greece (17%), Italy 
(16%), and Spain (23%); (2) most Latin American countries such as Argentina (14%), 
Brazil (12%), Columbia (23%), and Panama (17%); (3) most of the Middle East; and (4) 
most of Africa (ILO 2001).
Furthermore, during the same 10-year period, in most transitional economies such as 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, and Poland, unemployment rates have all 
dramatically increased to double-digit figures from the former long-term status of (near-) 
full employment (see ILO 2001). Considering that vast “hidden unemployment” 
typically existed in transitional economies (Woodward 1995), actual unemployment 
might have been a lot higher. In China, for example, urban unemployment at the turn of 
the century was reported at less than six million or about three per cent according to 
official figures (see SSB 2003). But actual (registered and non-registered) urban 
unemployment for the same period was estimated at 20 -  22 million or nearing 11% by 
local experts (e.g., Wang 1999; Cai, Wang et al. 2001).
With an estimated 30 million or at least one third of China’s state industrial workforce 
being admittedly redundant (Wang 1999), it is expected that an increasing number will 
be collectively displaced and laid off at an accelerated speed during “deepening of 
reforms” (Tang 1998; Sun 2000b; Holz 2003). Structural unemployment is also expected 
to rise following the nation’s WTO accession as millions of farmers are expected to 
transfer to non-agricultural sectors (Zhai and Wang 2002), further magnifying the 
employment risks for all.
Emergent employment practices. Another way of assessing employment risks is by 
examining the emergent employment arrangements at the firm level such as “lean and 
mean” workforce restructuring strategies that are driven by functional flexibility (i.e., 
the reorganization of task structures and production systems) and numerical flexibility 
(i.e., the reduction in employment security) (Macias 2003). The latter is often a
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consequence of the reduction of hierarchical layers positively framed by organizations as 
"strategic layoffs”, "rightsizing" or "delayering" (Howard 1995). A frequent byproduct 
of these activities is the “export of uncertainty” to individuals through subcontracting 
and other forms of precarious employment (Wallulis 1998).
Precarious employment. Precarious employment (Allen and Henry 1996) refers to 
nonstandard work (Beynon 1997), destandardized work (Beck 1992), and employment 
of a part-time nature. They represent a trend which is said to be reversing the tendency 
to de-casualize employment in the earlier part of the post-war period (Brown 1997). 
What is important to note is that although their occupants are on part-time, rather than 
full-time or permanent contracts, nonstandard seems to make up a large part of the 
“core” workforce of the organization in which they are employed (Beynon 1997).
It is difficult to demonstrate unambiguously the absolute and relative increase of those 
engaged in non-standard work, but Hutton (1995; 1996) suggested that 30% of adult 
workers in Britain are in some form of nonstandard or insecure employment. Such an 
estimate would have to include those in jobs that are nominally of indefinite duration but 
recognized by their occupants to be insecure, but is probably a better reflection of the 
extent of insecurity of employment than narrower definitions provide (Brown 1997). In 
other developed countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, among 
the growth of precarious employmemt, limited duration contracts (LDCs) were also 
reported to be replacing the more stable, traditional employment arrangements at a 
considerable rate (Bergstrom and Storrie 2003).
Overall, precarious employment may also be more apparent in deindustrialized societies 
where information and communication technologies (ICT) as a sector has emerged, 
creating a new labor market through the swift advance of technologies and open borders 
of global competition (ILO 2001). In this sector, the mode of long-term employment 
with one firm is said to be a thing of the past and is replaced by a “Hollywood model”, 
whereby individuals who were once employees are now contractors or entrepreneurs, 
working for multiple employers, changing jobs frequently, using online global networks 
as a talent agency. While integrated global markets of this kind could generate jobs, they 
also create a high degree of vulnerability due to rapid spillover effects through ICT, as
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occurred in the capital, equity, and currency markets in Asia, Brazil, and the Russian 
Federation in the late 1990s (ILO 2001).
As the workplace is increasingly populated by a contingent workforce of part-time and 
temporary workers, independent contractors, and other workers employed in transient 
relations with their employers (Cornfield, Campbell et al. 2001), the growth in unstable 
work inevitably increases the risks of employment for all workers (Belous 1989; Tilly 
1996; Rubin and Smith 2001).
4.1.2 Compensation Risks for All
As discussed in the preceding section, economic recession, global competition, and 
deindustrialization have had organizations trimming staff, reducing hiring, and making 
more use of the contingent workforce. In addition to their impact on employment 
instability, these environmental forces have heightened the pressure for organizations to 
adopt new compensation policies as a catalyst for change and particularly in 
“correcting” the entrenched entitlement attitude (Wilson 1995; Compensation and 
Benefits Review 1996) and risk aversive mentality of employees (e.g., see Gross and 
Duncan 1999).
Various contextual changes -  such as the pattern of employment, government support 
for particular initiatives to encourage financial participation, and the decline of 
collective bargaining -  have given employers an increasing freedom in determining both 
the composition and level of remuneration (Brown and Walsh 1994). In particular, the 
decline in unionism means egalitarian union wage policies are being increasingly 
replaced by higher pay dispersion (Metcalf, Hansen et al. 2001), thus increasing 
compensation risk for all.
At the same time, the new freedom has allowed pay determination to be increasingly 
linked to the performance of the individual company or business unit, the team or work 
group and, inescapably, the individual employees. New approaches include person- 
related as opposed to job-related pay (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Mahoney 1992),
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more decentralized pay determination systems (Jackson, Leopold et al. 1993; Murlis
1996), more flexible benefits schemes (IDS 1991), and perhaps most significantly, more 
“variable” or “at risk” pay (C B I1994/95).
“New Pay”, More Risks
The key development in the use of more contingent pay systems, known collectively as 
the “new pay” movement, has dominated the prescriptive pay management literature 
(see, for example, Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1987; Meyer 1987; Mahoney 1992; 
Armstrong and Murlis 1994; Lawler 1995; Zingheim and Schuster 1995a; Zingheim and 
Schuster 1995b) since the 1980s (Heery 1996; White 1996). Among its 
recommendations for pay to be aligned with ongoing changes in business strategy rather 
than simply left to union or legislative pressure, is the newly proclaimed function for 
compensation systems to reinforce flexibility and responsiveness to market forces.
It is often claimed by employers that aligning employees’ pay to “value creation” breeds 
a sense of shared destiny (see McNutt 1991). But since outcome measures such as 
profits or share values may have little to do with work performance even at the senior 
level of an organization (Femie and Metcalf 1998), the outcome may simply be a 
heightened sense of uncertainty and insecurity. As a new “way of thinking” (Lawler 
1995), the new pay calls for the use of all possible “ammunition” -  base pay, variable 
pay, and indirect pay -  to hit the proper performance targets (see Schuster and Zingheim 
1992 for a review). In economists’ parlance, more pay is “at risk” (Jacoby 1999).
The growing wage insecurity and instability has become a feature of the restructured 
American workplace as managers are increasingly thinking of labor as a variable rather 
than fixed cost and putting more pay at risk (Wysocki 1995). As today’s businesses take 
a bigger risk in producing products and services that will have increasingly shorter life 
spans, this risk is being transferred to employees in the form of variable pay that 
replaces traditional merit raises or Teflon-coated reward that has dominated 
compensation plans for the past 30 years” (Davis 1994).
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Among the more aggressive devices of employers to transfer risk to the employees, as 
more extensively reported in the business press than in the academic media, are the 
practices of broadbanding (for example, see Kenneth 1992; Zingheim and Schuster 
1995a; Armitage 1997). Broadbanding refers to the use of the use of a few, wide salary 
ranges or “bands” to flatten organizational structure and reduce the number of jobs 
(Zingheim and Schuster 1995a). It replaces the traditional, rigid salary hierarchies that 
proceed by small steps and allows salary increases without having to recreate junior or 
middle management layers or promote the incumbent. Under such a system, a person 
might stay in one pay category throughout an entire career with the firm (Kenneth 1992; 
Murlis 1996; Armitage 1997).
Another controversial device that is becoming increasingly commonplace, albeit being 
harshly criticized from an ethical point of view, is the practice of regrading. Regrading 
involves the revamping of the pay scale by inviting existing staff to reapply for their 
own jobs under a new pay structure that offers less protection and more instability 
(Armitage 1997). The emergence of such a practice does not only mean that employees 
can no longer take their existing job or pay statuses for granted, but also gives out a 
strong message that no one is being protected from the status quo. This message is 
reinforced by the application of variable pay not just among senior executives or sales 
staff but all functions.
Typically an organization may have a variety of different plans, each uniquely suited to 
different employee groups and/or functions. The trend is to direct incentives to specific 
classes of employees -  e.g., incentive stock options for the CEO, cash bonuses based on 
profits for managers, incentive plans for the sale staff and gainsharing for production 
line workers (Abbot and Kleiner 1992). The trend is also toward “portfolio” 
management in which pay plans are divided into regions. Within regions, pay scales are 
divided into categories of start-up, growth, revitalization, and even termination. It comes 
down to being flexible (Compensation and Benefits Review 1996). As such, the 
portfolio approach enables the organization to target specific pay plans to the roles and 
tasks of employees consistent with the overall competitive strategy of the firm. From the 
perspective of risk reduction, it also helps to make sure that no one can be insulated from 
the risks and fortunes of a challenging marketplace (Wilson 1995).
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Pay variability and unpredictability. One element of the trend toward more flexible 
pay systems that are more strategically aligned with complex, changing business 
environments (Heneman, Ledford et al. 2000; Lawler 2000) is to link pay and 
performance more tightly and increase the variability of pay (Deckop, Merriman et al. 
2004). But variable pay plans are by their very nature at risk (Wilson 1995). This mean 
that the payout can go up, and crucially, down (CBI 1994/95). In the worst scenario, 
payout may not even occur. As a matter of fact, this is an ordinary event among an 
increasingly number of Chinese enterprises that have incurred losses and subsequently 
large amounts of back-pay. Although one may argue that variable pay can offer workers 
the opportunity to share the good times, the problem is that by default they have to also 
share the declines.
The desirable qualities of earnings are quantity and security, the latter representing a 
dimension of supreme importance to many (Lane 1991). The outlook for both the 
quantity and security of earnings, however, seem poor. As a matter of fact, as presented 
below, there is strong evidence to suggest that today’s workforce is increasingly dealt 
the blow of not just variability in pay as is manifested in the form of variable pay and 
reduced pay increases but perhaps more frequently, wage freezes and pay cuts.
In the U.S., for example, more than 11% of the organizations included in a survey 
conducted by Coopers & Lybrand survey of 1,000 companies in 40 industries had a pay 
freeze in 1992 and many were reported to have increased consideration of alternative 
pay-for-performance plans such as gainsharing, skill-based pay, and small group 
incentives. Also, all levels of employees received lower annual pay increases in 1993 
than they did in 1992. As a matter of fact, the new pay guidelines averaged 4.6% to 
4.7% for non-management employees and only 4.9% for executives, the lowest figures 
in 20 years (Williams 1992).
This is not all because today’s workers are also likely to find themselves at an increased 
level of risks at the operational level. For example, workers whose performance cannot 
be defended by straightforward, quantifiable performance measures (as would be the 
case with most non-executive and non-sales positions) are exposed to risks of non­
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standardized and therefore continually re-definable and revisable performance targets 
and of subjective judgment in the process of evaluation.
What magnifies the risk factor is the trend toward pay delegation in both the private and 
public sectors whereby divisions and units within an organization are being allowed 
more and more autonomy and flexibility in pay plan design and wage determination at 
the local level (Murlis 1996). In fact, pay delegation has been a prominent and 
intensified feature in China’s wage reform policies (Sun 2000a). The fact that the 
process of change in the design and distribution of pay is no longer as cumbersome and 
bureaucratic as before means that changes can be swifter, less predictable and more 
frequent, thus further compounds the risks for employees.
While organizations endeavor to transfer more risk to employees through “new pay”, 
shareholders as a powerful economic actor are seeking at the same time to pervert 
threats to their security and reduce their own risks. This is regrettable because unlike the 
organization and their shareholders who are in a stronger position to spread their risks, 
most employees are dependent on their remuneration and have a diminishing role in 
influencing its outcome (Blair 1995). Despite the rhetoric about employee involvement, 
partnership, and “mutual gains” that flow through the new pay literature, it is possible to 
discern a fairly hard-edged set of proposals for transferring the risks inherent in 
economic activity from those who are powerful to those who are less able to bear them 
(Heery 1996).
According to the American Productivity & Quality Center, 75% of employers now use 
at least one form of nontraditional pay plan, and about 80% of these plans were adopted 
in the past five years. Most of the plans share two traits: (1) They put more of each 
employee’s pay at risk; (2) they link that pay more closely to performance. Incentive pay 
coaxes workers to produce more and lets compensation costs rise and fall with the 
company’s fortunes (Perry 1988). This makes variable pay more attractive to employers 
than to employees because it brings remuneration more in line with the employers’ 
“ability to pay” (CBI 1994/95).
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The fact that variable pay allows organizations greater flexibility and control over labor 
costs by the shift of risk to the employees (Bartol and Locke 2000) helps to explain why 
the compensation approach has spread from Fortune 100 to Fortune 1000 companies 
over the past two decades (see Marshall 1995), and from the private sector to the 
medical profession (e.g., see Hagland 1997) and various departments and agencies of the 
civil service (IRRR 1994; Murlis 1996).
As pointed out by Heery (1996), the new pay approach inevitably increases employee 
risk in a number of ways. First and most obviously, it does so by seeking to reduce the 
proportion of total remuneration comprising consolidated, base salary and guaranteed 
benefits in favor of bonuses and other contingent payments. Second, it sets out to 
straightforwardly penalize employee noncompliance. In so doing, it restricts employee 
freedom to gauge one’s effort level according to the attractiveness of extra rewards, thus 
reversing the traditional pay management thinking of making workers work harder by 
way of inducement. Third, even if employees subsequently become more compelled to 
meet performance expectations, an issue remains not so much pertaining to objective 
productivity measures but “soft” performance measures that focus on elements of quality 
and customer value (see Schuster and Zingheim 1992). This is an area where workers 
are perhaps dealt the hardest blow of, if  not also confusion about, uncertainties and risks 
in relation to pay.
Examples are various forms of contingent pay that are subject to ratings of peer 
appraisal and team work, of customer satisfaction and retention, and of repeat business 
and corporate performance; and performance indicators that are not feasibly or readily 
measurable, or that require the employee to support a means to an end that is against his 
work ethics or normative belief. These “multi-source performance measures”, as new 
pay gurus Schuster and Zingheim coined them, are likely to generate a substantial level 
of uncertainty and risks because they are subjective, susceptible to influences beyond the 
individual employee’s control, and are subject to change without notice.
Risks of decreasing benefits and pensions. The demographic shifts and globalization 
processes are reconfiguring the temporal, spatial, and social organizations of work and 
are redefining employment relationships, including patterns of risk and risk bearing
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pertaining to employment and pensions (Shuey and O’Rand 2004). As companies strive 
to be more competitive and get more for less from a downsized workforce, many have 
cut back on health benefits, pensions and retirement health care coverage (Hall and 
Mirvis 1995). In the U.S., for example, although the proportion of private-sector 
employers offering health benefits has not changed, the eligibility rules have, resulting 
in limited spousal coverage for core long-term fulltime staff and restricted access to 
peripheral employees in general. In addition, there has been a fundamental shift from 
defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans (Ippolito 1995).
This evidence presents a consistent and increasingly strong message that more risks are 
being shifted from the employer to the employee not just in pay but also in various 
aspects of non-cash compensation risks. Researchers in both the U.S. and Britain 
suggested that insecurity may have been one reason why wage inflation remained 
relatively subdued in the mid-1990s, despite significant falls in aggregate unemployment 
(Robinson 2000). While it was acknowledged that employment risks cannot be studied 
in isolation from compensation risks (Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2000; Guiso, 
Jappelli et al. 2002), the proposed relationship provides further justification for due 
attention to be drawn to the issue of compensation risks and its possible impact on 
insecurity or fear in the motivation process. In the section below, we shall examine 
compensation risks.
4.2 Research on Employment and Compensation Risks
Existing research in the field of motivation and current practices in employment and 
compensation are quickly leading to a paradox. On the one hand, the achievement-based 
theories of goal setting (Locke 1968; Latham and Locke 1979) and expectancy (Vroom 
1964; Porter and Lawler 1968) tend to emphasize the significance of rewards to 
motivation. Rather than a flexible and adaptive workforce, a happy and productive 
workforce, is heralded in the literature as the primary source of competitive advantage 
(for example, see Staw 1991; McKenzie and Lee 1998).
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Accordingly, research on employment and compensation systems and employee 
attitudes are directed to the outcome measures of performance (Schuster and Zingheim 
1992; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998) organizational commitment (Davy, Kinicki et 
al. 1997; Luthans and Sommer 1999; Allen, Freeman et al. 2001), turnover intentions 
(Davy, Kinicki et al. 1997; Allen, Freeman et al. 2001), job satisfaction (Davy, Kinicki 
et al. 1997; Luthans and Sommer 1999), satisfaction with pay (Martin 1987; Cropanzano 
and Folger 1991), and perceived justice (Brockner, Grover et al. 1987; Brockner 1988).
At the same time, however, there is a rapidly growing use of employment and 
compensation practices that multiply employee uncertainty and risks. Increasingly 
precarious work replaces permanent employment (Treu 1992; Allen and Henry 1996) 
and variable pay or “pay at risk” replaces guaranteed base pay and entitlement bonuses 
(Schuster and Zingheim 1992; Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2000). The growth of 
uncertainty and risks surrounding prevailing employment and compensation practices 
not just in capitalist societies but also in socialist economies, not just in commerce but 
also in the public sector suggests the need for a theory to understand motivation under 
uncertainty and risks.
Analyzing the phenomenon of significant increase in employment and compensation 
risks will require more theoretical guidance than past work on motivation has received. 
As a matter of fact, existing motivation studies generally do not consider the issue of 
employment risks. And the compensation literature discusses risks mainly at the 
executive level. The following two subsections succinctly capture such findings.
4.2.1 Study of Employment Risks
The study of employment risks has attracted the increased attention of researchers in the 
field of social sciences over the last four decades (e.g., McGregor 1960; Miyazaki and 
Neary 1983; Lane 1991; Beck 1992; Lane, Cannella et al. 1998; Adam, Beck et al. 2000; 
Wilkinson 2001). This is understandable given the significant level of job insecurity that 
is being felt among the growing majority of today’s workforce. Another reason for the 
important treatment of the subject is the importance of job security itself to the average
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worker. As Lane (1991) pointed out from the classic study by Sheppard and Herrick 
(1972), in the U.S., about two-thirds of all employed workers, regardless of age, think of 
job security as “very important,” only a few percentage points fewer than those ranking 
“good pay” as similarly important.
The study of employment risks has long been taken up in the economics literature. First, 
it was Adam Smith who referred to the “anxious and desponding moments” that 
employment inconstancy or uncertainty imposes. And if workers are assumed to have 
the usual neoclassical utility functions, then they are averse to variation in their hours of 
work, instability in their employment, and fluctuation in their earnings. Employment 
variability or employment risk can be considered in terms of the probability of layoff or 
unemployment or the probability of over- and underemployment, or both (Gaston 1991).
Studies in this area typically address the outcomes of employment risk in occupational 
choice, unionization, and wage determination. For instance, Gaston (1991) found that 
workers in the mining and construction industries, which typically face high cyclical 
employment variability, still attract compensating differentials for employment 
uncertainty. This is consistent with the notion that workers will purchase higher units of 
insured employment variability with a higher income.
Risk aversion. Furthermore, Guiso, Jappelli, and Pistaferri (2002) found that risk 
aversion is a predictor of income risk in that the more risk-averse select themselves into 
occupations with low-income risk (i.e., stable income). This finding is consistent with 
the claim that the concern for security is a major factor in the traditionally long queue of 
Italians seeking civil service jobs. Also, the risk-averse tend to self-select in jobs with 
low probability of low-income realizations. It is also in line with he argument that the 
poor will seek low-pay-high-security jobs because when amount and stability of income 
are tradeoffs they prefer stability to amount (Lane 1991).
Two other areas of study in the economics literature are worthy of note. Heywood 
(1989) revealed that the degree of employment security strongly influences the 
probability of unionization because of compensating wage differentials. In addition, 
Mayo and Murray (1991) showed that risk of permanent employment separation is
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negatively correlated with firm size. But when this measure of employment risk is 
included as a determinant of wages, the independent influence of firm size on wage 
vanishes. This implies a significant correlation between wage level and employment 
risk, which found support in the work of Wiseman, Gomex-Mejia, and Fugate (2000) 
and Guiso, Jappelli, and Pistaferri (2002).
Employment risk when studied in the form of job insecurity at the worker level and 
within a specific organizational context is defined as “one’s expectations about 
involuntary discontinuity in a job situation” (Davy, Kinicki et al. 1997). The emphasis is 
on the consequences in employee attitudes. Study in this area may be classified into two 
categories: the industrial psychology and organizational behavior literature, and the 
industrial sociology literature.
The focus of the first category of studies is on survivor reactions to downsizing and 
employees’ reactions to job insecurity. Survivor reactions studies have focused on 
exploring perceived equity and trust, and the change in organizational commitment (e.g., 
Brockner, Grover et al. 1987; Brockner, Wiesenfeld et al. 1995). For example, Brockner, 
Grover et al. (1987) posited that survivors react most negatively when they identify with 
layoff victims who were perceived to have been inadequately compensated, and the 
negative reaction took the form of lowered organizational commitment.
Furthermore, Mishra and Spreitzer (1998) found that trust in top management plays a 
powerful role in determining survivor responses. According to the study’s theoretical 
focus on cognitive appraisal and coping (Lazarus and Folkman 1984), how individuals 
respond to a potentially stressful situation, such as a downsizing, is dependent on how 
they appraise and interpret the situation. As such, if survivors do not trust that the top 
management is competent and honest with employees through the downsizing, they are 
likely to reduce their organizational commitment or respond in another destructive way 
(Allen, Freeman et al. 2001).
Research on employees’ reactions to job insecurity has typically explored mental and 
psychological well-being and turnover intentions (e.g., Van Vuuren, Klandermans et al. 
1990; Davy, Kinicki et al. 1997). For example, Davy, Kinicki, and Scheck (1997)
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showed that job satisfaction and organizational commitment mediate the effects of job 
security on withdrawal cognitions. Also, Van Vuuren, Klandermans et al (1990) argued 
that if insecure employees respond actively, their activity consists of attempts to restore 
job security by seeking another job or by engaging in industrial action.
As far as the industrial sociology literature is concerned, as Brown (1997) has pointed 
out, there is a lot of evidence that employees who are or feel that they are insecure will 
take measures to try to protect work they have. Examples are the restriction of output -  
to make existing work last as long as possible -  and the defense of jobs through 
demarcation and opposition to dilution, as was common in shipbuilding for instance, can 
all be plausibly attributed to the employees in question fearing that they would otherwise 
lose their share of available work.
Conspicuous by its absence, though, is research into the motivational consequences of 
job insecurity in the motivation literature itself. Workers are increasingly likely to face 
employment risk against the backdrop of discouraging labor market realities at the 
macroeconomic level and of the employer’s increasing risk shifting at the organizational 
level (Edwards 1979). Regardless of the widely reported levels of uncertainty and risks 
that are surrounding today’s employment situation, the phenomenon of employment risk 
or job insecurity has received little attention in the motivation literature.
A possible explanation for the omission is that the leading, achievement-based theories 
of goal setting and expectancy, despite their multiple extensions and refinements over a 
period of more than three decades, remain focused on issues of goal specificity and goal 
difficulty (Latham and Baldes 1975; Locke 1978; Latham and Locke 1979; Locke and 
Latham 1984; Mento, Locke et al. 1992; Mitchell, Thompson et al. 2000) and 
predictability (Porter and Lawler 1968; Lawler and Suttle 1973; Campbell and Pritchard 
1976; Klein 1991; Mento, Locke et al. 1992; Tubbs, Boehne et al. 1993; Daniels and 
Mitchell 1995) rather than account for uncertainty and risks.
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4.2.2 Study of Compensation Risks
Although compensation risk as studied almost exclusively in the economics literature 
relates to risks that are typically associated with contingent pay for executives (see, for 
example, Balkin and Banister 1993; Gomez-Mejia, Paulin et al. 1996; Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman 1997; Gray and Cannella 1997), the term should be expanded to include pay 
for all workers in today’s environment where employers seem less inclined to insulate 
employment relations from market forces and to exclude non-executive members of the 
workforce from “pay at risk”.
This argument is based on the very fact that organizations are moving away from 
traditional compensation programs, and toward more flexible pay systems that are 
aligned with more complex, changing business environments, and thus increasing the 
variability of pay for all staff (Deckop, Merriman et al. 2004). This is the case also with 
Japanese firms, which do not seem immune to the pressures of wage cuts and increased 
variability of pay even for the core employees (e.g., see Holman 1995; Sekigawa 2003).
The notion of risk is central to the study of compensation and has been growing in 
importance during the past two decades as a greater proportion of pay received by 
workers comes in variable form through such programs as gainsharing, key contributor 
bonuses, on-sport awards, team bonuses, and profit sharing (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 
1998; Martocchio 1998; Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2000). That said, most of the 
practitioner and scholarly literature on compensation does not devote much effort to 
understanding how variable pay or “pay at risk” affects employee behavior and 
decisions other than at the senior executive level (Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2000). 
This concern is shared by Bartol and Locke (2000), who acknowledged in their recent 
review of the incentives and motivation literature that there is insufficient knowledge 
regarding the impact of variable pay on employee motivation and performance despite 
its increased use in organizations.
Rather than providing a comprehensive review of the economics literature on executive 
compensation, a more effective approach is to delineate the emerging trends in and 
concerns about compensation risks that are relevant to variable pay or pay at risk for
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employees in general. The latest development in CEO pay, as captured by Miller, 
Wiseman, and Gomez-Mejia (2002), is that it has evolved from the successful attempts 
to find blanket evidence of incentive alignment (linking a portion of executive pay to 
specific performance criteria) at the top executive ranks toward the identification of 
those conditions under which incentive alignment and, thus risk sharing with CEOs, is 
most appropriate (Gray and Cannella 1997; Bloom and Milkovich 1998). Interestingly 
enough, it is at this point in time that cross-learning between the employee compensation 
and executive pay literatures seems most meaningful as employee compensation takes 
on unprecedented risk in terms of both level and magnitude and the inquiry of executive 
pay begins to give contextual issues special attention.
The employee and executive compensation literatures present differing approaches in 
analyzing and understanding behavior, I address the differing premises, assumptions, 
and arguments of the two bodies of research not necessarily with a view to reconcile 
them, but to present to the reader that an appreciation of both views is important in order 
to have a more complete understanding of reality. I shall first highlight the commonality 
between the two approaches, and then proceed to discuss their differences.
To begin with, a common and questionable assumption between agency and work 
motivation theories is self-interest as the inherent human nature, which has been 
criticized by Hirsch, Michaels and Friedman (1987) and Eisenhardt (1989) as too 
narrow. The problem perhaps is not so much its single view as is its assumption that 
self-interests of individuals are competitively related to each other in their exchange 
because as Wright and Cho (1992) pointed out, self-interests of individuals may be 
cooperatively interrelated within some organizations.
Along the same lines, Lane (1991) noted a variety of reasons behind people’s dedication 
to doing a good job that are not necessarily instrumentally based, among them are the 
pleasure they find in their working activities, meeting the challenges that increases their 
sense of personal control, fulfilling a sense of duty or a pressing need to achieve some 
higher standard of excellence. As suggested also by Rutledge and Karim (1999), there is 
an increasing recognition, based on cognitive moral development theory, that ethical and 
moral considerations constrain economic behavior of individuals. When normative
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 125
beliefs play an active role in guiding actions, trust may be a potential characteristic of 
the principal-agent relationship as is possible in a highly socialized or clan-oriented firm 
(Ouchi 1979). At the same time, contracting, monitoring, and bonding efforts could be 
minimized with a negligible residual loss and subsequently contribute to the efficiency 
of the firm (Wright, Mukheiji et al. 2001).
Employee pay vs. executive compensation literatures. Let us now turn to the 
differences in focus between the two literatures. The inquiry of the employee literature 
as it now stands focuses on performance rather than motivational outcomes of rewards 
and is based on the presumption of a stable, well-defined, and predictable environment. 
(See detailed review in Chapter 4). Importantly differently, executive compensation 
research emphasizes the principal-agent “risk sharing problem” (Eisenhardt 1989) and 
thereby accounts for uncertainty and risks on the outset.
While the purpose of introducing variable pay to broad groups of the workforce is to 
combat the entitlement mentality and control labor cost according to the firm’s ability to 
pay (Zingheim and Schuster 1995b), the purpose of “pay at risk” at the executive level is 
to counter opportunism and reduce monitoring cost (Wright and Cho 1992). A critical 
assumption or requisite for providing “pay at risk” is that CEO effort to influence firm 
outcomes is efficient and/or effectual.
It is important to note that the purpose of agency theory, which provides the theoretical 
framework for the bulk of inquiry on executive compensation, is to help determine the 
most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship. For example, in the 
case of complete information or observable behavior, behavior-based contract is most 
efficient. On the contrary, in the case of incomplete information or unobservable 
behavior, the principal may choose to either invest in a reporting system or contract on 
the outcome of the agent’s behavior (Eisenhardt 1989).
Along these lines, the theory suggests that task programmability, information systems 
(measured by the span of control), and outcome uncertainty variables (measured by 
number of competitors and failure rates) significantly predict the firm’s salary versus 
commission choice for the retail sales personnel (Eisenhardt 1988). Compared to
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employee variable pay that is tied to firm success, however, sales commission-based pay 
does not have as great a risk exposure because the commission is almost always 
guaranteed when individual performance targets are met.
The calculus of agency theory suggests that because outcome uncertainty and cause- 
effect ambiguity are low in firms with low risk, rewarding CEOs for predictable firm- 
level results that are largely disassociated from strategic choices (Powell 1992) makes 
little sense (Miller, Wiseman et al. 2002). Furthermore, it is claimed that risk sharing is 
less desirable when performance outcomes are driven by exogenous uncontrollable 
factors, such as business cycle effects (Miller, Wiseman et al. 2002).
This argument, however, does not seem to have much relevance for employee variable 
pay that is tied to firm success as the tie is centered on the firm’s ability to pay rather 
than on the employee’s ability to influence. In this connection, the more uncontrollable 
firm performance outcomes are, the more the employer is likely to prefer to shift the risk 
to the employees. Against the backdrop of a turbulent business environment and the 
mounting pressure to control labor costs, risk shifting in the form of employee variable 
pay is thus likely.
Risk preferences. A final point of discussion concerns risk preferences. This is a crucial 
issue because it challenges the assumptions of both agency and existing motivation 
theories that individuals are inherently risk-averse and that risk preferences are static and 
uniform across individuals and situations (Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2000; Wright, 
Mukheiji et al. 2001).
Contrary to neoclassical assumptions, however, the burgeoning field of behavioral 
economics reveals that in practice, decision makers exhibit a variety of risk preferences, 
including risk seeking and risk neutrality (Asch and Quandt 1988; Lattimore, Baker et 
al. 1992; Smidts 1997). Risk preferences could also vary across choice contexts (Mowen 
and Mowen 1986; Lattimore, Baker et al. 1992; Highhouse and Paese 1996), due to 
factors such as framing effects and judgment biases (Lopes 1987; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991) (see Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2000 for a review).
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These findings in behavioral economics represent exciting developments that challenge 
and enlighten at the same time existing perspectives on compensation risk and the study 
of risk in the general work context. I shall revisit some of these issues in the discussion 
of a proposed research framework in Chapter 6. Meanwhile, let us turn to the next 
section, on a proposed perspective of motivation under uncertainty and risks.
4.3 How W ork Motivation Theory Fares under Uncertainty and Risks
Before we evaluate the effectiveness of existing approaches to understanding 
motivation, it is helpful to take a step back and raise the important question of whether 
they represent scientific explanations of motivation or merely prescriptive delineations 
of what employers or managers should do to motivate their staff. The differentiation 
between theory and normative advice is that the former explains what happens in reality 
while the latter proposes what should ideally be done.
An examination of the theoretical context of the four leading theories of motivation, i.e., 
goal setting, reinforcement, expectancy, and equity -  may help clarify this issue. For 
instance, goal-setting theory promotes the cause of setting goals to help workers 
succeed. Reinforcement theory suggests that the supervisor give out rewards (and 
punishments) in such a way that these consequences are consistent and can be predicted 
by the employees so much so that they will encourage compliance and discourage 
noncompliance. Expectancy theory purports that rewards should be desirable and 
attainable at the same time. And finally, equity theory maintains that equity should be 
established to improve pay and job satisfaction.
While the above can be considered evidence that existing theories are of a prescriptive 
nature, it takes further substantiation to prove that they cannot be relied upon to predict 
motivation under uncertainty and risks. The issue at stake is whether and how existing 
theories may be limited in their predictions of motivation given the employment and 
compensation risks that exist in today’s workplace
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Table 4.1 highlights some of the situations of uncertainty and risks for which existing 
models are unable to generate a prediction due chiefly to the incompatibility of their 
theoretical contexts to today’s work environment. In this regard, it is worthy to note that 
rather than being peculiar or unique, the given examples are representative of the 
uncertainty and risks faced by many of today’s workers both in relation to compensation 
and employment as well as concerning the nature and processes of work.
Table 4.1
Limitation of Existing Theory in Predicting Motivation under 
Uncertainty and Risks
Leading theory Situations for which the model is limited in its predictions
Expectancy theory Payoff uncertainty: When attainability of payoffs cannot be predicted.
Adversity: When operating under severe resources constraints and 
contingencies that are beyond one’s control.
Goal-setting Noncompliance risk: When there is a risk that the worker will get
theory punished for the non-delivery of goals.
Ambiguity about goal difficulty: When the establishment of goal 
difficulty is affected by factors that are unstable or cannot be guaranteed 
(e.g., availability of supporting resources).
Non-specifiable goals: When it is not practical for performance output to 
be spelt out in advance due to the drive for work role flexibility, or the 
nature of work being exploratory or tentative.
Moving targets’. When clear, specific goals are continuously being 
revised, probably causing more frustration and confusion than 
encouragement.
Conflicting goals'. When workers are pressed with time or other resources 
to accomplish multiple tasks or when they report to more than one boss.
Reinforcement Environmental uncertainty: When an organization’s ability to administer
theory rewards and punishments is affected by environmental forces it cannot
predict or control.
Equity theory Risk aversion: When reactions to inequity expose the worker to the risks
of being considered inadaptable or inflexible.
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4.3.1 Adversity and Expectancy Theory
Payoff uncertainty. Expectancy theory is limited in at least two ways in generating 
predictions for motivation under uncertainty and risks. The first concerns payoff 
uncertainty, i.e., when the level of attainability of payoffs is uncertain and thus cannot 
realistically be predicted. This would be the case for variable pay, which puts employee 
pay “at risk” by not only making it contingent on work performance but also floating it 
with profitability and the firm’s ability to pay.
However, payoff uncertainty would not have been a major concern if work were 
conducted in a scientific management setting. Because activities would then be 
documented in lengthy job descriptions and as long as workers obeyed the rules and 
performance dictated by the machine that they tended, they could normally expect to not 
only keep their jobs but receive standard pay increases (Wood 1989; Kalleberg 2001a).
Adversity. The second situation in which the expectancy model is unable to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for motivation is adversity. Because when the attainability of 
payoffs is low or “too far off” in future, the theory would necessarily predict a low 
motivational outcome. Explaining the variation in motivation in the situation of 
adversity is an important concern because it reflects the reality facing the employees in 
my research organization.
To begin with, the core operational unit under study has been going through large-scale 
downsizing and over the previous three years and each of the five surviving production 
facilities was given an annual staff reduction quota to help further streamline the 
operation. Dedicated the workers may be, there was no guarantee of continued 
employment as they were all on fixed-term contracts. On the pay front, not only bonuses 
but also base pay are deductible. While the workers may risk losing up to 40% of their 
base pay if they missed a production target or had an industrial accident, they also find 
bonuses not only infrequent and but also “extremely difficult to get”, because they are 
given out only when a technological breakthrough in work processes is successfully 
initiated by the workers themselves.
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4.3.2 Risk Aversion and Goal-Setting Theory
Although goal-setting theory does not share the problems illustrated above, there exist 
other issues that prevent the theory from generating predictions of motivation under 
situations of uncertainty and risks. Five issues are at stake here. The first three deal 
directly with the key determinants of goal setting theory and the remaining two are 
concerned with other disputable assumptions of the theory.
Ambiguity about goal difficulty. The problem of ambiguity about goal difficulty exists 
when the condition of goal difficulty depends on factors that are unstable and cannot be 
guaranteed (e.g., availability of supporting resources) during or throughout the course of 
work. With the prevailing organizational policy to cut costs and stay competitive (Smith
1997), it is reasonable to assume that employees at organizations that adopt these 
measures are adversely affected. According to goal-setting theory, a main determinant of 
motivation is goal difficulty. But in situations where the level of goal difficulty is 
ambiguous and cannot be ascertained, it may not be feasible to apply the theory.
Non-specifiable goals. The second issue that puts goal-setting’s explanatory power to 
test is in regard to goals that are inherently non-specifiable, i.e., when it is not practical 
for performance output to be spelt out in advance due to the drive for work role 
flexibility (Murphy and Jackson 1999), or the nature of work being developmental, 
exploratory, or tentative. Given the development from a product- to a knowledge-based 
economy, the increased use of contingent staff, and the drive toward flexibility and 
adaptability, incidents of organizations expecting workers to be responsive and 
“flexible” in meeting the ongoing demands of their work are likely to likely to increase 
(Meulders and Wilkins 1987). While goal specificity is a key determinant of motivation 
within the framework of goal-setting theory, in work situations where goals are not 
always definable in specific terms and can at best provide broad directions and 
guidelines, it becomes undesirable to rely on the theory to explain motivation.
Moving targets. The third issue deals not with the non-specifiable nature of work goals 
but the instability of goals after they have been clearly specified. While it can be argued 
that goal clarity reduces task ambiguity and minimizes the risks of ineffective input and
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 131
subsequent delays, and that goal specificity helps focus attention and resources on what 
is important, it is doubtful that the positive effects of such goals could not be 
undermined by their instability. Given the need for today’s organizations to continually 
revise their strategies to adapt to changing business realities (Kanter 1989), the focus 
and specifics of performance requirements are expected to be revised accordingly. It is 
expected that such shifts will be more frequent than once a year if  an organization is 
undergoing extensive restructuring or reorganization.
Changes in corporate strategy would have been less problematic if  they coincided with 
periodic performance evaluations because performance targets for the new review period 
only need to be set accordingly. If, however, they took place in the middle of a 
performance review period, it is not likely that previously achieved performance based 
on old targets would be given much credit especially when they are no longer seen to 
contribute to firm success. Under these conditions, clear and specific goals are not likely 
to succeed in providing guidance and encouragement as goal setting theory predicts, but 
will possibly cause frustration and confusion, and even demoralize employees.
Conflicting goals. Besides the three afore-discussed issues that directly cast a shadow 
on the validity of goal setting theory’s explanatory variables, there are two other 
concerns that may render the theory’s contextual assumptions overly simplistic and 
explanation of motivation inadequate. We now go over these concerns. One such 
concern relates to conflicting goals. With the trends toward organizational cost-cutting 
(Schuster and Zingheim 1992; Sun 2001a), delayering, streamlining, multi-tasking 
(Ashkenas, Ulrich et al. 1995; Smith 1997; Hirsch and Naquin 2001) and work 
intensification (Edwards and Whitston 1991; Burchell, Day et al. 1999; Green 2001), it 
is likely for workers to be pressed with time and other resources in the strive to 
accomplish their tasks.
Under these circumstances, workers are likely to face the problem of conflicting 
priorities in their work. Although it is argued that goals helps to direct people’ energies 
toward what is important so they do not waste time on inconsequential or unproductive 
activities (Farr, Hofmann et al. 1993; Brown, Cron et al. 1997), the theory does not 
provide any guidance on what people may do when confronted with conflicting goals
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and objectives. What may further complicate the issue is when the individual’s 
responsibilities include performance for more than one independent supervisor. Under 
the competitive condition of dual demand for a joint resource (March and Simon 1958), 
two superiors may attempt to influence a shared subordinate to perform consistent with 
their own particular objectives (Organ 1973; Hinton and Barrow 1975), thus causing 
tension and stress.
Subordinates involved in project management teams are exemplary of these boundary 
role people (Organ 1973). But while project management and multi-tasking are common 
ways of managing tasks in a flexible, streamlined organizational environment (Boswell 
and Stevis 2001) incidents of multiple reporting lines are expected to increase. In this 
connection, it is hard to see how goal-setting theory’s assumptions about singular goals 
can fully accommodate the prediction of motivation given the potential complexity of 
work goals in today’s organizational environment.
Goals with potential punishment. The two main lines of research in support of goal- 
setting theory argued that goals help direct energy to valuable activities (Farr, Hofmann 
et al. 1993) and that participation in goal setting enhances goal commitment and thus 
performance (Donovan and Radosevich 1998). While these arguments appear to be 
complementary when proposed in a vacuum, they may contradict each other in real life. 
At my research organization, for example, workers are assigned production targets that 
are publicized in bold print on billboards at prominent locations throughout the factory 
and administration buildings and repeatedly verbally emphasized in weekly staff 
meetings. According to the first line of research that is in favor of the theory, none of 
these workers will perform because work goals are all top-down and none of the workers 
participated in goal setting. According to the second line of research that is in support of 
the theory, however, all of these workers will perform because they have clear, specific, 
and demanding goals.
A possible explanation for such contradiction is the theory’s disregard for risks that may 
be associated with the deadlines and penalties associated with goals. In the theory’s 
presumed “no risk” scenario, goals exist as something without negative consequences. 
Along these lines, performance is attributed only to that which helps the employees
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succeed -  the method of setting goals (e.g., employees are given a participative role) and 
the quality of goals (e.g., goals are clear, specific, and difficult).
With the increased intensification of work in today’s environment (Edwards and 
Whitston 1991; Edwards, Collinson et al. 1998; Green 2001), and the employer 
generally playing an upper hand in the labor market (Turnbull and Wass 1997; Auer and 
Speckesser 1998), it is possible that goals are being more frequently imposed on than 
mutually agreed or initiated by the worker. Since business and thus work goals are 
usually accompanied by deadlines, it is likely that the time perspective will help create a 
sense of urgency for employees to act (Burnham, Pennebaker et al. 1975; Rastegary and 
Landy 1993; Waller, Conte et al. 2001).
In line with reinforcement theory, the critical point is that workers may strive to meet 
their deadlines not necessarily as a direct result of whether they have had an active role 
in setting the goals or whether the goals are clear and difficult enough for them, but due 
to the potential punishment associated with the non-delivery of goals. In this sense, the 
clearer and more specific the work goals may be, the less excusable the failure to deliver 
and the more inescapable the punishment may seem.
Given the increased implementation of not just contingent pay but also contingent 
employment (Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2000), the punishment of non-delivery of 
goals may no longer be not getting a bonus or promotion, but the non-renewal of 
contract or the termination of employment. While participation in goal setting and the 
quality of work goals (e.g., clarity, difficulty) may help workers to succeed, these 
concepts do not provide any guidance in situations of risk where punishments may play 
a role in helping to stop the workers from failing.
4.3.3 Environmental Uncertainty and Reinforcement Theory
Environmental uncertainty. While reinforcement theory does not make any 
assumption about an organization’s “complete control” of the environment it operates, 
much of the literature on behavioral modification in the work setting (e.g., Luthans and
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Kreitner 1985; Komaki 1986; Komaki, Coombs et al. 2000) seems to assume on the 
basis of observed behavior that supervisors and organizations alike naturally and 
correctly apply reinforcement principles. Although Hinton and Barrow (1975) has raised 
this concern 30 years ago, there has since been little follow-up research on addressing 
this questionable assumption.
For reinforcements to work, the consequences of rewards and punishments, be they of a 
variable- or fixed-ratio schedule, must be within the administrator’s control. This has to 
be so such that there is no confusion about rewards or punishments being haphazard, 
random, or indiscriminate. Imagine how ineffective the laboratory experiment of 
behavioral reinforcement would have been if  the supply of electricity was unreliable and 
there was insufficient or unstable supply of food pallets -  the animals might not get an 
electric shock when they exhibited an undesirable behavior, or a food pellet when they 
did well. Worse yet, the animal might get an electric shock by accident, even without 
having done anything wrong. If such anomalies were to present themselves in an 
organizational setting such that that the consequences of noncompliance and compliance 
(e.g., layoffs and pay increments) cannot be guaranteed due, for instance, to the 
organization’s lack of control of the forces in its environment, the motivational 
technique would have no role to play.
This is because when an organization’s ability to administer rewards and punishments is 
affected by environmental forces it cannot predict or control, the likely outcome is 
violation of the consistency rule requisite for reinforcements to work. Examples of such 
violation are when an organization responds to economic downturns by laying off 
workers rather than firing them for cause; and when a firm rewards its employees based 
on its ability rather than its promise to pay, as may be the case for firms that implement 
variable pay.
4.3.4 Interaction Complexity and Equity Theory
Risky reactions to inequity. The latest development in equity theory proposes that as 
long as people are sensitive to situations of inequity (Huseman, Hatfield et al. 1987;
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King, Miles et al. 1993; King and Miles 1994) especially in terms of ill treatment rather 
than privilege to self, they are likely to react to it as the original theory predicted 
(Adams 1963). The approach suggests that people react to inequity to help them achieve 
something, such as the restoration of an equilibrium or comfort level. But as noted by 
Bentler and Speckart (1979) and Kuhn and Beam (1982), people possess divergent goals 
and preferences. To illustrate in relation to situations of inequity, having a preference 
could mean preferring to seek a higher goal such as employment security rather than 
running the risk of being seen as a disturber or troublemaker by reacting to inequity 
during a period of layoffs and organizational downsizing.
The usefulness of equity theory in explaining motivation in a politically sensitive 
environment such as the downsizing organization rests on the validity of its assumption 
that there is nothing to lose for the employees in restoring equilibrium by way of effort 
reduction or dysfunctional reactions such as thefts or other forms of subterfuge. But as 
pointed out by Pinder (1998), deliberate effort reduction can be risky at times because 
one may get caught.
The risk for the employee to outwardly react to inequity may be relatively more 
significant and even threatening to one’s survival in a firm if the organization is anxious 
to cut staff and the labor market is slow to hire. Under these conditions, political 
sensitivity maybe more valued and preferred than the fight for equity (see Time 1989). 
The opposite will however be true if an organization is experiencing high involuntary 
turnover and there is a great demand in the external labor market.
The point is that if effort reduction or other ways of restoring inequity exposed a worker 
to the risks of an unfavorable image, a poor performance evaluation or other disciplinary 
action, it would be unlikely for him or her to want to go down that path. In this 
connection, the workers may consider it wisdom to not show any sign of annoyance or 
grievance as a result of inequitable treatment especially at organizations where “adaptive 
flexibility” is the kind of attitude and behavior that gets rewarded (see Lane 1991; 
Pulakos, Arad et al. 2000).
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4.3.5 Significance of the “Flexible Firm” for Motivation Theory
The development of theory of work motivation during the post-World War II period has 
taken into account the person-environment interaction (see Steers and Porter 1991). But 
these authors have, as demonstrated above, been heavily influenced by a static view of 
work and workplaces. This observation is shared by Kalleberg (2001a) who argued that 
researchers of this period were misguided by a restricted view of work as organized 
hierarchically in relatively large, stable workplaces.
In particular, the author pointed out that the tightly integrated, hierarchical company that 
bases its work organization on principles of scientific management and Fordism was not 
a necessary feature of capitalist production, but rather an efficient response to stable and 
predictable environments in the post-Word War II period in which some corporations 
controlled their markets and GNP and productivity were on the rise (see also Piore 1986; 
Hyman 1988; Kalleberg 2001a; Kalleberg 2001b).
But environments often surprise organizations (Meyer 1982). Rather than thriving in a 
state of growth and expansion, many of today’s organizations find themselves striving to 
avoid declines and adapt when performance downturns occur or are anticipated (Ford 
and Baucus 1987). Within the framework of new, globally ascendant, post-Fordist 
production systems (Deyo 2001) or “flexible manufacturing systems”, companies are 
now faced with the challenge to quickly, efficiently, and continuously introduce changes 
in products and processes (Friedman 1988; Womack, Jones et al. 1990). Whether they 
are in the manufacturing or service sector, the prevalent view is that organizations must 
be not only efficient but as streamlined and flexible as possible in order to survive in an 
increasingly competitive and ever changing economic environment (see Hammer and 
Champy 1994; Dunlap 1996; Volberda 1996).
Functional flexibility. Individuals, organizations, and nations in the past two decades 
have all had to adapt to a variety of technological, economic, social, political, and 
demographic changes, and flexibility is widely seen as the way in which individuals, 
organizations, and societies can adapt to these changes (Kalleberg 2001a). Such
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flexibility yields a capacity for organizations to adapt to intensified pressures of 
liberalized trade, world market volatility, market fragmentation, rapid technological 
change, and heightened demand for just-in-time production and continuous 
improvements in productivity and quality (Deyo 2001). As the proposed solution to 
society-wide problems of recession and uncertainty (Pollert 1988) and the corporate 
watchword for the 1990s (Christensen 1989; Cappelli, Bassi et al. 1997), flexibility has 
become synonymous with survival and adaptability.
The emergence of “the flexible firm” (Pinfield and Atkinson 1988; Pollert 1988; Lorenz 
1992; Kalleberg 2001b) is of particular importance to the overall assessment of how 
existing theory fares under uncertainty and risks because it is through the call for 
flexibility that uncertainty and risks become inevitable. In particular, the drive for 
organizational flexibility results in strategies directed at labor utilization and 
remuneration. For instance, functional flexibility aims at increasing internal mobility, 
and thus instability and uncertainty for the worker, by cross-training them in a wide 
range of duties both in and outside of their normal functional area of expertise (Reilly 
2001; Kalleberg 2001b).
Numerical flexibility. Numerical flexibility seeks to cut down on labor costs through 
the extemalization of labor (Pfeffer and Baron 1988), thus contributing to employment 
precariousness and job insecurity. Last but not least, pay flexibility helps to tighten 
control of labor cost by tying employee compensation to the firm’s ability to pay, putting 
bonuses and possibly base pay “at risk”. Together the bundle of flexibility measures 
enables the firm to redeploy workers relatively quickly from one task to another, puts it 
in a strategically less committed role in employment relations, and reduces its risk 
exposure by shifting risks to the employees.
When the employment and compensation systems are unstable, the uncertainty and risks 
thereof need to be taken into account in the analysis of motivation and behavior. For 
example, if  these systems are set in a recession or economic downturn, the worker is 
likely to be preoccupied with such issues as a pay freeze, a pay cut, or worse yet, the 
potential of layoff. In eras when the employment and compensation systems are stable, 
however, uncertainty and risks would have little relevance. Especially if  these systems
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are embedded in a growth economy, the individual is likely to be anticipating bigger 
bonuses and pay raises, more benefits and perquisites, better training and development 
opportunities, faster upward internal mobility, and employers that have the long-term 
interest and happiness of their workers at heart.
The link between the direction of motivation research during the post-World War II 
period and prevailing economic conditions and the nature and organizational of work at 
the time is an interesting one. In view of its accompanying assumptions about a stable 
environment, existing theories tend to address the forces thereof as simple, 
straightforward, and reliable. As such, they seem to serve better as normative 
prescriptions of how things will work in an ideal world, rather than as a predictor of 
motivation in a changing environment.
The relatively static models we have dealt with thus far enable us to draw rather clear- 
cut notions of such fundamentals as payoffs, goals, rewards and punishments, and 
inequity reactions. The concepts thus drawn were reasonably compatible with the 
classical views of utility maximization and mechanical equilibrium (Bannock, Baxter et 
al. 1998). However, the classical concepts are widely viewed as inappropriate in 
contemporary, complex environments (Kuhn and Beam 1982). The challenge here is to 
explore an alternative framework that accounts for the uncertainty and risks embedded 
in today’s complex and fast-changing environment but not deliberately considered in 
existing models.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Adaptation and organizational survival. One of the basic arguments about managing 
in today’s economy is that organizations cannot function effectively, let alone survive, 
unless they can adapt to fast-changing environmental conditions (Ford and Baucus 1987). 
If researchers are right in suggesting that employee’s adaptive motivation and 
performance make an important contribution to organizational success (e.g., Le Pine, 
Colquitt et al. 2000; Pulakos, Arad et al. 2000), then the issue of how to get workers to
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respond positively to changing environmental forces that impinge on organizational and 
individual survival is something motivation scholars will be at risk to ignore.
As can be seen in the evidence presented above, employers in advanced and developing 
economies alike are becoming less willing to shoulder as much risk for their employees 
as they did in the past. The fact that the world economy is moving increasingly in a neo­
liberal direction that diminishes domestic welfare provisions without replacing them 
with regional or international ones (see, for example, Boswell and Stevis 2001) is likely 
to further aggravate the issue of uncertainty and risks associated with job insecurity and 
earnings instability discussed above.
Increasingly employment insecurity and compensation risk go hand in hand. This is 
because employees who lag behind on the performance criteria set in many of today’s 
new pay plans are implicitly at greater risk of termination (Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia et al. 
2000). It is unclear in what other forms compensation and employment systems may 
further develop. What is clear is that employment relationships can no longer be seen as 
a strictly bounded or boundaryless quid pro quo of wages in exchange for labor; they are 
certainly much more diverse and complex (Hirsch and Naquin 2001: 432).
In its new form, organized around a dynamic new technology, the economic system 
produces high levels of insecurity and involuntary economic inactivity (Beynon 1997). 
If employees in the industrialized world are becoming more insecure, then surely this 
reflects, at least in part, the decline in trade unionism, the primary institution, upon 
which employees have relied for protective regulation at work. As union membership 
and coverage by collective bargaining have fallen in Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
the U.S., Germany, and other countries, so worker vulnerability to offensive action by 
employers and exposure to hostile market forces has increased (Heery and Abbott 2000).
Constant corporate restructuring and downsizing, the outsourcing of jobs in advanced 
economies to foreign countries, heightened job demands, and reductions in health and 
pension benefits have all taken their toll on work careers in the past two decades (Hall 
and Mirvis 1995). It is evident that contingent arrangements raise troublesome issues
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concerning workers’ rewards, protections, and careers (Howard 1995). For one, the 
threat of workforce reduction has been a common experience (Brown 1997).
Job security or the absence of employment risks is a presumed condition of existing 
motivation studies that focus on pay and base largely on data from the American 
workplace. But as Jacoby (1985) pointed out, the critical fact is that job security was 
purported to be high only during the postwar period (1945 -  1973, around the time of the
tlifirst OPEC oil shock) and there was not much job security in the early part of the 20 
century. As a matter of fact, the firm internal labor market model was in place only 
during the period 1950 -  1985 (Hirsch 1993). This observation is shared by Kalleberg’s 
who noted that the idea of job security, which is often associated with employment in 
“core” bureaucratically controlled firms -  is a phenomenon that was uncommon in most 
of the 20th century (Kalleberg 2001a: 440).
It is likely then, that the assumption about job security is flawed and that the motivation 
literature as it now stands is a misrepresentation of the reality of today’s workplace (Sun 
2001a). In any event, the true picture of job insecurity revealed by work experts have 
made increasingly outdated images of work (such as secure employment and 
progressive, upward career paths) less useful as models for understanding motivation as 
well as for capturing contemporary work motivation realities.
The need for an alternative framework. This chapter represents a preparatory analysis 
that argued for the need of and laid the foundation for the development of a model of 
motivation under uncertainty and risks. Importantly, it revealed the reality of uncertainty 
and risks not accounted for in existing motivation literature. Based both on academic 
research and reports of international organizations and the business press, the magnitude 
and scope of employment and compensation risks affecting today’s workforce are 
discussed. Evidence showed that employment risk is no longer limited to manual 
workers, the lower rungs of society, or the private sector. And variable pay or “pay at 
risk” is fast extended as a labor cost control measure to cover potentially all work groups 
and functions of the organization not so much according to the worker’ contribution as 
to the organization’s ability to pay.
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The extent to which the reality of employment and compensation risks is reflected in the 
literature was also discussed. It has emerged that while many studies have been 
conducted on employment risk and job insecurity, none of them investigated their effects 
on individual work motivation. Furthermore, notwithstanding the prevalence of “new 
pay” or “pay at risk” schemes at all levels of the organization and in private and public 
sectors, compensation risk has mainly been studied within an economics framework and 
with references to executive pay and sales commission only. These findings suggested a 
gap between what is clear and present in today’s insecure workplace -  employment and 
compensation risks for all -  and what is missing in the existing literature.
The analysis of employment and compensation risks and their omission in the literature 
can be thought of as Copemican in that it attempts to move the center of the world of 
work motivation research away from a pure reward-achievement orientation toward the 
inclusion of a risk reduction motive and a protection-based view. But the thought is not 
at all original. The predominant views in the strategic management, behavioral 
economics, and international conflict and negotiation literatures are all predicated on a 
similar point of departure. In fact, the proposed research framework, which I shall 
present in Chapter 5 -  Toward a Model o f  Environmental Perception and Adaptive 
Motivation, is developed with extensive references to these views.
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Chapter 5
Toward a Model of Environmental Perception and 
Adaptive Motivation
This chapter is on model building and consists of three sections. The first section 
contrasts the existing and proposed views of motivation. The second section puts forth a 
model of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation” with testable 
propositions. The last section concludes.
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5.1 Existing vs. Proposed Views of Motivation
I f  we adopt the posture o f the ostrich with respect to our assumptions under the mistaken 
idea that we are thus "being practical," or that "management is an art," our progress 
with respect to the human side o f enterprise will indeed be slow.
McGregor 1960: 11
Consider the following vignettes. A telecommunications company has just been taken 
over by a competitor in the midst of market saturation and shrinking product demand. 
Over the years, the workplace has been substantially deunionized. With the new merger, 
management now must reorganize the firm, shed management layers, and within the 
next 6 - 9  months achieve a goal of cutting at least 40% of existing staff across the 
board. Inequity is expected to surface with the indiscriminate downsizing targets as 
several departments are already more severely understaffed than others. The external 
labor market looks grim and alternative employment does not appear a promising venue 
for workers. How likely will inequity inhibit motivation in such an insecure workplace?
A fast-food chain has just purchased its franchises and hired the managers of the newly 
acquired stores. The chain management has invited the store managers to participate in 
the setting of sales and market-share related goals, the fulfillment of which is directly 
linked to their remuneration. Challenging goals will be accorded with a bigger marketing 
budget and be rewarded handsomely when the goals are met. But failure to deliver to do 
so would require that the marketing expenses be reimbursed to the chain management by 
deducting the manager’s pay. How likely will the managers agree to set difficult goals?
A state-owned heavy machinery enterprise in a developing country sees intensified 
competition, ageing production technology, as well as tightening budget control and 
increasingly challenging downsizing mandates from the state. In this environment, 
workers face the uncertainty of continued employment and the risk of reduced pay if 
production targets are not met and/or the financial condition of the enterprise continues 
to deteriorate. How likely will workers be motivated to perform in their jobs under these 
circumstances when nothing is guaranteed?
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These and similar cases concern issues of motivation under uncertainty and risks. While 
current thinking of motivation focuses on issues of pay, and especially alternative pay 
systems such as pay-for-performance (Hopkins and Mawhinney 1992) and gainsharing 
(e.g., Welboume and Gomez-Mejia 1995), in a presumably stable and incentives-driven 
(if not also incentives-laden) workplace, the above scenarios help illuminate the timely 
issue of employment and income insecurity in light of individuals’ motivation to adapt 
to new and changing job demands and challenges for survival in a fast-changing, if not 
turbulent, workplace.
An alternative view of motivation. The proposed view of adaptive motivation proceeds 
from the fundamental premise that individuals as adaptive organisms adapt attitudes and 
behavior to the selective pressures of the environment (cf. Salancik and Pfeffer 1978). 
The origin of this view can be traced back to zoological philosophy, which identified 
adaptation as a response to environmental pressures and opportunities (Lamarck 1809). 
In the field of management, scholars have also applied this perspective to the study of 
industry evolution and adaptive outcomes in organizational performance (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967; Hannan and Freeman 1989; Madsen and McKelvey 1996).
In particular, Madsen and McKelvey (1996) proposed that adaptive changes arise 
purposefully in response to shifting environmental pressures. As such, firms and their 
individual members take a purposeful role in searching for alternatives so as to ensure 
performance and continued survival. In this sense selection and adaptation are 
interrelated rather than mutually exclusive processes This premise leads inexorably to 
the conclusion that we can most effectively learn about motivation by examining both 
the environment within which that motivation occurs and to which it adapts as well as 
the motive or purpose behind the adaptation (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978).
To facilitate the assessment of the proposed view, I shall provide in the subsections 
below an account of the major differences between the existing and proposed views of 
motivation. In particular, I shall argue that while existing views have contributed to our 
understanding of motivation in the past, there is sufficient evidence that they represent 
an oversimplified and indeed, outdated, version of reality in the workplace.
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Table 5.1
Differences between Existing and Proposed Views of Motivation
Existing approach to 
motivation
Abundant
Incentives
Simplistic and stable 
Recurring and predictable
Area of distinct 
differences
Assumptions about the 
environment
Organizational resources
(Pre)dominant stimuli
Organizational context
Nature of environmental 
events
Environmental pressures
Economic climate 
Union/management power
Work intensification
Assumptions about the 
person
Goal
Individual differences in 
decision rules
Theoretical approach 
Motivation as a process
Role of change
Motivation as a function 
primarily of:
Conceptualization o f 
Motivation
Motivation defined
Not specifically accounted for
Favorable conditions
Not specifically accounted for
Motivation involves the forces 
within individuals and in their 
environment that drive them 
toward the attainment of a goal 
as well as provide them the 
reinforcement and feedback to 
either continue or redirect their 
effort (Steers and Porter 1991).
Proposed view of adaptive 
motivation
Scarce
Sanctions and incentives 
Complex and fast-changing 
Uncertain and variable
Pressures of competition and 
selection
Economic uncertainty
Shifting power of influence 
from union to management
Acknowledged as a main issue
Optimization of multiple 
interests and goals
Varied bases of ideology and 
and instrumentality
Adaptation to a continual state 
of disequilibrium and flux
An antecedent and an outcome
Adaptive rationality; bounded 
rationality; and emotions
Motivation involves the forces 
within individuals and in their 
environment that drive them to 
adapt to new and changing 
environmental demands and 
challenges or be at risk of 
elimination in the selection 
process of survival of the fittest.
To survive, and thriveForces behind motivation To thrive
Not discussed
Maximization of gains
Not accounted for -  
uniformly utility-based
Restoration to a state of 
equilibrium and stability
Potentially an outcome
Calculated Rationality
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5.1.1 Assumptions about the Environment
Human behavior can be predicted, but as in physical science, accurate predictions hinges 
on the correctness of underlying theoretical assumptions (McGregor 1960). Recent 
changes brought on by the new economic era have blurred traditional workplace 
assumptions upon which prior theory had been based (Hirsch and Naquin 2001) (e.g., 
work motivation is achievement-based.). A classic distinction in organizational thinking 
is between situations that can be described as certain, predictable, well-understood, or 
routine and situations that are characterized as unpredictable, intractable, or uncertain 
(Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). In an attempt to assess work motivation within the 
organizational context, it thus seems appropriate to highlight the differences between the 
existing and proposed views concerning the environment. These differences are 
summarized in Table 5. 1 and discussed below.
Sanctions, incentives, and resource scarcity. Existing research tends to assume 
abundance of environmental resources, and in particular, financial incentives. The 
inevitable outcome is the almost exclusive focus on rewards in explaining the impact of 
environmental stimuli on motivation, leading in turn to incentive schemes being the very 
core of empirical investigation (see Peach and Wren 1992; Prendergast 1999; Bartol and 
Locke 2000). Whether reward is of an extrinsic or intrinsic nature such as achievement, 
power, and affiliation (Steers and Porter 1991), it seems that workers may not always be 
in such a fortunate state as to be performing their labors for the sake of bigger rewards. 
For example, recent research showed that employees have become willing to accept a 
pay cut to save their jobs (see, for example Van den Berg, Masi et al. 2001).
In view of cost-cutting in many of today’s workplaces and especially in times of 
economic downturn and unsatisfactory organizational performance, this finding is 
suggestive of sanctions playing an important role in motivating workers in a resource­
scarce environment. Sanctions should, however, not be understood as the opposite of 
incentives for two reasons: (1) sanctions threaten to reduce individuals’ current interests 
while incentives work toward the advancement of individuals’ current interests. The 
former is status quo minus; and the latter, status quo plus. (2) Sanctions and incentives 
may co-exist to fulfill their respective purposes of deterring workers from shirking and
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encouraging them to do well at the same time. This line of thinking is consistent with 
that of the proposed view of adaptive motivation, which accounts for resources scarcity 
in today’s competitive, cost-conscious environment, and the potential simultaneous use 
of sanctions and incentives among organizations to facilitate the adaptability and 
flexibility of the workforce.
Environmental complexity, pressures, and change. Arguments that behavior is being 
shaped by context or “embedded” in the circumstances external to the individual go back 
at least to Aristotle and Confucius and are especially important components of historical 
and sociological explanations. But work motivation research tended to downplay the 
importance of an objective environment (Cappelii and Sherer 1991). Among the 
fundamental tenets of existing perspective is the theme of simplicity and stability, which 
render environmental events recurring and thus predictable. However, the reality is that 
for and in most organizations the act-to-outcome contingencies are very uncertain and 
“individuals are seen facing the challenge of making sense of contingencies and making 
allocation decisions in more complex environments” (Sawyer 1990: 108).
Another related assumption is about environmental pressures, which are generally 
ignored in the work motivation literature. For example, effectiveness of reinforcement is 
based on past experiences of reward and punishment that are certain, predictable, 
consistent, specific, and repetitive according to a known pattern. It suggests that people 
who have been affected before need not “wait and see” to know what would happen next 
as if environmental forces were static. Selection pressures, however, emphasize that the 
direction and impact of environmental forces cannot be mapped according to a known 
pattern as such and are thus uncertain, unpredictable, inconsistent, and unspecific. In 
other words, forces tend to be dynamic rather than static; and rather than being 
predictable, outcomes may fluctuate according to changes in environmental conditions.
As Tsui and Ashford (1994) pointed out, all environments exert selection pressures -  
organisms that have certain characteristics or that have adopted certain action strategies 
are “selected” for survival (and thus the importance of maintaining a fit between one’s 
control system and that of the environment). Environments differ, however, in the 
strictness of these selection pressures. Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein (1977) argued,
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for example, that many environments are not structured to “show our limits”. Decision 
makers who recognize that they exist in such an environment are freed from the demand 
of rigorous decision-making. Similarly, organizational environments differ in the extent 
to which they test individual limits and select individuals for survival based on that 
assessment (see Tsui and Ashford 1994). As the environment exerted unprecedented 
pressures to select only the adaptive, individuals’ motivation to perform was likely to 
also increase. This increase would occur as individuals recognize the new importance of 
(and startling uncertainty related to) continued survival and success, the value of good 
performance and associated cost of noncompliance (cf. McAllister, Mitchell et al. 1979).
Economic uncertainty and flexibility. Changes in the economic climate have forced 
management at all levels in organizations to address more seriously those industrial 
relations matters relating to the productive and efficient use of labor. Increasing 
competition, combined with greater economic uncertainty, have come to characterize the 
modem marketplace, putting companies under greater pressure to adapt their 
organizational structures and production systems (Deery, Plowman et al 2002: 187). The 
trend in fallen union density and subsequent weakening of the bargaining power of and 
collective voice for workers in- many workplaces (Freeman and Hersch 2005) is 
expected to give way to more aggressive and less inhibited management initiatives in the 
drive for adaptive flexibility.
In industrialized nations, the search for flexibility has underpinned the reform programs 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This “new frontier” (Baglioni 1990) is regarded as the 
only way of maintaining profits and therefore surviving in the global marketplace 
(Benson, Philip et al 2000). As a matter of fact, flexibility is no long a unique 
development in the West. The search for adaptive flexibility in the fight for survival is 
no exception for the modem Chinese enterprise and its workers alike (see Section 2.2 -  
Uncertainty and Risks under “Deepening o f Reforms ”).
Work intensification. Several studies, though not directly looking at effort levels, 
suggested intensification in the use of individuals’ working time. In manufacturing, 
Eiger (1990) surveyed a range of evidence and concluded that there has been a “paring 
down of pauses, resting and waiting time”. On office work, Lane (1988) noted that an
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increased intensity of work was reported almost universally in studies of the introduction 
of word processors. Overall, workers were found to be putting in more hours and 
earning less take-home pay than a decade ago (Schor 1991).
There appears to be ample evidence that point to the correlation between management 
innovations and work intensification. For example, a recent case study of a company 
deploying just-in-time (JIT) and total quality management (TQM) argued that intensified 
surveillance and discipline is integral to these regimes (Sewell and Wilkinson 1990). For 
example, errors made by assemblers were automatically detected and sanctions were 
applied. And although management rhetoric had it that TQM transforms attitudes and 
behavior, the system was viewed by workers as a means to intensify work and tighten 
managerial control (see Edwards, Collinson et al. 1998).
Furthermore, teamworking, one of the management innovations of the last decade may 
have also contributed to the “efficiency norm” in today’s pressurized workplace. It has 
been found to have the effects of generating new skills, inducing employees to work 
harder, and engendering greater organizational efficiency (Green 2001). Such norm 
enforces adaptation to potential sanctions such as competition, performance standards, 
efficiency requirements and even conscience under pain of loss of job, loss of approval, 
reduced self-esteem, bankruptcy, or economic loss more generally (Lane 1991).
Reassessing Assumptions of Existing Theory
A productive way of exploring the usefulness of the assumptions of existing theory 
concerning the environment is to assess their relevance in light of major events and 
developments in a research setting that is reflective of the challenges facing today’s 
workforce. The modem Chinese workplace, albeit having the outward appearance of 
peculiarity and unfamiliarity to many, represents such a setting in that it exhibits 
virtually all of the characteristics of today’s fast-changing and turbulent workplace: (1) 
economic uncertainty, (2) intensifying global competition, (3) rapid technological 
changes, (4) organization’s drive for adaptive flexibility (through restructuring, cost- 
cutting, downsizing, and the introduction of new, contingent work arrangements), and 
subsequently, (5) magnification of employment and income risks for all.
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Details of China as a research environment have been presented in Chapter 2 -  Context 
o f China's employment and wage reforms. It suffices me to highlight critical 
developments in the workplace that render the assumptions of existing theory invalid, if 
not also incontestably outdated. To bring the analysis into focus, China’s employment 
and wage reforms exemplify the collapse of an insulated internal labor market and the 
simulation of external competitive pressures within the enterprise. Prior to the reforms, 
workers were hired for life and provided cradle-to-grave benefits. Work and income 
were organized based on to the communist ideal of “from each according to his ability; 
to each according to his needs” and accordingly, pay was undifferentiated among 
individuals and poor on-the-job performance was tolerated (Sun 2000b).
Under “deepening of reforms” since the mid-1990s, however, the enterprise was faced 
with increasingly tough demands and challenges such as market competition and 
mandate from the state to become economically self-sufficient. The spillover effects in 
human resources included all workers being put on limited duration contracts (LDCs) 
that offered no promise of continued employment, subject to a contingent pay that 
involved up to 40% of the original base salary, and made accountable for increasingly 
demanding work targets and skill upgrade requirements.
To explain the simultaneous motivational effects of employment and wage reforms 
amidst other ongoing changes in the environment, it appears needful that existing 
theory’s assumptions about resource abundance and environmental simplicity, stability, 
and predictability; and accompanying focus on incentives be abandoned. At the same 
time, an alternative view that defies these assumptions and accounts instead for change 
and adaptation that are more relevant in today’s workplace needs to be seriously 
contemplated. I shall discuss the theoretical approach and conceptualization of such a 
proposed view in Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4. Meanwhile, let’s continue with an assessment 
of the assumptions of existing theory about the person.
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5.1.2 Assumptions about the Person
According to the hedonistic account of human nature, which underlies the study of work 
motivation as well as utilitarianism and classical economics, the pursuit of pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain are the sole endeavors of human life. Research in philosophy and 
economic psychology, however, revealed that people's attitudes to work are more 
complex and contradictory than it suggests. In particular, it was found that the great 
majority want work and feel a need to work, even when they find it unsatisfying in all 
sorts of ways (Sayers 1988). Hedonists are inclined toward the gratification of needs, but 
as Antonides (1991) pointed out, even then there might be more and less important 
desires as well as conflicting ones. These findings give us a basis to question two 
interrelated assumptions governing existing motivation research: (1) the individual’s 
attitude towards goals is that of maximization; and (2) their decisions rules are uniformly 
utility-based.
Optimization vs. maximization. Expectancy theory postulated that people will do what 
they can do when they want something (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978). In assuming utility 
maximization and uniform decision rules for all, the theory failed to account for the 
possibility that there is a gap between what people can do and what they are morally 
inclined to do or not to do. The proposed view of adaptive motivation, however, 
considers the notion of well-being on an extended continuum between hedonism to 
asceticism, i.e., from the gratification of needs to the abstaining from or suppression of 
desires as leading to ultimate fulfillment. In so doing, it is able to account for the role of 
instrumentality and ideology in the process of individual decision-making as well as the 
possibility that some people are more instrumentally and/or ideologically driven than 
others in their motivation and behavior.
In contrast to existing theory, which assumed that motivation is governed by the 
maximization of single-focus, utility-based goals, the proposed view also budgets for the 
possibility that people work through a process of optimization in negotiating and making 
compromises when confronted with multiple interests and goals.
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A related issue concerns goal-setting theory, which proposed that clear and specific 
goals to facilitate prioritization among alternative actions but failed to account for the 
potential dilemma of multitasking expectations and conflicting goals. A risk is that with 
an emphasis on goal clarity and specificity, operationally demanding tasks that do not 
fall under formal goals may get superficially pushed outside, thus jeopardizing rather 
than helping performance. As Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) explained, 
the single-minded pursuit of formal goals may have a detrimental effect, as it lacks 
consideration for the pressure to negotiate and adapt to complex goal situations. This 
outcome may adversely affect firm performance in view of the organization as a 
complex adaptive system with a variety of strategic priorities and multiple and 
conflicting goals (Ashmos, Duchon et al. 2000).
5.1.3 Theoretical Approach
In order to be able to decide on the research framework that is more fitting for the 
explanation of motivation in a given research setting, we need a proper understanding of 
the reasoning that underlies the existing and proposed views of motivation. The analysis 
below is about the differing views’ take on issues concerning disequilibrium, the role of 
change, and rationality and emotions. Their fundamental differences in theoretical 
approach are highlighted in Table 5.1.
Disequilibrium vs. equilibrium. One of the critical differences between the existing 
research and the proposed view of adaptive motivation is that which concerns the static 
vs. dynamic nature of the motivation process. For instance, work motivation theory 
maintained that the emergence of a need, desire, or expectation generally creates a state 
of disequilibrium within the individuals, which they will try to reduce by satisfying that 
need or desire in order to be restored to a state of equilibrium (Steers and Porter 1991). 
This position suggests that equilibrium is the goal, the ultimate condition that regulates 
motivation. All these seem to make sense in a stable environment where disequilibrium 
is the exception and change is discontinuous or “one-off’.
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But what if there is ongoing unsystematic and unforeseen change in the environment to 
the extent that disequilibrium becomes the norm rather than an anomaly? For instance, if 
the environment in general is in a state of flux (as is the case with the reforming Chinese 
industry), there may be no future disequilibrium to anticipate as such because the current 
state is always one of disequilibrium (Morgan 1996). This stance is in line with 
Coleman’s (1999) suggestion that in rapidly changing environments individuals learn to 
live and work in disequilibrium, whereby self-regulation and organization become the 
natural “default” behavior and mode of operation, with adaptive processes moving 
through phases of structural stability and instability to promote survival and growth.
The individual adaptive process may be more fully understood by referencing its origin 
at the economic and organizational levels. In my research setting, for instance, the 
Chinese leaders are endeavoring to change the nation’s institutional legacy through “a 
policy of disequilibrium and non-linear progression” intended to accommodate basic 
strains within the system, especially between the goals of reform and social stability 
(Cooke 2005: 195).
The ongoing adaptation distinguishes the state enterprise as an adaptive system from 
classical equilibrium mechanics and economics, in which an initial agent action, such as 
the state freezing the wage for all state-owned enterprise workers (as had been the case 
in the planned economy), would reverberate through the whole system until equilibrium 
was attained. In an adaptive system set in the country’s increasingly open economy, the 
feedback effects from interacting agents, however, do not necessarily lead to equilibrium, 
but a situation of evolving complexity and the emergence of new agents, rules, and 
reform models within the overall adaptive system.
From the perspective of individual agents (e.g., the state-owned enterprise or an 
organizational member therein), the adaptive system is open and dynamic in the sense 
that: (1) no desirable or appropriate behavior can be fully pre-specified (Tsui and 
Ashford 1994); and (2) no single agent acting on its own is in complete control of the 
effects of its actions. As such, the choice of action on individual agents is necessarily 
restricted. As other agents in the system respond in their individual interests, their 
responses provide the impetus for additional agent actions (see Kurtyka 1999). In so
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doing, organizations and their individual members are believed to adapt to and co-evolve 
with the environment (Kauffman 1995), in the sense that they proactively influence and 
counteract with the forces of the environment, which also influences them.
As much as imposing a simplified order by constraining and routinizing behavior in the 
midst of conflict, ambiguity, and disorder has been empirically proven to be an 
ineffective response to environmental complexity in today’s organization (Ashmos, 
Duchon et al. 2000), it does not seem expedient for theorists to continue to regard the 
motivation process as strictly about the restoration to a state of equilibrium and stability.
Role of change. A major distinction between the existing and proposed views of 
motivation is the treatment of change. In as much as existing theories have contributed 
to the understanding and “pursuit of the happy/productive worker” referred to by Staw 
(1986) (see Chapter 3 -  Literature Review -  Work Motivation for a review), none of the 
frameworks addressed the important issue of organizational change and individual 
adaptation. As summarized in Table 5.2, existing theories tended to have potential 
relevance to the issue of change as a consequence rather than as an antecedent.
Table 5.2
Empirical Study of Change in W ork Motivation Research
Theory Role of change
Expectancy Change of effort as an outcome of expectancy beliefs
Goal-setting Change in performance as an outcome of specific and difficult goals
Equity Change in attitude/behavior as an outcome of inequity
Reinforcement Change in behavior as an outcome of rewards and punishments
For example, expectancy theory may address the change of effort (in terms of direction, 
strength, perseverance, and strategy) as an outcome of expectancy beliefs and goal 
setting theory, the change in performance as an outcome of specific and difficult goals. 
Similarly, equity theory may address the change in attitude and behavior as an outcome 
of inequity and reinforcement theory, the change or modification in behavior as an 
outcome of administered rewards and punishments. Most of the empirical studies of
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these theories were predicated on the propositions that, everything else being equal (i.e., 
assuming no change in the environment):
(1) the higher the perceived valence, instrumentality, or expectancy, the high the 
motivation (expectancy theory)
(2) the clearer and more specific the goals, the higher the motivation (goal-setting 
theory)
(3) the higher the perception of equity, the higher the motivation (equity theory)
(4) the administration of an intermittent schedule of events of reward and punishment 
is more effective than a continuous schedule (reinforcement theory)
Such approaches to investigating motivation would have been helpful if  the environment 
were stable and predictable, but perhaps not in a workplace that is characterized by 
ongoing workforce restructuring and cost-cutting initiatives (see Belous 1989; Hartley 
1996) On the organizational level, there may also be changes and adjustments in 
strategy and business focus. Organizations initiate these changes in multiple domains 
such as technology, structure, management, and employment and pay policies.
Yet, the common misassumption concerning the stability and predictability of the 
research setting cannot be attributed to the theorists themselves. After all, none of them 
suggested that such an assumption should be made of their theories. On balance, the 
purpose of existing theories has been to highlight the various aspects of work that can 
make a difference in motivation and performance, typically as a platform for making 
predictions by controlling for other factors -  never with the intent to account for change 
in the environment. However, existing empirical research tends to direct its attention 
mostly singly to new pay schemes, the study of which does not appear to account for the 
simultaneous influences of other potential forces in the environment.
Cognition and emotions. Existing work motivation theory, like most efforts to 
rationalize observed behavior, attempted to place that behavior within a framework of 
calculated rationality. It was however argued by behavioral economists that behavior 
cannot always be explained as following from a calculation of consequences in terms of 
prior objectives (e.g., Simon 1955; March 1978), as environmental events are not always
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calculable to individuals as such. This stance revealed that models of calculated 
rationality are deficient not only as descriptors of human behavior but also as guides to 
intelligent choice. The implication is that the phenomenon of motivation under 
uncertainty and risks, such as that observed in my research setting, should be examined 
not only as a product of calculated rationality, but perhaps more importantly, as a 
function of alternative forms of individual information processing such as systematic 
rationality and bounded rationality, and emotions.
Adaptive and selected rationality. Within systematic rationality, i.e., rationality as 
evolving over time within a (socio-economic) system rather than on the basis of 
calculation (March 1978), adaptive rationality and selected rationality are particularly 
worthy of note for their relevance to the study of motivation under uncertainty and risks. 
Adaptive rationality focuses on experiential learning by individuals or collectivities 
which amounts to properties that permit sensible adaptation to uncertainties and 
irregularities in environmental challenges and demands (see Cyert and March 1963). For 
instance, China’s incremental approach, as often contrasted with Russia’s “shock 
therapy” (see, for example, Clarke 2005), is heralded by the State as the way forward in 
introducing and deepening the economic reform amidst the complexities of an emergent 
socialist-market economy or “market economy with Chinese characteristics”.
Selected rationality emphasizes the coming about of “rule of behavior” not by conscious 
calculation of their rationality by current role players per se but by virtue of survival and 
growth of individuals, groups, and organizations by and in which such rules are 
performed or followed. For instance, “model laborers” (laomo) at my research enterprise 
and “best practice organizations” (longtuo qiye) in the reforming Chinese industry were 
selected as epitome of what could and should be. These two forms of rationality may be 
said to be connected in the sense that selected rationality may serve as a means to further 
adaptive rationality and as a result help speed up the reform process by saving 
“beginners” the painful and costly experience of learning by trial and error. .
Bounded rationality. Bounded rationality emphasizes deviations from rational 
expectations (March and Simon 1958). As a substitution for omniscient rationality, the 
concept proposed that all deliberate rational behavior is “behavior within constraints
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such as limitations in information processing and problem-solving” (March 1978: 590). 
Bounded rationality advances the understanding of individual decision-making in calling 
attention to heuristics or cognitive shortcuts, which may bias decision outcomes in 
systematic ways. This position was supported, albeit indirectly, by Mitchell and Daniels 
who, in criticizing the mechanistic nature of expectancy theory (Vroom 1964), noted 
that “while it relies on an explicit mathematical model of motivational force, it is clear 
that people seldom make such mental calculations” Mitchell and Daniels (2003: 229).
The combination of bounded rationality and environmental uncertainty looks set to 
trigger a whole new debate on how issues of environmental change may be processed by 
individuals in the process motivation. For instance, (1) what kind of information 
processing mechanism or mental shortcuts individuals may go by in making sense of 
pressing environmental issues and demands; and (2), what role emotions may play in 
information processing given the challenge of incomplete and/or inexact information in 
an uncertain world. While I shall discuss the first issue in the context of the proposed 
model of environmental perception and adaptive motivation in Section 5.2, I shall 
proceed to address the role of emotions below.
Emotions. Emotions depend on personal reactions to environmental events and this may 
differ according to temperament, mood, personality (Antonides 1991), and outlook. 
While uncertainty can be a source of stress as well as of stimulation (Berlyne 1975), 
what is critical to the proposed view of adaptive motivation is the affective significance 
of uncertainty in human adaptation processes (see Kittay, Serban et al. 1975). Consistent 
with research on emotional intelligence (Daus 2005; Spector 2005). Foster (2000) 
maintained that nothing need to be irrational about emotions in their unique function of 
relating to states concerning which normal cognition is less relevant. He further argued 
that we may not observe rational economic behavior when there is a lack of emotional 
arousal (e.g., state of indifference or boredom) or a state of overagitation (e.g., 
fanaticism or desperation).
Emotions may be extended to mean sensitivity to environmental cues for appropriate 
behavior given off by others (Snyder 1979). In this context, sensitivity almost 
definitionally implies an active participation in the adaptive self-regulation process (Tsui
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and Ashford 1994). The implication is that for individuals attempting to adapt to and 
succeed in a complex and fast-changing environment where there is typically no 
guarantee as to a consequence being systematically linked to a previously known cause, 
the role of such sensitivity may be critical. For instance, responses of individuals under 
uncertainty and risks may heighten, or contribute to, a sense of “risk consciousness” 
(Wilkinson 2001), which may in turn motivate them to take preemptive measures to 
protect their well-being and interests (Brown 1997).
Positive and negative emotions. While it was argued that positive emotions (such as 
hope and enthusiasm) carry direct and immediate adaptive benefits (Fredrickson 2001), 
facilitate creative problem-solving (Johnson and Tversky 1983), and encourage 
proactive coping (Aspinwall and Taylor 1997); the same might be argued for negative 
emotions (such as disappointment and feeling of being threatened) to the extent that they 
challenge individuals to consider broader issues, such as whether identified goals are 
worth pursuing and which strategies are appropriate to achieving desired goals (Eysenck 
1982; Stone and Ziebart 1995), and create or enhance a sense of resilience, unity and 
solidarity that lead to more effective teamworking and the development of collaborative 
measures against future threats.
The following section on how motivation is conceptualized and defined based on the 
existing and adaptive views will further clarify the issue at hand.
5.1.4 Conceptualization of Motivation
Empirical research on work motivation and performance presents a complex picture. For 
example, on one hand, researchers maintain that by making goals clear and specific to 
follow, goal setting can improve performance. On the other hand, scholars argue that 
real organizations are messy, indeterminate places and work in such a setting is beset 
with uncertainty and complexity (Pearce 1987), which makes goal clarity and specificity 
unrealistic and infeasible, if not also confusing, obstructive and damaging to morale. 
Given the paradox, it seems that goal-setting as “a motivational technique that works” 
(see Locke and Latham 1984) could be a double-edged sword, in that it has positive
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implications in some contexts and for some motivation or performance variables but 
negative implications in other contexts.
The discussion in this section introduces the possibility that the positive or negative 
effects of motivational techniques (such as goal setting and reinforcement) may not be 
just a function of the dependent variable or context examined but also a function of the 
way in which motivation is understood and conceptualized in the first place. Motivation 
has been defined as the allocation of time and effort across competing demands (Sawyer 
1990). As Sawyer points out, such resource allocation problems are made more difficult 
when the relationship between activities (e.g., effort) and desired outcomes (e.g., 
performance) is uncertain. This uncertainty prevents the individual from accurately 
predicting the optimal amount of time and effort needed to achieve desired outcomes. 
However, often an activity with uncertain outcomes cannot be totally abandoned. Some 
portion of the individual’s time and effort must be allocated to the uncertain activity 
(Sawyer 1990: 85).
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks
In much of the existing work, researchers consider motivation to involve “the forces 
within individuals and in their environment that drive them toward the attainment of a 
goal as well as provide them the reinforcement and feedback to either continue or 
redirect their effort” (Steers & Porter 1991: 6). Such approach overlooks the possibility 
that environmental events can be uncertain and variable, and subsequently fails to fulfill 
the need to explain motivation under uncertainty and risks.
Definition of adaptive motivation. The proposed view of adaptive motivation argues 
that motivation involves the forces within individuals and in their environment that drive 
them to adapt to new and changing environmental demands and challenges or be “at 
risk” of elimination in the selection process of “survival of the fittest”. In this 
connection, I define adaptive motivation as motivation to adapt to new and changing 
environmental demands and challenges with the purpose o f increasing one’s chances o f 
survival and success under uncertainty and risks.
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This conceptualization represents an attempt to explain what existing views cannot 
explain, for example, why individuals will be motivated given low input-outcome 
expectancies, i.e., when consequences are inconsistent and environmental feedback is 
not always or exactly in the affirmative. In light of the fact that an increasing number of 
today’s work roles are characterized by complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty (see 
Pelled, Eisenhardt et al. 1999; Smithson and Lewis 2000), the conceptualization of 
adaptive motivation is particularly helpful as individuals are increasingly found to be 
operating under uncertainty and risks and the links between input, performance and 
reward are not always clear or straightforward (ILO 2001: 147 -161).
Under these circumstances, individuals may be motivated to “do their best” despite low 
or uncertain perceived input-outcome expectancy because they do not know of a better 
way. The idea is that as long as the individuals feel that their increased effort helps to 
increase their chances of survival and success, and that there is no other way of attaining 
the outcomes they want, they are likely to be motivated to adapt to the changing 
demands of the environment.
Furthermore, once the adaptive view is established as meaningful for understanding 
motivation in today’s workplace, it is reasonable to ask -  “Adaptation to what?” 
Adaptive motivation may be conceived in terms of meeting new, changing and 
demanding performance expectations and requirements in one’s job. Adaptation need 
not necessarily be entirely conceived in terms of the delivery of tangible goals, but may 
be spurred by a perceived change in the scope of possibilities, broadly conceived (Potts 
2000). This, for instance, is what Kirzner's (1973) entrepreneur reacts to, characterized 
by alertness to opportunities. It could also be what my research organization consciously 
endeavors to achieve among its members -  alertness to competitive and other issues that 
are threatening the enterprise’ performance and survival.
Adaptation in the work context may also be viewed in terms of striving for what is not 
necessarily ideal or optimal, but advantageous and workable at a given place and time. It 
can be understood in light of what is referred to in post-Keynesian reading of 
expectation formation as “self-adaptation” or self-organization (Foster 1997; Witt 1997), 
which is not hinged to any objective environmental circumstance perse.
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Several job and organizational variables may systematically contribute to the adaptive 
motivation process. These contextual variables may be considered as most conducive to 
adaptive motivation. In accordance with what is discussed above, adaptive motivation 
would be a likely phenomenon in work situations defined by any or a combination of the 
following four characteristics: (1) ambiguity especially in terms of output standards 
(“ends”) and the process of achieving them (“means”) (Thompson 1967; Tsui and 
Ashford 1994); (2) new, changing or increasingly demanding performance standards 
(Lane 1988; Edwards and Whitston 1991); (3) uncertainty concerning performance 
outcome (Eisenhardt 1988; Sawyer 1990); and (4) uncertainty concerning other rewards 
such as economic payoffs (Libby and Fishbum 1977; Vlek and Stallen 1980) and social 
acceptance or approval (Skinner 1953; Welsh, Luthans et al. 1993). Each of these 
characteristics undermines the efficacy of conventional motivation theory, which was 
predicated on assumptions of clarity, stability, and predictability, and concomitantly 
increases the importance of explaining motivation in a fast-changing environment.
The drive to survive, and thrive. To more fully understand motivation, it is important 
to delineate the forces behind it given the individual differences and circumstances at 
hand. My curiosity is above all justified by the prevailing trends in the intensification of 
work (Edwards and Whitston 1991; Burchell, Day et al. 1999; Green 2001), which 
raised the issue about the motive behind all that overtime and hard work -  “7s it to 
thrive, or to survive?” In other words, are individuals being driven to work hard for the 
sake of attaining a higher level of payoffs only? Or could it be also because they feel that 
their status quo is being threatened and working hard is the only way to increase their 
chances of maintaining it?
Although employment insecurity has become a major issue in today’s workplace 
(Pfeffer and Baron 1988; Lane 1991), motivation scholars have devoted little attention to 
how individuals may be motivated for the purpose of survival and self-preservation. It is 
therefore expedient that due consideration be given to the motive to achieve as well as 
the motive to protect in explaining motivation. As achievement-driven motivation is 
growth-oriented, the focus of attention is on the advancement of interests, such as more 
pay, recognition, and promotion.
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On the other hand, protection-driven motivation is survival-oriented and focuses on 
avoiding loss, e.g., pay deductions, degradation, and termination of employment, etc. 
The basic mentality illustrated by the existing perspective is that of seeking 
opportunities for growth and that captured by the proposed view, reducing threats for 
self-preservation and survival. As such, according to the existing approach the 
individuals’ goal appears to be the maximization of gains for the purpose of prosperity 
and growth, and based on the proposed view of adaptive motivation, optimization of 
multiple interests and goals for the purpose of adaptation and survival.
Protection vs. achievement motivation. Protection motivation and achievement 
motivation represent the two distinct motives concerning the pursuit of gains or rewards 
and the avoidance of loss or punishment. However, the differences between them are not 
rigorously explored in the existing work motivation literature. One may argue that 
reward and punishment or positive and negative consequences are discussed in the 
motivation literature. But it is done mainly within the framework of reinforcement 
theory, the empirical research of which tends to be atheoretical (Ambrose and Kulik 
1999) and seldom includes the punishment or negative consequence aspect. 
Furthermore, neither the specific review of behavior modification in the business setting 
by Andrasik (1989) nor the general review of the motivation literature by Mitchell and 
Daniels (2003) distinguishes between the motives.
It has been queried that many accepted findings in organizational behavior may exist 
more because of the way researchers frame the problem than because of the presumed 
impact of the construct on individual motivation and behavior (Bazerman 1984). Making 
a distinction between the achievement and protection motives in this particular incidence 
will open up opportunities for the reality to manifest itself as to whether individuals are 
working extra hard primarily to seek after desirable things they have not yet attained 
(e.g., extra bonuses and promotion), or to avoid losing the very fundamental of what 
they currently have and value (e.g., their jobs).
So far we have contrasted the two main driving forces behind motivation -  growth and 
survival -  and the two corresponding motives addressed by the existing and proposed 
views of motivation -  achievement and protection. It is necessary to clarify that although
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the view of adaptive motivation depicts a motivational pattern that is primarily 
protection-driven, it is possible for the motivation of certain individuals, and especially 
that of the keen survivors in the adaptation process, to be driven by achievement at the 
same time. However, the existing view does not insist on the presence of protection 
motive as either a prominent or secondary feature in the motivation process.
5.2 A Model of Environmental Perception and Adaptive Motivation
Individuals view the changing environment as the source of many selective pressures 
that bear on their survival and success. Selective pressures are competitive in nature 
(Lane 1991) and could present threats to basic survival as well as opportunities for 
growth. Since events in a changing and complex environment are expected to be 
evolving (Ramanujam 2003) rather than repetitive, it would be unrealistic to assume that 
their outcomes can be systematically controlled or predicted on the basis of past events. 
This stance differs fundamentally from that of existing motivation literature, which 
considers change only as an outcome (e.g., change in motivation as a result of a new pay 
scheme) and bases its predictions on the controllability and predictability of 
organizational consequences such as money, security, recognition, social support, formal 
and informal sanctions, reprimands, and termination (Luthans and Kreitner 1985).
However, many of these so-called organizational consequences and in particular those of 
an economic nature such as pay and employment security, are subject to pressures in the 
organization’s external environment, and are therefore neither straightforwardly nor 
entirely controllable by the organization. As such, when an organization introduces a 
new pay scheme, for example, it is likely to be not only the contingent requirements of 
the new pay scheme that the workers have to adjust to, but also other pressing realities 
such as downsizing, restructuring, and merging. These organizational changes are taking 
place with striking frequency in response to more turbulent, more competitive and more 
global marketplaces (Tsui and Ashford 1994). The fact that they no longer follow a well- 
defined path where outcomes are known a priori (Edelman and Benning 1999) 
represents unprecedented adaptive demands and pressures on the individuals concerned.
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Accompanying these changes has been the introduction of management innovations 
such as total quality management, which has been acknowledged as a means to intensify 
work and tighten managerial control (Edwards, Collinson et al. 1998). One consequence 
of these trends is the increase in work pressure, a phenomenon seldom given attention in 
the motivation literature. Workers are now generally held responsible for a wider array 
of activities than before, including making rapid adjustments to changes in work 
processes and other commonplace organizational changes aforementioned. With 
multiple changes taking place in a complex environment (Foster 2000), it seems not only 
beneficial but also desirable to base predictions of motivation on the workers’ overall 
perception of the environment they are in rather than on specific aspects of work or 
work-related outcomes such as goal specificity and reward attainability propositioned by 
existing motivation theory.
As Sitkin and Pablo (1992) confirmed, most scholars who have studied decision making 
behavior in organizational situations have focused on the direct effects of one or two 
determinants of this behavior. However, such an approach does not adequately reflect 
the complex sets of real life or influences in organizations (Sitkin and Weingart 1995). 
By emphasizing the nature of the contemporary setting as an important context for 
individual adaptation, I am not implying that this process is not relevant or important for 
workers in different time periods. Rather, I am suggesting that the unprecedented pace of 
changes in today’s workplace heightens the need for rapid adaptation by individuals (cf. 
Tsui and Ashford 1994).
Worker perceptions of the changing environment have been given little attention in the 
motivation literature. Yet, there exists a myriad of questions that can be asked about the 
workers and their responses to the rapidly changing employment and pay arrangements 
in this context. Where adaptive behavior is not automatic, i.e., when behavior is not an 
automatic result of instinctive behavior, significant input such as the reception and 
processing of information, and the organization of responses has to be recognized, 
categorized, and acted upon, and the response to stimuli that appear to be insignificant or 
to have lost their significance must be inhibited (Grossman 1975). In the ultimate sense, 
adaptability means the capacity to behave in ways maximally consonant with the 
attainment of ends or goals in a changing environment (Harvey 1966).
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Accounting for cognition and emotions. It is important to clarify at this point, why 
existing cognition-based frameworks could be helpful but are insufficient for predicting 
motivation in a complex and changing environment. Concerning the cognitive 
informative processing aspect of human adaptation, Olds (1956) informed that 
individuals are concerned with searching and scanning for environmental cues, 
interpreting them, assessing “where they stand”, and deciding accordingly on what they 
can and will do to attain their goals. Without paying dual attention to the affective aspect 
of adaptation processes, however, the solution seems only partial. In this regard, Kittay, 
Seban et al.’s (1975) and Foster’s (2000) suggestions that emotions fill the gap where 
information is incomplete or when individual information processing capacities are 
limited are helpful in inspiring the theoretical direction.
In line with these views, I propose that adaptive motivation and behavior may be 
knowledge-based and emotions-driven. Adaptation, however, is not always oriented 
toward prosperity and growth. It therefore seems beneficial to consider a broader 
category, that of environmental perception, which: (1) in general caters for cognitive and 
affective activities in individuals’ adaptive responses to and interaction with 
environmental issues and demands for the purpose of development and growth; and (2) 
in particular cases of turbulence, crisis, and significant change and adjustment under 
uncertainty and risks, helps explain motivation from a view of adaptation for the 
principal reason of survival.
Environmental Perception under Uncertainty and Risks
Practically all forms of human behavior involve decision making under uncertainty. Any 
decision made under uncertainty, which effects future events, has some risk to it, and 
people are typically averse to risk (Katzan 1992). Uncertainty and risks as a subject has 
implications for organizational decision-making, executive behavior, managerial 
attitudes, and work motivation. Economics researchers of uncertainty and risks have 
however rarely studied motivation in the work setting, just as management researchers 
studying motivation have often ignored the uncertainty and risks within which the 
workers’ environment is embedded.
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Uncertainty seems especially inevitable in a complex environment whether the 
complexity arises from interactions between people, management and workgroups 
(Foster 2000), the task itself (Griesinger 1990) or the act-to-outcome contingencies in 
relation to it (Sawyer 1990). Uncertainty, objective or subjective, is associated with the 
amount of unpredictable variety furnished by the environment. Motivational phenomena 
must however depend more directly on subjective uncertainty, which involves 
anticipation of how an environmental event may unfold amidst mutually exclusive 
scenarios than on objective uncertainty, which deals with relative frequencies (Berlyne 
1975). The hypothesis is that subjective uncertainty, induced by external stimulation, 
can have energizing or activating effects.
An example given by Berlyne (1975) is for slight influxes of uncertainty to be gratifying 
for certain individuals at times of their boredom or sensory deprivation in which the 
puzzlement and the subsequent enlightenment are both pleasurable. Another possibility 
is for an amount of uncertainty to sufficiently create a sense of fear and concern for 
certain individuals so much so that they would not want to take their chances, so to 
speak, but do everything they can to help reduce the risk of failure. This would, for 
example, be the case at my research enterprise where all workers have been put on 
limited duration contracts with no guarantee of renewal.
Nature of environmental perception. Waller, Conte et al.’s (2001) referred to 
perception as an outcome of individuals’ information processing or a consequence of 
individuals’ selective attention, selective comprehension, and judgment. In particular, 
environmental perception represents evaluative information that is a result of sensing or 
scanning of the environment. It directly references one’s relationship with environmental 
forces (Ashford and Cummings 1983; Tsui and Ashford 1994) and may encompass 
cognitive and affective responses in the sense that individuals may go by what they think 
as well as how they feel in trying to make sense of complex environmental issues.
Environmental perception may denote a value of quality and be represented by a 
category (e.g., threat) that may be qualitatively reflective, but not necessarily 
quantitatively tied to, objective characteristics of the situation (Salancik and Pfeffer 
1978). This seems all the more plausible when information pertaining to environmental
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issues is incomplete or inexact and therefore subject to personal interpretations and 
perceptual biases (see Tversky and Kahneman 1974), as people are known to evaluate 
information sources in terms of personal relevance (Festinger 1954).
The ability to differentiate the environment and integrate the information may also vary 
across people. This variation may lead to different outcomes in learning and adaptation 
to new environments, even if individual circumstances and preferences are the same 
(Antonides 1991). There thus seems a strong case for investigating perception of 
environmental forces for which probability beliefs cannot be established due to factors 
of uncertainty and risks. In this connection, the economics literature offered valuable 
insight especially pertaining to attitudes toward risk.
Risk attitudes. Findings revealed that motivation is influenced by individuals’ attitudes 
toward risk, or risk propensity. In particular, people seem more concerned with avoiding 
losses than pursuing gains (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). It is thus likely for 
individuals to first pay attention to protecting existing interests that are fundamental to 
their survival than to go out of their way to pursue unprecedented, and thus risky, 
opportunities for growth. Survival means that individuals must constantly engage in the 
work of preserving themselves, particularly by acting upon the environment in a proper 
way to replenish the materials and energy needed. This is obviously the situation where 
proper information processing is most directly required (Toda 1983).
In order to explore individuals’ response to and processing of environmental cues in a 
today’s complex, fast-changing, and challenging organizational setting (see Tsui and 
Ashford 1994), the development of a model of environmental perception, i.e., the overall 
assessment of the environment rather than perception only of specific or isolated issues 
within it (e.g., expectancy, instrumentality, goal specificity, and goal difficulty), appears 
to be not only a more promising but also a necessary avenue for explaining motivation.
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5.2.1 Threat and Opportunity Perceptions and Adaptive Motivation
The psychology of perception deals with lawful relationships concerning the 
discrimination of stimuli (Antonides 1991). To begin with, all human behaviors are 
guided by how man goes about interpreting his universe (Alexander 1975). Particularly, 
people form cognitive representations of the environment to make sense of the 
ambiguity and complexity in their environment (Dutton and Jackson 1987). This view is 
consistent with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) argument that people use mental 
approximations to understand an uncertain world.
Schema of Threats and Opportunities
The most common form of discrimination of environmental stimuli in social sciences is 
perhaps that which involves the perception of threats and opportunities. Table 5.3 lists 
the multiple areas of research that use the schema of threats and opportunities or the like 
as cognitive representations of environmental cues under uncertainty and risks.
Table 5.3
Schema of Threats and Opportunities in Social Sciences Research
Area of research Representative studies Schema used
Behavior of the firm March & Simon 1958; Cyert & 
March 1963; Simon 1965
Opportunities and 
threats/problems/crises
Managerial decision-making Ansoff 1965; Steinbruner 1974; 
Fredrickson 1985; Dutton & Jackson 
1987; Jackson & Dutton 1988
Threats and opportunities
Marketing management Kotler 1967; Kotler 1997 Opportunities and threats
Conflict resolution Tedeschi 1970; Horai & Tedeschi 
1975
Threats and promises
Bargaining and negotiation Sawyer & Guetzkow 1965 Threats and promises
Economic and investment 
decisions
Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman 1981; Neale, Huber et 
al 1987
Losses and gains
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For example, in research on the behavior of the firm, decision makers can be motivated 
either to avoid or take risks by their perception of problems, crises or threats and 
opportunities (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963; Simon 1965). Jackson & 
Dutton (1988) described the strategic management process as one that involves the 
perception of ambiguous organizational issues as “threats and opportunities”. Such 
schema is evident throughout studies in managerial decision making (Ansoff 1965; 
Aharoni 1966; Steinbruner 1974; Fredrickson 1985; Dutton and Jackson 1987). Dutton 
and Jackson (1987) pointed out that organizational decision makers do not only employ 
schema, described as a memorized structure for the interpretation of data (e.g., threats 
and opportunities) to understand their world, their perceptual and interpretive processes 
are also consequential for determining organizational level action.
Another categorization in this same vein concerns the prescriptive marketing research 
and practice of “SWOT analysis”, which involved, in relation to a firm’s internal 
strengths and weaknesses, the scanning of the external environment for “opportunities 
and threats” (Kotler 1967; Kotler 1997). But categorizations of this kind are not limited 
to research in the organizational setting. An interesting parallel stems from research on 
interpersonal conflict, which discuss the presentation of “threats and promises” as tools 
in resolving differences (Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965; Tedeschi 1970; Horai and 
Tedeschi 1975). There is evidence that the same schema is used in related fields of 
bargaining and negotiation (Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965; Neale, Huber et al. 1987).
Last but not least, findings in research on economic and investment decisions show that 
the way an outcome is framed (in terms of losses or gains) can influence a decision 
maker's risk propensity and thereby his/her decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Neale, Huber et al. 1987). Inparticular, Levin, Johnson et 
al (1986) demonstrated that the locus of framing effects lies in the translation of 
subjective impressions into overt responses (Sawyer 1990).
I have so- far argued that the schema of threats and opportunities or the like are 
commonly used across the field of social sciences in understanding information 
processing and decision making. The importance of discriminating environmental 
stimuli for survival and success is perhaps best articulated by Kiesler & Sproull, who
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defined managerial problem-sensing, i.e., processing of ambiguous organizational 
issues, (or environmental scanning), as a “necessary precondition for managerial activity 
that is directed toward organizational adaptation” (Kiesler and Sproull 1982: 548).
Conspicuous by its absence in the motivation literature is research into how individuals 
process environmental cues and respond to perceived threats and opportunities under 
conditions of uncertainty and risks. To fill in the gap, I proceed in the following sections 
to conceptualize, based on insights from other literatures, the ideas of threat and 
opportunity perception in the work setting.
5.2.2 Proposed Concept of Threat Perception
The use of threat of punishment is a relatively common phenomenon in industrial and
organizational settings (Arvey and Ivancevich 1980). Indeed the threat of job losses
(Adam, Beck et al. 2000; Wilkinson 2001) and wage cuts (Blanchflower 1991; Beck
•
2000) represent an increasingly frequent and alarming reality of today’s workplace. 
But it seems that the concept of threat has not been given parallel attention in the 
motivation literature. As a matter of fact, a survey of subject indexes of leading volumes 
on motivation (e.g., Aldis 1961; Lawler 1973; Steers and Porter 1991; Pinder 1998) 
revealed that no entry of “threat” as a concept or as a term has been listed.
This lack of synchronization between theory and practice may be partly explained by the 
fact that in the Anglo-Saxon culture, it is neither socially desirable for managers to talk 
about the use of threat, nor is it considered appropriate for academics to examine its 
application in a research setting. It is therefore not completely surprising that analyses of 
threat and motivation in the workplace (Baker, Ware et al. 1966; Arvey and Ivancevich 
1980; Sims 1980) have largely been conducted without sophisticated theoretical 
development of the concept itself or the process of its perception.
Of particular relevance are those studies that examine how organizations have 
successfully or unsuccessfully adapted to threatening environments (Argenti 1976; 
Rubin 1977; Starbuck and Hedberg 1977). Studies that specifically investigated
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 171
unsuccessful adaptation include Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton’s (1981) theory of threat- 
rigidity effects which explained markedly cautious or even rigid organizational 
responses to adversity in ways such as increased formalization and control, conservation 
of resources, and the economizing of information processing by narrowing the 
perception field and limiting the incoming information. Along the same lines, Smart and 
Vertinsky (1977) argue that during a crisis, fear of failure incapacitates decision makers.
If adversity leads to rigidity and incapacitation, it seems likely that decision makers 
would undertake conservative rather than high-risk decisions in response to declines in 
performance. In other words, organizations tend to be more risk-averse in situations of 
adversity (see Singh 1986). These findings are consistent with Roger’s (1975) protection 
motivation theory in the persuasion literature, which proposed that fear-arousing stimuli, 
such as those in health warnings, seek to eliminate or establish response patterns that 
might produce or prevent the occurrence of noxious events.
On the other hand, researchers studying the successful adaptation to adversity find that 
decline triggers corrective processes in organization (Cyert and March 1963) and 
processes of decline activate their own counterforces (Hirschman 1979). Other theorists 
propose that organizational crises can be opportunities for innovation (Wilson 1966; 
Lindblom 1968; Whetton 1981). In addition, research in sociology suggests that coping 
effectively with adversity increases the survival prospects of the organization 
(Thompson 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
It can be argued that psychological rather than organizational or sociological theories are 
best equipped to explain individual-level phenomena. But as Miller (1978) pointed out, 
there are many effects that appear to generalize across levels of analysis, because meso- 
or marco-level effects may influence individual-level phenomenon. One way of gaining 
insight into the effects of threat on motivation is through how organizations make use of 
different kinds of power to manipulate employee behavior. In this connection, Etzioni 
(1961) proposed that organizations employ three kinds of power -  coercive, 
remunerative, and normative power -  but the degree to which they rely on each to 
motivate differs from organization to organization.
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In this light, coercive and remunerative powers seem most immediately relevant to 
examining the motivational effects of the kind of threat produced by China’s 
employment and wage reforms. Coercive power rests on the application, or the threat of 
application, of sanctions such as the non-renewal or termination of employment 
contracts, or the controlling through force the satisfaction of needs such as job security 
and the like. Remunerative power is based on control over material resources and 
rewards through allocation of salaries and wages, commissions and contributions, fringe 
benefits, services and commodities
Furthermore, independent of specific enterprise reform measures but equally relevant in 
the organization as a social institution is normative power -  the power of allocation and 
manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations through employment of leaders, 
manipulation of mass media, allocation of esteem and prestige symbols, administration 
of ritual, and influence over the distribution of “acceptance” and “positive response”. 
The main idea is that the larger the number of personal needs whose satisfaction the 
organization controls, the more power the organization has over the participants (see 
Etzioni 1961 for a detailed discussion ).
Perhaps the most severe form of threat affecting motivation in the process of adaptation 
from an entitlement environment to a contingent environment in the Chinese workplace 
is not that which is related to the fluctuation in compensation but the total discharge 
from employment. This reckoning is supported by the argument that the need for 
security usually precedes the demand for more pay (Lane 1991), social or other higher- 
level needs. Despite its importance, the notion of threat was riot taken seriously in the 
work motivation literature even in the seemingly closely related theoretical contexts of 
Maslow’s (1943) need hierarchy theory or Alderfer’s (1969) suggestion of existence, 
relatedness, and growth needs.
Literature at the individual level mainly dealt with the effects of threat in the form of 
stress, anxiety, and physiological arousal. The relevance of this research is individuals’ 
coping and adaptive responses. A crucial part of this study will therefore examine 
evidence for adaptive motivation in this regard.
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Defining “Threat Perception” in the Work Setting
One of the most radical changes in the workplace in recent years has been the 
transformation of traditionally secure managerial jobs into insecure ones (Roskies and 
Louis-Gerin 1989). In fact, the change did not just affect managers but also ordinary 
workers. In China alone, official statistics report 10 million unemployed industrial 
workers at the turn of the century (SSB 2000). With further industrial restructuring and 
enterprise reform, at least 1 5 - 3 0  million or up to 30% more jobs in Chinese industry 
were threatened to have to go. As a matter of fact, this seems a somewhat modest 
estimate given the admission across the Chinese industry that “three out of five jobs” or 
60% of the workforce are redundant or “superfluous” (fuyu). (Tang 1998: 146).
Although job losses are expected to be less extensive in the advanced economies, 
authors have presented detailed reports of the psychological effects of potential job loss 
and noted that workers are more anxious about losing their jobs than they were in the 
past (see Schmidt 1999). While job losses are often described as “traumatic experiences” 
for the individuals concerned (Johnson and Nalbandian 1998), the insecurity suffered by 
those who need to sell their labor to survive goes beyond the workplace; it extends to 
fear of loss of home and mortgage (Elliott and Atkinson 1998).
Two existing definitions of threat in social sciences research offered insights in 
conceptualizing the perception of threat in the work setting. In the setting of 
international conflict and negotiation, Singer (1958) defined threat perception based on 
the perceived intent and perceived capability of an opponent who allegedly plans some 
action detrimental to the target. This seems to be the most popular definition in the 
literature which involved the use of threat in influencing the behavior of an “opponent”, 
and especially in the form of a contingent threat which conveys an intent to harm and 
centers the use of punishment to coerce another to further the threatener’s goals 
(Tedeschi 1970).
In the analysis of societal evolution, Boulding (1978) used the term “threat systems” to 
refer to the source of dominance and internal discipline. For instance, threat is used in 
the family, commonly to ensure dominance of the husband, less commonly to ensure
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dominance of the wife, and in certain family roles almost universally to ensure 
dominance of parents over children. Furthermore, in the context of business 
organizations industrial discipline is maintained by the threat of punishment such as fine, 
dismissal, or withdrawal of privileges (Boulding 1978: 140).
Based on an adaptive view of motivation, my conceptualization of threat considers the 
subjective perception of the individual and the threat of punishment in conflict and 
social studies respectively but does not assume a relation of dominance and 
subordination or imply the role of a threatener per se. It focuses on the individual's 
response to disturbing environmental cues and highlights the person’s goal to adapt to 
and co-evolve with the changing environment (Kauffman 1995; Ashmos, Duchon et al. 
2000) to improve his/her chances of survival. As the reform philosophy of my research 
organization dictates, improvement in motivation and performance amidst intensifying 
competition requires alertness to and preparedness for threats in the environment.
Definition of threat perception. Focusing on the individual’s response to and 
processing of environmental cues, I define threat perception as the perception o f an 
environmental cue, situation or set o f circumstances as presenting a risk to the 
individual’s current interests in such a way that it is feared, i f  not acted upon efficiently, 
will impinge on one’s survival. It has potential loss associated with it and is negative. It 
tends to arouse fear and narrow the individual's options. The influence of threat lies in 
that it limits the perceiver to a passive role of self-preservation and defense and suggests 
a worsening of the overall situation if not acted upon in a timely fashion.
Economic and psychological punishments. Specifically, threat perception evolves along 
two paths: economic punishment (such as termination of employment and reduction of 
pay and employee benefits) and psychological punishment (such as reprimand and loss 
of self-esteem). Economic punishment may also merge with punishment of a 
psychological nature in creating a more substantial impact, when, for example, pay 
deduction is interpreted as an outward acknowledgment of unsatisfactory performance 
or failure on the part of the worker.
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5.2.3 Proposed Concept of Opportunity Perception
One only need to survey the job advertisements in newspapers, magazines, or the 
recruitment brochures of major corporations (e.g., IBM, HSBC, and British Gas) to find 
the framing of job vacancies as “opportunities” a common feature in the recruitment 
process. Opportunity as a concept, however, appears to have been studied more 
extensively in other social sciences disciplines than in work motivation. A review of the 
former showed a unifying thread that runs through the diverse literature pointing to the 
issue of whether a different quantity and quality of opportunity brings about an 
improvement at various levels of the organization, economy and society. In essence, the 
majority of these studies seemed to suggest that opportunity is a positive phenomenon.
For instance, at the societal level, opportunity influences labor market efficiency 
(Andrews 1992) and helps to reduce poverty and narrow the gap between social classes 
(Featherman and Hauser 1978; Rosenfeld 1986). At the firm level, it increases the 
competitive ability of the firm to recruit and retain employees (Cohen and Pfeffer 1986) 
and encourages risk-taking behavior for entrepreneurs (Kirzner 1979) and organizational 
decision makers (Dutton and Jackson 1987). At the individual level, it improves career 
attitudes within an organization (Cassirer and Reskin 2000) and reduces the intention to 
leave (Stewman and Konda 1983; Kirschenbaun and Mano-Negrin 1999). The question 
thus is: “Why is the same positive phenomenon not captured in motivation?”
Reward vs. Opportunity
As Pearce (1987) pointed out, compensation theory will fare better if it had as great a 
concern for the context in which employees must work as it does for their levels of 
individual effort. The same may be said of motivation theory if more concern is 
accorded the context of reward. This introduces the possibility that the positive or 
negative effects of reward may not be so much a function of the amount or manner it is 
distributed (as is argued by expectancy theory and equity theory respectively), but may 
be more a function of the context in which it is presented. Exploring whether reward is 
in effect viewed as “opportunity” by its target may therefore provide a theoretical 
solution to the dispute of whether rewards motivate (Sun 2001b).
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Table 5.4
When Reward is Not Perceived as “Opportunity5
Issue Possible condition under which reward is not perceived as “opportunity’
Exchange
Training
Promotion
Overtime
The gesture undermines the individual’s ego.
The suggested means of attaining the reward threatens a worker's 
protected values.
The reward is a “bad deal”.
Being away on training may give others’ an excuse to replace the worker.
Added responsibility increases risk exposure for the risk-averse individual. 
Upgrade to management status deprives individual of overtime pay.
New status alienates the worker from social/support group.
New work requirements clash with the worker’s preference for family life.
Time requirements clash with worker’s priority for leisure.
Performance-related The gesture of tying pay to performance communicates lack of trust, 
pay scheme
Performance-related work goals viewed as a weapon for management to 
axe workers.
Performance categories stipulated by management only partially captures 
practical requirements of the job (content).
Performance standards defined by management contradict the worker’s 
idea of “a job well done” (process).
Narrowly defined work goals stifle initiative, creativity, and flexibility.
Ambiguous work goals fail to provide direction and basis for evaluation.
Constantly changing work goals cause effort wastage and create 
confusion, frustration and stress.
Reward structure Reward is given for one-off achievements when continuous improvement 
is more important or meaningful, and vice versa
Reward is given to the individual when teamwork and cooperation are 
essential, and vice versa.
Reward is given only to the individual or only the team when input from 
both the individual and the team are essential.
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In distinguishing between opportunity and reward, it is important to note that while 
“opportunity” has to have some sort of a reward attached to it, what management calls 
“reward” is not necessarily what employees view as “opportunity”. And when the 
employee does not so perceive it, it loses the potential to motivate. In the worst scenario, 
reward may even be viewed as “threat” when, for example, the gesture undermines the 
individual’s ego, the suggested means of attaining the reward threatens the individual’s 
protected values, i.e., values that resist trade-offs with other values, particularly 
economic values (Baron and Spranca 1997), or the reward is simply a “bad deal”.
In addition to these critical issues, Table 5.4 illustrates other situations pertaining to 
training, promotion, overtime, performance-related pay, and reward structure that may 
not be perceived as “opportunity” by the target. Since these entries are self-explanatory, 
I would not reiterate them here. The conceptualization of “opportunity” below reveals 
the point of view that counts -  the individual’s subjective perception of the situation. By 
its nature, opportunity perception does not take reward, be it intrinsic or extrinsic, as 
necessarily positive or negative. It places at the center of the analysis the potential for 
reward to translate, given the proper conditions, into “pull forces” of motivation. Its 
emphasis on the context enables it to explain motivation in complex situations not 
feasible with existing concepts.
Defining “Opportunity Perception” in the Work Setting
Parallel to the unprecedented threat of unemployment in today’s workplace (Kochan, 
Katz et al. 1986; Wilkinson 2001) is the new wave of opportunity that emerges in multi­
skilled work roles (Green 2001) as well as in intrepreneurial organizational 
environments for individuals and their teams of colleagues to innovate within existing 
firms or found new enterprises (Miles, Coleman et al. 1998; Coleman 1999). These 
“new market opportunities” are relevant not just to managers but also others who 
recognize them (Hostager, Neil et al. 1998) and have the skills and expertise to take 
advantage of them.
What is in store for the Chinese workers in the country’s transition from a planned to a 
market economy may well involve some of these opportunities. But for the production
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 178
workers in my research organization whose skills are highly specialized and 
nontransferable to other departments within the steel enterprise, let alone the external 
labor market, the most meaningful opportunities are those that are extended to them to 
train and develop in their jobs.
As a matter of fact, at the time preceding the beginning of the economic reform in the 
late 1970’s, training and development, when available, were generally not identified as 
“opportunities” as such, because more responsibility meant the same wage for the 
communist workers. But with the introduction and intensification of “position and skill- 
based pay” (gangwei jineng gongji) and performance-related wage (anlao fenpei) (see 
Sun 2000a for a detailed discussion of China's wage reform), workers in the transitional 
economy begin to view things differently and subsequently seek after opportunities that 
would allow them to upgrade their skills and enable them to increase their chances of 
survival in the increasingly competition-based internal labor market.
Just as the conceptualization of threat in the work setting has benefited from existing 
views in conflict and social studies, the conceptualization of opportunity may draw on 
insights from perspectives in the sociology, economics, and strategy literature. For 
example, opportunity was defined as the observed degree to which socioeconomic 
achievement (e.g., occupational status, earnings, education) is free of a dependence upon 
social background (e.g. race, parental education and occupation) (Featherman and 
Hauser 1978). In work on labor markets, opportunity referred to the number of jobs 
available to potential quitters or job seekers (Laker 1991; Kirschenbaun and Mano- 
Negrin 1999). These views are helpful in establishing parameters by which aspects of 
societal and economic advancement can be objectively measured.
In its application in strategic management, we find further evidence of the positive 
nature of opportunity. In particular, Dutton (1993) noted that the label "opportunity" is 
typically used by managers as a linguistic device in framing ambiguous organizational 
issues for the sake of generating more participation among staff members in resolving 
and coping with such issues as change and uncertainty. For this purpose, opportunity 
was defined as “an organizational issue that some members will agree is controllable, 
has potential gain associated with it, and is positive”.
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Worker’s perception of opportunity. Based on an adaptive view of motivation, my 
conceptualization of opportunity does not embrace only the inherently affirmative nature 
of opportunity manifest in the sociology, economics, and strategy management research. 
It goes beyond that to capture what has not been captured in the work motivation 
literature -  the individual’s response to and processing of encouraging environmental 
cues -  and stress the person’s goal to adapt to, and co-evolve with (i.e., proactively 
influencing and counteracting), the changing environment (Kauffman 1995; Ashmos, 
Duchon et al. 2000) in sustaining growth and prosperity. Opportunity therefore is not 
necessarily something that is being strategically framed by the organization as 
“controllable, having potential gain associated with it, and positive” (see Dutton 1993) 
but more importantly, what the individual considers desirable and feasible to pursue 
given his/her own preferences and individual set of circumstances.
Definition of opportunity perception. Emphasizing the individual’s calculation of the 
costs and benefits involved, I define opportunity perception as the perception o f an 
environmental cue, situation, or set o f  circumstances as presenting a potential o f  
working toward the individual’s advantage in such a way that it is hoped, i f  acted upon 
efficiently, will further one’s growth and advancement. The impact of opportunity lies in 
that it empowers the perceiver with an active role toward self-realization and 
advancement, be it through the satisfaction of an* existence need, or a relatedness- or 
growth-need (see Alderfer 1969) and suggests an improvement of the overall situation 
when acted upon efficiently.
Unlike existing determinants of motivation in the literature, opportunity perception as a 
proposed antecedent takes into account a much wider spectrum of concerns: (1) not just 
instrumental perceptions but also normative beliefs; (2) not just rationality but also 
bounded rationality, i.e., constrained rational behavior given limitations in information 
processing and problem-solving capabilities (Simon 1955; Simon 1996); (3) not just 
cognitions but also emotions; (4) not just the ends but also the means; and (5) not just 
the ultimate reward but also the experience associated with attaining it and the tradeoffs 
in between.
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In particular, it provides a solution to the long-standing controversy over the positive 
and negative effects of reward, be it in terms its intrinsic vs. extrinsic nature (Wiersma 
1992; Lepper, Henderlong et al. 1999) or the unanticipated effects of reward systems in 
general (Kerr 1975; Pearce 1987). Given its inherently positive nature as well as special 
emphasis on the context in which reward is given, opportunity perception as an 
antecedent of motivation represents a major improvement over the often mentioned but 
unconceptualized, and thus non-operationalizeable, notion of “reward”.
As it is the case for the worker’s perception of threat, the worker's perception of 
opportunity is distinctive considering its unique setting. Specifically, the worker’s threat 
perception evolves along two paths: (1) economic reward (like renewal of employment 
contract and promotion); and (2) psychological reward (such as praise and trust in one’s 
ability). Economic reward may also combine with reward of a psychological kind to 
create a greater impact (Frey 1997), when, for example, promotion is interpreted as a 
stamp of approval of one’s performance and ability or evidence of mastery over both 
oneself and his/her environment (see Sayers 1988).
5.2.4 Testable Propositions
The propositions presented here represent two of a total of 21 hypotheses of the 
proposed research model of environmental perception and adaptive motivation. The 
remaining 19 hypotheses concern the respective antecedents of threat perception and 
opportunity perception and are presented in Chapter 6.
Predicting Threat Perception
Every layoff announcement affects the perceived probability of job loss and causes 
survivors to work harder and worry more (Jacoby 1999). If individuals acknowledge that 
increasing their performance is critical to improving the situation and that they are able 
to identify ways to increase their performance, the perception of threat is likely to have a 
positive effect on the motivation to perform under adverse circumstances and contribute
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to effective adaptation to the environment (see Staw, Sandelands et al. 1981). This line 
of reasoning leads to the following hypothesis regarding the role threat perception plays 
in determining motivation.
Hypothesis 1: The greater the workers’ threat perception o f environmental cues (e.g., 
downsizing and workforce restructuring activities), the more likely they will be 
motivated to adapt to the new and changing environmental demands and challenges in 
their jobs in order to protect their current interests.
Considering potential individual differences, the hypothesized relationship is expected to 
be stronger for individuals who are relatively: (1) more vulnerable, i.e., those who are 
poorly protected from potential losses in the sense that they have little or no protection 
or fallback position if and when losses occur; and (2) more risk-averse, i.e., those who 
find the potential of losses more unbearable.
Predicting Opportunity Perception
Purposive human action involves a posture of alertness toward the discovery of “as yet 
unperceived opportunities” and their exploitation (Kirzner 1979). If individuals 
recognize that increasing their performance will help improve the situation and that there 
is no other alternative to achieving this end, the perception of opportunity is likely to 
have a positive effect on the motivation to perform and contribute to effective adaptation 
to the environment, even if the perceived likelihood of success is minimal. This line of 
reasoning leads to a second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The greater the workers ’ opportunity perception o f environmental cues 
(e.g., trend in multitasking), the more likely they will be motivated to adapt to the new 
and changing environmental demands and challenges in their jobs in order to achieve (a 
higher level of) development and growth.
Considering potential individual differences, the hypothesized relationship is expected to 
be stronger for individuals who are relatively: (1) more entrepreneurial, i.e., those who 
are constantly alert of the potential that new challenges bring will new opportunities for
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growth and development; (2) more achievement-oriented, i.e., those who have a 
personality that is inherently inclined toward continuously furthering one’s personal 
growth, development, and success even under difficult and trying circumstances.
5.3 Discussion and Conclusion
One way of assessing the value of a new research model is whether it provides a critical 
solution for an unresolved theoretical issue. In chapter 4 , 1 have established uncertainty 
and risks as a clear and present reality of today’s fast-changing, if  not turbulent, 
workplace. I then provided a critique of how existing theory fares under the setting of 
uncertainty and risks. In relation to the four leading theories in the field, I have 
addressed the following issues:
(1) Can motivation in adversity be explained by expectancy theory?
(2) Are people motivated to work toward clear and difficult goals due only to the 
challenge and sense of achievement such goals afford rather than because of their 
risk aversion to the noxious outcomes of noncompliance?
(3) Can reinforcement theory predict motivation when environmental consequences are 
uncertain?
(4) Are people expected to react negatively to inequitable pay amount and/or distribution 
procedures even when it is politically sensitive to do so?
While the answers to all four questions are in the negative (see section 4.3 -  How Work 
Motivation Theory Fares under Uncertainty and Risks for a detailed analysis), I set out 
to propose in this chapter a model of environmental perception and adaptive motivation 
as a solution to the issues raised.
If we assume that motivation can thrive in the face of adversity for reason of self- 
preservation and survival, employees can be driven by deadlines and ultimatums to 
deliver their goals, attitudes to risk can influence motivation under uncertainty, and 
political sensitivity can divert the normal course of reaction to inequity, then motivation 
under uncertainty and risks really boils down to issues of threat and opportunity
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perception, and especially threat perception. This position is consistent with the 
cornerstone arguments in decision science and strategic management, which state that 
individuals are generally more sensitive to losses than to gains (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974) and that threat perception will generate a greater motivational response than 
opportunity perception (Dutton and Jackson 1987).
I put forth the model of threat and opportunity perception not because I can demonstrate 
that it is completely correct, but because it offers insights into aspects of behavior and 
job attitudes that are not captured by existing theories, the conceptualization of which is 
by and large predicated upon stable and predictable settings. As such, they become 
limited in their capacity to explain motivation under circumstances of uncertainty and 
risks. It is only by attempting to confront with existing models with situations capable of 
disconfirming them, such as those presented in the table above, and only by juxtaposing 
such models with alternatives such as the one proposed that we can develop a better 
understanding of the motivation process (see Salancik and Pfeffer 1978).
The results of this analysis challenge traditional approaches to the motivation process 
and highlight the necessity for future scholars to consider seriously the adaptive nature 
of motivation in the context of a fast changing and increasingly complex workplace. In 
light of these trends and developments, motivation researchers should not assume the 
stability and predictability of the environment of work. Future research ought to adopt 
an adaptive motivation perspective and be directed not just at documenting the effects 
of compensation risks at the executive level, but also the prevalence of employment 
risks and protection motivation at the worker level. In particular, increased employment 
risk has altered the web of employment relations in which people work, compelling 
motivation scholars to reexamine the impact of job insecurity and modify their research 
agendas accordingly.
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Chapter 6
Antecedents of Threat and Opportunity Perceptions
This chapter consists of six sections. The introductory section discusses the rationale 
behind my approach to developing the proposed antecedents of threat and opportunity 
perceptions. The second section deals with the development of the proposed antecedents 
of threat perception -  risk o f noncompliance and pressure to perform. The third section 
deals with the development of the proposed antecedents of opportunity perception -  
perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost. The fourth section 
proposes the respective antecedents of perceived organizational support and of 
willingness to bear cost. The fifth section discusses organizational commitment as a 
mediating variable. And the last section concludes.
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6. Antecedents of Threat and Opportunity Perceptions
This chapter presents the antecedents of threat perception and opportunity perception. 
The attempt is exploratory in the sense that the desired conceptualization is not available 
in any of the literatures reviewed, which tend to focus on the consequences of threat and 
opportunity perception, such as outcomes in managerial decision-making (e.g., 
Fredrickson 1985; Jackson and Dutton 1988) and conflict resolution (e.g., Tedeschi 
1970; Horai and Tedeschi 1975).
The proposed research framework consists of 12 variables and a total of 21 hypotheses. 
The three variables of the model of “environment perception and adaptive motivation” -  
threat perception, opportunity perception, and adaptive motivation' -  and the 
corresponding hypotheses 1 - 2  were covered in Chapter 5 -  Toward a Model o f  
Environmental Perception and Adaptive Motivation. In this chapter, I focus on the 
remaining nine variables of the framework and the corresponding hypotheses 3 - 2 1 .
The analysis represents a selective effort to integrate into the proposed framework four 
existing motivation/organizational behavior concepts -  perceived organizational 
support, organizational commitment, expectancy, and instrumentality. In particular, 
instrumentality is identified as being comparable to observed frequency o f deserved 
rewards, one of the two dimensions of the proposed concept of reward consistency.
I first introduce the antecedents of threat perception -  risk o f  noncompliance and 
pressure to perform. Next, I present the determinants of opportunity perception -  
perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost. I then explore the 
antecedents of perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost, which 
involve overall situation enhancement, reward consistency, and expectancy.
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6.1 Introduction
Before I proceed with the development of the antecedents of threat and opportunity 
perceptions, it is important to review the rationale behind my approach. In light of the 
fact that the Chinese state-owned enterprise represents an economic institution within 
the unique setting of a socialist state, I believe that a key to unraveling the complexity of 
the motivation process in such a setting may lie in recognizing the connection between 
economic and social activities. As proposed by Weber (1968), the objects of concern in 
the analysis of economic behavior are not only economic transactions but also certain 
other “social actions”. As such, economic transactions can be seen as a special kind of 
social transaction requisite for the formation and maintenance of the institutional 
framework in which economic activity occurs (Furubotn and Richter 2000).
This perspective offers valuable insights on the attention that needs to be given in 
predicting environmental perceptions. It is of special importance in research settings that 
are characterized by uncertainty and risks. For instance, workers who operated at an 
unprecedented level of uncertainty and risks under employment and wage reforms were 
indoctrinated economically and socially by the state-owned enterprise as to how they 
should respond to the challenges before them in order to “win the fight”. In particular, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, workers were socialized to the awakening of their senses in 
achieving (1) “awareness of competition” (jingzheng yishi), (2) “risk consciousness” 
(weiji yishi), and (3) “alertness to calamity” (youhuan yishi).
Parallel to this, workers were given unprecedented levels of training and development 
opportunities to upgrade their skills, and to take up otherwise unpopular positions and as 
a result be able to improve their pay and employment prospects. Under “deepening of 
reforms”, individuals were informed that those unwilling to adapt would be putting both 
their pay and employment “at risk”. As the workplace rhetoric has it, “Not working hard 
today in your job means working harder tomorrow looking for a job” (jingtian bunuli 
gongzuo; mingtian jiuyao nuli jiaogongzuo). At the societal level, individuals were 
socialized by the state to emulate those who have become better off during economic 
reform, based on the widely publicized reform strategy of “letting a portion of the 
population take lead in the creation of wealth (according to their own strengths and
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abilities)” (xianyang yibufenren fuqiliai). It is against this backdrop of threats and 
opportunities that the determinants of environmental perception are considered.
Cook & Campell (1976) outlined three necessary conditions for concluding that a 
relationship between two variables is causal: (1) the cause must precede the effect in 
time; (2) the treatments must co-vary with the effect; and (3) there must be no other 
plausible alternative explanations of the cause and effect relationship. It is based on 
these requirements that my conceptualization of the framework is developed. The 
independent variables of threat and opportunity perceptions are numbered 4 -  12 in 
Table 6.1 -  Definitions o f Key Variables. One may wish to note the source of reference 
in the table, which reflects the diversity of knowledge and insights brought in from 
different research streams in the broader social sciences literature to bear on motivation 
under uncertainty and risks in the work setting.
The numbers in Table 6.1 correspond to those in the research model in Figure 6.1 -  
Proposed Antecedents o f  Environmental Perception and Adaptive Motivation, whereby 
the proposed effects are illuistrated with hypothesis paths H3 -  H21. Since the proposed 
framework represents a direct challenge to existing models of work motivation, in the 
following discussion of the variables of the proposed model, I also contrast alternative 
explanations of the proposed concepts vis-a-vis existing theory.
6.2 Proposed Antecedents of Threat Perception
Ingram & Clay (2000) identified a three-layered hierarchy -  states, organizations, and 
individuals. Within the context of my research, the pressures that are being exerted at 
various levels of the hierarchy, with the state superordinate to the state-owned 
enterprise, which is superordinate to the individual, help to illuminate the kind of 
pressure that is felt at the individual level to “perform or perish” (cf. Nee and Ingram 
1998). To begin with, the State Council represents the highest level of authority for 
“making binding decisions for individuals and state-owned enterprise juridically located 
in a particular territory or industry and to implement these decisions using force, if 
necessary (cf Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985).
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and  Risks 188
Table 6.1 
Definitions of Key Variables
No. Variable Definition Source of reference
1 Adaptive motivation
2 Threat perception
3 Opportunity 
perception
4 Risk of
noncompliance
5 Pressure to perform
6 Perceived 
organizational 
support
7 Willingness to bear 
cost
8 Overall situation 
enhancement
9 & Reward consistency
10
11 Expectancy
12 Organizational 
commitment
Motivation to adapt to new and changing 
environmental demands and challenges 
with the purpose of increasing one’s 
chances of survival and success under 
uncertainty and risks.
Perception of an environmental cue, 
situation or set of circumstances as 
presenting a risk to the individual’s current 
interests in such a way that it is feared, if 
not acted upon efficiently, will impinge on 
one’s survival.
Perception of an environmental cue, 
situation or set of circumstances as 
presenting a potential of working toward the 
individual’s advantage in such a way that it 
is hoped, if acted upon efficiently, will further 
one’s growth and advancement.
The extent to which the individual believes 
that his current interests will be “at risk” 
if he fails to comply with the socially and/or 
economically imposed requirements and 
expectations of his performance at work.
The extent to which the person feels under 
pressure, due to job demands as well as 
socially and/or self-imposed expectations to 
perform and be seen as an achiever.
The extent to which individuals feel that the 
organization values their contributions, 
cares about their well-being, and is there to 
help them succeed.
The extent to which the individual finds a 
pursuit worthwhile and is thus willing to bear 
the costs associated with it.
The extent to which the individual’s overall 
situation or well-being has enhanced due to 
organizational change and one’s 
involvement in it, as socially observed or 
personally experienced by the individual.
The extent to which the individual witnesses 
the frequency occurrence of (i) deserved 
rewards and of (ii) undeserved rewards.
The extent to which the individual feels that 
by experience, he has control over results of 
his work (or a comparable kind of work).
The relative strength of the individual’s 
identification with and involvement in a 
particular organization.
Foster 2000eco; Hannan & 
Freeman 1995str; Klinger, 
Barta, & Mahoney 1975psy; 
Kuhn & Beam 1982org;
Boulding 1978soc; Cyert & 
March 1963org; Fredrickson 
1985s,r; Jackson & Dutton 
1988str; Singer 1958ne9; 
Steinbruner 1974dec; 
Tedeschi 1973neg
Cyert & March 1963 orfl;
Dutton 1993str; Jackson & 
Dutton 1988str; Fredrickson 
1985str; Kotler 1967str; 
Steinbruner 1974dec; 
Tedeschi 1973neg
Sitkin & Pablo 1992str; 
Sutinen & Kuperan 1999soc; 
Tittle & Logan 1973law; 
Wiseman, Gomez-Meijia, & 
Fugate 2000eco
Ferrari 2001psy; Ingram & 
Clay 2000 ^  Kerstholt 1995 
dec; Leibenstein 1966 Van 
Yperen & Hegedoorn 2003ob
Eisenberger et al. 1986psy; 
Fuller et al 2003ob; George et 
al. 19930b; Rhoades & 
Eisenberger 2002psy
Boardman, etal 1996ec0; 
Casey &Deliqui61995 eco; 
Maehr & Braskamp 1986 mot; 
Mishan 1975ec0
Alderfer 1969 mot; Antonides 
1991ec0; Bandura 1986soc; 
Cyert & March 1963org;
Maehr & Braskamp 1986 mot; 
Nord 1976 ob
Adam 1963 mot; Vroom 
19630101; Foschi ^ 1998500
Vroom 1963mot; Pinder1991 
mot; Simon 1957org; Staw 
1977 mot
Allen & Meyer 1990psy; 
Mowday, Porter, & Steers 
19820b; Neale & Northcraft 
1991 ob
Key: d“  D ecision science; “ ° Econom ics; law Law; neg International conflict &  negotiation; org Organization; 
ob Organizational behavior; psy Psychology; “  Sociology; *  Strategy; m0‘ Work motivation
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Figure 6.1
Proposed Antecedents of Environmental Perception and Adaptive Motivation*5
H3Risk of 
Noncompliance
Threat
Perception
HIH5
Pressure to 
Perform H4
Adaptive
Motivation
H20
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Situation 
Enhancement
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9 & 10
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The organization or state-owned enterprise can thus be seen as an instrument in the hand 
of the state to help bring to pass the collective goals of political unity and economic 
prosperity. The individuals who were formerly referred to by the state as “owners of the 
enterprise” (qiyede zhurenweng) are now expected to justify their existence on the basis 
of individual contribution rather than need.
Here is how the hierarchy of superordination works: Predicated on the economic reform 
principle of “survival of the fittest”, the reform policy of “performance-related wag bill” 
(gongxiao guagou) represents an unprecedented state initiative to put a cap on the 
enterprise wage bill in view of budget constraints. The concept of linking pay to 
performance is in turn introduced by the enterprise at the individual level through the 
increased differentiation of bonuses and basic pay on the bases of position, skill, and on- 
the-job performance. In a similar vein, the reform policy of “competition-based 
employment” (jingzheng shanggang) is aimed at tackling the low productivity and high 
redundancy problems of the state-owned enterprise by simulating within the enterprise 
competitive pressures from its external environment.
This is accomplished with the introduction of increasingly large wage differentials and 
the replacement of lifetime employment by limited duration contracts and the increased 
of cradle-to-grave benefits. These measures were incrementally and experimentally 
introduced in the state industry from as early as the beginning of the economic reform in 
1978. And at the time this study was conducted, the wage and employment reforms were 
seen by policy leaders to have arrived at a more mature stage at some of the more 
progressive enterprises such as the research organization.
The conceptualizations risk o f noncompliance and pressure to perform and their impact 
on threat perception are predicated on findings of the deterrence literature (see 
Paternoster 1987 for a review), which proposes that sanctions can deter individuals only 
under specific circumstances -  that is, under the reinforcement of formal sanctions by 
informal social controls such as familial bonds or employment. In particular, Paternoster 
(1987) proposed that threat perception is a commonly identified variable between actual 
sanctions and behavior, as are informal social controls.
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The hypothesized framework of threat perception is depicted in the upper part of Figure 
6.1. Threat perception is viewed as the outcome of two antecedents, namely risk o f  
noncompliance and pressure to perform.
6.2.1 Risk of Noncompliance
The concept of risk can be understood as (1) the degree of uncertainty about whether 
potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized 
(Sitkin and Pablo 1992); or (2) anxieties that are aroused in connection with the self­
perception of being “at risk” (Wilkinson 2001). In particular, riskier options are those 
that have more difficult decision goals, more uncertainty about outcomes, and more 
extreme consequences (Sitkin and Pablo 1992). On a positive note, knowledge of risk 
may serve to allay anxiety by making clear the proper dimensions of an anticipated 
danger so that it can be faced as a manageable fear (Wilkinson 2001). It is in this light 
that risk o f noncompliance is proposed to have an impact on threat perception.
As discussed at length in the previous chapter, probability measures may not be 
appropriate for understanding motivation under uncertainty and risks. For example, it is 
not easy for the individual to establish the likelihood (i.e., degree of certainty) of future 
events in an uncertain world. Since the idea of risk is in itself a manifestation of 
uncertainty (Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2000), the use of risk measures is expected to 
produce more reliable responses than probability measures in predicting threat 
perception, a key determinant of motivation under uncertainty and risks.
Risk o f noncompliance involves the chances of one’s having to suffer from the penalties 
of not measuring up to the social expectations of one’s success, for instance, guilt and 
shame (Klinger, Barta et al. 1975); or the economic sanctions of failing to meet the 
performance standards and requirements of one’s job, such as pay reduction and job 
loss. This conceptualization is based on the traditional deterrence model (see Tittle and 
Logan 1973; Paternoster 1987), which focused on the certainty and severity of sanctions 
as key determinants of compliance behavior, and Sutinen & Kuperan’s (1999) socio­
economic theory of compliance, which stressed moral obligations and social influence.
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In the above connection, I define the proposed concept of risk o f  noncompliance as the 
extent to which the individual believes that his current interests will be “at risk ” i f  he 
fails to comply with the socially and/or economically imposed requirements and 
expectations o f his performance at work. As regards its effect on threat perception, I 
propose as follows:
Hypothesis path 3 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who perceive a higher level o f risk o f  
noncompliance tend to have a higher level o f threat perception.
Alternative explanation vis-a-vis existing theory. Goal setting theory as found in the 
motivation literature emphasized the “technique” of setting clear and difficult goals 
(Latham and Locke 1979; Locke and Latham 1984) but failed to specify the very 
conditions under which it will enhance work performance. As long as goal setting is 
taken up as a performance theory rather than a communications theory (e.g., goal setting 
enhances communication and feedback), it seems premature to conclude that the mere 
gesture of setting specific and difficult goals will improve performance.
The proposed concept of risk o f noncompliance provides a theoretical solution to the 
issue raised by specifying one such condition for goal setting (and likewise other 
management techniques in general) to motivate. From the view of protection motivation 
(Rogers 1975), the key question is: “ Would specific and difficult goals (in the case o f  
goal setting) motivate i f  no penalties were attached to non-delivery ?” It seems clear that 
if economic sanctions and/or social penalties of noncompliance are not severe in the first 
place (i.e., considered “no risk” to the offender), clear and difficult goals will unlikely 
add to risk o f noncompliance, let alone threat perception and protection motivation.
6.2.2 Pressure to Perform
For a variety of reasons, neither organizations nor people work as efficiently or 
effectively as they could, without pressure (Primeaux 1977). Particularly, Leibenstein 
(1966) pointed out that competition, in an important way, affects the intensity with 
which firms and people work; where competitive pressure is light, many people trade the
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disutility of greater effort, of search, and the control of other people’s activities for the 
utility of feeling less pressure and of better interpersonal relations. This is no exception 
in my research environment where enterprises and workers alike have come under 
increased pressure that threatened their survival under “deepening of reforms”. Such 
pressure may be traced to the state level, as China became an increasingly- prominent 
player in the global economy. Indeed, the more it interacts with the rest of the world in 
economic terms, and hence the greater its dependence on the international economy for 
continued growth and increased prosperity, the more it is exposed to the pressures of 
global competition and external scrutiny (see EIU 2000).
At the micro economic level, work pressure may be conceptualized to include demands 
on effort expenditure and time constraints (too much to do, too little time) (Shaw and 
Weekley 1985; Van Yperen and Hagedoom 2003), self-awareness about performance 
inadequacies (Ferrari 2001), anxieties about uncertainty and risks and about one’s ability 
to cope, as well as the expectations of self and others for one to deliver and succeed in a 
certain situation. In this regard, I define the proposed concept of pressure to perform  as 
the extent to which the person feels under pressure, due to job demands as well as 
socially and self-imposed expectations to perform and be seen as an achiever. As 
regards its effect on threat perception, I propose as follows:
Hypothesis path 4 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who experience a higher level o f  
pressure to perform tend to have a higher level o f threat perception.
Alternative explanation vis-a-vis existing theory. In line with the proposal in Section
6.2.1 concerning the impact of risk o f  noncompliance on threat perception and 
protection motivation, I further argue that clear and difficult goals may influence 
motivation to the extent that they add to the pressure to perform. To illustrate, if  clear 
and difficult goals (e.g., “publish three articles in top-ranking journals”) have no 
absolute deadlines for delivery they are likely to remain an aspiration (for some time) 
due to the lack of pressure to perform. But if deadlines and especially ultimatums are 
given (e.g., “publish three articles in top-ranking journals within five years”), pressure 
will mount especially near the time of delivery and heighten threat perception.
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Such pressure is likely to intensify when the risk o f noncompliance is high, that is, when 
undesirable consequences of noncompliance seem inevitable (e.g., “publish or perish”). 
The subsequent increase in pressure to perform is likely to add to threat perception, 
which may in turn enhance adaptive motivation. I thus propose as follows:
Hypothesis path 5 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who perceive a higher level o f risk o f  
noncompliance tend to experience a higher level o f pressure to perform.
The proposed effect implies that individuals are generally risk-averse. This position is 
line with a growing body of literature in the decision sciences (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Thaler 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1981), which argued that individuals treat 
risk concerning perceived gains differently from risks concerning perceived losses in 
that potential losses are given more weight than potential gains.
6.3 Proposed Antecedents of Opportunity Perception
When people feel that their organization values and appreciates them, it is a sign of 
organizational support for them or of their status within the organization (Tyler 1999). 
Within the context of my research organization, such support had been perhaps mostly 
felt at the managerial level. For example, regardless of the fact that the state-owned 
enterprise is an industrial entity, its manager has been historically appointed as a civil 
servant based on his loyalty to and political affiliation with the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). With the introduction of employment and wage reforms, a lot has changed. 
For example, although it is still common for the enterprise manager to receive a 
promotion while the enterprise itself is suffering from poor performance, it is no longer 
possible for ordinary workers to get away with a lack of skill or performance on the job.
For example, due to subjective approach to performance appraisal in Chinese industry 
(see Chapter 2 -  Context for a discussion), double standards had significantly 
contributed to inequity in the workplace especially in the distribution of undeserved 
rewards and preferential housing benefits owing to favoritism or social relations 
(guanxi). However, during the employment and wage reforms, organizational support
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began to be more widely felt in the state-owned enterprise as management made a 
conscientious attempt to shift the focus of individual performance appraisal from 
political credentials to position, skill, and on-the-job performance.
In particular, individuals were now given unprecedented opportunities to receive task- 
related training and development and subsequently rewarded in employment and pay 
arrangements for achieving advancement in these areas. While there is pressure under 
the new competition-based employment and pay systems for the workers to perform (see 
Section 6.2.1 for a discussion), there is also support to help the workers succeed in their 
new, challenging roles under the reforms.
The hypothesized framework of opportunity perception is depicted in the lower part of 
Figure 6.1. Their antecedents are discussed in subsections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 below.
6.3.1 Perceived Organizational Support
The existing concept of perceived organizational support refers to the employees’ 
general beliefs concerning the extent to which the organization values their contributions 
and cares about their well-being (Shore and Shore 1995). Perceived organizational 
support is also valued as assurance that aid will be available from the organization when 
it is needed to carry out one’s job effectively (cf. George, Reed et al. 1993). This view is 
related to three other areas of research: (2) Eisenberger et al’s’ (1986) and Rhoades and 
Eisenberger’s (2002) organizational support theory in stress management at work; (2) 
Johnson and Hall’s (1988) and Bliese and Castro’s (2000) work on organizational 
support and control in occupational health; and (3) Vroom’s (1964) motivational 
concepts of instrumentality and expectancy.
A common characteristic of these studies is the proposed impact of positive emotional 
and cognitive orientations (cf. Pinder 1991), both of which are believed to play a role in 
contributing to opportunity perception. Based on this understanding and in light of 
organizations’ call for workers to adapt to new and changing demands and challenges in 
their jobs, I propose an extended definition for perceived organizational support as the
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extent to which individuals feel that the organization values their contributions, cares 
about their well-being, and is there to help them succeed.
This conceptualization proposes that individuals’ perception of organizational support is 
capable of generating beneficial emotions and beliefs that are conducive to their 
opportunity perception. This position is consistent with findings in the nascent positive 
psychology literature, and in particular, Fredrickson’s (1998; 2001) broaden-and-build 
theory, which proposed that (1) positive emotions and beliefs carry direct and immediate 
adaptive benefits in situations of adversity; and (2) experiences of positive emotions 
broaden people's momentary thought-action repertoires, which in turn serves to build 
their enduring personal resources, ranging from those of a physical, intellectual, social 
and psychological nature.
In the context of a changing organizational setting, the notion of “thought-action 
repertoires” can be applied to include environmental perception and motivation. For 
example, as individuals feel that they are being supported by the organization to adapt to 
new performance standards and requirements, the positive feelings of being given help 
to succeed or of not being alone are likely to contribute to opportunity perception. I thus 
propose as follows:
Hypothesis path 6 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who perceive a higher level o f 
perceived organizational support tend to have a higher level o f opportunity perception.
Alternative explanation vis-a-vis existing theory. Parallel to the alternative 
explanation of goal setting effects provided by pressure to perform in relation to threat 
perception, an additional alternative explanation is offered by perceived organizational 
support in connection to opportunity perception. From a communications perspective 
goal setting theory suggests that goal setting, and especially participative goal setting, 
enhances communication and feedback (Latham and Locke 1979). Although these 
authors’ three-step approach to goal setting (setting the goal, obtaining goal 
commitment, providing support elements) in eventually bringing about performance 
seems to make sense pragmatically, it becomes confusing theoretically as to whether it
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should be referred to as goal setting theory, goal commitment theory, or support theory, 
for the three concepts are separate and distinct.
I do not intend to suggest a total solution to the profound theoretical issue raised. But 
bearing in mind that goal setting is by nature forward-looking (Mitchell and Daniels 
2003), I tend to agree with Pinder’s (1998) position that the “general level of 
supportiveness” is perhaps more crucial than goal specificity and goal difficulty if goal 
setting is to account for any motivational effect in connection to opportunity perception.
6.3.2 Willingness to Bear Cost
Implicit in existing theories of motivation and decision-making is the notion that 
judgments of value are important. Most notably, in discussing the role of valence, 
Vroom (1964) referred to an outcome a person prefers having to not having to be of 
“positive valence”, an outcome a person prefers to avoid as having “negative valence”, 
and an outcome a person is indifferent to as having “zero valence”. Furthermore, in their 
study of personal investment and motivation, Maehr and Braskamp (1986) argued that 
“people do what they believe they can do and what they believe is worth doing” (Maehr 
and Braskamp 1986: 42) (italics original). However, they pointed out at the same time 
that the problem of what is “worth doing” is unfortunately more often cited than studied; 
that is, little attention has been given to its nature, measurement, and causal effects. The 
concept of willingness to bear cost is proposed to fill this gap.
The proposed concept is critical to the understanding of motivation under uncertainty 
and risks because exchange necessarily involves transaction costs, i.e., the economic and 
social costs associated with search and information, bargaining and decision, and 
supervision and enforcement (Williamson 1985; Furubotn and Richter 2000). When 
adapted to the analysis of individual decision-making in a work setting, such costs may 
include not only compliance costs (i.e., direct costs involved in generating or facilitating 
stable and satisfactory outputs), but also opportunity costs (i.e., value of time, energy 
and devotion in their best alternative use) especially when there is no guarantee that the 
effort will pay off.
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 198
For instance, even if work performance meets the increasingly challenging demands and 
requirements of the organization, the organization may be forced to introduce more 
layoffs and further wage cuts due to competitive pressure. In addition, there may be 
social and psychological costs (Mitchell, Lewin et al. 1990). For example, the individual 
may be expected to operate during unsociable hours, work with people he doesn’t like, 
or do things he doesn’t believe in.
The proposed concept of willingness to bear cost is concerned particularly with what 
may or may not make it worthwhile for the employee given the various costs involved. 
In this relation, I define willingness to bear cost as the extent to which the individual 
finds a pursuit worthwhile and is thus willing to bear the costs associated with it. As 
regards its effect on opportunity perception, I propose as follows:
Hypothesis path 7 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who have a higher level o f
willingness to bear cost tend to have a higher level o f opportunity perception.
Alternative explanation vis-a-vis existing theory. The proposed concept of willingness 
to bear cost represents a direct challenge to the premise o f expectancy theory that 
motivation is dependent on a single decision rule, that is, desired outcome attainability 
(as measured by valence, instrumentality, and expectancy). For there are at least two 
phenomena that render outcome attainability neither necessary nor sufficient for 
motivation to take place: (1) high motivation under adversity, and (2) low motivation 
under favorable conditions to succeed.
Instrumental vs. value rationality. Max Weber (1956) introduced a distinction between 
instrumental rationality and value rationality when describing the determinants of 
behavior. He argued that individuals may consciously choose an action either to 
instrumentally achieve an end or normatively for its own sake and independent of its 
success (see Sliwka 2003). Value-rational action is “rational action in relation to a 
value”. It represents one of the four major types of social action, together with affectual 
action, instrumental rational action, and traditional action. It is a type of action that is 
caused by the actor’s conscious attempt to realize certain values, come what may.
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What characterizes value-rational action is that it is “determined by a conscious belief in 
the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, 
independently of its prospects or success”. As opposed to instrumentality rational action, 
it is carried out for its own sake, regardless of the result and the cost to the actor. The 
action is undertaken because the actor feels forced or compelled to act in this manner 
(Swedberg 2005). It thus seems a much more powerful source of motivation than 
instrumental rational action, which is inherently linked to its prospects of success.
So rather than assuming that one specific (set of) decision rules apply to all persons or 
situations (as expectancy and goal setting theories have suggested), the concept of 
willingness to bear cost proposes that what matters is that individuals regard the cause, 
direction, or action pursued as “worthwhile”, whether based purely on ideological or 
instrumental justifications, or a combination of both. This helps to explain why some 
individuals are motivated even when things are not looking up so to speak, and why 
others are not motivated despite privileged circumstances to succeed.
There is ample evidence in the sociology literature concerning the positive impact of 
parental, institutional, or parental support on the outcome in resilience under uncertainty 
and risks (e.g., Anthony 1987; Werner 1993; Adger and Kelly 2001). These findings 
suggest that perceived organization support may similarly contribute to willingness to 
bear cost at work, thus indirectly contributing to opportunity perception. In a work 
setting where emphasis is placed on performance management, organizational support 
may manifest in the genuine effort of the supervisor to help individuals identify areas for 
improvement in the performance appraisal process rather than merely assigning them 
performance grades.
In a unionized workplace, perceived organizational support may come in the form of the 
union’s willingness to adopt an integrative approach to bargaining and management’s 
willingness to share information freely with the union (see Deery and Iverson 2005), 
thus having a potential reciprocal effect on the workers’ willingness to bear cost in their 
jobs. I thus propose as follows:
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Hypothesis path 8 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who perceive a higher level o f  
organizational support tend to have a higher level o f willingness to bear cost.
The proposed effect implies that workers prefer to receive practical/moral support to 
help them succeed and feel “not alone” in the process of adaptation in meeting new and 
challenging demands in their jobs.
6.4 Proposed Antecedents of Perceived Organizational Support and Willingness 
to Bear Cost
I have proposed that perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost are 
likely to lead to opportunity perception. But once the connections between perceived 
organizational support and opportunity perception and between willingness to bear cost 
and opportunity perception are understood, is it possible to predict which individuals 
will be more likely to have these positive emotions and beliefs? The answer may lie in 
the organization’s record in improving the livelihood of the workers and in establishing 
an undeviating pattern of merit-based employment and pay.
This suggestion is consistent with Shore & Shore’s (1995) proposal that perceived 
organizational support reflects the individual’s judgment of the organization’s readiness 
to reward increased work effort and to meet socioeconomic needs, and Maehr & 
Braskamp’s (1986) called for the organization to enable all workers to actualize their 
potential and make personal investment in their work pay o ff .
In this regard, I propose four antecedents: variable 8 (overall situation enhancement), 
variables 9 - 1 0  (the two dimensions of reward consistency), variable 11 (expectancy), 
and variable 12 (<organizational commitment), as shown in Figure 6.1 and discussed in 
subsections 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4 below.
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6.4.1 Overall Situation Enhancement
In the discussion of contextual constraints and demands in relation to personal 
investment at work, Maehr & Braskamp (1986) showed that people operate in terms of 
the goals they hold and in terms of what a given situation yields for them. As much as 
individuals may obtain this knowledge through experience of their own, they may also 
do so based on information exhibited and authored by others. Bandura (1986) argued 
that most human behavior is learned through modeling, that is, learning by observation 
through the imitation of successful others. This position coincides with China’s 
economic reform strategy of allowing the unprecedented accumulation and display of 
personal wealth by a successful few to stimulate the effort from the rest of the society.
From a social learning perspective observed outcomes of an improved situation for 
people who are willing to work hard for it may likewise inspire the observer to view the 
investment in a positive light. Based on this understanding, I define overall situation 
enhancement as the extent to which the individual’s overall situation or well-being has 
enhanced due to organizational change and one’s involvement in it, as socially observed 
or personally experienced by the individual In connection to the relationship between 
overall situation enhancement and willingness to bear cost, I propose as follows:
Hypothesis path 9 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who have a higher level o f  personal 
(or observed) overall situation enhancement tend to have a higher level o f  perceived 
organizational support.
Hypothesis path 10 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who have a higher level o f  personal 
(or observed) overall situation enhancement tend to have a higher level o f willingness to 
bear cost.
Alternative explanation vis-a-vis existing theory. The reactions of employees to 
human resource management (HRM) practices have attracted little scholarly attention. 
Even less research has been conducted into the effects of those practices on employee 
well-being (Deery 2002: 458). The proposed concept of overall situation enhancement 
represents a response to this call as well as a solution to the problem of unintended
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consequences of organizational change, which raised serious concern in the management 
and industrial relations literatures (e.g., Kerr 1975; Ehrenberg 1990; Ramanujam 2003). 
For example, unintended consequences of work redesign could negate or even reverse 
expected positive outcomes when it is narrowly focused on a single aspect (such as 
multitasking) but overlooks other important considerations (such as task significance, 
autonomy, and feedback) (see Hackman 1977). The same may be said of China’s 
employment and wage reforms if overall situation enhancement was not achieved in 
facilitating the survival and growth of willing and capable individuals in terms of (1) 
keeping their jobs, (2) raising their living standards, and (3) advancing their careers, 
among other employee concerns.
In a way one may argue that unintended consequences of organizational change and in 
particular, that which is intended to raise employee motivation, are a byproduct of 
leading motivation theories that focused on single issues (such as expectancy and goal 
specificity) and consequently failed to capture the essence of what makes a new policy 
or change work from a more holistic viewpoint, in terms of the survivors’ assessment 
that they have become better off with the change. This position is consistent with 
Herrick’s (1981) view that organizational arrangements that contribute to human well­
being are conducive to organizational effectiveness.
As pointed out by Cyert and March (1963), organizational members tend to seek 
satisfactory rather than maximum profits. A plausible explanation is that individuals 
may pursue many goals other than or in addition to profit maximization, including 
status, esteem, security, power, knowledge, approval, and the means of satisfying other 
human wants (Nord 1976). Here the concept of overall situation enhancement picks up 
where existing theory left off; it captures that which constitutes the “aggregate net 
benefits” in a situation (see Boardman, Greenberg et al. 1996) rather than the partial 
benefits or gains resulting from a single or specific aspect of work such as goal setting 
and expectancy.
Most distinctly, the proposed concept deals with the bottom line of an individual’s 
situation and well-being, be it in regard to economic and social needs, instrumental and 
normative concerns, instant gratification and long-term realization of goals, or the
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justification of means and end of work, as a result of organizational change. I argue that 
it is only when the change contributes to the overall satisfaction of needs will it be 
viewed favorably by the employees. On the contrary, feelings of deprivation and 
exploitation are likely to yield unintended consequences.
6.4.2 Reward Consistency
Attribution theory suggests that people are motivated not only to maximize their rewards 
(the assumption that is underlying many motivation theories), but also to “attain a 
cognitive mastery of the causal structure of their environment” (Kelley 1967). Grossman 
(1975) further explained that adaptive behavior may be lost or impaired, causing a kind 
of “behavior deficit” when an individual finds it difficult or impossible to perceive the 
relationship between stimuli and appropriate responses to them, to appreciate the 
consequences of particular behaviors, or to select behaviors that are appropriate to the 
possibly proper perceptions of such relationships.
In a work setting, a possible external cause of such a phenomenon is the inconsistency of 
organizational rewards, ranging from obvious ones such as pay, fringe benefits, and 
promotion, to praise, autonomy in decision making, and feelings of accomplishment and 
competency (see Steers & Porter 1991, p. 478 for a detailed list). The consequence of 
the confusion caused may be detrimental as employees may respond to insignificant 
stimuli or, conversely, not respond to stimuli that are of potential significance to their 
survival and success on the job. On the other hand, the consistency of organizational 
rewards is likely to have positive effects.
Unlike previous investigators of organizational rewards, who tend to assume that 
deserved rewards are all that matters to the employees, I view undeserved rewards as 
equally important. Though individuals are typically concerned about getting what they 
deserve, they are also concerned about the issue of double standards, i.e., incidents of 
others’ receiving undeserved rewards at the same time. The outcome of double standards 
that are based on status differences (e.g., gender and ethnicity) in ability inference and 
reward distribution has been studied in the sociology literature (Foschi and Foddy 1988;
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Foschi 1998). One may expect similar negative consequences of double standards based 
on other factors such as favoritism and inconsistency in the implementation of human 
resources policy. It is thus expedient for me to include undeserved rewards in my 
conceptualization. I hereby define reward consistency as the extent to which the 
individual witnesses the frequency occurrence o f (i) deserved rewards and o f (ii) 
undeserved rewards.
As deserving rewards and undeserved rewards are distinct dimensions that contribute to 
the concept of reward consistency, their measurements are found in two separate scales, 
which appear in the next chapter of this thesis. I now propose the relationship between 
observed frequency o f deserved rewards and observed frequency o f undeserved rewards 
dimensions of reward consistency and the outcomes in overall situation enhancement, 
perceived organizational support, and willingness to bear cost as follows:
Hypothesis path 11 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who observe a higher frequency o f  
deserved rewards tend to perceive a higher level o f organizational support.
Hypothesis path 12 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who observed a higher frequency o f  
undeserved rewards tend to perceive a lower level o f organizational support.
Hypothesis path 13 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who observe a higher frequency o f  
deserved rewards tend to perceive a higher level o f overall situation enhancement.
Hypothesis path 14 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who observe a higher frequency o f  
undeserved rewards tend to perceive a lower level o f overall situation enhancement.
Hypothesis path 15 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who observe a higher frequency o f  
deserved rewards tend to have a higher level o f willingness to bear cost.
Hypothesis path 16 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who observe a higher frequency o f  
undeserved rewards tend to have a lower level o f  willingness to bear cost.
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 205
Alternative explanation vis-a-vis existing theory. The proposed concept of reward 
consistency is value-added in its revelation about a previously ignored twin dimension 
concerning deserved rewards, and that is, undeserved rewards. One may argue that 
existing concepts investigating organizational rewards only capture part of the issue by 
their omission of undeserved rewards, and are thus misleading in their subsequent 
predictions and interpretation of the reality.
What’s more, the concept of reward consistency helps to clarify the confusion and 
discomfort raised by Mowday (1991) in his review of equity theory concerning claims 
that equity can be replaced by expectancy theory. For example, Lawler (1968) argued 
that if perceived inequity influenced the valence or attractiveness of rewards (one of the 
three concepts of expectancy theory), then the theory could make the same predictions 
as equity theory.
With the conceptualization of reward consistency encompassing both deserved rewards 
and undeserved rewards, however, it becomes clear that instrumentality and expectancy 
(the two remaining concepts of expectancy theory), which only deal with deserved 
rewards, cannot substitute for the concept of equity because the latter can be expanded 
(as is hereby demonstrated) to include undeserved rewards. As observed frequency o f  
deserved rewards is independent of observed frequency o f undeserved rewards, the two 
concepts are asymmetrical. This counterargument should help settle the outstanding 
claims by Lawler (1973) and Campbell & Pritchard (1976) that equity considerations 
could be subsumed under the more general theory of expectancy.
6.4.3 Expectancy
Since I have covered this concept and the alternative explanations of Vroom’s (1964)’s 
predictions in Chapters 3 and 4, I shall proceed with the proposed redefinition of the 
concept within my research framework.
Taking into account that people have limited cognitive capacities (Simon 1957; Staw 
1977; Pinder 1991) and considering that it may not be feasible, especially in a setting
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characterized by uncertainty and risks, for individuals to make sensible estimations of 
the unfamiliar future, I define expectancy not as probability beliefs but in terms of one’s 
experience on the job, i.e., the extent to which the individual feels that by experience, he 
has control over the results o f his work (or a comparable kind o f work).
Within the proposed framework of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation”, 
which specifically takes into account the complexity and unpredictability of 
environmental factors in today’s economic and organizational settings, expectancy does 
not automatically lead to motivation. Rather, I propose that it has a potential impact on 
motivation through its influence on willingness to bear cost, which in turn influences 
opportunity perception. In this regard, I propose as follows:
Hypothesis path 17 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals with a higher level o f  expectancy 
tend to have a higher level o f willingness to bear cost.
6.4.4 Organizational Commitment
Research suggests that greater job autonomy and a more positive and harmonious labor 
relations environment are among the factors that contribute to organizational 
commitment (Deery, Iverson et al. 1994), which in turn helps reduce turnover intentions 
(Davy, Kinicki et al. 1997; Allen, Freeman et al. 2001). However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that reduction or absence of turnover intentions can be taken as an indicator of 
work motivation.
In an attempt to understand how organizational commitment may contribute to 
motivation, we may turn to the burgeoning literature on positive emotions. In particular, 
research shows that positive emotions (with which organizational commitment is 
believed to be closely associated) are conducive to creativity and flexibility at work 
(Isen, Daubman et al. 1987) and proactive coping in the midst of problems and obstacles 
(Aspinwall and Taylor 1997). One possible reason for positive emotions to lead to 
positive work outcomes in challenging work situations is willingness of the mind to
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“hope for the best” and persevere in the absence of complete information or guarantee. 
In this regard, I propose as follows:
Hypothesis path 18 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals with a higher level o f organizational 
commitment tend to have a higher level o f willingness to bear cost.
6.5 Organizational Commitment as a Mediating Variable
So far, I have explored the antecedents of threat and opportunity perceptions. It appears 
one should be cognizant not only of the direct relationships between the proposed 
constructs, but also the compound effect that can occur through the intermediation of 
other variables. As I now turn to the discussion of the mediating effect of organizational 
commitment on the relationship between environmental perception and adaptive 
motivation, it seems appropriate for me to clarify what a mediating variable is. 
According to Stone & Ziebart (1995), a variable is a mediator if it “represents the 
generative mechanism through which the focal independent variable is able to influence 
the dependent variable of interest” (Stone and Ziebart 1995: 250 - 251).
To demonstrate that organizational commitment is a mediating variable of the 
relationship between threat and opportunity perception (i.e., the independent variables) 
and adaptive motivation (i.e., the dependent variable), it is necessary to establish the 
conditions suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) and that is: (1) that the mediating 
variable is correlated with adaptive motivation; and (2) the effects of threat and 
opportunity perceptions on adaptive motivation are reduced or eliminated if the 
mediating variable is used as a covariate. The measurement and evaluation of 
organizational commitment as a mediating variable provides a mechanism for 
explicating the specific condition in which threat and opportunity perceptions may have 
the greatest impact on adaptive motivation. Without such a measure, the prediction of 
environmental perception and adaptive motivation would be incomplete.
Organizational commitment has been defined as the relative strength o f  the individual’s 
identification with and involvement in a particular organization (Mowday, Porter et al.
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1982). As summed up by Neale & Northcraft (1991), it encompasses three dimensions: 
(1) a strong belief in the organization’s goals and values (normative dimension); (2) 
willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization (affective 
dimension); and (3) a strong desire to continue as an organizational member 
(continuance dimension). Organizational commitment, then, is not simply loyalty to an 
organization. Rather, it is an ongoing process through which organizational actors 
express their concern for the organization and its continued success and well-being.
Members in my research organization may be regarded as highly committed in the sense 
that they tended to do more than what might be sufficient to get by (the quintessential 
communist work attitude). In particular, they tended to (1) work for the best interests of 
the organization, based on a deep understanding of those interests; (2) be flexible and 
adaptive; and (3) be willing to accept new challenges pertinent to the survival and 
success of the organization. Unlike their counterparts in a market economy, workers in 
my research organization are ideologically indoctrinated to give their best not just to the 
state-owned enterprise but also to the country as it struggles to transform itself from a 
planned economy to a socialist-market economy. Since the state-owned enterprise is to 
these workers an epitome of their country, organizational commitment in this context 
encompasses commitment to both the enterprise and the State. To understand the 
antecedents of and the mediating effect of organizational commitment in my research 
setting, I propose as follows:
Hypothesis path 19 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals who perceive a higher level o f  
organizational support tend to have a higher level o f organizational commitment.
Hypothesis path 20 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals with a higher level o f overall 
situation enhancement tend to have a higher level o f organizational commitment.
Hypothesis path 21 (as per Figure 6.1): Individuals with a higher level o f organizational 
commitment tend to respond more positively to threat and opportunity perceptions in 
their motivation to adapt to changing demands and challenges in their jobs.
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6.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of exploring the antecedents of threat and opportunity perceptions is to be 
able to anticipate, and subsequently, prevent, some of the unintended negative 
consequences of workplace innovations, which are of concern to practitioners and 
motivation experts alike (e.g., Kerr 1975; Pearce 1987). It is my intention that 
researchers may benefit from an improved understanding and operationalization of the 
complex factors that influence social and economic behavior in the proposed framework, 
and thereby improve their predictions and potential to guide practice.
Concerning antecedents of threat perception. Although threat is a well-established 
concept in the broader social sciences, their antecedents are seldom explored. As such, 
the proposed antecedents of threat perception are expected to not only help anticipate 
protection motivation in the work context, but also potentially contribute to the strategy 
and international conflict and negotiation literature upon which the concept of threat 
perception was drawn and expanded.
In the proposed model, I have explored risk o f noncompliance and pressure to perform 
as the antecedents of threat perception. In view of the findings in decision research that 
people are generally more sensitive to potential loss than to potential gain (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), development of the antecedents of 
risk o f noncompliance and pressure to perform is likely to help advance our 
understanding of protection-based motivation.
Concerning antecedents of opportunity perception. As can be seen in Figure 6.1 -  
Proposed Antecedents o f  Environmental Perception and Adaptive Motivation, five 
existing concepts in the work motivation/organizational behavior literature have been 
accounted for in the proposed framework, namely (1) expectancy; (2) instrumentality 
and (3) equity (which are manifest in two different dimensions of reward consistency -  
observed frequency o f deserved rewards and observed frequency o f  undeserved rewards; 
(4) perceived organizational support, and (5) organizational commitment.
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The ways existing concepts are positioned in the model have important implications. 
Expectancy may contribute to motivation, but in ways that are less straightforward and 
clear-cut than existing theory suggested. I propose that expectancy contributes (through 
willingness to bear cost) toward opportunity perception, which in turn enhances 
motivation. My position is that “can do” does not equal “will do”. By the same token, 
“not easily accomplished” does not equal “will not endeavor or strive to accomplish”. 
The value of expectancy then depends, among other factors, on the extent to which “can 
do” influences “worth doing” in people’s reckoning of the costs and benefits at stake.
Similarly, instrumentality and equity do not guarantee motivation. Rather, their effects 
are indirect, depending on the degree to which overall situation enhancement, perceived 
organizational support, and willingness to bear cost are influenced. Lastly, while 
perceived organizational support is expected to influence opportunity perception, which 
in turn affects adaptive motivation, it is also likely to influence motivation through its 
effect on organizational commitment, which in turn mediates the relationship between 
environmental perception and adaptive motivation. These relationships and issues will 
be revisited in my discussion of the empirical findings in Chapter 9 -  Discussion.
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Chapter 7 
Methods and Measures
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section reviews, the methodology in 
light of the research-averse setting I operated in, covering aspects of research strategy, 
data collection preparatory to the main study, and the main study itself. The second 
section deals with the measures in four parts: (1) scale development, (2) scales, (3) 
reliability, and (4) validity. Nine out of 12 variables in the proposed research model 
represent new concepts for which no existing operationalization was available. In 
establishing preliminary measures for these new concepts, I followed instructions for 
exploratory research in the scale development literature. The last section concludes.
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7.1 Methodology in a Research-Averse Setting
In the study, I have sought to capture data that could inform me about the unfolding 
impact of China’s employment and wage reforms on individual workers. I refer to my 
environment I operated in as a “research-averse setting” due to the scarcity of empirical 
data on the subject matter and the extremely high barriers to conduct research.
Scarcity of empirical studies. Although there has been an increasing amount of highly 
useful analyses that captured the ongoing challenges and development of China’s human 
resources scene (see, for example, Child 1994; Warner 1995; Warner 2001; Taylor, 
Chang et al. 2003; Clarke, Lee et al. 2004), empirical studies pertaining to wage reform 
either deal with managerial pay or are limited to firm-level data, except for a rare few 
which assessed the reform’s individual-level effects. Furthermore, reform shocks of 
nonrenewable limited duration contracts and massive layoffs notwithstanding, there does 
not seem to be any empirical study on the motivational impact of employment reform 
(see Section 3.3 for a review of literature). These unusual outcomes in research do not 
appear commensurate with the reforms’ duration and magnitude, which spanned more 
than two decades since the late 1970s and have had a profound impact on the nation’s 
100 million-strong industrial workforce2.
Barriers to entry. The scarcity of empirical studies on employment and wage reforms’ 
at the individual worker level may be attributed to the extremely high barriers to conduct 
research in state industry. Given that the vast majority of state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
have been suffering from grievous financial difficulties during the lengthened process of 
economic reform (Tsang & Cheng 1999; Holz 2003), it is understandable that they have 
not been in the most favorable position or frame of mind to entertain the sophisticated 
demands of academic researchers. Another legitimate concern, as expressed by a 
spokesman of the Ministry of Labor I interviewed with at an earlier stage preparatory to 
the main study, was the worry about the “misinterpretation of complex Chinese realities” 
by researchers who might lack the knowledge of the political-economic history of the 
country and the peculiar circumstances of its economy and workplace in transition.
2 The workforce has since been continually substantially reduced. See discussion in Section 2.1.2 -  
Historical Summary o f  the Two Reforms.
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7.1.1 Research Strategy
Uncertainty and risks. My dissertation involved the study o f workers faced with 
employment uncertainty and compensation risks. It also represents a research project of 
uncertainty and risks in its own right from both a data collection point of view and a 
model-building perspective. To begin with, no empirical study has been conducted to 
assess the simultaneous motivational effects of employment and wage reforms at the 
individual level anywhere in the world. In addition, no theoretical framework was 
available to help make sense of the phenomenon at hand, that is, motivation of workers 
to adapt to rapidly changing environmental demands and challenges in their jobs in spite 
o f  adversity. As a matter of fact, leading work motivation theory such as expectancy 
would have predicted low motivation as a result o f  adversity (see Chapters 3 and 4 for a 
detailed discussion).
From a data collection standpoint, the intended study faced the formidable challenges of 
non-receptivity of the Chinese state industry in providing access to research and the 
unfamiliarity of enterprise management and workers alike with surveys and academic 
research procedures. Moreover, the research environment was one of complexity, 
involving among other issues, the transition from a planned economy to a “socialist- 
market economy” or “market economy with Chinese characteristics” (fuzhongguo 
teshede shichang jingji) and the involuntary and rapid transformation of the state 
enterprise from an entitlement communist workplace to a contingent market-led 
environment. Understanding and contending with these issues and dynamics called for a 
fair amount of “muddling through” (Lindblom’s 1959, 1968). It is thus fair to say that 
the workers as the subjects of my observation and I as the author of this unconventional 
study were both at risk.
In retrospect, my motivation to stay on one such risky path of doctoral research was to 
no small degree inspired and strengthened by the subjects of my own study. Indeed, 
what seemed to make it worthwhile for them to adapt in a fast-changing and turbulent 
workplace -  a combination of ideological principles and instrumental beliefs, was what 
also made it worthwhile for me to persevere and succeed in a research-averse setting.
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Figure 7.1
Evolution of my Research on China’s Employment and Wage Reforms
Preparatory Work Main Study
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1 The strategic sector included oil, petrochemical, steel, and other energy-related industries.
Methodology. My research strategy may be likened to that of China’s economic reform 
process -  “experimental and incremental”. What is in common between my research and 
the phenomena of employment and wage reforms in particular, which form part of the 
economic reform, is that, the main objective was deliberate and clear from early on, but 
the path to achieving it was a long and winding road. In research terminology, the 
methodology represents evolving, rather than calculated or intentionally designed, 
patterns (cf. Mintzberg 1979).
Figure 7.1 illustrates the evolution of my research, showing how it progressed through a 
series of stages, moving from a macro, policymaking level to a meso, sector level to a 
micro enterprise level, and the methodologies employed at each stage. These four stages 
may also be viewed as “components” as they were presented only roughly 
chronologically, with activities overlapping one another as shown. The research as a
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whole has, nevertheless, been systematic in nature. For instance, whichever stage or 
component was involved at the time, I have always tried to adopt a well-defined focus -  
to collect and analyze specific kinds of data systematically.
How employment reform became part of mv study: As mentioned in the Introduction 
Chapter, I had set out to fill the gap of the lack of motivational studies on the wage 
reform at the individual level, as existing studies tended to involve only firm-level data. 
But once I began to have some success over a period of two years in breaking through 
various barriers to conduct exploratory work in state industry, it emerged that the 
original framing of my research question did not fit the evolving realities. For it were not 
only the opportunities under the wage reform, but perhaps more so, the threats produced 
by the employment reform that bore on motivation. This realization prompted me to go 
beyond the original emphasis on pay to include employment as the bi-foci of my study.
This substantial but appreciatively advantageous adjustment in the focus of my research 
meant that the stages or components outlined in this discussion actually involved more 
than one cycle of activities -  on assessing in the first instance the impact of the wage 
reform and later, the simultaneous impact of the employment and wage reforms. The 
model-building component was no exception to this complicated procedure, which was 
pursued throughout as well as after the collection of field data. As such, the model 
building consisted of two parts: (1) a preliminary aspect that lent the theoretical 
grounding to the empirical study; and (2) a more fully developed aspect that was put into 
place following the completion of the empirical study (see Chapters 5 and 6 for a 
detailed discussion).
My fieldwork involved a total of 56 weeks of primary data collection from 1996 -  1999, 
with one year of being based in northern China during the final data collection period. 
My visits to enterprises covered parts of the coastal region, (which includes Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, 
Guangxi Qiwan autonomous ethnic region and Hainan), and parts of the middle region, 
(which includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and 
Hubei) (see Figure 7.2 -  Map o f the People’s Republic o f China).
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Figure 7.2 
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The first three components of my research, i.e., strategy inquiry, exploratory fieldwork, 
and model building, are collectively referred as “preparatory work” or “data collection 
preparatory to main study” and will be discussed in detail in Section 7.1.2 below. Details 
of the fourth component, i.e., empirical test or “main study”, will be reviewed in Section 
7.1.3. Expanding on the presentation in Figure 7 .1 ,1 will discuss the manner information 
about the reforms was gathered and processed at each stage and how the sequence of 
activities leading to the main study co-evolved with the complex realities of the reforms 
and the research setting in the process of inquiry.
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7.1.2 Data Collection Preparatory to Main Study
Activities of the three components of preparatory work leading to the main study are 
summarized in Table 7.1. It is important to note that, since the source of my data on the 
strategies and concerns of reforms represent a combination of personal interviews, and 
classified materials for internal circulation (neicari) within the respective government 
department or policymaking unit, which has been made available to me during personal 
visits for the sole purpose of facilitating my understanding of the complex reform 
dynamics, I am obliged to honor my commitment to not disclose the source. I have 
however endeavored to list in the references a selection of quality Chinese language 
publications that were relevant to my discussion and in the public domain.
Table 7.1 
Components of Data Collection
Component Strategy Inquiry Exploratory
Fieldwork
Literature Review  
(Chinese materials)
Empirical Test
Purpose Understand the 
strategies behind 
& challenges o f  
the reforms
Identify the most 
innovative and 
advanced reform 
models & their effects
Supplement 
review o f English 
language literature 
for model building
Evaluate reforms’ 
motivational effects 
based on proposed vs. 
existing theory
Level of 
inquiry
Central policy­
making level
Multiple enterprises Open Single enterprise
Industry State industry “Strategic sector”: 
oil, petrochemicals, 
and steel industries & 
their joint ventures
State-owned & 
foreign joint- 
venture enterprises
Steel
Source of 
Data
Policy-makers 
& advisors
All levels o f staff 
within the enterprise
Ministerial officials 
& leading scholars
All levels o f staff 
within the enterprise
Methods Policy briefings 
& discussions
Interviews, focus 
groups & pilot 
surveys
Personal visits 
& institutional 
contacts (including 
review of policy 
documentation)
Interviews, focus 
groups, test 
questionnaires & 
main study
Duration 31 visits of 
2 - 4  hours each
Visits to 8 enterprises 
o f about 2 weeks each
23 visits o f 2 -  5 
hours each
40 weeks continuously 
at research enterprise
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As was the case with Figure 7.1, the components in this table are presented roughly 
chronologically to give a general sense of how the research had progressed through time. 
In actuality, however, the activities were conducted somewhat in parallel to each other 
as and when research access and conditions allowed to facilitate better overall 
understanding of the main issues at stake and efficient counter-verification of data. In 
particular, the strategy inquiry and review of Chinese materials and internal policy 
documents were conducted in an interspersed fashion as quite a few of the individuals I 
worked with were mutual contacts in both fields of inquiry.
Component 1: Strategy inquiry. The logistics and organization of activities of 
component 1 (or first stage) of my research are summarized in the first column of Table 
7.1. This component involved interaction and exchange at the highest policy-making 
level at the central government. The purpose was to acquire (1) a firsthand knowledge of 
the objectives and strategies of the country’s economic reform, and in particular the 
employment and wage reforms; and (2) a fundamental understanding of the various 
historical, social, political, and economic forces governing the administrative and 
management agendas of the state industry at the national, local, and enterprise levels.
Between April 1996 and June 1999,1 conducted a total of 31 formal visits of two to four 
hours each with chief policy makers at the Ministry of Labor (laodongbu), leaders of 
major research organizations and government think-tanks such as the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS) (zhongguo shehui kexue yenjiuyuan), advisors at the China 
Federation of Workers’ Unions (zhongguo laodong zonggonghui), leading authors on the 
reforms, as well as heads of the Party School (dangxiao) and other executive training 
arms of the country’s “strategic sector” (cheluxing hangye), which includes the oil, 
petrochemical, steel, and other energy-related industries.
The meetings usually took the form of one-on-one policy briefings and discussions, 
which were on occasion preceded or followed by a lunch invitation by the host 
institution. The close-range exchanges with major decisions-makers and advisors 
provided reliable and timely firsthand assessments of and reflections on the employment 
and wage reforms, where the state industry had come from, what it was going through, 
and where it was heading with “deepening of reforms” (shenhua gaige). Since
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information at the strategic level was otherwise classified and controlled, this 
understanding would not have been possible through secondary sources.
Component 2: Exploratory fieldwork. The logistics and organization of activities of 
component 2 (or second stage) of my research are summarized in the second column of 
Table 7.1. This component involved a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
studies of an exploratory nature at a cross-section of enterprises in the “strategic sector”, 
that is, the oil, petrochemical, steel, and other energy-related industries.
The purpose was to identify the most innovative and advanced reform models and their 
potential consequences and effects on the motivation of individual workers. As had been 
pointed out to me by the policymakers and advisors of the reforms, the strategic sector 
was where the financial constraints and operational conditions were least unfavorable for 
driving the reforms forward and setting new procedures and standards of success for the 
rest of the industry to follow. At the same time, I tried to cultivate with the enterprises a 
foundation for mutual understanding that would hopefully lead to full access for the 
execution of the main study at a latter stage.
Between April 1996 and June 1999,1 visited a total of eight enterprises with a duration 
of two to three weeks each mainly in the “strategic sector”, which included one 
petrochemical plant in Beijing, one oil enterprise in Heibei Province, one steel enterprise 
in the north (for reason of confidentiality I am obliged not to specify the location), one 
oil enterprise in Shangdong Province, two steel enterprises in Shanghai, and two major 
fast-moving consumer goods foreign joint ventures in Beijing, which belonged to a 
conglomerate I had previously visited. On all of these visits, I was accompanied by a 
host of advisors and collaborators from various leading Chinese institutions and research 
units. To be more accurate, it would not have been possible for me to enter these 
enterprises at all, let alone accomplish what I had managed to accomplish without the 
assistance and support of these my local mentors.
The inquiry leading to the final launch of the questionnaire survey or main study 
consisted of three progressive parts: (1) interviews with the senior management of 
potential research organizations, (2) focus group studies, and (3) pilot questionnaire
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surveys. These activities formed the backbone of my fieldwork and will be described in 
detail below.
Interviews with senior management. Discussions with the senior management of 
potential research organizations specifically fulfilled two purposes. First, I was able to 
familiarize myself with the major issues and concerns in relation to the implementation 
of the reforms at the enterprise level. In particular, I was able to attain an in-depth 
understanding of the different ways the enterprise management of different SOEs chose 
to exercise their autonomy in implementing reforms given the peculiar conditions and 
circumstances of individual enterprises (changqing). Second, the interviews were 
interactive and provided a basis for mutual understanding and the exploration of 
organized research activities to empirically assess the reforms. Access to pilot studies at 
two oil enterprises, one petrochemical enterprise, and two steel enterprises in five major 
geographical across the country were obtained in this capacity.
Focus group interviews. The purpose of focus group studies was to gather preliminary 
information about the employment and wage reforms and how individuals were 
responding to the demands and requirements of the reforms in their respective 
workplaces. At each of the five SOE’s that subsequently provided access to pilot 
questionnaire surveys, I conducted three to four focus group studies of about 10 
participants each. During the first sessions in particular, the enterprise management 
seemed to have handpicked the “stars” of the workforce for participation. At my 
subsequent requests, the more ordinary and on occasion rebellious workers as well as 
those with grievances were also brought forward and included in the studies to ensure a 
cross-section of views on what reform policies and measures they believed worked or 
did not work for them. In these follow-up sessions, I also made sure that no supervisory 
or management staff was present to safeguard confidentiality.
Typically, the focus group study lasted for about one to two hours and was semi­
structured with four to five theory-based content categories, which included both 
existing work motivation theories such as needs hierarchy, expectancy, equity, and 
reinforcement, and other alternative perspectives. Over the process of working with the 
SOEs at different stages of my research, a variety of perspectives were explored as to
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their potential in capturing the complex realities of the reform phenomenon at hand. As 
such, rather than being rigidly predetermined, the content development of the focus 
group studies may be said to have been experimental and incremental. As a matter of 
fact, in between the various field visits conducted from 1996 -  1999 I engaged in 
extended literature reviews of the mainstream motivation literature as well other relevant 
social sciences research inspired by sources of my primary data.
The value of the focus group studies lies in their lending the requisite qualitative support 
for the proposed analytical framework. This is particularly important given the 
complexity of the research environment and the fact that the subject of the study (i.e., 
the dual impact of employment and wage reforms) has not been previously empirically 
explored. In addition, the activities helped to refine the main survey items included in 
the structured questionnaire, which was subsequently tested in the pilot surveys and 
adopted as the main research instrument in the final study.
Pilot surveys. Exploratory research in this category involves five different enterprises in 
the oil, petrochemical, and steel industries. These enterprises were the ones that had 
participated previously in the focus group studies. At the special request of the enterprise 
management, the questionnaires had been limited to four pages in order to sustain the 
interest of the respondents and ensure a satisfactory completion rate.
At each of the enterprises pilot surveys were internally distributed to two to three groups 
of randomly chosen individuals of 15 -  20 each, which amassed more than 30 completed 
questionnaires on each occasion for preliminary data analysis. The main objective of the 
pilot surveys was not to check the scale reliabilities and validities, but rather to (1) 
ensure that the item wordings were understandable and appropriate for the particular 
enterprise reform context; (2) gauge the actual completion time; and (3) benefit from any 
additional feedback or suggestions from the respondents.
Stage 3: Review of local Chinese literature. The logistics and organization of activities 
of component 3 (or third stage) of my research are summarized in the third column of 
Table 7.1. In the West very little was known empirically about China’s employment and 
wage reform and within the Chinese academic publication system there was neither
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standard procedures for literature search nor requirement for references as such. 
Personal contact with ministerial officers and leading scholars on the reforms therefore 
seemed a logical way to tap the reservoir of knowledge that was available on a firsthand 
basis especially in regard to their qualitative and latest assessments of the reforms and 
“lessons learned”.
As a result, the review of Mainland Chinese literature involved both primary and 
secondary sources in the sense that a significant portion of the data sought was not in the 
public domain but came instead in the form of internal policy documents or 
commentaries, the restricted on-site review of which was made available to me through 
personal contact. As regards other widely circulated materials that could be found in 
public or reference libraries, virtually all dealt with the assessment of the reforms in the 
form of historical and strategic reviews or “success stories” and at a prescriptive and 
somewhat atheoretical level. As such, most of the information obtained has been used to 
facilitate and enrich the discussion on the reform context and the challenges therein in 
Chapter 2 rather than being incorporated in the main and extended literature reviews in 
Chapters 3 and 4.
7.1.3 The Main Study
Through working in close consultation and collaboration at the policymaking and 
multiple enterprise levels, I was able to acquire an in-depth understanding of the 
employment and wage reforms over a distinct 39-month period from March 1996 to 
June 1999. This period represents some of the most challenging and turbulent times in 
the respective state enterprise’ transition from lifetime employment and egalitarian pay 
to new systems of limited duration contracts, competition-related employment, and work 
contribution-based pay.
The timing of my observation was crucial because adaptive motivation and behavior 
generally occur in the face of environmental challenge, instability, and change (Rook 
1987; Gersick 1991), so research on adaptive motivation needed to focus on responses 
of individual state enterprises at these times.
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Sample selection and questionnaire administration. The present inquiry is focused on 
The Steel Conglomerate’s second-tier operation units (STOUs), which employed a total 
of 20,000 workers (see Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 for a discussion of the dynamics of 
“deepening of reforms” at the STOU level). The five STOUs selected for the study were 
among the highest performing operations of the enterprise and often referred to by 
management as the five “star factories”. Since these STOUs had over the previous three 
years gone through constant and rapid processes of workforce restructuring and 
reduction, their workers may be appropriately identified as some of the most adaptive 
and flexible members of the workforce in the reform process of “survival of the fittest”.
Toward the end of 1998,1 visited the senior management of the enterprise to introduce 
the study and encourage participation. Following a series of intensive management 
review sessions and focus group studies at the middle management, supervisory, and 
worker levels of the organization, a large-scale empirical study was launched in June 
1999 with the active participation of the management and workforce. Since the target 
sample involved operation units that were on three eight-hour shifts, the production unit 
supervisors were assigned the role of distributing and collecting the questionnaires.
Quality control. Proper measures were adopted to ensure confidentiality and efficiency 
in returning the questionnaires. In particular, workers were assured of the choice to 
return either a completed or blank questionnaire. However, they were required to return 
it within three working days and do so in a sealed envelope provided for them, which 
carried the logo of the local research institution I was affiliated with (see covering note 
of questionnaire in Appendix B). Since no more specially made envelopes than the 
number of questionnaires were allocated and a fair number of the returned 
questionnaires included comments that were rather critical of the management and 
reform measures, I was satisfied that the personnel involved in the questionnaire 
administration had dealt fairly and ethically and that the contents of the questionnaire 
had not been controlled, censored, or tempered with.
Sample characteristics. The sample consisted mainly of production workers. The 
results presented in this study were based on a total of 1,134 usable questionnaires at the 
completion of the field study, which accounted for 95% of the questionnaires
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administered to the workgroup. The high response rate was owed to management 
support in promoting the questionnaire as a quasi-mandatory exercise for the workers. 
During the final data collection period, which lasted continuously for more than nine 
months, about 15% of supervisory staff and five percent of ordinary workers from all 
five plants had actively participated in and provided feedback on the design and 
construction of the questionnaire. The extended period of close exchange and 
collaboration is believed to have helped socialize and prepare the targeted population for 
the launch of the questionnaire, which due to the enterprise’ usual closed-door policy to 
research, was a new experience for all participants concerned.
The sample represented about 20% of the workforce at the operation units surveyed, 
which together employed 5,613 workers. According to the sample statistics, the sample 
was recognized as one representative of the demographic characteristics of the 
workforce under study. The average age of the respondents was 32 years, 70% of them 
were married, and 79% were male. The average education level was senior high school 
or technical college and the average skill was of an intermediary level. Of the total 
sample, front-line production staff made up 64%; supporting staff, 21%; and 
professional and managerial personnel, 15%. Seventy percent of the respondents were 
members of the Chinese Communist Party or Young Communist Party (gongqingtuan) 
and nine percent, Party member trainees. Eighteen percent of the respondents have been 
awarded the honorary title of “Model Laborer” (laomo) or “Able Hand” (nengshou).
Personal employment data. The majority of workers (96.6%) were official, “urban 
workers”, and the remaining 3.4% were of “rural-worker” status. The average length of 
service was 14 years and the average duration of employment contract was 10 years, and 
62% have been awarded permanent, open-ended employment contracts. The average 
time period from the expiry of the limited duration contracts was 49 months or about 
four years for those who had an expiry date on their contracts. In terms of recruitment 
background, 56% were placed through the school; 22%, through open recruitment; 16%, 
through external transfer; and the remaining 6% were veterans.
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Personal income data. The average total monthly pay of the respondents was RMB 1,042, 
which represented an efficiency wage set above the then average national wage of 
RMB8,543 for state industry and RMB8,346 for all sectors (SSB 2003). Of the total 
monthly pay, the average bonus was RMB352 or 34%. The average position point was 
1.3 on a scale of 1.0 to 3.4 and the average monthly position-based pay was RMB236 or 
23% of total monthly pay. The average skill point was 3.9 on a scale of 1 to 10 and the 
average monthly skill-based pay was RMB98 or nine percent of total monthly pay.
The Questionnaire
Length of questionnaire. Under normal circumstances and in research-receptive 
settings, it would seem more advantageous and indeed “safer” to organize a lengthy 
questionnaire so as to cover as much ground as possible in testing various concepts that 
might help explain the phenomenon at hand. An important concern in my situation, 
however, was that the workforce has had no former exposure whatsoever to 
questionnaire surveys. Following careful consultation and deliberation with managers, 
supervisors, and worker representatives in focus group discussions and the review of 
repeated pilot test results, I was convinced that four pages was the maximum we could 
manage to ask the employees fill out in order to ensure a high response rate.
Though difficult and trying at the time, this unusual limitation turned out to be a blessing 
in disguise -  since there were no room for “nice-to-have” or “fallback” questions, I had 
to be extremely selective as to what questions to ask and what frameworks to include in 
my inquiry. This discipline was achieved through intensive focus group discussions held 
nearly bi-weekly for a continuous period of 40 weeks, which helped shape the 
questionnaire content and give it a sharper and more decisive focus. The end result was a 
compact questionnaire of one folded A3 sheet or the equivalent of four A4 pages (see 
Appendix A). The English translation of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.
Questionnaire content. The questionnaire included four pages of structured inquiry. 
Main constructs of three explanatory frameworks were included: (1) equity theory, (2) 
expectancy theory, and (3) the proposed model of “environmental perception and 
adaptive motivation”. In addition, the concept of organizational commitment was
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included to test mediation effects. However, due to space limitation and the concern that 
goal setting as a performance theory could not explain motivation (see detailed 
discussion in Chapter 3 -  Literature Review: Work Motivation), goal setting theory has 
not been identified as critical content for inclusion in the questionnaire.
The contents of the questionnaire were organized into 10 parts, which comprised a total 
of 174 items. The following is a list of the section headings. Remarks in the parentheses 
were added only at this point to facilitate understanding of the questionnaire items used.
(1) Opportunities and threats under the competition-based employment and wage 
reforms (in relation to the perception of opportunities and threats under the reforms)
(2) Impact of reforms (in terms of the workers’ motivation to adapt to various new and 
challenging demands in their jobs under the reforms)
(3) Effort and reward (in relation to the instrumentality component of expectancy theory 
and what makes it worthwhile for the workers to put forth their best efforts in their 
jobs)
(4) Effort and outcome (in relation to the individuals’ control over their work results or 
the expectancy component of expectancy theory)
(5) Situation or dynamics at work (in terms of pressures felt and risks involved in not 
complying to expected behavior and performance standards)
(6) Work values (in both instrumental and ideological terms)
(7) Supervision and appraisal (especially in relation to support received in the process of 
adaptation at work and in terms of performance review/appraisal)
(8) Work group atmosphere (e.g., workgroup and social expectations concerning 
acceptable behavior and performance at work)
(9) Execution of rewards and punishments (in terms of observed frequencies of 
undeserved rewards and undeserved punishments in the workplace)
(10) Personal data (e.g., demographics, position and skill grades, base pay and bonus 
amounts, job nature, tenure, employment status, contract type, etc.)
Scoring format. The questionnaire mainly utilized a self-reporting five-point Likert scale. 
The response categories for Part A and Parts C -  H were “strongly disagree”, 
“moderately disagree”, “neither disagree nor agree” (or “no opinion whatsoever” in the
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Chinese language), “moderately agree”, and “strongly agree”. Section 2 measured the 
impact of the reforms on the change in motivation, with the following response 
categories: “substantially reduced”, “moderately reduced”, “no impact whatsoever”, 
“moderately increased”, and “substantially increased”. Section I measured the observed 
frequencies of undeserved rewards and of undeserved punishments in the workplace, 
with the response categories of “extremely infrequent (<10%)”, “relatively infrequent 
(10 -  49%)”, “medium (50%)”, “relatively frequent (51 -  90%)”, and “extremely 
frequent (> 90%)”.
Item 10 in Part C was a ranking question, whereby respondents were asked to pick three 
items from a list of seven potential driving forces behind their motivation, (which were 
generated from previous focus group discussions), and rank them in terms of “the 
foremost driving force”, “the 2nd most important driving force”, and “the third most 
important driving force”.
Item 23 in Part I was an open-ended question intended to encourage the respondents to 
provide additional comments and input in their own words concerning their personal 
assessment of the employment and wage reforms as well as the effectiveness of 
organizational rewards and punishments. The last part concerning personal data 
consisted of fill-in-the-blank and multiple-choice questions.
7.2 Measures
As discussed in the previous chapter, of the 12 variables in the proposed framework, 
three benefited from existing conceptualizations in literature -  perceived organizational 
support, organizational commitment, and expectancy while the remaining nine are new, 
exploratory measures for understanding motivation under uncertainty and risks in a work 
setting. A comprehensive scale development process was undertaken to develop these 
new scales. A variety of tests were also carried out to ensure their reliability and validity.
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7.2.1 Scale Development
Except for three variables, the conceptualizations of which already exist, I did not 
uncover in the work motivation/organizational behavior literature any existing scales for 
the proposed concepts. As a result, I embarked on a course of primary scale 
development. Four focus groups were conducted for this purpose, each lasting about two 
hours. Participants in each of the four studies included 10 steel workers and two 
supervisors randomly selected within my research organization. In the group setting, 
respondents were invited to discuss the ideas extensively among themselves as well as 
with me. The main goals of the focus groups were to ascertain what the proposed 
concepts meant to the workers and the specific aspects of employment and wage reforms 
that needed to be captured in the scales.
To complement and corroborate the knowledge gained from the workers, managerial 
interviews were conducted with two groups of five middle managers each, and with two 
senior executives. The interviewees were probed about their understanding of what it 
meant for the workers to adapt to the requirements of employment and wage reforms, 
and whether the proposed research model accurately and sufficiently captured the 
strategies and rationale behind the reforms. All participants were guaranteed 
confidentiality.
From minutes of the focus group discussions and managerial interviews, I extracted and 
list the various statements related to the relevant concepts. In concert with the proposed 
research framework, an overarching theme emerges that workers and managers alike all 
talked about the unprecedented levels of uncertainty and risks brought about by 
employment and wage reforms. Results also revealed a variety of different issues that 
reflected a perceptual identification with threats and opportunities that have not been 
part of traditional inquiry of work motivation.
Another issue reflected frequently is the ideological influence on motivation and work 
behavior, and especially in situations of hardship and adversity where continuous 
downsizing seemed inevitable and there is no guarantee as regards continued 
employment and base pay. The measures were developed based on these results and
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subsequently administered in the form of a “mock questionnaire survey” to the same 
focus groups and management staff on four different occasions to ensure that the 
questionnaire contents effectively captured the “poignant issues at hand” (wendao 
dianzishang). The finalized measures are presented below.
7.2.2 Measures
The rationale behind the composition of measures is discussed in this section. Unless 
otherwise indicated, responses are on a five-point Likert scale with anchors from 1, 
"strongly disagree", to 5, "strongly agree". All survey respondents completed the same 
scales. Reliability coefficients and KMO measures of sample adequacy are reported. The 
order of presentation of the scales in the following is consistent with the manner their 
definitions are presented in Table 6.1 in the previous chapter.
Adaptive motivation. The purpose of the study is to evaluate the impact of China's 
employment and wage reforms on adaptive motivation, i.e., individuals’ motivation to 
adapt to new and changing demands and challenges in their jobs. Responses are on a 
five-point Likert scale with anchors from 1, "greatly reduced", to 5, "greatly increased". 
A total of nine items were developed. Five items involved “tangible targets” 
(yingzhibiao) against which members of the workforce were evaluated periodically, with 
four specifically addressing (i) efficiency, (ii) quality assurance, (iii) cost cutting and 
energy saving, (iv) cooperation, and one summarizing, and (v) the overall situation.
The remaining four items dealt with “long-tem benefits” (changyuan liyi) of the 
enterprise, for which the workers were ideologically indoctrinated to sustain and support, 
with three specifically addressing (vi) participation in innovation and development, (vii) 
extrarole behavior, (viii) long-term goal orientation, and one summarizing (ix) the 
overall situation. The alpha coefficient for the nine-item scale is 0.91, with a sample 
adequacy measure of 0.93.
Threat perception. The proposed framework is built around environmental perception, 
of which threat perception is one of the two core components. The threat perception
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scale examined the change that was brought about by employment and wage reforms. 
This was accomplished through two sets of questions. The first set contained four items 
that addressed individual perception of what management referred to as “threat-based 
reform measures”, which included (i) “survival of the fittest”, (ii) non-automatic renewal 
of limited duration contracts, (ii) Job Transfer Center, and (iv) pay reduction for non­
delivery of production/work targets.
The second set of items was drawn on the international conflict (Tedeschi 1970; Brown 
and McDougal 1977) and protection motivation research (Rogers 1975), which 
highlighted fear, and clarity and immediacy in the investigation of threat. It contained 
three items on (v) feeling of insecurity, (vi) alertness to the threat of competition, and 
(vii) immediacy of the threat of competition. The alpha coefficient for the seven-item 
scale is 0.68, with a sample adequacy measure of 0.79.
Opportunity perception. Opportunity perception represents the other core component 
of the proposed framework of environmental perception. The opportunity perception 
scale examined the change that was brought about by employment and wage reforms. 
This was accomplished through two sets of questions. The first set contained three items 
that addressed the individual perception of what management referred to as 
“opportunity-based reform measures”, which included (i) “putting people’s talents and 
capabilities to maximum use” (renjin qicai\ (ii) unprecedented training and 
development opportunities, and (iii) provision of favorable conditions to exceed one’s 
production/work targets.
This second set of questions was inspired by research in strategy (Averill 1973; Dymsza 
1984) and entrepreneurship (Bandura 1977; Krueger 2000), which highlighted feasibility 
and potential gain in the identification of opportunity. It contained the next three items: 
(iv) hope, (v) feelings toward the overall situation under the reforms as offering “more 
opportunities than threats”, and (vi) seeing one’s role in the process of adaptation as 
being “more active than passive”. The alpha coefficient for the six-item scale is 0.67, 
with a sample adequacy measure of 0.76.
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Pressure to perform. The measure of pressure to perform as a determinant of threat 
perception captured various demands and expectations that originated from three 
sources: the job, people important to the individuals, and the individuals themselves. As 
demonstrated below, the dimension pertaining to job demands addressed both the 
extensiveness of work (i.e., time effort) and intensity of work (i.e., effort) discussed in 
the work pressure literature (Aldrich and Wiedenmayer 1993; Auer and Speckesser 1998; 
Burchell, Day et al. 1999). Dimensions concerning social and self-imposed expectations 
were drawn on work in social control (Etzioni 1961) and adaptive self-regulation 
(Snyder 1979; Ashford and Cummings 1983; Tsui and Ashford 1994).
The scale consisted of two sets of questions. The first set contained two items tapping 
the effects of (i) Position and Responsibility System (gangwei zherenzhi), which held 
individuals accountable for their work results, and of (ii) Annual Job Review and Skill 
Assessment {gangwei jineng cheping), which ranked the individuals openly one by one, 
from top to bottom, on big bulletin boards, according to the scores on their work 
performance and skill level. The second set contained four items: (iii) self-imposed 
expectations, (iv) social expectations, (v) work pressure (workload, quality, and 
difficulty of tasks), and (vi) the overall feeling/conclusion that one was not given a 
choice to deliver less. The alpha coefficient for the six-item scale is 0.63, with a sample 
adequacy measure of 0.74.
Risk of noncompliance. The measure of risk of noncompliance as a determinant of 
threat perception captured the kind of risk individuals saw themselves taking in relation 
to sanctions of an administrative, economic, and social nature. These three aspects were 
discussed extensively in the sanctions literature (Horai and Tedeschi 1969; Paternoster 
1987; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Accordingly, the scale contained three items: (i) 
“risk of showing up at work without putting in genuine effort” (chugong buchuli), a 
deep-rooted work behavior the reforms were intended to correct; (ii) risk of job loss, 
which did not exist before “deepening” of employment reform; and (iii) risk of social 
reproof, an especially powerful form of control in the socialist workplace. Together 
these risk items probed the critical issue of “Gz« I afford not tol”
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Risk of noncompliance was significant in both directly and indirectly affecting threat 
perception such that when it scored low, both threat perception and pressure to perform 
was likely to weaken. The alpha coefficient for the three-item scale is 0.66, with a 
sample adequacy measure of 0.65.
Perceived organizational support. The new employment and wage arrangements were 
often referred to as the “mounting waves of reforms’’(gazgede daichao) by management 
and workers alike in Chinese industry. The measure of perceived organizational support 
as a determinant of opportunity perception captured what the individuals appreciated 
concerning the role of leadership (or management) in promoting their survival and 
success under the new competition-based employment and pay-for-labor systems.
Researchers have interchangeably included supervisor and organization in measuring 
support (see Eisenberger, Huntington et al. 1986 for a review). Likewise, I included both 
direct supervision and enterprise management in addressing the crucial aspects of their 
support for the workers in (i) offering guidance in the normal course of work, (ii) 
offering guidance on making improvements in their work, and (iii) providing convincing 
support for their appraisal outcomes. I also included an item that concluded that (iv) 
overall the leadership (or management) played an active role in promoting the survival 
and development of the workers.
Perceived organizational support was significant in both directly and indirectly 
affecting opportunity perception such that when it weakened, both opportunity 
perception and willingness to bear was likely to score low. The alpha coefficient for the 
four-item scale is 0.81, with a sample adequacy measure of 0.79.
Willingness to Bear Cost. Since individuals in the socialist workplace may be 
particularly, though not exclusively, concerned about normative issues in their value 
judgment, the measure of willingness to bear cost captured both instrumental and 
ideological concerns that were likely to contribute to opportunity perception. It included 
items that reflected what made it worthwhile for people to exert maximum effort in their 
work in order to adapt to new demands and challenges in their jobs. Items for this 
measure were not selected on an arbitrary basis. Rather, they represented the top four
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issues voted by the individuals as the “greatest forces driving you to work really hard in 
your job” in an accompanying rank-order question in the same questionnaire (see item 
CIO in Appendix B).
The items were (i) job security, (ii) materials gains, (iii) honorary title of Model 
Laborer/Advanced Worker, and (iv) self-actualization. I also included an item that 
indicated (iv) the individual’s overall judgment of whether they believed the investment 
of their time and energy at work had been worthwhile for them. Together these items 
probed the critical issue of “Is it worth it for me?” The alpha coefficient for the five-item 
scale is 0.64, with a sample adequacy measure of 0.71.
Overall situation enhancement. The measure of overall situation enhancement as a 
determinant of perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost 
represented the blanket coverage of reforms’ fulfillment of individual needs that helped 
to improve their bottom line or enhance their overall situation, thus making them better 
off. In the scale, each needs item was matched with the respective reform measure 
specifically aimed at satisfying that need. For instance, C.12 in Appendix B reads, 
“Establishment of the Competition-Based Employment (jingzheng shanggang) system 
has enhanced the job stability for those who are able and willing to work hard” The 
items are presented according to categories in Alderfer’s (1969) ERG theory: (1) 
existence needs, (2) relatedness needs, and (3) growth needs. The respective reform 
measures are shown in italics.
Existence needs items covered (i) job security (<competition-based employment) and (ii) 
material gains {pay for labor). Relatedness needs items covered (iii) public recognition 
{open ranking of Job Review and Skill Assessment results) and (iv) management 
recognition {survival of the fittest). Growth needs items included (v) career development 
{training and development opportunities), (vi) self-actualization {puttingpeople ’s talents 
and capabilities to maximum use) {renjing qicai), and (vii) altruistic fulfilment 
{contributing to the enterprise).
These needs items were not selected on an arbitrary basis. Rather, they represented the 
top responses to the rank-order question (see item CIO in Appendix B), which probed
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the “greatest driving force of your motivation to work hard (to adapt) in your current 
position”. They thus reflected specific components that together contributed to the ideal 
“overall situation” for the workforce at stake. The alpha coefficient for the seven-item 
scale is 0.86, with a sample adequacy measure of 0.89.
Reward Consistency. The principles governing employment and wage reforms are 
“more work for the able” (nengzhe duolao), which can be extended to mean “the more 
able the more employable”; and “more pay for more work” {duolao duode). The 
implementation guideline is that of “driving efficiency with due respect for equity” 
{xiaoluyouxian jiangugongping) (Sun 2000a). The measure of reward consistency 
captures aspects that were frequently talked about by the workers -  not just rewarding 
the deserving but also making sure the undeserving were not met with favoritism due to 
social connections (guanxi), a common practice in Chinese society. The measure 
consisted of two separate scales capturing the following dimensions: (1) observed 
frequency of deserved rewards and (2) observed frequency of undeserved rewards. They 
are discussed below.
Observed frequency of deserved rewards. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
concept of observed frequency of deserved rewards is comparable to that of 
instrumentality in expectancy theory, which is expressed in probability measures. Here, 
however, designed in frequency occurrences, the items here were expected to yield more 
reliable responses, because they addressed the actual situation as it was witnessed by the 
individuals (“how frequent”) rather than as it was speculated the individuals (“how 
likely”). Responses were on a five-point Likert scale with anchors from 1, "very seldom", 
to 5, "very often".
Like all other measures discussed above, observed frequency of deserved rewards 
captured that which had direct relevance to employment and wage reforms. For instance, 
item II in Appendix B reads, “Someone with good on-the-job performance got to keep 
his job .” And item 19 in Appendix B reads, “Someone got a bigger bonus than others in 
the same position because of having made a greater contribution at work.”
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In total, seven aspects of deservingness, expressed in terms of input-outcome 
relationships, were captured, with the outcome in italics: (i) good on-the-job 
performance (continued employment), (ii) better work performance (better appraisal 
results), (iii) greater contribution (bigger bonus), (iv) outstanding work performance 
(honorary title of Model Laborer), (v) mastery of new skill (advantage in competition- 
based employment), (vi) acceptance of extra responsibility (management recognition), 
and (vii) significant contribution to the enterprise (preferential housing). In addition, I 
included an item that indicated (viii) the overall conclusion that reward outcome was 
linked to individual input at work. The alpha coefficient for the eight-item scale is 0.81, 
with a sample adequacy measure of 0.88.
Observed frequency of undeserved rewards. As discussed at length in the previous 
chapter, observed frequency of undeserved rewards reflected the phenomenon of double 
standards that was ignored in work motivation studies. Like the responses for the 
measure of observed frequency of deserved rewards, those for the observed frequency of 
undeserved rewards scale were on a five-point Likert scale with anchors from 1, "very 
seldom", to 5, "very often". For example, 14 in Appendix B reads, “Someone managed to 
keep his job despite poor work performance”. And 110 in Appendix B reads, “Someone 
got a bigger bonus than others in the same position for reason(s) other than having 
made a greater contribution at work”
The same seven aspects of non-deservingness (vis-a-vis deservingness discussed above) 
are captured here in five items, with the first item encompassing three aspects. The 
undeserved reward is presented in italics: (i) absence of higher skill attainment, 
acceptance of extra responsibility, and higher work performance (management 
recognition), (ii) poor performance (continued employment), (iii) absence of greater 
contribution (bigger bonus), (iv) absence of outstanding work performance (honorary 
title of Model Laborer), and (v) absence of significant contribution to the enterprise 
(preferential housing). The alpha coefficient for the five-item scale is 0.81, with a 
sample adequacy measure of 0.84.
Among all the independent variables of perceived organizational support and 
willingness to bear cost, the impact of reward consistency was believed to be most wide-
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ranging. Reward consistency was significant in directing affecting willingness to bear 
cost. At the same time, it was significant in both directly and indirectly affecting 
perceived organizational support in that when reward consistency was low both 
perceived organizational support and overall situation enhancement tended to weaken.
Expectancy. The existence of several versions of expectancy theory (from which the 
concept of expectancy was extracted) has not produced instruments that could be 
regarded as scales in the conventional sense (Cook, Hepworth et al. 1981). As a result, in 
measuring expectancy as a determinant of willingness to bear cost, I addressed issues in 
the work process that were considered critical by the workers themselves, including the 
extent to which (i) the level of authority was commensurate with one’s accountability on 
the job and (ii) cooperation and assistance were received from co-workers to carry out 
one’s duties on the job. In addition, I included an item indicating (iii) the overall 
judgment that individuals had reasonable control over the results of their work 
(considering the skills and various resources required).
As discussed at length in the previous chapter, I focused on the actual experience of the 
individual rather than using probability estimates in capturing the link between effort 
and performance. This approach to conceptualization was intended to improve 
robustness of the expectancy measure, which was acknowledged as a major weakness in 
the literature (see Arvey and Ivancevich 1980 for a detailed discussion). The alpha 
coefficient for the three-item scale is 0.60, with a sample adequacy measure of 0.63.
Organizational Commitment. The measure of organizational commitment as a 
mediating variable of environmental perception and adaptive motivation was based on 
successful existing measures. A total of five items captured three established dimensions 
of the concept. In particular, the item probing (i) the belief in leaving the enterprise “the 
sooner the better” in order to avoid being victimized by workforce reduction addressed 
the continuance dimension of the concept. The items investigating (ii) the desire to 
contribute to the enterprise, and (iii) willingness to put forth more efforts than others for 
the enterprise addressed the affective dimension of the concept. Lastly, the item 
examining (iv) the act of contributing to the enterprise as a realization of self-worth 
addressed the normative dimension of the concept.
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My approach to capturing in the same scale the affective, continuance, and normative 
dimensions established by Mowday, Porter, and Steers (1982) proved effective, with an 
alpha coefficient for the five-item scale of 0.69 and a sample adequacy measure of 0.74.
7.2.3 Reliability
The internal consistency of the 12 variables in the research model is now reported. 
Several measures provide evidence of internal consistency. Those used here are 
reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s coefficient a) and variance extracted (VE) estimates.
Cross-validation of data. Following the recommendation of De Vellis (1991).for new 
scale development, I split the data to produce two sub-samples to facilitate the cross- 
validation of data. The first sub-sample represented 520 responses collected from 
operation units 1 and 2 of my research organization. The second sub-sample represented 
714 responses collected from operation units 3,4, and 5 of the same organization.
The alpha values of the 12 scales for sub-sample I range from .60 to .91 and those for 
sub-sample II, from .59 to .90, with an average of .73 for both sub-samples. The average 
VE estimate of the 12 scales is .47 for sub-sample I, and .48 for sub-sample II. Upon the 
successful validation of data across the two different sets of respondents, I combined the 
two sub-samples to further assess the reliability and validity of the individual scales. 
Final results of the total sample of 1,134 are presented in Table 7.2 together with the 
means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations.
The abbreviations in parentheses here are as shown from 1 -  12 in the table: Adaptive 
motivation (AM), threat perception (TP), opportunity perception (OP), pressure to 
perform (PP), risk of noncompliance (RNC), perceived organizational support (POS), 
willingness to bear cost (WBC), overall situation enhancement (OSE), observed 
frequency of deserved rewards (FDR), observed frequency of undeserved rewards 
(FUR), expectancy (E), and organizational commitment (OC).
Brenda C. Sun London School of Economics
(Motivation under Uncertainty and  Risks 23 8
Descriptive statistics. On average, the individuals in the present sample reported more 
threat perception than opportunity perception (3.82 vs. 3.49) and subsequently not 
surprisingly, also more pressure than support, as measured by pressure to perform and 
perceived organizational support (3.65 vs. 3.33). From a strategic point of view, these 
findings indicated that the “thought reform” devised by management to “awaken 
workers to a sense of threat” in the enterprise’ business and economic environment (see 
detailed discussion in Chapter 2) has taken effect. From a theoretical perspective, these 
results are consistent with those of previous studies on environmental perception (Cyert 
and March 1963; Averill 1973) showing that decision-makers tend to be more sensitive 
to threat-consistent information than to opportunity-consistent information.
Table 7.2
Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities, Variances Extracted, and 
Pearson Correlationsa
Variable Mean SD VE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 . AM 3.77 0 . 6 8 0.57 (.91)
2 . TP 3.82 0.61 0.35 .52 (.6 8 )
3. OP 3.49 0.70 0.38 .58 .50 (.67)
4. PP 3.65 0.61 0.36 .36 .57 .41 (.63)
5. RNC 3.41 0.93 0.59 .27 .34 .19 .18 (.6 6 )
6 . POS 3.33 0.91 0.63 .47 .42 .51 .38 .19 (.81)
7. WBC 3.51 0.72 0.41 .43 .42 .44 .37 .09 .35 (.64)
8 . OSE 3.45 0.81 0.55 .54 .49 .61 .44 . 2 1 .60 .45 (.8 6 )
9. FDR 3.30 0.75 0.43 .37 .36 .46 .31 .13 .51 .33 .46 (.81)
10. FUR 2.63 0.93 0.57 -.34 .30 -.31 ■- . 2 0  ■-.35 ■-.43 ■-.13 -.33-.28 (.81)
1 1 . E 3.57 0.76 0.56 .38 .39 .39 .34 .17 .48 .36 .47 .34 -.31 (.60)
12. OC 3.49 0.78 0.45 .47 .43 .41 .36 .36 .44 .37 .40 .33 -.39 .31 (.81)
a N = 1,134. Range = 1 - 5 on all scales. Reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s Alpha) 
in brackets. VE = Variance extracted. All inter-correlations are significant at 0.01 level 
(2 tailed). All ps < .01.
Reliability coefficient. With new measures, Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) 
recommended a minimum coefficient alpha result of .60. As shown in the main diagonal 
of Table 7.2, the internal consistency reliability estimates for all nine new variables (i.e., 
adaptive motivation, threat perception, opportunity perception, pressure to perform, risk 
of noncompliance, overall situation enhancement, willingness to hear cost, observed 
frequency of deserved rewards, and observed frequency of undeserved rewards) fulfilled
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this requirement, with alpha values ranging from .63 to .91 and the average alpha value 
at .74. Alpha values for the three variables that were based on existing measures (i.e., 
perceived organizational support, expectancy, and organizational commitment) 
are .81, .60, and .69 respectively, with an average alpha value of .70.
Variance Extracted. The variance extracted (VE) estimate was used here as an 
additional indicator of internal consistency. Dillon and Goldstein (1984) and Hair, 
Anderson et al. (1998) suggested that the average variance extracted (VE) estimates 
approach 0.50 for existing measures, as a rule of thumb. In this connection, the VE 
estimate of .56 for the expectancy scale provided support for the argument that the scale 
was acceptable, albeit having a reliability coefficient alpha of .60. The average VE 
estimate for the three existing measures of perceived organizational support, expectancy, 
and organizational commitment is .55 and that for the nine new measures of adaptive 
motivation, threat perception, opportunity perception, pressure to perform, risk of 
noncompliance, willingness to bear cost, overall situation enhancement, observed 
frequency of deserved rewards, and observed frequency of undeserved rewards is .47.
The strength of the internal consistency estimates be it demonstrated by the reliability 
coefficient alphas or VE estimates, on the whole provided evidence for the homogeneity 
of the scale items for both the existing scales as well as the new scales in the model.
Intercorrelations. The correlations among the 12 variables range from -.39 to .61. All 
the correlations are significant (p < 0.01) and are in the expected directions. In particular, 
threat perception and its two independent variables, namely, pressure to perform and 
risk of noncompliance, showed meaningful and positive correlations of .57 and .34 
respectively. Opportunity perception and its two independent variables, namely, 
perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost, also showed high and 
positive correlations of .51 and .44 respectively. Furthermore, perceived organizational 
support and its independent variables showed similar strength in correlations of .45 for 
overall situation enhancement, and .51 for observed frequency of deserved rewards and 
-.43 for observed frequency of undeserved rewards.
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Willingness to bear cost and its independent variables also showed comparable strength 
in correlations of .45 for overall situation enhancement, .33 for observed frequency of 
deserved rewards and -.13 for observed frequency of undeserved rewards, and .36 for 
expectancy. The low correlation between willingness to bear cost and observed 
frequency of undeserved rewards indicate that the latter is unlikely to have the kind of 
influence on willingness to bear cost as it does on perceived organizational support. 
However, the effect of observed frequency of undeserved rewards on willingness to bear 
cost tended to show indirectly, through overall situation enhancement. The latter had 
significant correlations of .46 with observed frequency of deserved rewards and of -.33 
with observed frequency of undeserved rewards.
According to Gerbing and Anderson (1981), the reliability of a scale should be assessed 
in conjunction with its unidimensionality. I shall address this aspect in the next section.
7.2.4 Validity
A series of initial analyses were conducted to allow for the investigation of 
dimensionality and factor loadings. I first handled the two concepts that had two 
dimensions to determine whether the structure of the measures coincided with the two- 
dimensional conceptualizations developed from the literature investigation. The first of 
such concept was environmental perception and the second, reward consistency.
As prescribed in psychometric theory (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994), items were 
deleted based on loadings on multiple dimensions and low factor scores. I conducted a 
principal component analysis (varimax rotation) based on two criteria: (1) significance 
of item loadings and (2) simplicity of factor structure. Using these criteria, items with 
loadings of less than .35 on all factors or with loadings greater than .35 on two or more 
factors were dropped (Andrasik 1989). This process of evaluating the factor analysis 
results, dropping items, and performing the analysis on the remaining items was 
repeated until a stable solution was found.
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Accordingly, all items pertaining to environmental perception were subjected to 
exploratory factor analysis. Result of the third factor analysis groups 13 items into two 
factors, which were in line with the conceptualization of threat perception and 
opportunity perception. A scree plot, coupled with a minimum eigenvalue criterion of 
1.00, confirmed that a two-factor solution was appropriate. Items pertaining to reward 
consistency were subjected to the same analysis. Result of the second factor analysis 
grouped 13 items into two factors, which were in line with the conceptualization of 
observed frequency of deserved rewards and observed frequency of undeserved rewards. 
Examination of the scree plot with the 1.00 minimum eigenvalue criterion validated^ a 
two-factor solution.
The same procedures were then repeated for items of the remaining eight measures in 
the model including adaptive motivation, pressure to perform, risk of noncompliance, 
perceived organizational support, willingness to bear cost, overall situation 
enhancement, expectancy, and organizational commitment until a stable solution with a 
dominant single dimension was found for each measure.
Unidimensionality. It is widely recognized that factor analysis of individual scales is 
useful in early stages of scale development. However, as more knowledge is acquired 
about the nature and structure of the scales, further tests are called for to confirm or 
disprove the results obtained in the initial phase. For an explanatory framework 
involving new scales in particular, it is important to ensure that the explanatory variables 
are factorially distinct, that is, they consist of unique features other constructs do not 
have. To show the distinctiveness of the explanatory variables of threat perception and 
opportunity perception from each other, I conducted a principal components analysis 
(varimax rotation), which involved a total of 46 items for all of the variables combined.
The overall pattern matrix for the nine-factor solution (representing eight concepts with 
reward consistency encompassing two dimensions) showed that the items mapped unto 
the scales as expected (see Table 7.3), therefore providing evidence of unidimensionality 
of the measures.
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Table 7.3
Factor Loadings for Pattern Matrix of Explanatory Variables of 
Environmental Perception *
E xplanatory  V ariah les  and Item s
Factor
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9
Overall situation enhancement (extent to which I witness
policy of... has increased the...for those willing to respond)
Maximization of Potential: Realization of self-worth .75
Training/Development: Satisfaction in career development .70
Position-Responsibility System: Contributing to enterprise .69
Open ranking Job Review & Skill: Public recognition .67
Survival of the Fittest: Management recognition .66
Current pay policy: Bigger bonuses .65
Employment by Competition: Job security .58
Deserved rewards dimension (frequency occurrence of
someone getting or receiving ... because of having ...)
Preferential housing: Made big contribution to enterprise .71
Advanced/Model Laborer: Outstanding performance .66
Management recognition: Taken up extra responsibility .65
Bigger bonus: Made a greater contribution in his work .64
Edge in Employment by Competition: Mastered new skill .64
Better appraisal results: Better performance on the job .64
Overall, rewards are consistently linked to performance .56
Continuation in employment: good work performance .45
Undeserved rewards dimension (frequency occurrenceof
someone getting or receiving ... not because of having ...)
Advanced/Model Laborer: Outstanding performance .75
Management recognition: Acquired higher skills, taken .73
up extra responsibility or achieved higher performance
Bigger bonus: Made a greater contribution in his work .72
Preferential housing: Made big contribution to enterprise .69
Continuation employment despite poor work performance .60
Organizational commitment (extent to which I feel)
Willing to put out more effort than others for enterprise .65
Pulling together for enterprise same as for my own sake .62
My desire to contribute to the enterprise has reduced .61
since the implementation of Labor Contracts
My biggest realization of worth is contribute to enterprise .58
Workforce reduction and staff diversion policies made .55
me feel that the sooner to leave enterprise the better
Perceived organizational support (extent to which leader):
Provides convincing support for grade in my appraisal .69
Engages actively in helping me in routine appraisals .66
Engages actively in guiding me during the course of work .59
Overall, actively engaged in promoting the survival and .56
development of workers
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Table 7.3 (continued)
Factor Loadings for Pattern Matrix of Explanatory Variables of 
Environmental Perception *
Explanatory Variables and Items
Factor
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Risk of noncompliance (extent of negative consequence if)
Workers pretend to work (Management System detects it) .73
Work peers shirk (there would be stiff social monitoring) .72
My work performance was mediocre (I would lose my job) .71
Pressure to perform (extent to which I feel)
Under a lot of work pressure (load, quality, task difficulty) .73
Expectations of important people make me push myself .65
I couldn’t answer to myself if I didn’t give my best at work .53
Position Responsibility System imposes strict requirement .42
Overall, I do not have choice not to give my best at work .39
Open ranking of Job Review & Skill Assessment results .36
puts me under a lot of pressure at work
Expectancy (extent to which I think I have)
Support and assistance in carrying out my duties at work .73
Control over the results of my work considering all aspects .54
Authority compatible to the responsibility I have in my job .53
Willingness to bear cost (extent to which it is worthwhile for 
to exert maximum effort at work purely for the sake of)
Attaining the Title of Model Worker or similar honors .65
Self-actualization in my work .62
Overall (considering all the factors listed here) .49
Job security .44
Material gains .29
a All factor loadings > .35 (except for the last item in Factor 9).
Apart from one item, all factor loadings exceeded .35. The outlier represents one of the 
five items in Factor 9 (willingness to bear cost), with a factor loading of .29. Its residual 
loading of .76 did not load onto any other factors but stands alone as an extra single-item 
component. Under normal circumstances, this item would have been dropped. I however 
found it necessary to keep it in the scale based on two reasons: (1) conceptually, it is an 
important item as it addressed the issue of material gains, which was voted by the 
workers as the top driving force in their work in an accompanying rank-order question 
(see item CIO in Appendix B); and (2) statistically, when analyzed on their own factor 
loadings of the scale were .74, .64, .62, .62, and .58, with the previous outliner showing 
a robust factor loading of .62.
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The findings from factor analyses demonstrated that constructs of the explanatory 
variables of environmental perception were factorially distinct, which provided support 
for one aspect of construct validity. I further examined the scales of threat perception 
and opportunity perception by assessing their nomological validity.
Nomological Validity. Nomological validity involves the hypothesis testing of the 
preliminary nomological network. Of the two approaches I used to assess construct 
validity, the test of nomological validity is more critical and profound for two reasons. 
First, Schwab (1980) and Kerlinger (1986) argued that assessment of a proposed set of 
theory-based relationships (a nomological network) is the key to examining construct 
validity. More specifically, Schwab suggested that scholars should use theory to 
differentiate constructs and that construct redundancy will decrease if constructs are 
developed and tested on the basis of theory. Second, the proposed perspective of 
environmental perception under uncertainty and risks represents a clear departure from 
conventional motivation research. For the proposed framework of adaptive motivation to 
stand, evidence of nomological validity is a must.
I based the hypotheses of adaptive motivation on the theoretical framework in the 
strategy and the international conflict and negotiation literatures. A key advantage of this 
approach is that it avoided atheoretical expansion of the antecedents of adaptive 
motivation. Moreover, the relationships tested in the hypotheses provided the beginning 
of a theory-based nomological network for adaptive motivation research. By specifying 
a schemata with boundaries I was able to help prevent the proliferation of dimensions of 
environmental perception and simultaneously facilitate the examination of the 
hypothesized dimensions more rigorously. Empirical examination of the network could 
also provide a firm foundation for future research by suggesting different relationships 
for the theory-driven antecedents of threat perception and opportunity perception.
Tests of nomological network. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 21 were used to test the construct 
validity of the new adaptive motivation, threat perception, and opportunity perception 
scales. Drawing on research on strategy, and international conflict and negotiation, I 
hypothesized specific relationships in the preliminary nomological network of adaptive 
motivation. Thus, I present these statistical tests as part of the construct validation of the
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measures rather than as evidence of substantive relationships (Schwab 1980), which will 
be reported in full detail in the next chapter.
Hypotheses 1 - 2  predict the relationships between environmental perception and 
adaptive motivation. Hypotheses 1 predicts that threat perception will have a positive 
impact on adaptive motivation. Hypothesis 2 predicts that opportunity perception will 
have a positive impact on adaptive motivation. Accordingly, I regressed adaptive 
motivation on the independent variable of threat perception, and on the independent 
variable of opportunity perception. Results were that threat perception and opportunity 
perception both have a positive impact on adaptive motivation, with an R of .27 and a 
standardized coefficient (beta) of .52 (p < .0001) for threat perception, and an R2 of .33 
and a standardized coefficient (beta) of .58 (p < .0001) for opportunity perception.
Hypothesis 21 predicts that organizational commitment will mediate the causal 
relationships between environmental perception and adaptive motivation. I tested 
mediation using the three-step regression approach recommended by Baron and Kenny 
(1986). First, the mediator was regressed on the independent variable; second, the 
dependent variable was regressed on the independent variable; and third, the dependent 
variable was regressed simultaneously on the independent and mediating variables.
According to Baron and Ritov (1994), mediation is in effect if the following four 
conditions are met: (1) the independent variable must affect the mediator in the first 
equation; (2) the independent variable must affect the dependent variable in the second 
equation; (3) the mediator must affect the dependent variable in the third equation; and
(4) the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must be less in the 
third equation than in the second equation (Baron and Ritov 1994: 1177). Full mediation 
is supported if the independent variable has no significant effect when the mediator is 
controlled, and partial mediation is indicated if the independent variable’s effect is 
smaller but still significant when the mediator is controlled.
Table 7.4 presents mediated regression results for the two dimensions of environmental 
perception in the prediction of adaptive motivation. For step 1, I regressed 
organizational commitment (the mediator) on threat perception and on opportunity
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perception. For step 2, I regressed adaptive motivation on threat perception and on 
opportunity perception. For step 3 ,1 regressed adaptive motivation on threat perception 
and organizational commitment simultaneously, and on opportunity perception and 
organizational commitment simultaneously. All relationships in the three-step analysis 
for both dimensions of environmental perception are significant (p < .0001).
Table 7.4
Results of Mediated Regression Analysis *
Independent Variable Adaptive motivation
Threat perception .433***
Step 1 .521***
Step 2 .404***
Step 3 .293***
Regression sum of squares 164.489***
(df) (2 )
Residual sum of squares 301.582***
(df) (999)
F 272.438***
R2 .353***
Adjusted R2 .352***
Opportunity perception .408***
Step 1 .575***
Step 2 .463***
Step 3 .280***
Regression sum of squares 192.388***
(df) (2 )
Residual sum of squares 287.836***
(df) (1 0 1 0 )
F 337.540***
R2 401***
Adjusted R2 .399***
a N ’s for regression analyses of threat perception: 
Step 1 = 1,019; Step 2 = 1,051; Step 3 = 1,002 
N’s for regression analyses of opportunity perception: 
Step 1 = 1,030; Step 2 = 1,063; Step 3 = 1,013 
Values are standardized beta coefficients. The second 
coefficient in Step 3 refers to the mediator.
*** Allps < .0001
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Results of the three-step regression analysis indicated the presence of partial mediation 
for the causal relationships between threat perception and adaptive motivation, and 
between opportunity perception and adaptive motivation. In both cases, the independent 
variable’s effect was smaller but still significant (p < .0001) when the mediator was 
controlled. Specifically, there was a decrease in the betas from .521 to .404 for threat 
perception and from .575 to .463 for opportunity perception when organizational 
commitment was included as part of the equation.
Results of the regression analyses testing Hypotheses 1 - 2  and of the three-step 
regression analysis testing Hypothesis 21 supported my theory building. The results 
exceeded the significance criterion of p  < .10 that Achen (1982) and Harwig and 
Dearing (1979) recommended for exploratory research. Even when reviewed in relation 
to established work, the regression coefficients (p < .0001) are desirable. These results 
seem logical given the initial conceptualization of environmental perception and 
adaptive motivation, which was based firmly on research in other social sciences 
disciplines more advanced in the study of motivation under uncertainty and risks.
7.3 Conclusion
I have reviewed my research strategy and methodology, which represent a relatively 
lengthy but fruitful process in gaining entry to a research-averse environment where no 
empirical study on the motivational effect of employment reform or the simultaneous 
motivational effects of employment and wage reforms has been conducted before.
I have also discussed the process of developing the measures of the proposed research 
model of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation” and reported on the 
reliability and validity of these measures. In particular, I proposed two dimensions of 
environmental perception -  threat perception and opportunity perception, as antecedents 
of adaptive motivation. I also explored their antecedents and proposed organizational 
commitment as a mediating variable in the causal relationship between environment 
perception and adaptive motivation.
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The model’s 12 variables, including the outcome in adaptive motivation, its proposed 
antecedents of threat perception and opportunity perception and their respective 
antecedents, all tested satisfactory in reliability and validity. These encouraging findings 
provide a basis for the future refinement of the scales, most of which have no 
precedence, and for the further empirical examination of the model itself.
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Chapter 8 
Analyses and Results
This chapter consists of four sections. The discussion begins with a preview of the 
statistical procedures chosen for the analysis of the data, which consisted of 1,134 usable 
cases. Section 8.1 reports on the motivational outcome of employment and wage 
reforms. Sections 8.2 -  8.8 report on results of the testing of Hypotheses 1 -  21 in the 
proposed model of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation”. Section 8.9 
summarizes the findings of the tested model and contrasts them against those of 
competing theories, using the same dataset. And Section 8.10 concludes.
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8. Analyses and Results
Analyses. I used linear regression, since the variable assessing the outcome in adaptive 
motivation and the explanatory variables are continuous. The use of hierarchical 
regression models is considered inappropriate because the research hypotheses do not 
require that the causal priority among the independent variables be established.
I proceeded with the analyses according to the sequence of the propositions presented in 
the Chapters 5 - 6 ,  from Hypotheses 1 -  21. I addressed the first two hypotheses 
concerning the antecedents of adaptive motivation by regressing the dependent variable 
on the control and analysis variables (using a simultaneous entry rule). Separate 
regression equations were estimated for each of the two conceptualized dimensions of 
environmental perception -  threat perception and opportunity perception. The same 
procedure was repeated for the relationships proposed in Hypotheses 3 -  20. For 
Hypothesis 21, which addresses the mediating relationship between environmental 
perception and adaptive motivation, I included effects of the control variables previously 
not required in the preliminary analysis of the relationship for nomological validity in 
section 7.14 above.
Results. To begin, I report on the outcome in adaptive motivation, which provides the 
answer to the research question, “ What effects did China’s employment and wage 
reforms have on the adaptive motivation of workers? ”
As regards the relationships in my research model, I present the results of my analyses 
according to Hypotheses 1 -  21 as stated in previous chapters. First, I tested Hypotheses 
1 -  2 concerning the relationships between the two dimensions of environmental 
perception and adaptive motivation. Second, I tested Hypotheses 3 - 4  concerning the 
antecedents of threat perception, and Hypothesis 5 concerning the relationship between 
the antecedents. Third, I tested Hypotheses 6 - 7  concerning the antecedents of 
opportunity perception, and Hypothesis 8 concerning the relationship between the 
antecedents. Fourth, I tested Hypotheses 9, 11 -  12, regarding the antecedents of 
perceived organizational support, and Hypotheses 1 3 - 1 4  concerning the relationship 
between the antecedents. Fifth, I tested Hypotheses 10, 15 -  18 pertaining to the
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antecedents of willingness to bear cost. Sixth, I tested Hypotheses 1 9 - 2 0  regarding the 
antecedents of organizational commitment. Lastly, I tested Hypothesis 21, which 
involves the mediation relationship between organizational commitment and the two 
dimensions of environmental perception in adaptive motivation.
In my regression analysis, I tested for evidence of serial correlation, multi-collinearity, 
and heteroskedasticity in the data and found no problems.
8.1 Effects of Employment and Wage Reforms on Adaptive Motivation
Figure 8.1 
Outcome in Adaptive Motivation
300
Std. Dev = .68 
Mean = 3.77 
N = 1107.00
1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75 3.25 3.75 4.25 4.75
Adaptive motivation
The purpose of the study is to evaluate the impact of employment and wage reforms on 
individuals’ motivation to adapt to new and changing demands and challenges in their 
jobs. In examining the frequencies of the outcome measure, data showed that a fraction
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or 10.5% of the 1,107 workers who responded to this group of questions reported a 
reduction in adaptive motivation, while the majority or 85.5% reported an increase in 
adaptive motivation, and 4% reported no change in adaptive motivation. As seen in 
Figure 1, the outcome is skewed considerably toward the positive end.
-8.2 Antecedents of Adaptive Motivation
The antecedents of adaptive motivation represent the backbone of the proposed 
framework with respect to threat perception and opportunity perception.
8.2.1 Testing of Hypotheses 1 - 2
To test Hypothesis 1, which states that threat perception will enhance adaptive 
motivation, I regressed adaptive motivation on threat perception. To test Hypothesis 2, 
which proposes that opportunity perception will enhance adaptive motivation, I 
regressed adaptive motivation on opportunity perception. To gauge the simultaneous 
effects of threat perception and opportunity perception, I regressed adaptive motivation 
on both variables at the same time.
Control variables. I included four control variables that were variously associated with 
employment and wage issues and the social context. In relation to employment, I 
measured the duration of individual labor contract to control for the possibility that the 
length of contractual commitment extended by the enterprise to its members affected the 
latter’s response to the organization’s demands (Fuller, Barnett et al. 2003). In terms of 
pay, I measured the size of monthly bonus and the percentage increment in monthly 
income over the previous year as controls for the possible effects of incentive size on 
motivation (Asch 1990; Bartol and Locke 2000). I also included the number of people in 
the work unit to control for the potential that peer (Kandel and Lazear 1992; Hansen 
1997) and/or socio-economic pressure (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999) influence(s) the 
motivation to adapt to new and changing demands and challenges in their jobs. I also
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attempted, as I have done throughout the analyses, other demographic variables such as 
age, gender, marital status, education, and job tenure.
Plant dummies. Since the data set consists of surveys conducted at five neighboring 
sub-factories of the research organization, I included the plant dummies representing 
each of the five sub-factories wherever possible throughout my regression analyses. This 
approach seems necessary based on the results of a two-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Except for the expectancy scale, for which the ratio of the between-group 
mean square to the within-group mean square met the criterion of being close to 1 (F 
= .320), those for the other 11 of the 12 variables in the framework were substantially 
larger than 1 (F s = 2.24 to 8.58), thus rejecting the null hypothesis that all of the means 
are equal in the population.
I first report on the regressions of adaptive motivation on the individual antecedents, 
then the regression on the antecedents simultaneously, with the inclusion of control 
variables in both instances. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, threat perception showed a 
significant association with adaptive motivation (B = .565, p  < .0001), demonstrating a 
statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2= .356,/? < .0001). Similarly, as predicted 
by Hypothesis 2, opportunity perception showed a significant association with adaptive 
motivation (B = .608, p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance 
(Adjusted R2 = .389, p  < .0001).
Table 8.1 presents the results of the main analysis, which included both of the 
independent variables and the four control variables, namely, percentage of annual 
increment, size of monthly bonus, number of people in work unit, and duration of labor 
contract. The final results demonstrated a greater statistically significant variance than 
was possible when adaptive motivation was regressed on the independent variables 
individually rather than simultaneously (Adjusted R2 = .473,/? < .0001).
Both independent variables prove to be significant predictors of adaptive motivation. 
Most notably, as predicted by Hypothesis 1, threat perception showed a significant 
association with adaptive motivation (B = .360, p  < .0001). This result suggested that 
individuals are more likely to be motivated to adapt to the new and changing demands
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and challenges in their jobs under employment and wage reforms to the extent that they 
interpret certain aspects of the reforms (e.g., no automatic renewal of labor contracts) to 
as threats to their survival.
Table 8.1 
Results of Regression Analysis: 
Antecedents of Adaptive Motivation *
Independent Variable Adaptive motivation
Intercept .619***
Threat perception .360***
Opportunity perception .405***
Annual increment .076**
Average monthly bonus .063*
No. of people in work unit .061*
Contract duration .053*
Regression sum of squares 154.989***
(df) (6 )
Residual sum of squares 169.745***
(df) (705)
F 107.286***
R2 4 7 7 ***
Adjusted R2 .473***
a N = 1,021 (or 712 when including four control variables). 
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
*** p  < .0001 
** p  <01
* p  <.05
At the same time, opportunity perception was positively associated with adaptive 
motivation (13 = .405, p  < .0001). This finding supported Hypothesis 2. Adaptive 
motivation was more likely when individuals perceived certain aspects of the reforms 
(e.g., more pay for greater contribution) as opportunities for growth and development.
The results of the control variables agreed with my expectations. As annual increment 
increases, adaptive motivation increases (13 = .076, p  = .006) and as size of monthly 
bonus increases, adaptive motivation increases (13 = .063,/? = .022). Furthermore, as the 
number of people in the work unit increases, adaptive motivation increases (13 = .061 ,p
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= .026). This finding seemed to indicate an effect of socialization (Denhardt and Jeffress 
1971; Jones 1983). And as the duration of the labor contract increases, adaptive 
motivation increases (13 = .053, p  = .054). None of the demographic variables -  age, 
gender, marital status, education, and job tenure -  contributed to the regression equation 
and were therefore excluded. This was the case with all of he five plant dummies.
8.3 Antecedents of Threat Perception
8.3.1 Testing of Hypotheses 3 - 4
To test Hypothesis 3, which proposes that risk o f noncompliance will enhance threat 
perception, I regressed threat perception on risk o f noncompliance. To test Hypothesis 
4, which states that pressure to perform will enhance threat perception, I regressed 
threat perception on pressure to perform. To gauge the simultaneous effects of risk o f  
noncompliance and pressure to perform, I regressed threat perception on the variables at 
the same time.
Control variables. I included two control variables that are associated with the issue of 
pay and the social context. I measured skill-based pay to control for the possibility that 
the variable, which reflects the level of on-the-job technical and/or professional 
competence and the extent of sense of mastery over the environment, reduces the 
individuals’ threat perception (Sayers 1988) of changes in their work environment, and 
particularly in terms of employment and wage issues. I also included the number of 
people in the work unit to control for the potential that peer (Kandel and Lazear 1992; 
Hansen 1997) and/or socio-economic pressure (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999) influence(s) 
the motivation to adapt to new and changing demands and challenges in their jobs. I 
attempted to include other demographic variables such as age, gender, marital status, 
education, and job tenure. I did so also for the plant dummies.
I first report on the regressions of threat perception on the individual antecedents, then 
the regression on the antecedents simultaneously, with the inclusion of control variables
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 256
in both instances. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, risk o f noncompliance showed a 
significant association with threat perception (13 = .373, p  < .0001), demonstrating a 
statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2 = .148, p  < .0001). And as predicted by 
Hypothesis 4, pressure to perform showed a significant association with threat 
perception (13 == .582, p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance 
(Adjusted R2= .346 , p<  .0001).
Table 8.2 presents the results of the main analysis, which includes both of the 
independent variables and the two control variables, namely, skill-based pay and number 
of people in work unit. The final results demonstrated a greater statistically significant 
variance than is possible when threat perception was regressed on the independent 
variables individually rather than simultaneously (Adjusted R2 = .421,/? < .0001).
Table 8.2 
Results of Regression Analysis: 
Antecedents of Threat Perception a
Independent Variable Threat Perception
Intercept 1.341***
Risk of noncompliance 284* * *
Pressure to perform .518***
No. of people in work unit .063*
Skill-based pay -.051
Regression sum of squares 115.248***
(df) (4)
Residual sum of squares 156.704***
(df) (721)
F 132.566***
R2 424***
Adjusted R2 421* * *
a N = 1,020 (or 726 when including two control variables). 
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
*** p  < .0001 
** p  <01
* p  <.05
p  <.10
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Both independent variables proved to be significant predictors of threat perception. As 
predicted by Hypothesis 3, risk o f noncompliance showed a positive association with 
threat perception (13 = .284, p  < .0001). Threat perception is more likely when 
individuals perceive a risk(s) associated with noncompliance with the demands of 
reform measures in employment and pay in their jobs. At the same time, pressure to 
perform showed a significant association with threat perception (13 = .518, p  < .0001). 
This finding supported Hypothesis 4. Individuals are more likely to interpret certain 
aspects of the reforms (e.g., no automatic renewal of labor contracts) as threats to their 
survival to the extent that they feel under pressure to perform in their jobs.
The results of the control variables agreed with my expectations. As skill-based pay 
increases, the level of threat perception decreases (13 = -.051, p  = .071). And as the 
number of people in the work unit increases, the level of threat perception increases (13 
= .063, p  = .027). This seems logical as workers were made to compete against one 
another for continued employment and pay. None of the demographic variables such as 
age, gender, marital status, education, and job tenure contributed to the regression 
equation and were thus excluded. This was also the case with all the five plant dummies.
8.3.2 Testing of Hypothesis 5
To test Hypothesis 5, which suggests that risk o f noncompliance indirectly affect threat 
perception, in the sense that it increases pressure to perform, I regressed pressure to 
perform on risk o f noncompliance.
Control variables. I included three control variables relating to employment and wage 
issues. I measured the duration of labor contract to control for the potential that the 
deadline to contract expiry negatively affects the level of pressure at work (Rastegary 
and Landy 1993; Waller, Conte et al. 2001). Based on the view of fear of loss under risk 
(Lopes 1987; Harvey 2001) I measured the size of the monthly bonus and of the annual 
increment in monthly income as control for the possible effects of contingent rewards on 
pressure to perform. I attempted to include other demographic variables such as age, 
gender, marital status, education, and job tenure. I did so also for the plant dummies.
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Table 8.3 presents the results for the relationship between risk o f noncompliance and 
pressure to perform and a total of six control variables. Among the latter are the 
theoretically based measures of contract duration, size of monthly bonus, and annual 
increment in monthly income. As predicted by Hypothesis 5, risk o f noncompliance 
showed a significant association with pressure to perform (13 = .204, p  < .0001). This 
result suggested that individuals are more likely to feel under pressure to perform in 
their jobs, and subsequently have a higher level of threat perception to the extent they 
perceive a risk(s) associated with noncompliance with the new and changing demands 
brought about by reform measures in employment and pay in their jobs.
Table 8.3
Results of Regression Analysis: Relationship between 
Risk of Noncompliance and Pressure to Perform*
Independent Variable Pressure to Perform
Intercept 2.972***
Risk of noncompliance .204***
Job tenure 176***
Marital status .151***
Contract duration - . 1 0 1 **
Average monthly bonus .089**
Education -.088**
Annual increment .076*
Regression sum of squares 41.067***
(df) (7)
Residual sum of squares 263.238***
(df) (785)
F 17.495***
R2 .135***
Adjusted R2 .127***
a N = 1,068 (or 793 when including six control variables). 
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
*** p  < .0001 
** p  <01
* p  <.05
The results of the control variables agreed with my expectations. As the contract 
duration increases, pressure to perform decreases (13 = -.101, p  = .007). At the same time,
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as average monthly bonus increases, pressure to perform increases (B = .089, p  = .008), 
and as annual increment increases, pressure to perform increases (B = .076, p  = .024).
In addition to the theoretically based control variables, three demographics-based 
measures also contributed to the regression equation. In particular, as job tenure 
increases pressure to perform increases (B = .176, p  = .000). This outcome may be due 
to the fact that the skill set of the production workers were according to enterprise 
management “hardly transferable to other workplaces”, thus rendering the prospects of 
alternative employment low and perhaps even unimaginable.
Quite the reverse, when education increases pressure to perform decreases (B = -.088,/? 
= .010). This finding suggested that since education improves individuals’ employment 
opportunities in the external labor market, it helps to relieve the pressure they may 
otherwise feel to perform in their jobs to stay employed. Lastly, results revealed that 
married individuals experience a higher level of pressure to perform than those who are 
single (B = .151, p  = .000). However, none of the five plant dummies seemed to 
contribute to the regression equation and were therefore excluded.
8.4 Antecedents of Opportunity Perception
8.4.1 Testing of Hypotheses 6 - 7
To test Hypothesis 6, which states that perceived organizational support improves 
opportunity perception, I regressed opportunity perception on perceived organizational 
support. To test Hypothesis 7, which proposes that willingness to bear cost improves 
opportunity perception, I regressed opportunity perception on willingness to bear cost. 
To gauge the simultaneous effects of perceived organizational support and willingness 
to bear cost, I regressed opportunity perception on both variables at the same time.
Control variables. In the absence of theoretically based control variables concerning 
the relationship between perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost
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and the dependent variable of opportunity perception, I tried to include demographic 
variables such as age, gender, and marital status. I did so also for the plant dummies.
I first report on the regressions of opportunity perception on the individual antecedents, 
then the regression on the antecedents simultaneously, with the inclusion of control 
variables in both instances. As predicted by Hypothesis 6, perceived organizational 
support showed a significant association with opportunity perception (6 = .515, p
<y
< .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R = .306, p
< .0001). Similarly, as predicted by Hypothesis 7, willingness to bear cost showed a 
significant association with opportunity perception (6 = .390, p  < .0001), demonstrating 
a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2 = A99,p < .0001).
Table 8.4 presents the results of the main analyses concerning opportunity perception. 
The results indicated a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2 = .362, p  < .0001). 
Both independent variables proved to be significant predictors. As predicted by 
Hypothesis 6, perceived organizational support showed a significant association with 
opportunity perception (6 = .429,/? < .0001). This result suggested that individuals are 
more likely to interpret certain aspects of reforms (e.g., policy of “maximum realization 
of people’s potential” (renjin qicai) as opportunities for development and growth to the 
extent that they feel that the enterprise is helping them to succeed. At the same time, 
willingness to bear cost showed a positive association with opportunity perception (13 
= .255, p  < .0001). This finding supported Hypothesis 7. Opportunity perception is more 
likely when individuals have a reason(s) to believe that it is worth it for them to put forth 
their best efforts in their jobs.
The demographics based control variables yielded encouraging results. In particular, 
male workers reported a higher level of opportunity perception than their female 
counterparts (J3 = .113, p  = .000). Married individuals reported a higher level of 
opportunity perception than those who are single (13 = .083, p  = .003). When education 
level increases, opportunity perception decreases (13 = -.081, p  = .003). This finding 
suggested that educated individuals do not appreciate the internal opportunities available 
to them as much as their less educated counterparts, probably because a higher education 
level opens up more alternative employment opportunities for the individuals concerned.
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Table 8.4 
Results of Regression Analysis: 
Antecedents of Opportunity Perceptiona
Independent Variable Opportunity Perception
Intercept 1 .2 2 2 ***
Perceived organizational support .429***
Willingness to bear Cost .255***
Gender .113***
Marital status .083**
Education -.081**
Dummy plant 3 -.071**
Regression sum of squares 153.924***
(df) (6 )
Residual sum of squares 266.110***
(df) (847)
F 81.654***
R2 .366***
Adjusted R2 .362***
a N = 1,024 (or 854 when including three control variables 
and a plant dummy).
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
*** p  < .0001 
** p  <.01
Last but not least, individuals in Plant 3 reported lower opportunity perception than their 
counterparts in other plants (13 = -.071, = .011). This result seemed reasonable given
that Plant 3 has the lowest mean (3.41) compared to the average mean of all five plants 
(3.49) for opportunity perception.
8.4.2 Testing of Hypothesis 8
To test Hypothesis 8, which states that perceived organizational support indirectly 
affects opportunity perception in the sense that it increases willingness to bear cost, 
which in turn increases opportunity perception, I regressed willingness to bear cost on 
perceived organizational support.
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Control variables. I attempted to include three control variables that are associated with 
employment and wage issues. Based on the view of positive psychology (Fredrickson 
2001), I measured the duration of employment contract, monthly bonus, and annual 
increment as control for the possible effects of appreciative gestures for a job well done 
on willingness to bear cost. I attempted to include other demographic variables such as 
age, gender, marital status, education, and job tenure. I did so also for the plant dummies.
Table 8.5
Results of Regression Analysis: Relationship between 
Perceived Organizational Support and Willingness to Bear Cost*
Independent Variable Willingness to Bear Cost
Intercept 2.213***
Perceived organizational support .327***
Average monthly bonus .097**
Marital status .083**
Gender .060*
Dummy plant 1 -.071**
Regression sum of squares 57.514***
(df) (5)
Residual sum of squares 360.635***
(df) (838)
F 26.729***
R2 .138***
Adjusted ft2 .132***
a N = 1,057 (or 844 when including three control variables and a 
plant dummy).
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
*** /?<.0001 
** p  <.01
* p  <.05
Table 8.5 presents the results for the relationship between perceived organizational 
support and willingness to bear cost with three control variables and one plant dummy 
variable. Among the latter is the theoretically based measure of size of monthly bonus. 
As predicted by Hypothesis 8, perceived organizational support showed a significant 
association with willingness to bear cost (B = .327, p  < .0001), demonstrating a
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 2 6 3
statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2= .132,/? < .0001). This finding suggested 
that individuals are more likely to feel that it is worth it for them to put forth their best 
effort at work, and subsequently have higher opportunity perception to the extent that 
they perceive that the organization is there to support them and help them succeed.
The results of one of the three theoretically based control variables agreed with my 
expectation. In particular, as the size of monthly bonus increases, the level of willingness 
to bear cost increases (13 = .097, p = .003). In addition, two demographics-based 
measures contribute to the regression equation. As marital status increases, willingness 
to bear cost increases (13 = .083, p = .011). And male workers showed a higher level of 
willingness to bear cost than female workers (13 = .060, p = .066). These two outcomes 
were indicative of the possibility that married men perceive a greater need to devote 
their time and energy to their jobs than their female counterparts.
Last but not least, individuals in Plant 1 showed a lower level of willingness to bear cost 
than their counterparts in other plants (B = -.071, p = .028). This result was not 
surprising given that Plant 1 has one of the two lowest means (3.45) compared to the 
average mean of all five plants (3.51) for willingness to bear cost.
Summary of core findings. Core findings of the tested model of “environmental 
perception and adaptive motivation” as discussed in Sections 8.2 -  8.4 above are 
summarized in Figure 8.2. Hypotheses 1 - 8  pertaining to the relationships between (1) 
the two dimensions of environmental perception and adaptive motivation and (2) the 
respective antecedents of threat perception and opportunity perception were all 
supported by the findings.
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Figure 8.2
Tested Model of Environmental Perception and Adaptive Motivationab
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8.5 Antecedents of Perceived Organizational Support
8.5.1 Testing of Hypotheses 9,11 -1 2
To test Hypothesis 9, which states that overall situation enhancement improves 
perceived organizational support, I regressed perceived organizational support on 
overall situation enhancement. To test Hypotheses 11 -  12, which propose that reward 
consistency improves perceived organizational support, I regressed perceived 
organizational support on the two different dimensions of reward consistency: observed 
frequency o f deserved rewards and observed frequency o f undeserved rewards.
Control variables. I included four control variables that represented gestures of 
organizational support for individual workers in the form of recognition for achievement 
potential and actual achievement. In particular, I measured Trainee in the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), the membership of which was a prerequisite for promotion to 
the management grade in state industry. At the same time, I measured the honorary titles 
of Model Laborer (laomo)/Advanced Worker (xianjin gongzuozhe), which represented 
the highest honors individuals could receive in recognition of their work performance. I 
also measured the point on the position scale or position grade point, which indicated the 
achievement status of the employee at the organization and tied in directly with the level 
of base pay.
Lastly, I measured annual increment in monthly income, which reflected the appraisal 
results on the skill and performance of individuals and tied in directly with both base pay 
and bonuses. All four measures were for the purpose of controlling for the potential that 
the organization's readiness to reward individuals’ potential and demonstrated work 
effort affects the individuals’ perception of organizational support (Rhoades and 
Eisenberger 2002). I attempted to include other demographic variables such as age, 
gender, marital status, education, and job tenure. I did so also for the plant dummies.
I first report on the regressions of perceived organizational support on the individual 
antecedents, then the regression on the antecedents simultaneously, with the inclusion of
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control variables in both instances. As predicted by Hypothesis 9, overall situation 
enhancement shows a significant association with perceived organizational support (B 
= .601,/? < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2= .360, 
p  < .0001). As predicted by Hypothesis 11, observed frequency o f deserved rewards 
showed a significant association with perceived organizational support (B = .504, p
< .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2 = .276, p
< .0001). And as predicted by Hypothesis 12, observed frequency o f undeserved rewards 
showed a significant negative association with perceived organizational support (B = -. 
482,/? < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R = .247,/?
< .0001).
Table 8.6 
Results of Regression Analysis: 
Antecedents of Perceived Organizational Supporta
Independent Variable Perceived Organizational Support
Intercept .740***
Overall situation enhancement .339***
Observed frequency of deserved rewards .253***
Observed frequency of undeserved rewards -.280***
Party trainee .119**
Point on position scale .096**
Annual increment .075*
Honorary titles of Model/Advanced Laborer .065
Regression sum of squares 183.084***
(df) (7)
Residual sum of squares 190.199***
(df) (444)
F 61.056***
R2 .490***
Adjusted R2 .482***
a N = 961 (or 452 when including four control variables). 
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
*** p  < .0001 
** p  <01
*p  <05
p  < 1 0
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Table 8.6 presents the results of the main analyses concerning perceived organizational 
support. The findings demonstrated a significant variance (Adjusted R = .482, p  < 
.0001). Both sets of independent variables proved to be significant predictors. As 
predicted by Hypothesis 9, overall situation enhancement showed a significant 
association with perceived organizational support (13 = .339, p  < .0001). This result 
suggested that individuals are more likely to feel that the organization is there to help 
them succeed to the extent that they can witness for themselves that the overall situation 
or “bottom line” for those who are willing to put forth their best efforts at work has been 
or is being enhanced.
Findings of the two dimensions of reward consistency supported Hypotheses 11 and 12. 
As a matter of fact, observed frequency o f undeserved rewards showed a stronger 
association with perceived organizational support than observed frequency o f  deserved 
rewards. This interesting finding suggested that individuals have stronger views about 
the lack of organizational support when high frequency of undeserved rewards is 
observed than about the presence of organizational support when high frequency of 
deserved rewards is observed.
As a matter of fact, observed frequency o f undeserved rewards was not only negatively 
associated with perceived organizational support (13 = -.280, p  < .0001) but its impact 
on perceived organizational support was also greater than that of observed frequency o f 
deserved rewards on perceived organizational support (13 = .253, p  < .0001). These 
results suggested that perceived organizational support is more likely when individuals 
can witness for themselves first and foremost that people whose rewards are not due are 
not given them, although for them to witness that people whose rewards are due actually 
receive them also substantially enhances perceived organizational support.
The results of the control variables agreed with my expectations. Party trainees reported 
a higher level of perceived organizational support than non-Party trainees (13 = .119,/? = 
.001). This result is consistent with the enterprise policy of giving priority to Party 
trainees in career development and advancement. As the point on position scale 
increases, perceived organizational support increases (13 = .096, p  = .007). At the same 
time, as the amount of annual increment increases, perceived organizational support
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increases (B = .075, p  = .029). And individuals who have earned the titles of Model 
Worker/Advanced Laborer showed a higher level of perceived organizational support 
than those who have not held any of these titles (B = .065,/? = .069).
None of the demographic variables such as age, gender, marital status, education, and 
job tenure contributed to the regression equation and were therefore excluded. This was 
also the case with all of the five plant dummies.
8.5.2 Testing of Hypotheses 13 -1 4
To test Hypotheses 13 and 14, which suggest that reward consistency indirectly affects 
perceived organizational support through its influence on overall situation 
enhancement, I regressed overall situation enhancement on the two dimensions of 
reward consistency: observed frequency o f  deserved rewards and observed frequency o f  
undeserved rewards.
Control variables. I included two control variables that are associated with employment 
and wage issues. I measured months from expiry of the labor contract to control for the 
possibility that a lengthened period from contract expiry creates a sense of security, thus 
affecting the level of overall situation enhancement. I also measured annual increment 
as a control for the possible effects of increased satisfaction of financial needs on the 
level of overall situation enhancement. Both of these measures are intended to account 
for the potential that the fulfillment of existence and growth needs raises improves the 
well-being (Alderfer 1969) or overall situation enhancement of the individuals. I 
attempted to include other demographic variables such as age, gender, marital status, 
education, and job tenure. I did so also for the plant dummies.
I first report on the regressions of overall situation enhancement on the individual 
antecedents, then the regression on the antecedents simultaneously, with the inclusion of 
control variables in both instances. As predicted by Hypothesis 13, observed frequency 
o f deserved rewards showed a significant association with overall situation 
enhancement (B = .579, p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance
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(Adjusted R2= .366, p  < .0001). And as predicted by Hypothesis 14, observed frequency 
o f undeserved rewards showed a significant negative association with overall situation 
enhancement (13 = -.312, p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance 
(Adjusted R = .114, p  < .0001). These results indicated that overall situation 
enhancement is more likely when workers can witness for themselves first and foremost 
that people whose rewards are due actually receive them, although for them to witness 
that people whose rewards are not due are not given them also increases overall 
situation enhancement.
Table 8.7
Results of Regression Analysis: Relationship between 
Reward Consistency and Overall Situation Enhancementa
Independent Variable Overall Situation Enhancement
Intercept 1.966***
Observed Frequency of deserved rewards .502***
Observed Frequency of undeserved _ .2 1 0 ***
rewards
Education -.136**
Marital status .106**
Annual increment .133**
Months from contract expiry .082
Regression sum of squares 93.716***
(df) (6 )
Residual sum of squares 133.381***
(df) (312)
F 36.536***
R2 .413***
Adjusted R2 .401***
a N = 990 (or 319 when including four control variables). 
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
*** p  < .0001 
** p  <01
* p  < 05
p  <.10
Table 8.7 presents the results of the main analysis for the relationship between reward 
consistency and overall situation enhancement. Both dimensions of reward consistency 
supported Hypotheses 13 and 14. In particular, observed frequency o f deserved rewards
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was positively associated with overall situation enhancement (B = .502, p  < .0001) while 
observed frequency o f undeserved rewards was negatively associated with overall 
situation enhancement (B = -.210, p  < .0001). These results confirmed that overall 
situation enhancement and its subsequent outcome in perceived organizational support 
are more likely when individuals can witness a consistent pattern in the distribution of 
organizational rewards in the sense that not only (1) people whose rewards are due 
actually receive them, but also (2) people whose rewards are not due are not given them.
The results of the control variables were consistent with my expectations. As annual 
increment increases, overall situation enhancement increases (B = .133, p  = .003). And 
as the months from contract expiry increases, overall situation enhancement also 
increases (B = .082,/? = .064).
In addition to the theoretically based control variables, two demographics-based 
measures contributed to the regression equation. In particular, as the level of education 
increases, overall situation enhancement decreases (B = -.136, p  = .002). This finding 
seemed to suggest that educated individuals are harder to please than their less educated 
counterparts, due probably to higher expectations in the fulfillment of their needs. 
Results also revealed that married individuals have a higher level of overall situation 
enhancement than those who are single (B = .106, p  = .016). However, none of the five 
plant dummies contributed to the regression equation and were therefore excluded.
8.6 Antecedents of Willingness to Bear Cost
8.6.1 Testing of Hypotheses 1 0 ,1 5 -1 8
To test Hypothesis 10, which states that overall situation enhancement improves 
willingness to bear cost, I regressed willingness to bear cost on overall situation 
enhancement. To test Hypotheses 15 and 16, which proposes that reward consistency 
improves willingness to bear cost, I regressed willingness to bear cost on the two 
dimensions of reward consistency: observed frequency o f  deserved rewards and
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observed frequency o f undeserved rewards. To test Hypothesis 17, which proposes that 
expectancy improves willingness to bear cost, I regressed willingness to bear cost on 
expectancy. And to test Hypothesis 18, which states that organizational commitment 
increases willingness to bear cost, I regressed willingness to bear cost on organizational 
commitment. To gauge the simultaneous effects of overall situation enhancement, 
organizational commitment, expectancy, and reward consistency, I regressed willingness 
to bear cost on all four independent variables at the same time.
Control variables. In the absence of theoretically based control variables concerning 
the relationship between willingness to bear cost and its antecedents, I attempted to 
include the usual demographic variables such as age, gender, marital status, education, 
and job tenure. I did so also for the plant dummies.
I first report on the regressions of willingness to bear cost on the individual antecedents, 
then the regression on the antecedents simultaneously, with the inclusion of control 
variables in both instances. As predicted by Hypothesis 8 and discussed in detail in 
Section 8.4.2, perceived organizational support showed a significant association with 
willingness bear cost. As predicted by Hypothesis 10, overall situation enhancement 
showed a significant association with willingness to bear cost (B = .446, p  < .0001), 
demonstrating a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2= .200, p  < .0001). And as 
predicted by Hypothesis 15, observed frequency o f  deserved rewards showed a 
significant association with willingness to bear cost (B = .338,/? < .0001), demonstrating 
a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2= .113,/? < .0001).
And as predicted by Hypothesis 16, observed frequency o f undeserved rewards showed 
a significant negative association with willingness to bear cost (B = -.129, p  < .0001),
•y
demonstrating a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R = .016, p  < .0001). As 
predicted by Hypothesis 17, expectancy showed a significant association with 
willingness to bear cost (B = .363, p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant 
variance (Adjusted R2 = .131, p  < .0001). And finally as predicted by Hypothesis 18, 
organizational commitment showed a significant association with willingness to bear 
cost (B = .376, p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2 
= .140,/? <.0001).
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Table 8.8 presents the results of the main analyses concerning willingness to bear cost, 
which involved four supported hypotheses. Results rejecting two other hypotheses were 
however not included in the table as they did not contribute to the variance explained. 
Possible reasons behind the hypotheses’ rejection are discussed in the analysis below.
The results indicated a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R = .268, p  < .0001). 
All four sets of independent variables proved to be significant predictors. As predicted 
by Hypothesis 10, overall situation enhancement showed a significant association with 
willingness to bear cost (13 = .222, p  < .0001). This result suggested that individuals are 
more likely to believe that it is worth it for them to put forth their best efforts in their 
jobs to the extent that they can witness for themselves that the overall situation or 
“bottom line” for those who are willing to put forth their best efforts at work has actually 
been or is being enhanced.
Table 8.8 
Results of Regression Analysis: 
Antecedents of Willingness to Bear Cost*
Independent Variable Willingness to Bear Cost
Intercept 1.456***
Overall situation enhancement .2 2 2 ***
Organizational commitment .189***
Expectancy .172***
Observed frequency of deserved rewards .116***
Dummy plant 4 -.063*
Regression sum of squares 128.901***
(df) (5)
Residual sum of squares 345.918***
(df) (941)
F 69.757***
R2 .271***
Adjusted R2 .268***
a N = 942 (and same when including a plant dummy). 
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
*** p  < .0001 
** p  <01
* p  <.05
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The main analyses indicated that Hypotheses 10, 15, and 1 7 -1 8  were supported but not 
Hypotheses 8 and 16. I report first on the supportive findings then on those that reject 
the hypotheses. As predicted by Hypothesis 15, observed frequency o f  deserved rewards 
showed a significant association with willingness to bear cost (B = .116,/? < .0001). This 
result suggested that individuals are more likely to believe that it is worth it for them to 
put forth their best efforts in their jobs to the extent that they can witness for themselves 
that people whose rewards are due do receive them.
As predicted by Hypothesis 17, expectancy showed a significant association with 
willingness to bear cost (B = A l l , p  < .0001). This result suggested that individuals are 
more likely to believe that it is worth it for them to put forth their best efforts in their 
jobs to the extent that they feel that they are in control of their work results. And, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 18, organizational commitment showed a significant 
association with willingness to bear cost (B = .189,/? < .0001). This result suggested that 
individuals are more likely to believe that it is worth it for them to put forth their best 
efforts in their jobs to the extent that they are committed to the organization and its 
cause to adapt to new demands and challenges under the reforms.
Concerning Hypothesis 8, contrary to the preliminary finding of the regression of 
willingness to bear cost on perceived organizational support, the latter did not show a 
significant association with willingness to bear cost in the main analysis in which other 
independent variables were included. This result seemed to suggest that other 
independent variables of willingness to bear cost have helped to offset the effects 
hypothesized of perceived organizational support. To verify this, I conducted a further 
regression analysis using the “stepwise” method. The results showed that perceived 
organizational support was removed when additional predictors (overall situational 
enhancement, organizational commitment, expectancy, and observed frequency o f  
deserved rewards) were added, confirming that the former is no longer a significant 
predictor in the face of other independent variables.
Hypothesis 16 yielded similar results. Contrary to the preliminary finding of the 
regression of willingness to bear cost on observed frequency o f undeserved rewards, the 
latter did not show a negative association with willingness to bear cost in the main
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analysis in which other independent variables were also included. In particular, the 
adjusted R2 decreased from .268 to .265 when the variable observed frequency o f  
undeserved rewards was included, although the regression coefficient was statistically 
significant (B = .084, p  <.01). This justified the subsequent exclusion of the variable 
from the main analysis despite the fact that the regression coefficient was statistically 
significant (B = .084,/? <.01).
The decrease in the adjusted R2 was in line with the unexpected outcome of the 
coefficient’s being positive rather than negative as has been hypothesized. The result 
also seemed to suggest that other independent variables of willingness to bear cost have 
helped to cancel out the effect of observed frequency o f  undeserved rewards. To verify 
this, I conducted a further regression analysis using the “stepwise” method. The results 
showed that observed frequency o f undeserved reward was removed when additional 
predictors (overall situational enhancement, organizational commitment, expectancy, 
and observed frequency o f deserved rewards) were added, confirming that the former is 
no longer a significant predictor in the presence of other independent variables.
Last but not least, individuals in Plant 4 showed a lower level of willingness to bear cost 
than those in other plants (B = -.063, p  = .026). This result was not surprising given that 
Plant 4 has the lowest mean (3.44) compared to the average mean of all five plants 
(3.51) for willingness to bear cost. None of the other demographics based control 
variables seemed to contribute to the regression equation and were thus excluded.
8.7 Antecedents of Organizational Commitment
8.7.1 Testing of Hypotheses 1 9 -2 0
To test Hypothesis 19, which proposes that perceived organizational support enhances 
organizational commitment, I regressed organizational commitment on perceived 
organizational support. To test Hypothesis 20, which states that overall situation 
enhancement enhances organizational commitment, I regressed organizational
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commitment on overall situation enhancement. To gauge the simultaneous effects of 
perceived organizational support and overall situation enhancement, I regressed 
organizational commitment on both variables at the same time.
Control variables. In the absence of theoretically based control variables concerning 
the relationship between overall situation enhancement and perceived organizational 
support and the dependent variable of organizational commitment, I attempted to 
include the usual demographic variables such as age, gender, marital status, education, 
and job tenure. I did so also for the plant dummies.
I first report on the regressions of organizational commitment on the individual 
antecedents, then the regression on the antecedents simultaneously, with the inclusion of 
control variables in both instances. As predicted by Hypothesis 19, perceived 
organizational support showed a significant association with organizational 
commitment (B = .466, p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance 
(Adjusted R2 = .287, p  < .0001). And as predicted by Hypothesis 20, overall situation 
enhancement showed a significant association with organizational commitment (B = .408, 
p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2 = .234, p  
< .0001).
Table 8.9 presents the results of the main analyses concerning organizational
t y
commitment. The results indicate a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R = .312, 
p < .0001). Both independent variables proved to be significant predictors. Perceived 
organizational support was positively associated with organizational commitment (B 
= .358, p < .0001). This finding supported Hypothesis 19. Organizational commitment is 
more likely when individuals feel that the enterprise is helping them to succeed. The 
finding was also consistent with Gouldner’s (1960) argument on reciprocity and the 
more recent identity-based research, which established that perceived organizational 
support leads to organizational commitment (Fuller, Barnett et al. 2003).
As predicted by Hypothesis 20, overall situation enhancement showed a significant 
association with organizational commitment (B = .193,/? < .0001). This result suggested 
that individuals are more likely to be committed to the organization to the extent that
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they can witness for themselves that the overall situation or “bottom line” for those who 
are willing to put forth their best efforts at work has actually been or is being enhanced.
Table 8.9 
Results of Regression Analysis: 
Antecedents of Organizational Commitment*
Independent Variable Organizational Commitment
Intercept 2.316***
Perceived organizational support .358***
Overall situational enhancement .193***
Point on position scale -.135***
Marital status .1 0 2 **
Ratio of largest to smallest bonus _ .068*
Education .064*
Plant dummy 3 .115**
Regression sum of squares 126.799***
(df) (7)
Residual sum of squares 269.685***
(df) (650)
F 43.659***
R2 .320***
Adjusted R2 .312***
a N = 1,017 (or 658 when including four control variables and a 
plant dummy).
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
* * *  /?<.0001 
** p  <01
* p  <.05
The demographics-based control variables yielded interesting results. As point on 
position scale increases, organizational commitment decreases (13 = -.135,/? < .0001). 
Married workers reported a higher level of organizational commitment than those who 
are single (13 = .083, p  = .003). Individuals with a greater ratio of largest to smallest 
bonus in workgroup were less committed to the organization. A possible explanation is 
that bonus differentials had been stretched too far to create feelings of animosity toward 
the enterprise among socialist workers. When education level increases, organizational 
commitment decreases (13 = -.064,/? = .051). This maybe due to the individuals’ higher 
potential mobility in the external labor market when they have a higher education level.
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Last but not least, individuals in Plant 3 showed a lower level of organizational 
commitment than those in other plants (13 = -.115, p  = .001). This result seemed 
reasonable when we consider that Plant 3 has the lowest mean (3.33) compared to the 
average mean of all five plants (3.49) for organizational commitment.
8.8 The Mediating Role of Organizational Commitment in Adaptive Motivation
I first report on the three-step regression analyses of organizational commitment, the 
mediating variable of the relationship between environmental perception and adaptive 
motivation, with the inclusion of control variables. I then give details of the final 
regression analysis of the relationship between environmental perception and adaptive 
motivation, with the mediating and control variables.
8.8.1 Testing of Hypothesis 21
Hypothesis 21 proposes that organizational commitment mediates the relationships 
between the two dimensions of environmental perception -  threat perception and 
opportunity perception, and adaptive motivation. Results of prior three-step regression 
analyses of the mediating effect of organizational commitment have been presented in 
section 7.1.4. It suffices therefore to highlight here evidence confirming the mediation of 
organizational commitment when the control variables were added to the analyses.
The first-step regression analyses of organizational commitment on threat perception 
and on opportunity perception both yielded satisfactory results (p < .0001). The second- 
and third-step regression analyses confirmed that the independent variables’ effects were 
smaller but still significant ip < .0001) when controlling for the mediator (p < .0001), 
indicating partial mediation. Specifically, there was a decrease in the standardized beta 
from .565 to .499 for threat perception when organizational commitment was included. 
At the same time, there were slight decreases in the standardized betas for the control 
variables, which dropped from .096 to .093 for average monthly bonus, from 0.88 to
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 278
.078 for annual increment, from .092 to .076 for number of people in work unit, and 
from .086 to .072 for contract duration. Similarly, there was a decrease in the 
standardized beta from .608 to .497 for opportunity perception when organizational 
commitment was included. And there were slight decreases in the standardized betas for 
the control variables, which dropped from .063 to .051 for annual increment and from 
.082 to .069 for number of people in the work unit. In sum, findings from the three-step 
regression analyses, which included the control variables, supported Hypothesis 21 
concerning the mediating role of organizational commitment.
8.8.2 Final Testing of Hypotheses 1 - 2,21
The final regressions between environmental perception and adaptive motivation 
encompass Hypotheses 1 - 2 ,  which concern the independent variables of threat 
perception and of opportunity perception and Hypothesis 21, which relates to the 
mediating variable of organizational commitment. In addition, four control variables are 
included. The relationship is expressed by the following equation:
Yi = a + biXi/ + b2X2/ + b3X3/ + b4X4/ + b 5X5/ + b6X6/ + b7X7/ + E /; where
Yi represents the level of adaptive motivation of individual worker i as a
function of: 
a constant;
XI threat perception
X2 opportunity perception
X3 organizational commitment
X4 annual increment
X5 average monthly bonus
X6 people in work unit
X7 contract duration
E Error term
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Control variables. I attempted to include four control variables that are directly 
associated with the new competition-based employment and pay-for-labor systems. 
Based on the premise of the proposed framework of “environmental perception and 
adaptive motivation” concerning the protection and achievement motives driving threat 
and opportunity perceptions, I measured the number of people in the work unit, contract 
duration, annual increment, and average monthly bonus.
Table 8.10 presents the findings of the main analyses. The results demonstrate 
significantly more variance than attributable to chance (.R = .502, p  < .0001). The 
individual effects of the explanatory variables are discussed below:
Table 8.10 
Final Results of Regression Analysis: 
Antecedents of Adaptive Motivation *
Independent Variable Adaptive motivation
Intercept .500***
Threat perception .305***
Opportunity perception .360***
Organizational commitment 1 7 4 ***
Annual increment .070*
Average monthly bonus .064
No. of people in work unit .052
Contract duration .045
Regression sum of squares 158.645
(df) (7)
Residual sum of squares 154.323
(df) (671)
F 98.542***
R2 .507***
Adjusted R2 .502***
a N = 1,021 (or 679 when including one mediating 
and four control variables).
Values are linear regression standardized beta coefficients.
*** p  < .0001 
** p  <.01
* p  < 05
p  <.10
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 2 8 0
Effects of independent variables. Both independent variables of adaptive motivation 
proved to be significant predictors. In particular, as proposed by Hypothesis 1, threat 
perception showed a significant association with adaptive motivation (13 = .305, p  < 
.0001). This result suggested that individuals are more likely to be motivated to adapt to 
the new and changing demands and challenges in their jobs under employment and wage 
reforms to the extent that they perceive certain aspects of reforms (e.g., non-automatic 
renewal of employment contracts) as threats to their survival.
At the same time, opportunity perception was positively associated with adaptive 
motivation (13 = .360, p  < .0001). This finding supported Hypothesis 2. Adaptive 
motivation is more likely when individuals perceive certain aspects of reforms (e.g., 
more pay for greater contribution) as opportunities for growth and development. Results 
for tests of the mediating variable were in line with my prediction. As organizational 
commitment increases, adaptive motivation increases (13 = .174, p  < .0001). This 
supported Hypothesis 21.
The results of the control variables were consistent with my expectations. As annual 
increment increases, adaptive motivation increases (13 = .070, p  = .011) and as average 
monthly bonus increases, adaptive motivation increases (13 = .064, p  = .019). 
Furthermore, as the number of people in work unit increases, adaptive motivation 
increases (13 = .052, p  = .057), suggesting the increased intensity of competition as the 
size of the workgroup increases under the new competition-based employment system. 
And as contract duration increases, adaptive motivation increases (6 = .045, p  = .101), 
suggesting that longer contractual periods work as an incentive in motivating individuals 
to adapt to new and changing environmental demands and challenges in their jobs.
It seems beneficial to also report this outcome in tandem with a related finding in Table 
8.3 -  Results o f Regression Analysis: Relationship between Risk o f Noncompliance and 
Pressure to Perform on p. 258, whereby the shorter the contracted period, the more 
pressure to perform it tends to create in individuals. Put together, these two findings 
suggested that longer contractual periods work as an incentive while shorter contractual 
periods also have adaptive benefits to the extent that they forewarn individuals of the 
automatic non-renewal of contracts should they fail to perform.
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What is noteworthy in these results compared to those in the initial testing of 
Hypotheses 1 -  2 in section 8.2.1 is that, when organizational commitment as a mediator 
was added to the equation, the total variance explained increased by six percent from 
.473 (p < .0001) to .502 (p < .0001). As expected, the effects of the independent 
variables remained significant but were now smaller. In particular, the regression 
coefficient for threat perception reduced from .360 (p < .0001) to .305 (p < .0001). 
Similarly, the regression coefficient for opportunity perception reduced from .405 (p < 
.0001) to .360 {p < .0001).
8.9 The Proposed vs. Existing Models
8.9.1 Summary of Findings of the Proposed Model
Variance explained. The proposed model comprises 21 hypotheses derived from a 
causal chain of 12 variables, of which eight are dependent variables. Table 8.11 
summarizes the results of the regression analyses of the dependent variables, which were 
all highly statistically significant (p < .0001). Despite the fact that all the dependent 
variables in the proposed model were tested empirically for the first time in this study, 
the adjusted R of the regression analyses is near or above .30 for all except pressure to 
perform, which has only one independent variable as the model now stands.
What is worth particular mention is that the most crucial dependent variable in the 
model -  adaptive motivation, yielded the most encouraging result, with an adjusted R of 
.502. Results concerning its two proposed antecedents were also satisfactory. In 
particular, the regression analyses of threat perception and opportunity perception 
yielded an adjusted R2 of .421 and .362 respectively.
Number of cases. The total number of usable cases in the study is 1,134, with the 
number of cases used in the various regression analyses involving the dependent and 
mediating variables ranging from 942 to 1,068. These numbers were reduced, however, 
when control and dummy variables were included. The extreme cases concerned the
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control variables Party trainee and months from contract expiry, the valid responses of 
which were relatively significantly less compared to all other control variables -  677 and 
408 respectively. Consequently, the number of cases in the final regression was reduced 
to 452 for perceived organizational support, which involved the control variable Party 
trainee, and to 319 for overall situation enhancement, which involved the control 
variable months from contract expiry.
The number of cases used in the final regression of adaptive motivation, threat 
perception, pressure to perform, opportunity perception, willingness to bear cost, and 
organizational commitment were substantially more, ranging from 679 to 942. On 
balance, the number of cases used in the final regressions of the dependent variables was 
above the acceptable level.
Table 8.11
Summary of Results of Regression of Dependent Variables*
Dependent variable Hypotheses Adjusted R2 N
1. Adaptive motivation H1 -2 ,  21 .502*** 1,021 (6794)
2. Threat perception H 3 - 4 .421*** 1,020 (7262)
3. Pressure to perform H5 *| 2  y*** 1,068(793®)
4. Opportunity perception H 6 - 7 .362*** 1,024 (8544t)
5. Perceived organizational support H9, 11 -12 .482*** 961 (452“)
6. Overall situation enhancement H13-14 .401*** 990(319“)
7. Willingness to bear cost H8, 10, 15 -18 .268*** 942 (942n)
8. Organizational commitment H19-20 .312*** 1,017 (8544t)
a N in parenthesis is number of cases when control and dummy variables are added. 
The superscript in the parenthesis is the total number of control and dummy variables.
* = Plant dummy included.
*** All/?*s<.0001
Control variable effects. A total of 14 control variables were included in the regression 
analyses: annual increment, average monthly bonus, contract duration, education, 
gender, honorary title of Model Laborer/Advanced Worker, job tenure, marital status, 
months from contract expiry, number of people in work unit, Party trainee, point on 
position scale, ratio of largest to smallest bonus, and skill-based pay.
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Findings concerning three theory-based control variables merit special attention. First, 
results of regression analyses showed that the number of people in work unit had a 
significant association with adaptive motivation (13 = .052, p  = .057) and threat 
perception (13 = .063,/? = .027) but not other dependent variables.These results supported 
my expectation that social monitoring affects adaptive motivation and threat perception.
Second, result of regression analysis indicated that the control variable contract duration 
had a significant association with pressure to perform (B = -.101,/? = .007) but not with 
any other dependent variable. This result agreed with my expectation that the shorter the 
duration of employment contract, the more pressure individuals feel they have to 
perform in their jobs. This outcome is likely due to the fear of job loss or not having 
their employment contracts renewed if deemed a non-performer.
Third, results of regression analyses indicated that the control variable education had a 
significant association with opportunity perception (B = -.081, p  = .003) and with 
overall situation enhancement (6 = -.136, p  = .002) but not other dependent variables. 
These results suggested that the more qualified portion of the workforce is also harder to 
please, probably because there are more alternative opportunities outside the enterprise 
for career development and the overall fulfillment of their needs.
Results of final testing. Results of the final testing of the proposed model of 
“environmental perception and adaptive motivation” as discussed in Sections 8.5 -  8.8 
above are presented in Figure 8.3. Of the 21 hypotheses concerning the antecedents of 
adaptive motivation and of threat perception and opportunity perception, 19 were 
empirically supported.
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Figure 8.3
Tested Antecedents of Environmental Perception and Adaptive Motivation81*
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8.9.2 How It Compares to Existing Theories in Explanatory Power
I have been able to analyze the findings of the empirical study based on the proposed 
framework of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation”. It would at this point 
be helpful to compare, based on the same data, the explanatory power of the proposed 
model against that of leading theories of motivation. Based on Steers and Porter’s (1991) 
and Mitchell and Daniels’ (2003) reviews of the literature, I focused on two competing 
theories that are relevant to the research context at hand, and that is, equity and 
expectancy. I also included organizational commitment as a mediating variable as I have 
done in my own model. Given that the outcome measure of the main empirical study is 
adaptive motivation and in view of the concern for consistency, the measure of adaptive 
motivation is used in the testing of competing theories.
To test the role of organizational commitment (Mowday, Porter et al. 1982) as a 
mediating variable between equity and expectancy and the outcome in adaptive 
motivation, I regressed adaptive motivation on organizational commitment. To test 
equity theory (Adams 1963), which proposed that motivation is enhanced by the 
equitable distribution of rewards, I regressed adaptive motivation on equity as measured 
by observed frequency o f deserved rewards. Since the conceptualization of equity in this 
context is compatible to that of observed frequency o f  deserved rewards, one of the two 
dimensions of reward consistency in the proposed model (see Section 6.4.3 for a detailed 
discussion), the measure of observed frequency o f  deserved rewards was used. In 
addition, to test Vroom’s (1964) expectancy (VIE) theory, which proposed that reward 
attainability leads to motivation, I regressed adaptive motivation on expectancy.
Clarifications are due as to the manner the remaining two concepts of VIE theory, 
namely valence and instrumentality (or “V” and “I”), are given due consideration. As 
conceptualized by Vroom (1964), valence refers to a person’s preference to a specific 
(categorical) option over another, as in occupational choice. Although the concept was 
later interpreted, albeit without any theoretical justification, by motivation scholars as 
“attractiveness of a reward” (see Pinder 1984 for a review), the concept remains limited 
in its power to predict motivation in work settings in which individuals and teams do not 
have single and straightforward, but multiple and often competing, goals and priorities.
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So, whether interpreted one way or the other, the concept of valence remains 
conceptually incapable of explaining why a person will choose a particular course of 
action in the face of two (or more) equally or similarly attractive rewards. As such, there 
was no cause for the concept’s inclusion in the current framework (for a solution to this 
problem, see discussion in Section 6.3.2 -  Willingness to Bear Cost).
Second, the notion of deservingness in the conceptualization of observed frequency o f  
deserved rewards already encompasses that of instrumentality in that the former is a 
much broader concept that addresses not only the link between performance and reward 
(i.e., what instrumentality specifically aims to measure) but also any discrepancies that 
may exist in relation to the input-outcome relationship in the case of relevant others. As 
the concept of instrumentality is already represented by one of the twin dimensions of 
reward consistency (see Section 6.4.2 -  Reward Consistency for a detailed discussion), 
its repeated inclusion would have added no value to the framework.
This treatment in testing the expectancy theory was adopted in view of the research 
context and in response to Mitchell and Daniels’ (2003) caution that people seldom 
make the kind of mental calculations the theory asserted that they make, and that is, 
distinctively in terms of valence instrumentality, and expectancy.
Control variables. In the absence of theoretically based control variables concerning 
the relationship between expectancy, equity, and organizational commitment and the 
dependent variable of adaptive motivation, I attempted to include the usual demographic 
variables such as age, gender, marital status, education, and job tenure. I did so also for 
the plant dummies.
I first report on regressions of adaptive motivation on the individual antecedents, then 
the regression on the antecedents simultaneously, with the inclusion of control variables 
in both instances. In agreement to my prediction concerning the mediating role of 
organizational commitment, the variable showed a significant association with adaptive 
motivation (13 = .489, p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance 
(Adjusted R2 = .272, p  < .0001). As predicted by equity theory, equity as measured by 
observed frequency o f deserved rewards showed a significant association with adaptive
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motivation (8 = .452, p  < .0001), demonstrating a statistically significant variance 
(Adjusted R2 = .237, p  < .0001). And as predicted by expectancy theory, expectancy 
showed a significant association with adaptive motivation (13 = .377, p  < .0001), 
demonstrating a statistically significant variance (Adjusted R2= .178,/? < .0001).
Table 8.12
Results of Regression Analysis of Existing Theories: 
Antecedents of Adaptive Motivation *
Independent Variable Adaptive motivation
Intercept 1.124***
Organizational commitment .327***
Observed frequency of deserved rewards .278***
Expectancy .181***
No. of people in work unit .109***
Annual increment .076*
Contract duration .055
Regression sum of squares 122.802
(df) (6)
Residual sum of squares 194.198
(df) (680)
F 71.667***
R2 .387***
Adjusted R2 .382***
a N = 975 (or 687 when including three control 
variables). Values are linear regression 
standardized beta coefficients.
***/?<.0001 
** p  <.01
* p  <.05
p  <.10
Table 8.12 presents the results of the main analyses of the two independent variables and 
one mediating variable in relation to adaptive motivation. The results indicated a 
statistically significant variance (Adjusted R = .382, p  < .0001). All three variables 
proved to be significant predictors. And organizational commitment was positively 
associated with adaptive motivation (13 = .327, p  < .0001). This finding supported the 
prediction of the mediating role of organizational commitment. Adaptive motivation is 
more likely when individuals are more committed to the organization.
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As predicted by equity theory, equity (as measured by observed frequency o f deserved 
rewards) showed a significant association with adaptive motivation (13 = .278/7 < .0001). 
This result suggested that individuals are more likely to be motivated to adapt to new 
and changing demands and challenges in their jobs to the extent that they witness a 
higher level of justice in the frequency distribution of deserved rewards in the 
organization. Finally, expectancy is positively associated with adaptive motivation (B = 
.181,p  < .0001). This finding supported expectancy theory. Adaptive motivation is more 
likely when individuals feel that they have more control over the results of their work.
Three demographics-based measures also contributed to the regression equation. In 
particular, as the number of people in work unit increased, adaptive motivation increased 
(B = .109,/? = .000) and as annual increment increased, adaptive motivation increased (fi 
= .079, p  = .012). Results also revealed that individuals with a longer contractual 
duration had a higher level of adaptive motivation (B = .055, p  = .072). However, none 
of the five plant dummies contributed to the regression equation and were thus excluded.
In sum, the results indicated that organizational commitment, equity, and expectancy all 
contributed to explaining adaptive motivation. This was the case whether the variables 
were tested individually on their own or in an integrated fashion, as was done in the 
main analyses. Results showed that the integrated approach, which included all three 
variables at the same time, was able to explain more variance in the outcome in adaptive 
motivation (Adjusted R2 = .382, p < .0001). However, their combined explanatory power 
compared unfavorably to that of the proposed model (Adjusted R2 = .502, p < .0001), 
which accounted for 31.4% more variance.
In addition to the operationalization in the form of observed frequency o f deserved 
rewards, equity theory could no doubt have been more extensively tested with existing 
scales of distributive justice (Ambrose and Cropanzano 2003), procedural justice 
(Cropanzano and Folger 1991), and interactional justice (Moorman 1991). I, however, 
did not pursue this course because the dependent measures of these scales tended to be 
organizational commitment and citizenship behavior, and dysfunctional or retaliatory 
actions rather than motivation, which is the focus of my study (see discussion on equity 
theory in Section 3.1.1 -  Expectancy, Goal Setting, Equity, and Reinforcement).
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8.10 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter is two-fold. The first is to analyze and report on the results 
of the proposed framework of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation”. The 
second is to compare the results of competing theories based on the same data. The 
results of the linear regression analyses indicated that more than 50% of the variance in 
adaptive motivation was explainable by threat perception and opportunity perception.
In contrast, only 38% of such variance was attributable to the concepts of equity (as 
measured by observed frequency o f deserved rewards) and expectancy combined. As a 
matter of fact, findings supported my theoretical argument that the impact of equity and 
expectancy is indirect, that is, by way of their impact on willingness to bear cost, which 
in turn affects opportunity perception and adaptive motivation. Even in their capacity as 
antecedents of willingness to bear cost, equity and expectancy turn out as less powerful 
predictors than overall situation enhancement and organizational commitment.
Other notable findings evolved around threat perception and its twin concept of 
opportunity perception. First, individuals revealed a higher threat perception than 
opportunity perception. In terms of impact, threat perception had an almost equal effect 
as opportunity perception on adaptive motivation. Results of the antecedents of 
environmental perception agreed with the predicted effects of risk o f noncompliance on 
threat perception, and of willingness to bear cost on opportunity perception.
In particular, threat perception is heightened when risk o f noncompliance increases and 
opportunity perception is enhanced when willingness to bear cost increases. Along these 
lines are the results demonstrating the parallel forces of pressure and support, which also 
lead to threat perception and opportunity perception respectively. In particular, threat 
perception is heightened when pressure to perform increases and opportunity perception 
is enhanced when perceived organizational support increases.
In sum, results of the final regression analyses supported 19 of the 21 hypotheses tested, 
including the key propositions concerning environmental perception and adaptive 
motivation. I shall examine their implications in Chapter 9 -  Discussion.
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Chapter 9 
Discussion
This chapter consists of three sections. Section 9.1 reviews the implications of key 
findings of the proposed model of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation”. 
Section 9.2 considers the implications of other findings related to the antecedents of 
threat perception and opportunity perception. It also clarifies the roles of existing 
concepts in the complex process of adaptive motivation. Section 9.3 reviews the study’s 
limitations and potential extensions for future research. And Section 9.4 concludes.
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9. Discussion
This dissertation raises some thought-provoking questions. At the outset, it was 
hypothesized, contrary to predictions of existing theory, that motivation would occur in 
the face of adversity, such as amidst high levels of employment uncertainty and 
compensation risks. My empirical study provides support for this argument. The results 
show that motivation varies across individuals as a result of two factors -  threat 
perception and opportunity perception.
Below, I review a total of 23 findings and their implications in relation to the outcome in 
motivation and the testing of 21 hypotheses in the research framework. I first review the 
key findings in relation to the core argument about environmental perception and 
adaptive motivation, then other findings concerning the antecedents of threat and 
opportunity perceptions. To assist understanding of the complex dynamics in my 
research setting and the interpretation of empirical findings thereof, I incorporate, where 
appropriate, insights from focus group studies preparatory to the questionnaire survey on 
which my main study was based.
9.1 Implications of Key Findings
In this section, I review a total of 12 key findings including the outcome in adaptive 
motivation and its relationships with threat and opportunity perceptions. Closely related 
to these are the findings on the antecedents of threat perception -  risk o f noncompliance 
and pressure to perform; and the antecedents of opportunity perception -  perceived 
organizational support and willingness to bear cost. The significance of the findings 
rests with the central position of these seven concepts in the proposed framework of 
“environmental perception and adaptive motivation”.
Table 9.1 summarizes the 11 key findings numbered Findings 1 - 1 1 ,  and their various 
implications for theory and practice.
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Table 9.1 
Key Findings and Implications
Key Findings Implications
1. The vast majority o f individuals indicated an increase in 
their motivation to adapt to changing and increasingly 
challenging demands in their jobs as a result o f the 
employment and wage reforms.
2. Nearly half o f the individuals perceived a higher level of 
threats than o f  opportunities concerning the reforms.
3. Threat perception had a similarly significant impact as 
opportunity perception on adaptive motivation.
4 & 5. Individuals with higher threat and opportunity 
perceptions indicated a higher level o f adaptive motivation.
6. Organizational commitment mediates the relationship 
between environmental perception and adaptive motivation.
7. Threat and opportunity perceptions account for more 
variance in motivation than equity and expectancy.
8 & 9. When motivated by threat perception, individuals 
experienced significant degrees o f (i) risk of 
noncompliance and (ii) pressure to perform.
10 & 11. When motivated by opportunity perception, 
individuals experienced significant degrees o f (i) perceived 
organizational support and (ii) willingness to bear cost.
Findings 8 & 10 above: Complementary roles o f pressure 
and support
Findings 9 & 11 above: Complementary roles o f risk and 
cost
Employment uncertainty and 
compensation risks are the critical 
circumstances that drive adaptive 
motivation in today’s fast-changing and 
competitive workplace.
Threat is the leading environmental factor.
The role o f threat perception in motivation 
cannot be ignored.
Organizations wishing to take advantage 
of uncertainty and risks to motivate need 
to balance between employing threat and 
opportunity perceptions.
Environmental perceptions are effective 
predictors o f adaptive motivation.
Organizational commitment’s adaptive 
benefits open a new dimension in research.
Cultivation o f deepened organizational 
commitment in a crisis will help maximize 
the positive effects o f environmental 
perception on adaptive motivation.
The proposed model is more promising for 
predicting motivation under uncertainty 
and risks.
Effects o f  risk o f noncompliance and 
pressure to perform illuminate trends in 
tightening disciplinary measures and work 
intensification as likely sources o f threat.
Risk o f noncompliance and pressure to 
perform provide the missing theoretical 
explanation for effects o f goal specificity 
and difficulty in goal setting theory.
A supportive organizational culture and 
genuine managerial efforts in lowering the 
costs and/or increasing the benefits for 
employees to oblige the organization are 
conducive to opportunity perception.
There is a balance o f two distinct, 
predominant forces o f “push and pull” 
behind threat and opportunity perceptions.
The concerns o f “Can I  afford not toT’ and 
it worth it for me? ” prompted by risk of 
noncompliance and willingness to bear cost 
reinforce threat and opportunity perceptions 
as twin drivers o f motivation.
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9.1.1 Environmental Perception and Adaptive Motivation
Finding 1: Outcome in adaptive motivation. Results indicated that for the vast 
majority of the 1,134 survey respondents motivation to adapt to new and increasingly 
challenging demands in their jobs has improved as a result of the employment and wage 
reforms. The reforms have drastically altered the form and substance of employment and 
pay for China’s 100 million state industrial workers, from guaranteed lifetime 
employment to one that is competition-based and from near subsistence-level egalitarian 
wage to higher, differentiated, and deductible base pay and bonuses.
The changes signify a clear and determined shift from an entitlement environment 
governed by needs to a contingent environment that simulates the forces of market 
competition. The new, harsh realities are unprecedented uncertainty and risks in 
employment and pay. Since the situation at hand is representative of the world’s largest 
industrial workforce and illuminates the employment uncertainty and compensation risks 
prevalent in today’s workplace in general (see Heery and Salmon 2000 for a review), the 
empirical evidence seems sufficient to support my premise that employment uncertainty 
and compensation risks are the critical circumstances driving adaptive motivation in 
today’s fast-changing and competitive workplace.
Finding 2: Threat as the leading environmental factor. Results showed that nearly 
half of the individuals perceived more threats than opportunities considering the 
employment and wage reform measures. This finding is not surprising given that the 
motivation strategy of the research organization was anchored by the objective to 
“awaken the workers’ to a sense of threats or “risk consciousness” in relation to the 
increasingly challenging demands of the business and economic environment in which it 
operated. The notion of threat was strategically framed by the enterprise management in 
reference to external events and that is, shrinking state subsidies and intensifying market 
competition that bore on the organization’s survival. In so doing, the organization 
effectively put itself at the same level or “in the same boat”, so to speak, with the 
workforce in feeling threatened to fight for survival.
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While the employment and wage reforms have created opportunities for the workers in 
many ways and particularly in terms of more promising career prospects for those able 
to take up more responsibility and higher base pay and bonuses for better performance, 
parallel measures that created threats to the basic survival of the employees especially in 
terms of terminable employment for all and contingent base pay and bonuses were 
perhaps more striking to the employees. I suspect that it is due to this reason that threats 
were reported to be greater than opportunities in relation to the reforms. This 
observation is consistent with findings in the decision sciences and strategy literatures 
that individuals are generally more sensitive to losses than to gains (Cyert and March 
1963; Simon 1965; Jackson and Dutton 1988).
The survey respondents represent the top performing operation units of the enterprise 
and were referred to by the steel conglomerate as ‘pick of the crop”. The fact that they 
were among the top performers and technically survivors of a series of large-scale 
workforce structuring and downsizing efforts makes this finding all the more profound. 
What is noteworthy is that though never before conceptualized or explored theoretically 
in the work motivation literature, evidence shows that threat is the leading 
environmental factor in a fast-changing and turbulent workplace.
Finding 3: Level of significance of threat vs. opportunity perception. In support of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, results of regression analysis showed that threat perception had an 
almost equally significant impact as opportunity perception on adaptive motivation. This 
finding lends additional support to my argument that the role of threat perception in 
motivation is central and cannot be ignored.
Having made this point, I need to clarify that certain elements need to be in place for the 
perception of threat to induce, rather than inhibit, motivation. Insights from in-depth 
focus group interviews prior to the questionnaire survey are worth noting. In particular, 
individuals indicated that threat perception motivated them to adapt to new and 
increasingly challenging demands in their jobs for two main reasons. First, the 
individuals attributed the source of threat to forces of the external environment at large. 
This is somewhat reflective of the organization’s success in strategically framing threat 
to motivate. The anti-thesis would be that the enterprise was seen as the “threatener” and
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the workers its victims. But this did not seem to be the case at the research organization. 
As a matter of fact, individuals acknowledged not without empathy that the enterprise 
was as much threatened by intensifying environmental demands as the employees 
themselves. This point is consistent with the identity-based perspective of employee 
cooperation (Tyler 1999).
Second, individuals felt that while adaptive motivation or behavior could not guarantee 
continued employment or the level of pay given the inevitability of continual 
organizational downsizing and cost-cutting, the swiftness to adapt would nevertheless 
help increase their chances of survival and success in the midst of change. This 
observation is in line with findings in research on strategy (Staw, Sandelands et al. 1981) 
and stress (Fleming, Baum et al. 1984), which suggested that people tend to respond 
more constructively to threatening situations when they feel that they can cope or have a 
coping strategy.
Findings 4 & 5: Environmental perception and adaptive motivation. In support of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 constituting the core argument of the proposed framework, results of 
regression analysis indicated that environmental perception accounts for a significant 
level of variance in adaptive motivation. Results showed that although independent 
aspects of threat perception and opportunity perception enhance adaptive motivation, 
the two together created a much greater motivational impact. These are perhaps the most 
crucial findings in the entire study. They suggested that motivational programs that 
consist of elements capable of simultaneously fashioning both perceptions would be 
more effective than those that manage to create only threat perception or opportunity 
perception alone. This position overturns that of existing motivation research, which, 
with its focus on rewards, only relates to the opportunity aspect of the equation.
From this unconventional stance, all is not lost for individuals who are not consistently 
sufficiently enticed by the opportunities on offer or who sometimes find the payoffs too 
far-fetched or uncertain. Because the perception of threat is likely to leave them little 
room to slack, become discouraged and settle for less. Threat perception can thus work 
as a back up for opportunity perception, and vice versa, in motivating employees -  if 
they can’t always get motivated one way, they will likely the other. This suggestion is
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consistent with my conceptual description and synthesis of two asymmetrical yet non- 
mutually exclusive sources of motivation: (i) protection motivation, which relates to 
threat perception and is prompted by the motive to defend one’s current interests and 
status quo, and (ii) achievement motivation, which relates to opportunity perception and 
is driven by the motive to advance one’s interests beyond the current level (see Section
5.2.3 -  Proposed Concept o f Opportunity Perception for a detailed discussion).
The implications are profound. Now that knowledge of the dual sources of motivation is 
theoretically and empirically established by this study, and the risk and insecurity theses 
about today’s workplace firmly in place (Beck 1999; Beck 2000; Heery and Salmon 
2000), motivation researchers could no longer afford not examining employment 
uncertainty for all and compensation risks for non-executive/non-sales employees 
without severely distorting the reality of motivation in today’s workplace.
From a practice point of view, for managers to pretend that there are only rewards to be 
had would not help either. For without acknowledging the threats to the employees in 
the organizational system of reward and punishment, management would not be in a 
position to systematically devise a strategy to help them cope and subsequently benefit 
from their reciprocal motivation and behavior to adapt to new and increasingly 
challenging demands in their jobs. As discussed in Key Finding 3 above, this is the point 
where threat perception can turn into a negative, rather than constructive, force and 
consequently lead to many of the so called “unintended consequences” (see, for 
example, Kerr 1975) of motivational programs that only talk about rewards.
Finding 6: Organizational commitment as a mediator. In support of Hypothesis 21, 
results of regression analysis showed that the more committed the employees are to the 
organization, the more likely they will be motivated to adapt to new and increasingly 
challenging demands in their jobs. The indirect associations suggest that organizational 
commitment can enhance adaptive motivation through certain social control and/or and 
affective mechanisms. According to O’Reilly (1989), there are three processes or stages 
of commitment: (1) compliance, (2) identification, and (3) internalization. Social control 
relates to the first stage -  compliance, whereby an employee cooperates with the 
organization mainly to obtain something in return, for example, continued employment
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and a certain level of pay. However, when commitment deepens, employees accept the 
influence of the organization in order to maintain a satisfying, self-defining relationship. 
They also find the values of the organization to be intrinsically rewarding and congruent 
with personal values.
Conceiving of commitment as developing in this manner allows us to understand the 
possible ways organizational commitment mediates adaptive motivation. In particular, 
the latter, deepened state of commitment represents the case with those employees in my 
research organization who remained committed when the enterprise ran into difficulties 
and despite probable organizational decline. In this relation, organizational commitment 
is no longer simply loyalty to an organization but also an ongoing process through which 
organizational actors express their concern for the organization and its continued success 
and well-being (Neale and Northcraft 1991).
A comparable perspective of organizational commitment as a positive affective 
mechanism is that people make sense of situations when they are committed (Staw 1974; 
Comer and Laird 1975) and therefore have a positive attitude even under uncertainty and 
risks. This is consistent with research in the budding field of positive psychology, which 
maintains that positive emotion carries direct and immediate adaptive benefits and can 
also occur in situations of adversity (Fredrickson 2001).
Coupled with insights from recent research on positive emotions in general and positive 
emotions under uncertainty and risks, my own findings of the mediating influence of 
organizational commitment on the relationship between environmental perception and 
adaptive motivation are informative for researchers and managers of motivation in two 
main aspects. First, they indicate that future research examining the effects of 
organizational commitment needs to assess its adaptive benefits while individuals 
remain in their jobs as well as broaden its purview to address situations of uncertainty 
and risks. Second, the results suggest that successful implementation of a motivation 
strategy especially at a time when the organization is facing severe environmental 
challenges may require the cultivation of a deepened sense of commitment within the 
organization for employees’ threat and opportunity perceptions to have the maximum 
positive effect.
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9.1.2 Superior Explanatory Power of Threat and Opportunity Perception
Finding 7: Superior explanatory power of threat and opportunity perception. I
adopted a view of adaptive motivation in the fast-changing and turbulent workplace to 
derive a model of environmental perception to explain motivation. In support of 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 21, results of regression analysis indicated that threat and 
opportunity perceptions explain substantially more variance in motivation than equity 
and expectancy. In the testing of both the proposed and competing models, the outcome 
in adaptive motivation was enhanced by the mediation of organizational commitment.
From a measurement point of view, one may argue that the scales of equity and 
expectancy could be improved to yield better results vis-a-vis those of the proposed 
model. But the same could also be said of the scales of threat and opportunity 
perceptions. After all, given that the latter are new and relatively less developed 
measures, they are expected to have more room for betterment than the scales of equity 
and expectancy, which have been continually refined and improved upon over the course 
of more than four decades.
From a theoretical point of view, several possibilities are in need of exploration as to 
why the long-established notions of equity and expectancy are inferior in explanatory 
power to the model of environmental perception. The first possibility is that equity and 
expectancy are altogether inappropriate concepts for the prediction of motivation. The 
second possibility is that equity and expectancy are useful explanatory variables but their 
influences are not as simple or direct as have been previously assumed. Related to the 
second possibility is yet the likelihood that the setting in which expectancy and equity 
had been conceptualized does not reflect the reality of today’s workplace.
I take the position that equity and expectancy are not inappropriate concepts but that 
their effects on motivation are not straightforward but indirect. I base my argument on 
the intricacy of workplace dynamics the respective theorists failed to capture. To 
illustrate, equity theory assumes that workers have nothing to lose in lowering their 
work efforts in inequitable situations. In doing so, the theory did not acknowledge the 
potential limitation in employee discretion to respond negatively to inequity without
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putting one’s career or other interests at risk. In a downsizing workplace that also puts a 
certain emphasis on norms and social expectations as is the case in my research 
organization, issues of political sensitivity and social desirability are likely to restrain 
employees feeling unfairly treated from “getting even” in the manner suggested by 
equity theory.
The loophole in expectancy-based theories is not so much about issues of political 
sensitivity and social desirability as is with the proposition that instrumentality is a 
necessary condition for motivation to occur. An alternative to instrumentality as a 
decision rule of motivation is normative concerns, which are typically about ideology- 
based principles and strategically inspired means and preferences rather than 
immediately realizable ends. As much as instrumental and ideological concerns are not 
mutually exclusive, a framework that accounts for both is likely to be more effective. 
The proposed model fulfills this requirement. Without prejudgment of whether it is the 
instrumental or ideological that makes the individuals tick, it delineates the outcome in 
the employees’ own judgment of the situation at hand as presenting a threat and/or an 
opportunity to them personally.
Given that important issues of political sensitivity and social desirability as well as 
normative concerns have not been captured in equity and expectancy theories 
respectively, it is perhaps no wonder that regression results from testing both of these 
concepts in a combined model still compare less favorably in explanatory power to the 
proposed framework. This finding suggests that there is a more fruitful way of 
predicting motivation in a complex environment than had been possible before. Issues of 
complexity explored above are in no way exhaustive. They do, however, illuminate the 
need for the reassessment of existing theories as having the direct, mechanical 
motivational impact claimed.
9.1.3 Factors Conducive to Threat and Opportunity Perception
Findings 8 & 9: Impact of risk of noncompliance and pressure to perform on threat 
perception. In support of Hypotheses 3 and 4, results of regression analysis showed that
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risk o f noncompliance and pressure to perform account for significant variances in 
threat perception. Results also showed, in support of Hypothesis 5, that risk o f 
noncompliance is linked to pressure to perform, thus confirming the hypothesized direct 
and indirect effects of risk o f noncompliance on threat perception.
As much as risk o f noncompliance helps to intensify the pressure to perform while the 
two also independently contribute to threat perception, tightening disciplinary measures 
especially in continued employment and pay, and work intensification, which relate to 
risk o f noncompliance and pressure to perform respectively, can be identified as the very 
developments and trends that contribute to employee threat perception. Since these 
developments are not unique to my research setting, they have a critical role to play in 
environmental perception and motivation not only in China but across today’s workplace 
in general (see Sewell and Wilkinson 1990; Burchell, Day et al. 1999; Green 2001).
The findings about the effects of risk o f noncompliance and pressure to perform are 
critical in illuminating the global trends in the tightening of organizational disciplinary 
measures and the intensification of work. However, these findings should not be taken 
hastily to mean that the key to the problem of motivation is simply to heighten the level 
of threat perception by way of increased risk of noncompliance and pressure to perform 
(such as in the form of work intensification and tightened discipline). In fact, these 
results are helpful and constructive only if they are understood alongside Findings 10 & 
11, which point to the importance at the same time of perceived organizational support 
and willingness to bear cost in motivating workers through opportunity perception.
Many meaningful avenues exist for further analysis concerning risk o f  noncompliance 
and pressure to perform. One of them is the reassessment of goal setting theory. 
Although goal setting as a performance theory has been extensively used for nearly three 
decades to predict motivation to the extent that it is today considered “a leading 
motivation theory”, there remains no theoretical justification for the link between the 
proposed features of goal specificity and goal difficulty and motivation or performance 
(see detailed discussion in Section 3.1.1 -  Expectancy, Goal Setting, Equity, and 
Reinforcement).
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 301
One way of looking at specific and difficult goals is their representation of raised 
standards and expectations, a byproduct of work intensification. In view of tightening 
organizational disciplinary measures, a plausible explanation for the positive effect of 
goal specificity is that the more specific the goals, the clearer and more inexcusable the 
employee’s failure to deliver, thus contributing to risk of noncompliance. Along the 
same lines, difficult goals may have a positive impact because the more difficult the 
goals, the more likely the failure to deliver, thus contributing to pressure to perform.
While risk o f noncompliance and pressure to perform increase threat perception, 
whether the latter translates into motivation in this context depends in turn on the extent 
to which the employees are aware of or able to find a way to achieve the specific goals 
set despite their difficulty. As discussed above under Finding 3 -  Level o f significance o f  
threat perception vs. opportunity perception, having a coping strategy or being able to 
cope is of the essence. In the absence of this, goal specificity and goal difficulty will 
likely inhibit, rather than improve, motivation because the perceived threat they 
contribute to would have become unmanageable for the individual concerned.
This line of argument is coherent with two existing theoretical perspectives in the 
management literature. The first is found in crisis research, which proposes that, unless 
constructively managed, fear of failure incapacitates decision makers (Smart and 
Vertinsky 1977). The second appears in work on strategy in the form of threat-rigidity 
effect under adversity (Staw, Sandelands et al. 1981), the counterproductive outcomes of 
which is manifest in the restriction of information processing and tightening of control 
when an organization is unable to cope.
In fact, these perspectives can also help explain findings about the lack of motivational 
success of goal setting in the context of complex tasks (Weingart 1992; George-Falvy 
1996). There are no doubt limitations both in terms of sensibility and feasibility as to the 
degree goals should and can be meaningfully specified for complex tasks. Furthermore, 
since complex tasks are by nature evolving and inherent with high levels of 
complication, ambiguity, and uncertainty, it is hard to see how setting difficult goals for 
complex tasks could increase motivation. The point is not to make the tasks more 
difficult than they already are, but to help individuals to cope with and succeed in them.
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In the absence of a substantive theoretical justification for goal setting theory, I was able 
to demonstrate the rationale as well as specify the conditions for goal specificity and 
goal difficulty to work in today’s fast-changing and complex workplace. As much as I 
have made references only to two explanatory variables in this brief analysis, significant 
potential remains concerning the efficacy of other variables in the proposed framework 
for assessing other aspects of goal setting and other management tools and techniques.
Findings *10 & 11: Impact of perceived organizational support and willingness to 
bear cost on opportunity perception. In support of Hypotheses 6 and 7, results of 
regression analysis showed that perceived organizational support and willingness to 
bear cost account for significant variance in opportunity perception. These findings 
provided insights into the emotional mechanisms and mental reckoning through which 
individual opportunity perception of organizational change events (such as employment 
and wage reforms) is shaped and formed.
One way of assessing the contribution of perceived organizational support and 
willingness to bear cost in shaping opportunity perception is to consider the undesirable 
consequences of their antitheses. For instance, when employees do not perceive an 
enthusiastic level of support from the organization in their attempt to adapt to changing 
and increasingly challenging demands or deal with stressful situations in their jobs, they 
are unlikely to be convinced of the organization's sincerity and readiness to reward the 
effort, however attractive or attainable the reward may seem in the first place. So, rather 
than seeing the reward or offer as an opportunity, the individuals are likely to approach 
it with gaming and distrust (Lewicki, Mcallister et al. 1998; Risher 1999).
At the same time, when individuals do not find it worth their time or energy to adapt to 
the changing and increasingly challenging demands or contend with difficult situations 
in their jobs, a possible explanation is that the cost of doing so is too high for them. The 
possible outcomes are that individuals will either ignore the reward or offer altogether if 
the opportunity cost is too high, or see it as a threat in the event of a direct conflict(s) 
with protected personal values and interests. Low willingness to bear cost may also be a 
reflection that the individual perceives the benefits to be insufficient to justify the effort. 
The likely consequences in this case are that the individual will be indifferent to the
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reward, or consider the offer a disgrace or the exchange exploitation. One way or the 
other, it is not likely that the individual will view it in a positive light as an opportunity.
This counter analysis helps demonstrate that there is no guarantee an organizational 
reward, no matter how attractive or attainable, will be viewed as an opportunity by the 
employees. In other words, the link between reward and its positive reception is more 
complex than existing theorists had assumed. This argument corresponds with my 
findings concerning perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost, 
which suggest that a supportive organizational culture and genuine managerial efforts in 
lowering the costs and/or increasing the benefits for the employees to oblige the 
organization are likely to contribute positively to opportunity perception.
Further implications of findings 8 & 10: Complementary roles of pressure and 
support. The findings concerning the antecedents of threat perception and of 
opportunity perception have so far been discussed separately from each other. When the 
antecedents of threat perception and opportunity perception are assessed alongside each 
other, however, the effects of pressure to perform on threat perception and of perceived 
organizational support on opportunity perception stand out in their prediction of 
environmental perception. This demonstrates that behind threat and opportunity 
perceptions there is a balance of two distinct, predominant forces of “push and pull” that 
simultaneously contribute to adaptive motivation more than any other forces.
The view about the “push and pull” forces of the environmental raises questions about a 
number of previous discussions in the motivation and human resource management 
literatures. For example, Steers and Porter maintain that “motivation comes down to the 
complex interactions between push forces within the person and the pull forces 
originating from the environment” (Steers and Porter 1991: 108). To begin with, this 
position disagrees with an earlier one taken by Porter and his other colleagues, which 
points out that in practice most organizations try to use the wide array of rewards and 
punishments they have available to accomplish a number of purposes (Porter, Lawler III 
et al. 1975). Putting aside the lack of substantiation and explanation for the recent self­
contradictory view of Porter and Steers, it is opportune especially in an age of workforce
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restructuring and organizational downsizing to set the records straight by acknowledging 
the environment as capable of presenting both promises and threats.
From the basis that the environment is a source of both opportunities and threats, my 
argument follows that these forces are not mutually exclusive but complementary of 
each other. Drawing on similar views in international conflict and resolution (Tedeschi 
1970), I argue that organizations have tremendous incentives to extend pressure and 
support at the same time in shaping and raising threat and opportunity perceptions 
among employees to bring about adaptive motivation in a time of change. As much as 
the “push and pull” forces of pressure to perform and perceived organizational support 
can be identified as features of “hard and soft HRM” respectively, findings about their 
parallel impact on threat and opportunity perceptions may thus help to settle outstanding 
debates that hinge on the mutual exclusivity of control vs. commitment (Walton 1985) 
and hard vs. soft HRM (Hirsch 1976; Frey 1997).
Complementarity between pressure and support means that the goal of high-commitment 
HRM in creating a dedicated and flexible workforce (Baron and Kreps 1999) can be 
more efficiently fulfilled with the simultaneous tightening of organizational disciplinary 
measures and improved organizational support. I argue that this would hold regardless of 
the state of the economy, that is, whether it is a boom or a downturn. It seems inevitable 
in the latter condition, however, that exertion of additional pressure on employees to 
perform will have a stronger immediate appeal to organizations because resource 
scarcity leads to tightened control (see Whetton 1981).
But this is not to say that under these circumstances organizations would not benefit 
from also extending a higher than usual level of support to their employees. As a matter 
of fact, at a time when external pressures (such as cost- and time-based competition, 
which often translate into various forms of cost-cutting and work intensification) seem 
ever more acute, internal support (such as coaching, trust, and encouragement) are likely 
to have a much greater impact on employee opportunity perception than at a time when 
external pressures are at a minimal. This suggestion is in line with the resiliency 
literature, which maintain that support works as a protective mechanism in relation to a 
wide range of adversities for those afflicted (Anthony 1987; Rutter 1987; Barney 1995).
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My view concerning the parallel forces of pressure to perform and perceived 
organizational support is consistent with Truss et al’s (1997) unconventional revelation 
that even if the rhetoric of HRM is “soft”, in reality organizations are found to adopt a 
mixture of hard and soft approaches. This suggests that rather than being substituted one 
for the other, the utilitarian-instrumental and developmental-humanist principles of 
people management (Legge 1995), which translate into “carrots and sticks”, are used 
simultaneously by organizations to achieve motivational results. This is in line with 
Deery’s (2002) observation that organizations often adopt a combination of control and 
commitment regimes in human resources management.
Further implications of findings 9 & 11: Complementary roles of risk and cost.
Although relatively less dominant than pressure to perform and perceived 
organizational support, findings about the respective effects of risk o f  noncompliance on 
threat perception and of willingness to bear cost on opportunity perception are critical to 
the formulation of a more complete picture of environmental perception. Unlike decision 
science research, existing theorization about motivation in the work setting have tended 
to emphasize individuals’ response to certainty rather than to uncertainty (see 
discussions in Sections 4.3 and 5.1). My results enlarge motivation theory by informing 
how personal concerns about risk and cost shape and influence environmental 
perceptions under uncertainty, which in turn bear on motivation.
What makes the effects of risk o f noncompliance and willingness to bear cost on 
environmental perception particularly interesting is that they bring to light two major 
issues in individual decision-making that had been previously neglected in work 
motivation research. The first relates to the concern of “Can I  afford not to?” and 
suggests that when individuals are motivated by threat perception, the strength of 
motivation reflects the extent of aversion to noncompliance risk. The second relates to 
the concern of “/s it worth it fo r  me?” and suggests that when people are motivated by 
opportunity perception, the strength of motivation reflects the degree of perceived 
worthiness of a pursuit or an undertaking.
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While risk and cost represent the criteria organizations typically take into account in 
designing incentives contracts (see Milgrom and Roberts 1992), the significance to the 
employees rests with their representative states of fear and hope that help shape and 
influence threat and opportunity perceptions in the face of probable, albeit uncertain, 
punishments and rewards. In an environment of downsizing and cost-cutting, for 
example, slowness in responding to the risk o f noncompliance is likely to cost one’s job. 
Readiness in complying with set standards and expectations of performance, however, 
may bring about incentive benefits.
It follows that individuals who are considerably fearful and hopeful of the changes that 
are taking place in their environment are likely to develop high levels of risk o f  
noncompliance and willingness to bear cost and subsequently threat perception and 
opportunity perception. It would therefore be desirable for environmental changes (such 
as reform measures in employment and pay) to simultaneously generate in the 
employees (i) enough fear to the extent they will be averse to the risk of noncompliance 
(or noncompliance risk-averse) and (ii) sufficient hope to the extent that they will be 
willing to bear the cost of compliance (or compliance cost-bearing).
9.2 Implications of Related Findings
In this section, I review a total of 12 related findings concerning three sets of variables 
that influence perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost, which in 
turn explain opportunity perception. Although the variables under discussion do not 
immediately explain motivation as such, their indirect effects are not to be 
underestimated. The significance of their findings rests with their links to expectancy 
and equity theories and to organizational rewards as a whole. Importantly, they reveal 
something of the complexity of the motivation process and the contextual richness of 
how individual employees respond to payoffs in a broader sense than has been 
previously conceptualized or understood.
Table 9.2 summarizes the 12 related findings numbered Findings 12 -  23, and their 
various implications for theory and practice.
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Table 9.2
Other Related Findings and Implications
Findings Implications
12 & 13. Individuals with higher levels o f (i) overall 
situation enhancement and (ii) reward consistency reported 
higher perceived organizational support.
14. Concerning the two dimensions o f reward consistency, 
undeserved rewards had a slightly more significant impact 
than deserved rewards on perceived organizational support.
15. Concerning the two dimensions o f reward consistency, 
undeserved rewards had nearly half as significant an impact 
in negative terms as deserved rewards in positive terms on 
overall situation enhancement.
16. Individuals with a higher level o f perceived 
organizational support indicated a higher level o f  
willingness to bear cost.
17. Individuals who observed a higher frequency o f  
undeserved rewards indicated a lower level o f willingness 
to bear cost.
1 8 - 2 1 .  Individuals with higher levels o f (i) overall 
situation enhancement, (ii) reward consistency, and (iii) 
organizational commitment, and (iv) expectancy indicated 
greater willingness to bear cost.
2 2 - 2 3 .  Individuals with higher levels o f (i) perceived 
organizational support and (ii) overall situation 
enhancement indicated greater organizational commitment.
Findings 13, 15, & 19 above: Individuals who observed a 
higher level o f reward consistency indicated higher levels 
of (i) perceived organizational support, (ii) overall situation 
enhancement, and (iii) willingness to bear cost.
Findings 12, 17, & 23 above: Individuals with a higher 
level of overall situation enhancement indicated higher 
levels o f (i) perceived organizational support, (ii) 
willingness to bear cost, and (iii) organizational 
commitment.
Finding 20 above: Expectancy has only a modest effect on 
willingness to bear cost compared to other variables.
Organizations interested in supporting 
their employees and helping them succeed 
need to be concerned with making 
concrete improvements in the well-being 
o f deserving individuals and ensuring 
reward consistency for all.
Individuals are relatively more sensitive to 
the incidents o f undeserved rewards than 
to that o f deserved rewards.
Management would be better off focusing 
on ensuring that only the worthy are 
rewarded than on topping up on rewards 
but failing to prevent double standards in 
distribution.
Employees would find it more worthwhile 
to put forth their best effort at work when 
the organization is behind them and eager 
to help them succeed.
Employees would be less willing to bear 
the costs o f contingent organizational 
rewards if  they are aware o f other 
alternative means o f attaining the reward.
Although expectancy and reward 
consistency help make it worthwhile for 
employees to put forth their best effort at 
work, what seems to make the greatest 
difference is how much better off they 
believe they can become as a result.
Firms that help their employees succeed 
and make concrete improvements in their 
well-being can expect to be reciprocated 
with higher organizational commitment.
Rewards do not directly explain motivation.
If rewards fail to fuel perceived 
organizational support, willingness to bear 
cost, or overall situation enhancement, 
they may not contribute to motivation.
Workers desire enhancement o f the overall 
situation rather than isolated- or single­
aspect improvement in their work or pay.
Management needs to properly assess the 
costs and benefits o f a reward scheme to 
the employees to help ensure success.
All is not lost i f  productive effort measures 
low or is unstable if  workers look forward 
to a better tomorrow and are committed.
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9.2.1 Role of Existing Concepts in Adaptive Motivation
Findings 12 & 13: Impact of overall situation enhancement and reward consistency on 
perceived organizational support. In support of Hypotheses 9, 11 -  12, results of regression 
analysis showed that both overall situation enhancement and reward consistency account 
for significant variances in perceived organizational support. In keeping with Hypotheses 
13 and 14, results also indicated that reward consistency has a positive impact on overall 
situation enhancement. These results are encouraging in a number of ways. First, they 
confirm my proposition that reward consistency has both direct and indirect impact on 
perceived organizational support. Second, they imply that employees have sound rational 
bases that involve both general and specific issues in judging organizational support. Third, 
they suggest that perceived organizational support is a touchstone of whether potential 
changes in rewards and overall situation for the employees will translate into positive 
influences in the motivation process.
These implications are important for both theory and practice. To begin with, existing 
motivation theory puts a lot of emphasis on how employees look at organizational rewards. 
For instance, expectancy theory focuses on perceived attainability and equity theory, 
justice in reward procedures and distribution. However, how people look at organizational 
rewards cannot be inferred as how they view the organization. In fact, it is only when 
employees’ perception of organizational rewards enhances their perception of the 
organization will the former be likely to increase motivation. Therefore, the suggestion that 
employee perceptions of reward features (e.g., attractiveness and attainability) 
automatically lead to motivation is an oversimplification.
One complexity is that however attractive or attainable an organizational reward may be, if 
the employees believe that the cost of attaining it exceeds the benefit, there will be no net 
benefit to be had and no overall situation enhancement for the individuals concerned. So, 
what the management may promote in their rhetoric as “a good deal” may end up being 
cynically viewed by the employees as “an ordeal”. When these conditions prevail, it is 
unlikely for perceived organizational support to increase.
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The second complexity is that although it seems reasonable to assume that employees are 
concerned, that the deserving will receive their reward, this condition alone is insufficient to 
increase their perception of the organization support. Because employees are concerned at 
the same time that the undeserving are not getting the reward. When the latter expectation 
is violated, that is, when there are double standards, attainability is likely to take on a new 
meaning for the employees and result in disillusion and resentment rather than motivation.
All these point to one critical understanding -  organizations serious about supporting 
their employees and helping them succeed (or desirous about being seen in this light) 
need to be concerned about making concrete improvements in the overall situation or 
well-being of deserving employees and ensuring at the same time that rewards are not 
allocated to those undeserving of them. Put differently, firms that pay no or little 
attention to making sure that organizational rewards increase perceived organizational 
support and overall situation enhancement for the employees run a high risk of facing 
unintended negative consequences in motivation.
Finding 14: Comparative impact of the two dimensions of reward consistency on 
perceived organizational support. A closer look at the results supporting Hypotheses 
11 and 12 concerning the impact of reward consistency on perceived organizational 
support revealed something rather unexpected. In particular, observed frequency o f 
undeserved rewards accounts for more variance (in the negative sense) than observed 
frequency o f deserved rewards (in the positive sense). This suggests that employees are 
more concerned about and sensitive to occurrences of people getting rewards they do not 
deserve. Importantly, it implies that positive feelings brought about by consistency in the 
distribution of deserved rewards cannot compensate for bad feelings caused by the 
distribution of undeserved rewards.
Indeed, administrative tolerance for double standards in reward distribution could have 
dire consequences. To begin with, it communicates a dispiritingly message to the 
workforce at large that the organization does not care enough for those who work hard 
for its success to safeguard their interests. In a way, it also reflects on the extent of 
powerlessness and susceptibility (Schervish 1983) of affected employees to attain 
favorable outcomes in connection to their contribution at work vis-a-vis those who are in
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a manipulative position to willfully allocate the rewards to those who fall short in 
proving themselves worthy. It is therefore no wonder that observed frequency o f  
undeserved reward is found to have a more significant impact on perceived 
organizational support than observed frequency o f deserved rewards.
Employee sensitivity to double standards in rewards distribution may have also stemmed 
from a rationally defensive motive -  the pie won’t get bigger; if rewards are given out in 
any part to undeserving individuals, others would necessarily end up getting less than 
they deserve. This premise would certainly hold in situations of resource scarcity and 
tightening budget control. It is thus reasonable to expect the distribution of undeserved 
rewards to result in greater than usual levels of tension and disaccord when an 
organization is undergoing massive downsizing and cost cutting. These implications 
seem a far cry from existing motivation research, which neither acknowledge the 
connection between organizational rewards and perceived organizational support nor 
accounts for the important issue of double standards in reward distribution.
Finding 15: Comparative impact of the two dimensions of reward consistency on 
overall situation enhancement. Results showed, in support of Hypotheses 13 and 14, 
that the two dimensions of reward consistency are linked to overall situation 
enhancement, thus confirming the hypothesized effects of reward consistency on overall 
situation enhancement. In particular, observed frequency o f  deserved rewards accounts 
for more variance than observed frequency o f  undeserved rewards. This entails that 
employees’ first and foremost concern is the extent to which the bottom line has actually 
improved for those who made the requisite investment in their jobs and worked hard for 
it. Since observed frequency o f undeserved rewards explains nearly half as much 
variance in negative terms, it follows that the positive impact of distribution of deserved 
rewards can be considerably offset by incidents of undeserved rewards distribution.
Taken together, the significant effects of both dimensions of reward consistency suggest 
that people assess overall situation enhancement in both absolute and relative terms. 
That is, people judge in proportion to the extent to which deserving members of the 
workforce are better off as well as the degree to which the well-being of others is not 
undeservedly lifted. Given that existing motivation research focuses on specific reward
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features and pays no attention to improvement in the bottom line rewards are meant to 
create for employees, it is no wonder that the significance of reward consistency has 
never been explored in relation to overall situation enhancement.
New understanding from the findings discussed herewith points to fresh insights in 
reward management. Importantly, it suggests that in creating a sense of improved well­
being for employees who work hard for it, management will be better off focusing on 
ensuring that only the worthy are given the rewards than on necessarily topping up on 
the reward budget but failing to steer clear of double standards in reward distribution. As 
much as the negative effects of distribution of undeserved rewards can work against the 
positive effects of the distribution of deserved rewards, prevention of the former would 
help maximize the perception of overall situation enhancement. What is reward 
management is therefore also very much a matter of impression management
Finding 16: Impact on perceived organizational support on willingness to bear cost
In support of Hypothesis 8, results of regression analysis showed that perceived 
organizational support has a significant impact on willingness to bear cost. This 
suggests that employees find it more worthwhile to put forth their best effort at work 
when the organization is behind them and eager to help them succeed. On the contrary, it 
would be disconcerting for individuals to feel they are fighting the battle alone.
It thus seems worthwhile for management to do everything they can to help employees 
feel “not alone” in their attempt to adapt to new and increasingly challenging demands 
in their jobs. Possible ways of achieving this is for management to increase 
communication and feedback, provide moral support and guidance, and demonstrate 
trust in the employees’ ability to deliver. Certainly, these would mean harder work than 
the expression of superficial concern can accomplish. But if efforts of the more 
challenging kind are taken seriously by management, employees can be expected to 
reciprocate by being more willing to bear all costs in the process of getting the work 
done so as not to let the management down. The relationship between perceived 
organizational support and willingness to bear cost is therefore reflective of a 
benevolent cycle.
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 312
So far, I have discussed findings of the preliminary analysis of perceived organizational 
support as a single explanatory variable in the regression of willingness to bear cost. It is 
important to note that the effect of perceived organizational support seems suppressed, 
however, in the main analysis in which other independent variables are included. In 
search of an explanation for such occurrence, it seems sensible to step back and consider 
the relationships between perceived organizational support and other antecedents of 
willingness to bear cost.
This approach proves fruitful as three out of four other explanatory variables are related 
to perceived organizational support. In particular, overall situation enhancement and 
reward consistency are predictors of perceived organizational support, with both 
dimensions of reward consistency also having indirect effects through their effects on 
overall situation enhancement (as has been discussed in detail under Findings 1 2 - 1 5  
above). Furthermore, perceived organizational support is a significant predictor of 
organizational commitment (as will be discussed in detail under Finding 22 below).
These supplemental findings suggest that perceived organizational support's effect on 
willingness to bear cost did not suddenly cease to exist, so to speak. But rather, its 
influence would have in part manifest indirectly through its effect on organizational 
commitment. In addition, since overall situation enhancement and reward consistency 
together account for nearly 50% of the variance in perceived organizational support, it 
seems rather evident that the effect of perceived organizational support on willingness 
to bear cost can be largely attributed to overall situation enhancement and reward 
consistency in the first place. So, although the effect of perceived organizational support 
on willingness to bear cost does not seem to show through directly in the presence of 
other variables, it is clear that its indirect influences can be logically traced both 
conceptually and empirically based on supplemental findings concerning both its 
dependent and independent variables.
Findings 17: Impact of observed frequency of undeserved rewards on willingness to 
bear cost. In support of Hypothesis 16, results of regression analysis showed that 
observed frequency o f  undeserved rewards has a significant negative impact on 
willingness to bear cost. This suggests that when there are double standards in reward
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distribution, employees would be hesitant, rather than convinced, that it is worthwhile to 
put forth their best effort at work.
The last thing an organization intending to use contingent rewards to motivate is to give 
the employees a reason to believe that there are alternative means of attaining the 
rewards without having to work hard for them or making the requisite investment in 
their jobs. Management tolerance for double standards in reward distribution thus seems 
to be a sure way of frustrating employees’ cost and benefit calculations. As double 
standards in reward distribution occur, so may the relationship between reward 
consistency and willingness to bear cost suffer as a result. To prevent these undesirable 
outcomes, organizations must make sure that there is no exception to the rule, whether 
as a result of administrative negligence, policy discrepancies and loopholes, or isolated 
cases of favoritism.
So far, I have discussed findings of the preliminary analysis of observed frequency o f  
undeserved rewards as the only explanatory variable in the regression of willingness to 
bear cost. It is necessary to note that such effect seems compromised in the main 
analysis in which other independent variables are included. An examination of 
supplemental findings confirming the hypothesized effects of both dimensions of reward 
consistency on overall situation enhancement, however, helps to clarify this concern.
In particular, the supplemental findings suggest that the effect of observed frequency o f  
undeserved rewards on willingness to bear cost would have largely manifest through its 
effect on overall situation enhancement, which in turn accounts for most variance 
among all explanatory variables of willingness to bear cost. So, although the effect of 
observed frequency o f undeserved rewards no longer seems to show through directly in 
the presence of other variables, it appears evident that its indirect influence can be 
logically traced both conceptually and empirically through its relationship with overall 
situation enhancement.
Findings of 1 8 - 2 1 :  Impact of overall situation enhancement, reward consistency, 
expectancy, and organizational commitment on willingness to bear cost. In keeping 
with Hypotheses 10, 15, and 1 7 - 1 8 , results of regression showed that overall situation
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enhancement, observed frequency o f deserved rewards, organizational commitment, and 
expectancy account for significant variances in willingness to bear cost.
Supplemental findings that show both dimensions of reward consistency having 
significant effects on overall situation enhancement further demonstrate that observed 
frequencies o f deserved rewards and of observed frequency o f undeserved rewards have 
significant indirect effects on willingness to bear cost.
One way of assessing the findings of the four explanatory variables of willingness to 
bear cost is to compare the relative levels of variance attributable to them individually. 
The assessment results in the following ranking in the variance explained, from the 
greatest to the smallest: overall situation enhancement, organizational commitment, 
expectancy, and observed frequency o f deserved rewards. This suggests that while 
expectancy and reward consistency help make it worthwhile for employees to put forth 
their best efforts in their jobs, what however seem to make the most difference in the 
outcome in willingness to bear cost are (1) how much better off the individuals believe 
they could become as a result, and (2) the level of their organization commitment.
A closer examination of overall situation enhancement and organizational commitment 
as the two most significant and similarly influential explanatory factors of willingness to 
bear cost revealed the parallel influences of rational calculations and emotional 
involvement. On the one hand, overall situation enhancement involves the rational 
assessment of the extent to which people’s situation or well-being has improved as a 
result of their hard work or personal investment in their jobs. On the other hand, 
organizational commitment deals with the level of employee identification with and 
involvement in the organization as may manifest in pride in, and loyalty and dedication 
to the institution. These two aspects may therefore be seen as capturing both the 
employees’ hearts and minds in contributing to willingness to bear cost.
The above finding concerning the complementarity of rationality and emotion is 
consistent with what has been widely acknowledged in other social sciences literature. In 
particular, behavioral economists, who challenge the conventional wisdom that underlies 
most, if not all, economic theories, that individuals are perfectly rational wealth-
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maximizers acting only in their own self-interest, talk about emotional arousal as a 
source of bounded rationality (see, for example, Kaufman 1999). Along the same lines, 
organization scholars Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) proposed that man has an affective 
side that helps process information rapidly and usefully. This capability of the emotions 
is especially valuable in predicting motivation and behavior in situations of uncertainty 
and risks, such as those that characterize the fast-changing and complex workplace, 
where incomplete information necessarily renders total reliance on rationality both 
infeasible and insensible.
Though in line with what is long established in the broader social sciences disciplines 
reviewed above, the findings in my study about the parallel forces of rationality and 
emotion represent a provocative stance. In particular, it contradicts the position of 
existing work motivation research, which focuses on rationality only and renders the 
interplay between rationality and emotion an unpopular proposition. But if  overall 
situation enhancement and organizational commitment influenced willingness to bear 
cost, which in turn influenced opportunity perception and subsequently motivation (see 
review of supporting evidence under Findings 11 and 8 (ii) respectively), the 
complementary influences of rationality and emotion in the causal chain must be given 
their due recognition.
Findings 2 2 - 2 3 :  Impact of perceived organizational support and overall situation 
enhancement on organizational commitment. In support of Hypotheses 19 and 20,
results of regression analyses showed that perceived organizational support and overall 
situation enhancement account for significant effects on organizational commitment. 
Supplemental findings that show overall situation enhancement having a significant 
impact on perceived organizational support indicate that overall situation enhancement 
also has a significant indirect effect on organizational commitment.
As discussed in the previous section, Findings 1 8 - 2 1  showed that overall situation 
enhancement and organizational commitment can tap into the hearts and minds of 
employees to the extent that these factors contribute both rationally and emotionally to 
willingness to bear cost. In similar ways, overall situation enhancement reflecting the 
workings of the rational mind, and perceived organizational support involving
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employees’ feelings about how much they are being appreciated, cared for, and 
supported by the organization, are both found to account for significant variances in 
organizational commitment.
These findings have important implications. First, supporting Hypothesis 19 on the 
effect of perceived organizational support on organizational commitment, my finding is 
consistent with an established argument in the organizational behavior literature 
concerning the reciprocal relationship of the two variables. The basic argument is that 
people are likely to become committed to an organization when they feel that the 
organization is committed to them (Gouldner 1960; Fuller, Barnett et al. 2003). In other 
words, it is a kind of emotional investment made by employees in the organization on 
the condition that the organization shows support for them in the first place.
Second, supporting Hypothesis 20, my finding indicates that overall situation 
enhancement can play an important role in promoting (and undermining) organizational 
commitment. It suggests that organizational commitment is in part conditional upon the 
employees’ assessment of whether the organization is making a genuine effort in 
benefiting those who work hard for its success. This sends out an important message to 
management that organizational commitment is something an organization needs to 
substantially invest in and consciously work for, rather than take for granted. The upside 
is that organizations that help their employees succeed and make concrete improvements 
in their well-being can expect to be reciprocated with higher organizational 
commitment.
The additional significance of this finding is that it provides evidence for an important 
causal relationship that is not discussed in the existing organizational behavior literature. 
Specifically, it broadens the focus of existing organizational commitment research, 
which addresses the normative, affective, and continuance as the three aspects of its 
manifestation (Neale and Northcraft 1991) and, has up to now, identified perceived 
organizational support as the single most important explanatory variable (see Rhoades 
and Eisenberger 2002 for a review). Future research should therefore include both 
perceived organizational support and overall situation enhancement in predicting 
organizational commitment.
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What is more, the collective findings supporting Hypotheses 19 and 20 concerning 
perceived organizational support and overall situation enhancement reinforce my prior 
argument (supported in the first instance by Findings 18 -  21) that rationality and 
emotion simultaneously significantly contribute to the causal chain affecting motivation. 
As a matter of fact, this recurring theme illuminates the critical elements in my research 
on motivation in a fast-changing and turbulent environment, and that is, uncertainty and 
risks. For in as much as information is inconsistent or incomplete, as may likely be the 
case in the presence of employment uncertainty and compensation risks, rationality and 
emotion are expected to manifest their dual complementary effects on individual 
motivation as a complex, rather than straightforward, process of decision-making.
Further Implications of Findings 13,15, & 19 above: Impact of reward consistency 
on perceived organizational support, overall situation enhancement, and 
willingness to bear cost. Of a total of 23 findings discussed above, Findings 13,15, and 
19 are particularly pertinent to the focus of existing motivation research -  rewards. For 
this reason, it is important for me to also review them collectively in light of this theme.
To capitulate, Finding 13 and 19 relate to the direct effects of reward consistency (its 
two dimensions being observed frequency o f deserved rewards and observed frequency 
o f undeserved rewards) on perceived organizational support and willingness to bear 
cost. Finding 15 relates to the indirect effects of the two dimensions of reward 
consistency in the sense that they affect overall situation enhancement, which in turn 
affects both perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost.
The direct and indirect effects of reward consistency behind these findings emphasize 
the employees’ cost and benefit calculations (as reflected in overall situation 
enhancement and willingness to be cost) on the one hand and their feelings toward the 
organization (in terms of perceived organizational support) on the other. These 
calculations and feelings contribute to opportunity perception, which in turn contributes 
to motivation. What these relationships suggest is that the link between reward and 
motivation is complex and multi-faceted.
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 318
As a matter of fact, reward consistency predicts perceived organizational support and 
willingness to bear cost better when the web of complex indirect relationships among 
them is included than when only multiple simultaneous direct effects are studied. For 
instance, reward consistency influences overall situation enhancement, which in turn 
accounts for significant variances in perceived organizational support, willingness to 
bear cost, and organizational commitment, all of which bear indirectly on motivation.
Furthermore, the multiple direct and indirect effects of both dimensions of reward 
consistency figure in the prediction of perceived organizational support and willingness 
to bear cost when these total effects are considered, so that neither perceived 
organizational support nor willingness to bear cost is adequately explained from a 
single perspective. For instance, even observed frequency o f  undeserved rewards, which 
does not seem to explain willingness to bear cost when regressed alongside overall 
situation enhancement, organizational commitment, and expectancy, affects willingness 
to bear cost through effect upon more direct links with overall situation enhancement.
A conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that it paid off to not presume as 
existing motivation scholars have presumed that reward directly predicts motivation. By 
studying the effects of reward consistency on select concepts along the causal chain of 
motivation in the proposed framework, I was able to gain a more complete 
understanding of the motivation process than has been gained in previous efforts. 
Moreover, I learned that such simplistic explanations of motivation as the 
instrumentality and equity viewpoints, (the difference between which has been clarified 
and the concepts incorporated into my broader conceptualization of reward consistency), 
were not so relevant in this study for directly explaining motivation as for explaining 
perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost, which in turn contribute 
to opportunity perception, and subsequently motivation.
Importantly, this means that if organizational rewards do not fuel perceived 
organizational support, willingness to bear cost, or overall situation enhancement, it is 
unlikely to subsequently contribute to motivation. So, for rewards to have a positive role 
in the motivation process, it is not so much the issue of whether they are intrinsic or 
extrinsic per se, or whether they are attainable and attractive enough, as it is their
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potential to improve perceived organizational support, willingness to bear cost, and 
overall situation enhancement.
For instance, offers or gestures of rewards that merely satisfy superficial targets in 
attractiveness, attainability, and even goal setting but are held in the hearts and minds of 
employees with suspicion, distrust, discomfort, or contempt are unlikely to contribute to 
perceived organizational support, willingness to bear cost, or overall situation 
enhancement, what may be considered as “the gateways to motivation”. This 
understanding represents a theoretical breakthrough in reward management in that it 
provides a powerful alternative explanation for the lack of success of a reward system to 
motivate. In practice, this advancement in knowledge can help managers to anticipate, 
and subsequently prevent, many of the so-called “unintended consequences” of rewards 
or reward systems.
Further Implications of Findings 12, 17, & 23 above: Impact of overall situation 
enhancement on perceived organizational support, willingness to bear cost, and 
organizational commitment. Although findings on the individual effects of overall 
situation enhancement have been previously individually discussed, a holistic view of 
the concept’s multiple effects will give us a full picture of its sphere of influence and 
significance in the motivation process.
To reiterate, Findings 12 and 17 confirm the direct effects of overall situation 
enhancement on perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost, both of 
which in turn have an effect on opportunity perception. In particular, overall situation 
enhancement accounts for greater variances in both perceived organizational support 
and willingness to bear cost than all other variables, and that include reward 
consistency, expectancy, and organizational commitment.
This points to the strategic importance in reward management of facilitating positive 
change in the overall well-being of employees rather than isolated- or single-aspect 
improvement in their work or pay. However, the role of reward consistency is not to be 
underestimated in this respect. As a matter of fact, supplemental finding demonstrates 
that the two dimensions of reward consistency together explain more than 40% of the
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variance in overall situation enhancement (see detailed discussion under Finding 15). 
This suggests that reward consistency is a crucial and indispensable link to overall 
situation enhancement.
Finding 23 verifies the direct effect of overall situation enhancement on organizational 
commitment, a mediator of the relationship between environmental perception and 
adaptive motivation. This suggests employees’ perceptions of and feelings toward the 
organization can in part be accounted for on a rational basis. This principle seems to 
hold true also for the outcome in perceived organizational support, in which nearly half 
of the variance is accounted for by overall situation enhancement (see detailed 
discussion under Finding 12).
In sum, these findings reveal the complex and wide-ranging effects of overall situation 
enhancement, and in so doing suggest numerous ways to improve the connections 
between organizational rewards and multiple factors in the causal chain leading to 
motivation. The fact that links between organizational rewards and motivation are not as 
straightforward as previously understood should not in any way undermine their 
significance. As a matter of fact, it is the intricacy of these tested relationships that helps 
strengthen my position for motivation researches to refrain from making 
oversimplifications and subsequently hasty conclusions about them.
On the practice side, care can be taken to see that organizational rewards perform their 
proper function in creating net gains and improving the bottom line for members of the 
workforce. That is to say, if the costs of attaining a reward no matter how desirable, 
exceeds the benefits sought, outcomes in perceived organizational support, willingness 
to bear cost, and organizational commitment would almost certainly all suffer. And 
when they do, it is hard to see how organizational rewards or whatever an organization 
cares to call them can help lead to motivation.
The implication of this analysis is that as much as it is requisite to assess the costs and 
benefits of a new incentive scheme to a firm prior to introduction, it would benefit the 
management to assess its costs and benefits to the workforce also. This is no easy task; it 
entails a thorough understanding of the hopes and desires, values and preferences of the
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workforce in economic, social, and ideological terms, which if not well- understood or 
balanced, could seriously upset the web of complex relationships between organizational 
rewards and motivation. For this reason, conducting dual diligence from the perspectives 
of the firm and the employees can make favorable consequences more likely.
Further implication of Finding 20 above: Impact of expectancy on willingness to 
bear cost. Despite ongoing criticisms about its validity (Pinder 1984) and ability to 
capture the reality of the individual decision making process (Mitchell .and Daniels 
2003), expectancy as a theory (Vroom 1964; Porter and Lawler III 1968) has dominated 
the field of work motivation for more than three decades. For this reason, I feel it 
important to explore the implications of Finding 20 concerning the limited effect of 
expectancy.
Under Findings 18 -  21, I have previously discussed results of the antecedents of 
willingness to bear cost and contrasted the superior explanatory power of overall 
situation enhancement and organizational commitment against that of expectancy. A 
relevant question is: Where does the lesser explanatory power of expectancy put the 
concept in future research? Taken at face value, it would seem that expectancy has a 
very limited role to play. But this limitation must be assessed in view of the dynamics of 
the workplace under consideration.
For instance, the setting of this study represents a fast-changing and turbulent 
workplace, one in which individuals faced unprecedented levels of employment 
uncertainty and compensation risks. In addition, there were ambiguities in management 
reform as well as operational, workforce, and organizational restructuring activities. The 
identification of uncertainty and risks illustrates the possibility of an unstable, if not 
weakened, link between effort and performance. This suggests that the reliability and 
importance of expectancy as a measure by which forces of motivation may be estimated 
will reduce with the increase in risk and uncertainty in the workplace.
As much as low expectancy is a sign of adversity, and willingness to bear cost a possible 
condition even under adversity, it is only reasonable that expectancy turned out to be a 
relatively weak predictor of willingness to bear cost in a workplace characterized by
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uncertainty and risks. As a matter of fact, low or unstable expectancy may not be so 
much of a unique phenomenon in the reforming Chinese industry as a general trend in 
the increasingly knowledge-based global economy. This would especially be the case 
where the level of resources and support fluctuates, performance outcomes are driven by 
exogenous non-controllable factors such as business cycle effects, and/or management 
and employees vary in opinion as to what constitutes performance (see detailed 
discussions in Section 4.3.1 -  Adversity and Expectancy Theory).
However, all is not lost if productive effort measures low at times or is altogether 
unstable. In particular, Findings 18 and 20 concerning overall situation enhancement 
and perceived organizational commitment suggest that willingness to bear cost is 
sustainable as long as the employees look forward to a better tomorrow and are 
committed to the organization. Taken together, findings on expectancy and other 
competing predictors of willingness to bear cost suggest the need for motivation 
scholars to refocus attention away from expectancy and toward uncertainty and risks. 
Indeed, given the current trends and developments in today’s fast-changing and complex 
workplace it would seem less fruitful to dwell excessively on the simplistic notion of 
expectancy than to adapt to a new research agenda of alternative explanations of 
motivation under uncertainty and risks.
9.3 Limitations and Extensions
My study represents the first attempt that I am aware of to theoretically construct and 
empirically examine a framework of motivation under uncertainty and risks that 
concerns members of the workforce who are neither senior executives nor sales 
personnel. I believe that the evidence and insights gained are valuable, but the study 
must be considered in light of its limitations. I shall review them in terms of measures, 
theoretical perspective, and empirical focus. I shall also explore the extensions that 
could be made of this study in future research.
The first limitation relates to the measures. In a detailed discussion in Chapter 7 ,1 was 
able to conclude on the scale reliability and sample adequacy of the data. A remaining
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concern is the use of self-report scales, which raises the possibility of common method 
bias producing the results (Crampton and Wagner 1994). Since the variables under 
examination were attitudinal, it was necessary to assess the perceptions of employees 
directly. The case of overstated correlations cannot be entirely ruled out, yet it seems 
highly unlikely. For instance, common methods would have triggered large correlations 
among the major variables. Although the independent variables of threat and opportunity 
perceptions have statistically significant correlations with other variables, on the whole 
the correlations are not large enough to call for any specific concern (see Table 7.2 -  
Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities, Variances Extracted, and Person Correlations on p. 
238). In fact, the significant effects threat and opportunity perceptions have on the 
outcome in adaptive motivation increase my confidence in the validity of the findings.
The second limitation relates to the theoretical perspective. My model emphasizes that 
the motivation process is complex and cannot be directly estimated by expectancy-based 
explanations. One may argue that this is true only to the extent that the work 
environment under consideration is characterized by uncertainty and risks. No doubt it is 
possible in certain organizations that employment and pay are guaranteed and not 
contingent in any way upon variable factors such as employee or corporate performance, 
thus making expectancy applications more relevant and reliable. But then even if there is 
no variability in environmental factors, there are likely to be individual considerations 
such as cost concerns associated with not just economic but also the more delicate social 
and normative issues, which my model takes into consideration and is aimed to tackle.
The third limitation is that I focused my empirical inquiry on two forms of risks -  
employment and pay. Although employment uncertainty and compensation risks are 
critical issues in both the Chinese enterprise reform setting as well the global workplace, 
there are also other types of risks that are relevant to individual employees such as health 
and safety risks as well as reputational risks (see Degraeve and Nicholson 2004 for a 
discussion). In explaining motivation under uncertainty and risks in the work setting, 
which is an unprecedented undertaking, what is perhaps more important is that the 
proposed framework accounts for and is open to a wide range of economic, social, 
normative, and other concerns, thus enabling the testing of other (additional) categories 
of uncertainty and risks should the situation at hand warrant attention to these areas.
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Punishment consistency. Several extensions of this study could make significant 
contributions to a new research agenda of motivation under uncertainty and risks. First, 
in parallel to the proposed concept of reward consistency, which contributes indirectly to 
opportunity perception, an examination of punishment consistency would be helpful. We 
could then better understand how punishment consistency and threat perception are 
directly or indirectly associated. Although I was mindful in this study of the potential 
impact of punishment consistency and have as a matter of fact included four 
questionnaire items (namely, 1.2,1. 3,1.5 and 1.17) to test its effects, the scale had to be 
excluded from the analysis due to outcome in low reliability.
Antecedents of risk o f  noncompliance and pressure to perform . A second extension 
could be the further development of variables to predict risk o f noncompliance and 
pressure to perform, both of which in turn predict threat perception. As the research 
framework now stands, no explanatory variable of risk o f noncompliance is available. 
Although I was able to verify my hypothesis with empirical evidence that risk o f  
noncompliance influenced pressure to perform, the R2 is below a 0.2 level with only one 
explanatory variable. By exploring the dynamics that bear on risk o f noncompliance and 
pressure to perform, we could learn much more about the causal chain leading to threat 
perception. After all, at least based on the findings of this study, employees had 
relatively higher levels of threat perception than opportunity perception under the 
employment and wage reforms. So knowing more about what makes employees feel 
threatened is an essential step forward.
Alternative expectancy. A third extension of this study is the further development of a 
variable that can help explain willingness to bear cost better than has been possible in 
the current study. My particular concern is the finding that the four proposed 
explanatory variables -  overall situation enhancement, organizational commitment, 
reward consistency, and expectancy -  together explain less than 30% of the variance in 
willingness to bear cost. It therefore seems likely that an additional strong predictor has 
to yet to be identified. A possible contender is the notion of alternative expectancy, i.e., 
the extent to which the individuals believe that there is some other (or better) alternative 
means for them to achieve an end, based on their own perception (Sun 2001b).
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In light of the fact that an increasing number of today’s work roles are characterized by 
complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty (see Pelled, Eisenhardt et al. 1999; Smithson and 
Lewis 2000), alternative expectancy seems to be a particularly poignant measure as 
workers operate under uncertainty and risks and the links between input, performance, 
and reward are neither clear nor straightforward (ILO 2001: 147 - 161). Under these 
circumstances, a worker may be motivated to “do his best” despite low or uncertain 
perceived input-outcome expectancy because “there is no other way.”
My study aligns well with research on risk in the decision sciences and executive pay 
literatures. I have included in my analysis the notion of risk aversion in my 
conceptualization of risk o f noncompliance, which affects threat perception directly as 
well as indirectly through its effect on pressure to perform. But there are other existing 
concepts especially in the decision sciences that can be further explored to help enlarge 
understanding of employee threat and opportunity perceptions I modeled in my study. 
For example, existing concepts of preference for status quo, endowment effect, and 
overcompensation (risk homeostasis) also contribute to risk psychology. These issues 
are beyond the scope of the present study, but they may provide fertile ground for 
subsequent studies on motivation under uncertainty and risks.
9.4 Conclusion
Overall, evidence in this study appears to be supportive of my view that environmental 
perception affects adaptive motivation in a fast-changing and turbulent workplace. 
Importantly, risk and pressure influence threat perception while support and cost 
bearing influence opportunity perception. When employees are approving of the level of 
overall situation enhancement and reward consistency, they see the organization as 
supportive. Moreover, when they are impressed with the overall situation enhancement, 
reward consistency, and productive effort and are themselves committed to the 
organization, they find it worthwhile to bear the requisite costs of success in their jobs.
Reciprocal effects are also at play. Above all, when employees are pleased with the level 
of overall situation enhancement and of organizational support, they become more
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committed to the organization that helps and cares for them. At the same time, 
organizational commitment mediates the relationships between environmental 
perception and adaptive motivation in the sense that it broadens the employees’ capacity 
to cope in adversity and to rise to new challenges.
The various implications for theory and practice of a total of 23 findings have both been 
discussed in detail and summarized in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 above. What is particularly 
noteworthy in this closing section is that the motivation process proves to be more 
complex, and indeed fascinating, than has been previously understood. In sum, the most 
significant advancement in knowledge of this study is in relation to threat.
As demonstrated by the influence of threat perception on adaptive motivation, the 
effects of probable punishments are just as influential as the potential effects of rewards. 
This is consistent with the finding in the growing behavioral economics literature 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman 
and Tversky 1982), which showed that individuals view risk concerning perceived 
losses with a higher level of sensitivity and attention than they view risks concerning 
perceived gains.
In other words, ceteris paribus, protection motivation is a stronger driving force than 
achievement motivation. This insight, when understood in light of my finding that 
employees perceived more threats than opportunities under employment and wage 
reforms, suggest that the neglect of “threat” in work motivation research will risk 
leaving more than half of the puzzle unresolved in any work setting where there is 
significant level of uncertainty and risks.
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion and Outlook
This chapter consists of three components. Section 10.1 summarizes the study and its 
major findings. Section 10.2 discusses the implications for organizational approaches to 
motivation and for the role of risks in motivation research. Section 10.3 reviews the 
contributions of this dissertation and provides directions for future research.
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10. Conclusion and Outlook
This thesis contains first and foremost the theoretical development of a model to explain 
adaptive motivation under China’s employment and wage reforms, which brought about 
the harsh, unprecedented reality of “survival of the fittest” for state industry as a whole 
and for its 100 million-strong workforce. Uncertainty and risks are accounted for in the 
proposed research model like no motivation theory has done and amply attested to by 
the findings of the empirical study. This chapter is a summary of the most significant 
themes of the thesis and a statement of its paramount purpose.
10.1 Summary of this Research
I have tried to capture in this study the role of uncertainty and risks in motivation. The 
desire for this unconventional and admittedly ambitious undertaking stemmed from my 
firsthand observation of the individual motivation process in the enterprise setting of 
China’s employment and wage reforms. Being fast-changing and turbulent the 
environment under consideration was embedded in a multitude of uncertainty and risks 
at both enterprise and individual levels. But there did not seem to be a work motivation 
theory that considered uncertainty and risks. It therefore became clear to me that the 
solution to my problem was to embark on the development of a research model to 
explain what I have identified in my research setting as a form of “adaptive motivation”, 
that is, individuals’ motivation to adapt to new and changing environmental demands 
and challenges in their jobs.
Basis of proposed model. I adopted an interdisciplinary approach, which incorporated 
insights on motivation and behavior under risks from 10 different social sciences 
disciplines ranging from evolutionary economics to decision science to strategy and 
international conflict resolution (see complete listing in Table 6.1 -  Definitions o f Key 
Variables). The result is a model of “environmental perception and adaptive motivation” 
(see Figure 6.1 -  Proposed Antecedents o f Environmental Perception and Adaptive 
Motivation). Importantly, the framework (1) captures with a more intricate and balanced
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treatment what leading theories considered in relation to expectancy and equity; and at 
the same time (2) explores what existing theories have overlooked, that is, the 
complementary forces of pressure and support, and of risk and cost-bearing, and their 
respective effects on threat perception and opportunity perception, which in turn bear on 
adaptive motivation.
The findings of my empirical study based on a sample of 1,134 questionnaire surveys 
indicate that adaptive motivation has increased as a result of employment and wage 
reforms for the vast majority of the employees surveyed. As regards influences of the 
conventional concepts of expectancy and equity theories, my findings somewhat 
contradict those of existing studies, which presumed that the motivational effects are 
direct and automatic. In keeping with my propositions, my findings indicated that 
expectancy and reward consistency contribute to motivation indirectly through their 
effects on perceived organizational support and willingness to bear cost, which in turn 
affect opportunity perception and subsequently adaptive motivation.
Provocatively, this suggests that rationality-based calculations, (which guided the 
thinking of existing theories), will affect motivation to the extent that they influence 
individual perception of support and resolve on cost bearing (see Chapter 9 for a detailed 
discussion). But since considerations affecting individual perception of support and 
resolve on cost bearing are potentially multi-faceted, the effects of expectancy and 
equity should be explored in conjunction with other potential factors (such as personal 
preferences and ideological concerns) rather than being untenably overestimated, as 
existing studies had allowed to happen.
Environmental perception and adaptive motivation. Moving to the core argument of 
my research on “environmental perception and adaptive motivation”, results of 
regression analyses are clearly in favor of the view that threat and opportunity 
perceptions are drivers of adaptive motivation. In fact, the twin concepts of threat and 
opportunity perceptions are found to have significantly greater explanatory power than 
that of expectancy and equity combined, which were also tested with the same data. If 
motivation under adversity is a phenomenon whose antecedent forces are beyond the
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grasp of existing theory, which was proven the case in this study both conceptually and 
empirically, then the proposed model is a realistic alternative to current frameworks.
To support this argument, it suffices me to point out that threat and opportunity 
perceptions together with the mediation of organizational commitment explained more 
than 50% of the variance in the outcome in adaptive motivation. The result implies a 
coherent understanding and that is, in times of organizational adversity and/or crisis, 
when instrumentality is least expected to play a major role in the motivation process, 
ideologically and morally based mentality and sentiments (as manifest by the Chinese 
workers in the form of a deep-rooted commitment to the state-owned enterprise, which 
symbolizes the state), are likely to magnify their mediating influence in the face of 
pressing environmental demands and challenges.
In terms of the independent effects of threat and opportunity perceptions, what is 
particularly noteworthy is that threat perception had a nearly equal impact on adaptive 
motivation as opportunity perception under the employment and wage reforms. 
Furthermore, results demonstrate that risk and pressure, (as measured by risk o f  
noncompliance and pressure to perform), significantly influence threat perception while 
support and cost bearing, (as measured by perceived organizational support and 
willingness to bear cost), significantly influence opportunity perception. What is 
important to bear in mind is that adaptive motivation is at its best or highest level when 
both threat and opportunity perceptions are high.
Motivating with threat effects. While threat has its limitations (Nicholson 2003), it 
seems clear from the findings of this study that promoting individuals’ recognition of 
opportunities and threats in the environment while providing support to help them 
succeed can enhance adaptive motivation in a fast-changing and turbulent workplace. 
Notwithstanding the insights gained from existing threat literature, the purpose and 
execution of the proposed threat effects are strategically different from the brutal use of 
managerial threats, whereby the “threatener” has the upper hand (see Boulding 1978); 
the threat effects of unionism on wage determination (see Freeman, Ichniowski et al 
1985), and the international conflict negotiator’s claim of “If you don’t do this, I’ll do 
that” (see Tedeschi 1970).
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In essence, it is not to coerce the adversary to submit to one’s will as such, but to 
forearm the threatened to adapt to formidable environmental demands and challenges. 
The threat effects behind adaptive motivation relate to pressing environmental issues 
that bear on the organization and its members to the extent that it creates a shared 
destiny and desire in them to work together to counteract and systematically overcome 
external threats. For example, as identified by management of my research organization, 
The Steel Conglomerate, the source of threat was intensifying domestic and global 
competition and the risks of organizational decline and bankruptcy. Accordingly, the 
strategic direction of the enterprise was to “catch up” with (rather than be hit by) the 
domestically competitive and internationally vibrant iron and steel businesses and the 
focus of its socialization campaign, preparedness.
The notion of preparedness is not new; it too was the focus of advertising campaigns of 
nations that came under threat, albeit of a distinct category. For example, September has 
been earmarked as National Preparedness Month “to educate and empower American 
citizens to prepare for and respond to potential attacks and other emergencies” 
(Homeland Security 2005). Having been “prepared” for similar attacks and emergencies, 
British citizens were able to produce “an incredible response of stoicism, of discipline 
and order” when faced with similar challenges (Mayor of London 2005). Whether it is in 
relation to nations, organizations, or individuals, the idea behind the proactive coping 
strategy is the same: “If ye are prepared, ye shall not fear” (D&C 38:30). As such, the 
proposed threat effects are of a positive and adaptive nature in that they create an urgent 
sense for preparation and in so doing drive motivation, even under uncertainty and risks.
The value of threat effects lies then in its potential of (1) bringing institutions 
(governments and organizations alike) and individuals together; and (2) giving them a 
common cause and objective to prepare and be at their best in adapting to changing 
environmental challenges and demands, as has also been powerfully demonstrated at 
The Steel Conglomerate.
Best practice in Chinese management. In the state sector’s adaptation to economic 
self-reliance under the economic reform, the establishment of employment and wage 
systems that effectively prepare the industry’s 100 million-strong workforce for the
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market-led environment is a pressing issue. A common practice in advancing the 
reforms has been for the state to “pick the winners” and widely publicize their successes. 
There are great potential gains associated with this and there are risks as well. The 
potential for emulating the success of best practices is present, and salutary impact of 
accelerated reforms based on this approach is indeed possible, but not a foregone 
conclusion. Moreover, given the peculiar conditions and circumstances of individual 
enterprises {changing), it is uncertain how many enterprises can reap the advantages of 
the so-called best practices without subjecting themselves to the painstaking processes of 
trial and error. The critical issue is the ambiguity associated with the applicability of best 
practices across different enterprises.
Reformers at the state and industry levels who advocate and embrace the dualistic 
approach to reward and punishment (with which the concepts of opportunity and threat 
perceptions are congruent) in transforming the state sector are perhaps well versed with 
the legalistic origin ifajia) of this ancient management philosophy (see Fu 1996 for a 
discussion). However, they seem to lack any unified and effective framework for 
organizing and understanding the facts and patterns that evolve once these ideas are put 
into practice. This study represents a major step in a much-needed direction in providing 
theoretical justification for the success of innovative reform measures at The Steel 
Conglomerate and specifying the conditions under which a similar level of success in 
workplace reforms may be realistically pursued by other enterprises.
10.2 Implications
In the wake of “deepening of reforms” in modem enterprise management and in national 
employment and wage policies, Chinese enterprises and their workers alike have been 
confronted with unprecedented levels of uncertainty and risks. Along with the nation’s 
WTO accession, acceleration of the dismantling of previous industry policy and the 
“creative destruction” of outdated industrial plants to liberate capital for infusing the 
small and medium-sized enterprise sector (see Lee 2000) is set to take place. These 
developments are of great importance not only for China, but also for developing
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countries as a whole, and indeed, for the entire structure of world political economy in 
the twenty-first century (Nolan 2001: xxiii).
From a global perspective, it is no coincidence that, as we enter the new millennium, 
questions regarding the impact of the changing environment, evolution of the adaptive 
and flexible workforce, and emergence of the insecure workplace are arousing intense 
discussion in industrial relations and other related disciplines. Compared to the stable, 
predictable, and incentives-laden workplace all too often taken for granted by work 
motivation theories of the 1960s -  1980s that have continued to dominate the field, the 
organizational environment has today changed beyond all recognition.
My study represents an attempt to bring such change into focus and provide a 
framework therein to guide research and practice. In particular, the proposed framework 
and its findings have important implications for organizational approach to motivation 
and the future role of risks in motivation research. The newfound directions outlined in 
the succeeding analysis are likely to develop and take root, as a retreat to an exclusive -  
or even dominant -  focus on the stable and predictable organizational environment 
appears unlikely due to the inexorable processes of competition set in motion by 
globalization and other formidable forces of change.
10.2.1 Rethinking Organizational Approaches to Motivation
Many of the existing theories in work motivation have been developed with the 
assumption that environmental factors are simplistic, well defined, stable, and 
predictable (see discussion in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5). The most critical future 
developments in motivation research with respect to the world risk society (Beck 1992; 
Beck 2000) and the insecure workplace therein (Hartley, Jacobson et al. 1990; Heery 
and Salmon 2000) may come from overturning this fundamental assumption.
As demonstrated by the proposed model of “environmental perception and adaptive 
motivation” and the accompanying empirical evidence in this study, the notion of 
environmental change (as opposed to a stable environment) has potential for expanding
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our understanding of motivation in a fast-changing and turbulent workplace. Before 
proceeding to a consideration of an alternative approach to motivation in view of that, it 
seems meaningful to place this bold and potentially controversial suggestion within a 
framework of existing vs. emergent organizational approaches to motivation. Such a 
framework would serve as an instrument not only for systematically assessing first and 
foremost the efficacy of the existing approach in tackling some of the most poignant 
issues in today’s work environment but also for laying the foundation of my argument 
for the emergence of a new “environmental change model” of motivation.
As shown in Table 10.1, the framework consists of three analytical components -  
assumptions, policies, and expected motivational outcomes. These components are 
predicated on and modeled after the work of Miles, Porter, and Craft (1966) and Steers 
and Porter (1991). In fact, details in the table concerning the existing approach, which 
encompasses the human relations and human resources schools, represent a direct 
adaptation of the work of these important authors. As seen in the third column of the 
table, however, the framework goes above and beyond the existing approach to include 
what I shall argue below as the emergent, environmental change model of motivation.
Limitations of the Human Relations and Human Resources Schools
Despite the fact that large-scale, complex organizations have existed for several hundred 
years, managerial attention to the role of motivation in such organizations is a most 
recent phenomenon (Steers and Porter 1991: 14). Much of the discussion past the era of 
scientific management, especially since the early 1930s, has to do with the assessment of 
the relative advantages of different approaches for ameliorating contemporary 
motivation problems from withheld effort on the job to absenteeism to voluntary 
turnover. In particular, two schools of thought -  the human relations and human 
resources models -  stand out as the most influential in guiding the development in the 
field for a total of more than 70 years up to now.
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Table 10.1
Existing and Emergent Patterns of Organizational Approaches to Motivation
Existing approach 
Human relations model Human resources model
1. People want to feel useful 
and important.
2. These needs are more 
important than money in 
motivating people to work.
3. People desire to belong and to 
be recognized as individuals
Assumptions
1. Work is not inherently 
distasteful. People want to 
contribute to meaningful goals 
which they have helped 
establish.
2. Most people can exercise far 
more creative, responsible self- 
direction and self-control than 
their present jobs demand.
Emergent approach 
Environmental change model
1. People need to feel a sufficient 
level o f pressure to perform in 
their jobs.
2. When faced with high levels 
o f environmental uncertainty 
and risks in their jobs, people 
particularly need to also feel 
that the organization is there 
to help them succeed.
Policies
1. The manager’s basic task is 
to make each worker feel 
useful and important.
2. He or she should keep 
subordinates informed and 
listen to their objections to 
his or her plans.
3. The manager should allow 
subordinates to exercise some 
self-direction and self-control 
on routine matters.
1. The manager’s basic task is to 
make use o f “untapped” human 
resources.
2. He or she must create an 
environment in which all 
members may contribute to the 
limits o f their ability.
3. He or she must encourage full 
participation on important 
matters, continually broadening 
subordinate self-direction and 
control.
1. The organization’s challenge 
is to strike a balance between 
warding off the tendency to 
slack by imposing sanctions 
and unleashing the potential to 
excel by offering incentives.
2. Ways to achieve this include:
(a) Strict compliance to both 
punishment consistency 
and reward consistency
i.e., no exceptions and no 
double standards.
(b) Provision o f productivity- 
enhancing resources, 
training, and guidance.
(c) Continual investment in 
enhancing the well-being 
o f the worthy.
Expected Motivational Outcomes
1. Sharing information with 
subordinates and involving 
them in routine decisions will 
satisfy their basic needs to 
belong and to feel important.
2. Satisfying these needs will  ^
improve morale and reduce 
resistance to authority -  people 
will “willingly cooperate”.
1. Expanding subordinate 
influence, self-direction, and 
self-control will lead to direct 
improvements in operating 
efficiency.
2. Work satisfaction may improve 
as a “by-product” o f  
subordinates making full use of 
their resources.
Raising individuals’ awareness 
o f and preparedness for threats 
and opportunities in the business 
and organizational environments 
will help motivate them to adapt 
to new and changing 
environmental demands and 
challenges in their jobs.
Source of existing approach: Steers & Porter’s (1991) and Miles, Porter, & Craft (1966).
Source of emergent approach: Supportive findings of the proposed model of Environmental Perception and 
Adaptive Motivation.
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Human relations model. The human relations school (Mayo 1933; Roethlisberger and 
Dickson 1939; Mayo 1945) views motivation largely as a social process whereby the 
supervisor’s role is not simply that of a taskmaster but also a guide and counselor who 
understands and sympathizes with the needs and desires of the workers. In contrast to 
the scientific management school, the human relations school does not assume people as 
“typically lazy, often dishonest, aimless, dull, or mercenary” but that they actually want 
to feel useful and important. As a matter of fact, it goes so far as suggesting that these 
intrinsic needs are more important motivators than extrinsic incentives.
Based on this rationale, importance is placed on the manager’s role to fulfill the intrinsic 
needs of employees, inform and consult with them on important matters affecting them, 
and maintain a two-way dialogue and communication with them. For the most part, it 
advocates a certain degree of autonomy and self-direction on day-to-day activities. The 
expected motivational outcomes of these employee-friendly policies are that rather than 
being adversarial or confrontational, workers will be more willing to cooperate and 
overall morale will improve (see Steers and Porter 1991 for a review).
Human resources model. Although the human relations school has dominated the field 
for no less than three decades up to at least the early 1960s, alternatives were being 
sought as both the real and the relative success of related policies diminish in the face of 
growing concern for complex set of factors that may motivate different individuals. The 
human resources approach, which has been referred to under various different titles: 
McGregor’s (i960) “Theory Y”, Likert’s (1967) “System 4”, Schein’s (1972) “Complex 
Man”, and Miles’ (1965) “Human Resources” model, in general takes on a considerably 
less idealistic and more progressive approach than the human relations school.
The core argument of the approach is that people have complex and multiple needs and 
that different types of incentives will appeal to different people. It assumes that people 
are to a certain extent self-motivated and therefore willing and ready to contribute to 
meaningful goals especially if they have had a part with setting these goals. This means 
that given increased autonomy and empowerment in decision-making on the job, work 
can be far from being unpleasant or distasteful.
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In fact, it is argued that employees can attain a sense of job satisfaction from 
undertaking and accomplishing meaningful roles and tasks by way of self-direction and 
control. It is thus up to the manager to create an environment that is conducive to putting 
workers’ talents and capabilities to best use, such as with job redesign and enrichment in 
task variety and responsibility. The expected motivational outcomes of these 
empowerment and development-oriented policies are improvements in both operating 
efficiency and job satisfaction. The key is not managerial command-and-control but 
employee self-direction and restraint (see Steers and Porter 1991 for a review).
Relevance of an Emergent, Environmental Change Model
Apparently, the human relations school has its benefits in pacifying and subsequently 
securing a higher level of cooperation from an otherwise adversarial or confrontational 
workforce especially when unionism was in its hay day. Similarly, the human resources 
approach could improve job satisfaction and perhaps even operating efficiency by 
focusing on employee development and empowerment at a time when high voluntary 
turnover threatened internal organizational stability and competitiveness. The substantial 
achievements of these approaches in the past, however, are not sufficient for 
understanding motivation in today’s fast-changing and turbulent workplace. The 
expectations of performance are changing. Traditionally, work performance has meant 
the satisfactory fulfillment of well-defined and specified job descriptions, and 
motivation the direction, strength, or persistence of work effort.
Over time, the nature of performance has given way to complex and constantly changing 
requirements. The concern for productivity has not disappeared and issues of 
adaptability and flexibility have been added to the mix (Howard 1995; Ilgen and Pulakos 
1999; Pulakos, Arad et al. 2000). Accordingly, firms have become more concerned 
about the pursuit of an adaptive and flexible workforce (Lane 1991; Smith, Ford et al. 
1997; Kozlowski, Gully et al. 1999). As emergent nonmember-based organizations 
(NMO) concerned with the well-being of workers are seen struggling to develop 
strategies and tactics to survive and expand in an economic environment where 
traditional unionism is greatly weakened (Freeman and Hersch 2005), so are individuals 
expected to struggle and adapt to new and changing challenges and demands at work.
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Despite the sea change in the expectations of organizations regarding the motivation and 
performance of their workers, alternatives to the existing approach seem to have arisen 
only in the form of a “contingency approach”, which incorporated the use of both the 
human relations and human resources models at one time or another (see Steers and 
Porter 1991). My premise is that the considerable body of knowledge about the pressing 
need for a flexible and adaptable workforce (Smith, Ford et al. 1997; Auer and 
Speckesser 1998; Ilgen and Pulakos 1999) has an important place in motivation in 
today’s complex and fast-changing workplace.
This is not to suggest that the human relations and human resources model have outlived 
their usefulness; rather, it is to suggest that we should at the same time be conscious o f 
additional knowledge about the changing nature and expectations of today’s workforce 
in the broader industrial relations and organization literatures to help recognize a new, 
“environmental change approach” to motivation.
Environmental change model. A motivational tool that works in today’s environment 
needs to be realistically in tune with the pace and magnitude of changes confronted by 
organizations today. With reference to the existing approach outlined in Table 10.1, I 
shall review the contrasting assumptions, policies, and expected outcomes of the 
emergent approach I refer here as the “environmental change model”. A main feature of 
this model is that, rather than being wishfully prescriptive, its elements have their origin 
in the conceptualization of the proposed research framework and its empirical findings 
(see Figure 8.3 -  Tested Antecedents o f  Environmental Perception and Adaptive 
Motivation for an overview).
In particular, it reveals with timeliness a new organizational approach to motivation 
through the window of China’s employment and wage reforms. Because the reality of 
employment uncertainty and compensation risks (if not also of other risks) are as direct 
and immediately recognizable for individuals in other parts of the world as they are for 
Chinese workers, the new, emergent organizational approach to motivation is likely to 
have a universal application in workplaces characterized by uncertainty and risks.
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As summarized in the third column of Table 10.1, the basic assumptions governing the 
“environmental change model” of motivation are: (1) rather than being left to their own 
free agency (an assumption firmly held by the existing approach), people need to feel an 
adequate level of pressure to perform in their jobs; and (2) when faced with high levels 
of environmental uncertainty and risks in their jobs, such as those concerning their 
employment and compensation, people particularly need to also feel that the 
organization is there to help them succeed. In other words, the ideal situation for people 
to be motivated to adapt to the changing and challenging demands in their jobs is to 
experience adequate pressure on the one hand and sufficient support on the other.
Given these conditions for motivation, the organization’s challenge is thus to strike a 
balance between warding off the slightest temptation or tendency to slack with the 
deterrence of sanctions and unleashing the desire or potential to excel with the 
enticement of incentives. There are at least three ways that will help an organization 
establish such a balance. First, the organization needs to ensure strict compliance to both 
punishment consistency and reward consistency in not making exceptions or allowing 
double standards in the enforcement of organizational punishments and rewards. This 
will help reduce confusion about what justifies punishment and what merits reward.
Second, the organization needs to take the initiative to provide the requisite resources, 
training, and guidance to enhance productivity at times when additional performance 
expectations and demands are imposed on the employees. If, however, the organization 
left the employees to themselves to confront substantial challenges without help or 
assistance, it would be unlikely for them to develop the trust and respect for the 
organization to the extent that they would be willing to reciprocate in contributing to its 
continued success. The practical and/or symbolic significance of organizational support 
cannot be emphasized more especially in situations of adversity where success or 
performance is subject to many uncontrollable factors and is therefore hard to come by 
or has no guarantee.
Third, the organization needs to continually invest in the advancement of the interests of 
members of the workforce who work hard for the success of the firm. This appears to be 
one of the most trying challenges facing the organization that operates under mounting
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pressures to streamline and cut-costs in order to stay in business. While it is not always 
realistic for the organization to find substantial extra budget to invest in the economic 
well-being of workers when it is under severe financial constraints, the proposed course 
of action may nevertheless in some measure be fulfilled by making sure that managerial 
staff and chief executives do not (continue to) enjoy unjustified privileges and payouts 
whilst workers are unfairly left to bear its negative consequences.
In this respect, valuable lessons may be learned for the Chinese enterprise as well as the 
Western firm from their Japanese counterpart that managed to win the hearts and minds 
of the workforce by investing in their “emotional well-being” in times of adversity, that 
is, taking the lead to cut managerial and chief executive compensation first and in much 
larger proportions to pay cuts for ordinary staff. Another area the organization can invest 
in without having to come up with a large financial budget is by introducing work 
practices that would help contribute to work-family balance. Examples are flexi-work 
schedules and other family-friendly work arrangements (ILO 2001).
In sum, with the contemporary concern of motivating workers to adapt to new and 
changing environmental demands and challenges in their jobs, the solution is no longer 
just the creation of job enrichment and decision-making opportunities suggested by the 
human resources school or making workers feel useful and well cared for proposed by 
the human relations model. The assumptions reviewed above of the emergent, 
environmental change model observed in the setting of the Chinese enterprise illuminate 
the pressing need for more demanding and multifaceted organizational policies.
In particular, it seems that the empirically proven motivational approach of my research 
organization in strategically raising the workers’ awareness of and subsequent 
preparedness for environmental threats and opportunities sustained through a fine 
balance of pressure and support could be of tremendous value to enhancing adaptive 
motivation and performance in other organizational settings. Although the reforming 
Chinese industry has its unique environmental challenges and demands, what is critical 
is that, like the Chinese enterprise, today’s organizations in general are faced with an 
unprecedented level of environmental uncertainty and risks, which are increasingly 
being transferred in different shapes and forms beyond the ranks of senior executives
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and commission-based sales staff to ordinary members of the workforce (Beck 2000; 
Heery and Salmon 2000; Nolan, Wichert et al. 2000).
The usefulness of the emergent, “environmental change model” in guiding adaptive 
motivation thus has significant potential outside the peculiar setting in which it is first 
identified and hereby conceptually accredited.
10.2.2 The Future Role of Risks in Work Motivation Research 
The Strange World With No Risk
Although the fact does not seem to be recognized explicitly, existing work motivation 
theory is predicated on the assumption that no risk is involved with the individual’s low 
or lacking in motivation. This stance suggests that motivation is all about achieving 
additional gain or improving the status quo. As such, motivation could stem only from 
the motive to achieve but not also the motive to protect (see Chapter 5 for a discussion 
on the distinction between the two). At first glance, such a generalization may appear to 
be both innocuous and highly useful to analysis, because then scholars can focus on the 
more socially desirable and research-accessible effects of incentives. But such an 
approach is not without costs to the field of motivation.
In the rarefied world of zero risk, for instance, individuals can supposedly choose what 
to do and the consequences thereof. There is nothing to lose as a result of one’s actions. 
Individual employees can decide without any undesirable or negative consequences in 
sight, as to how or how much they work. They have total discretion and liberty and, 
hence, are inclined to put forth their efforts only in the hope of reward, rather than for 
fear of punishment. Pressure, in all its forms, is therefore only self-generated.
Consequently, there can be no externally imposed costs involved with the individual’s 
lack of response to the call to contribute one’s best or adapt to changing requirements 
and expectations at work. As such, the power of coercion and disciplinary action lies 
exclusively within the individual. Quite simply, then, it seems that the context in which
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motivation is assumed to take place is remarkably specialized and indeed, remote from 
reality. One only has to note the magnitude of employment and compensation risks in 
today’s workplace to find this a gross misrepresentation of the world of motivation.
Although it is acknowledged in the motivation literature that punishments exist and are 
actually found to have an effect on absenteeism (e.g., Ford 1981; Harvey and Nicholson 
1993), positive reinforcement is generally regarded as more effective than punishment in 
motivating employees (see Kreitner and Luthans 1984). Notwithstanding the absence of 
profound justification, the idea that reward is what really matters is so entrenched that 
motivation studies to date remain focused on rewards.
The serious neglect of punishments in motivation research may have been a direct result 
of the field’s isolation from other disciplines. It is possible that the more a discipline 
isolates itself intellectually, the greater the chances of employing unrealistic and 
outdated assumptions about the subject matter concerned. Not surprising, risk is 
extensively discussed in other disciplines, ranging from economics to decision science to 
international conflict and negotiation (see discussion in Sections 4.1 -  4.2; and Section 
5.2). It therefore seems that a sensible corrective measure in this respect is to explore, as 
I attempted to do in this study, other social sciences disciplines that examined risk.
Reckoning Risks
In determining the future role of risks in work motivation research at the conclusion of 
this study, an important consideration is how prevalent risks are in the context of today’s 
workplace. In this regard, Steers, Mowday, and Shapiro’s (2004) account of the 
changing contemporary workplace is worth noting:
“Today’s workplace is characterized by an increasingly short-term focus, time as a 
critical performance variable, increasing interdependence among employees (often 
manifested in some form o f team organization), evolving affective responses to the 
workplace experience, increasing value and motive conflicts on the part o f  the 
employees, and a clear recognition o f the transitory nature o f  careers ” (Steers, 
Mowday et al. 2004: 384).
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In this succinct description, one can straightforwardly identify six characteristics by 
which today’s workplace has evolved: (1) short-term focus, (2) time pressure, (3) 
interdependence, (4) affective responses, (5) conflicts, and (6) transitory careers. Each 
element reflects the common forces of a contingent economic environment (intensifying 
competition, rapid organizational changes, and the call for adaptive flexibility), with 
inevitable negative consequences of inadaptability or noncompliance to continually 
revised standards and requirements. As shown in Table 10.2, the manifestations of these 
characteristics are clearly and immediately relevant to the ordinary employees, with 
risks as a common denominator despite the area of impact.
Characteristic 1, short-term focus, emphasizes rapidly changing market conditions and 
environmental demands (Miles, Snow et al. 1997) as the driver and the introduction of 
policies to minimize costs on the one hand and maximize organizational flexibility on 
the other. Not surprisingly, on the labor front, permanent employment is being 
increasingly replaced by fixed-term labor contracts (Treu 1992) (as has been the case for 
all 100 million of China’s state industry workers), if  not other forms of precarious work 
that promise no security or guarantee of pay or employment for the long term. The 
results are unprecedented levels of employment and employment risks. These risks are 
further magnified in the absence of alternative employment and income opportunities.
Table 10.2
Some of the Characteristics of the Changing Contemporary Workplace
Characteristic Manifestation Example of risks
1. Short-term focus Fixed-term labor contracts Employment and income risks
2. Time pressure Nonnegotiable deadlines Noncompliance and health risks
3. Interdependence Team organization Performance and compensation 
risks
4. Affective responses Negative response to inequity Political risks
5. Conflicts Irreconcilable goals Performance and ethical risks
6. Transitory careers Contingent/project-based work Career investment and income risks
Note: The list on the left is based on Steers, et al.’s (2004) description of the changing workplace. Rather 
than being exhaustive, it is meant to list characteristics recently recognized by experts in the field.
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and  Risks 344
Characteristic 2, time pressure, emphasizes the impact of time-based competition on 
time as a critical performance variable. The speed of product development, response to 
customers, and problem solving all have dramatic effects on today’s organization and 
employee (Waller, Conte et al. 2001). In manufacturing in particular, it is noted that the 
deployment of just-in-time and total quality management resulted in intensified 
surveillance, discipline, and control (Edwards and Whitston 1991; Edwards, Collinson et 
al. 1998), with severe penalties attached to underperformance or the failure to comply. 
Since heightened time pressure, as most commonly manifested in the form of clear, 
unmistakable deadlines, will necessarily lead to work intensification and excessive 
work-related stress unless skill or technology is improved (Green 2001), its multiple 
consequences will give rise to both noncompliance and health risks.
Characteristic 3, interdependence, relates to the emergence of the team organization that 
results in coordination and cooperation as well as conflict and tension between 
individual members of a team. The development of the team as the basic operational unit 
may be attributed to the call for adaptive flexibility (Lane 1991) that is vital to continued 
survival and success in today’s evolving and complex business environment. Although 
distributing work to teams shifts the unit of responsibility of work from individuals to 
teams, individuals are the ones who get promoted, transferred, trained, and rewarded in 
organizations (Ilgen and Sheppard 2001). As a result, where means interdependence is 
high, i.e., the degree to which the task that one team member faces is significantly 
affected by the performance of another team member (Beersma, Hollenbeck et al. 2003), 
individual exposure to performance and compensation risks are also expected to be high.
Characteristic 4, affective responses, emphasizes emotions that could both aid and 
impede individual adaptation and survival in the work setting. As Seo, Feldman Barrett, 
and Bartunek (2004) point out, positive emotions can enhance creativity and flexibility 
(Isen, Daubman et al. 1987) as well as proactive coping in adversity (Aspinwall and 
Taylor 1997). On the other hand, negative emotions such as those that may be harbored 
toward events of organizational injustice could have dire consequences especially in 
times of organizational crisis or decline. During these times, negative affective responses 
may typically not be seen as appropriate or sensible, even if the injustice or adverse 
condition itself could be objectively established. As new threats of job loss and pay cut
Brenda C. Sun London School of Econom ics
Motivation under Uncertainty and Risks 345
demand new responses to inequity and other adverse situations at work, so are the 
political risks involved in negative affective responses likely to increase.
Characteristic 5, conflicts, emphasizes awareness and/or experience of discrepancies, 
incompatible desires, or irreconcilable goals (Boulding 1963) amidst conflicting 
demands in modern-day work life. For example, it is no longer unusual for individuals to 
be given multiple tasks, if not also put on multiple work teams, with competing 
deadlines and demands. The allocation of resources across competing demands is thus a 
common issue faced by executives and workers (Sawyer 1990). In the decision process, 
protected values, i.e., those that resist trade-offs with other values, particularly economic 
values (Baron and Spranca 1997), including ethical concerns and other normative issues 
and preferences such as work-family balance, are likely to be most at risk. While 
consequences of performance deficit in today’s insecure workplace need no further 
elaboration, tension between performance and ethical risks is expected to be high.
Characteristic 6, transitory careers, emphasizes some of the most aggressive labor 
utilization strategies aimed at reducing cost and increasing organizational flexibility. For 
example, functional flexibility involves the training and using of labor across functional 
boundaries, engaging workers in a wider range of duties than their job titles suggest to 
the extent that their involvement could be systematically adjusted upward, downward, or 
horizontal in grade terms (Reilly 2001). In addition, numerical flexibility enables the 
employer to readily alter the size of the workforce to meet the changing demand for 
labor through the processes of extemalization, i.e., the use of fixed-term contractors, 
seasonal or casual labor, temporary agency staff, ex-employees, consultants and 
freelancers, interim managers, and outsourcing of the whole activity to a subcontractor 
(Treu 1992; Reilly 2001; Kalleberg 2001b). What accompany these transitory work 
arrangements are higher levels of career investment and income risks.
Although this discussion touches only on some of the characteristics of the 
contemporary workplace, they attest in great measure to the realities facing individuals 
today especially in terms of the unprecedented scope and magnitude of uncertainty and 
risks evident in global economy (Lavigne 1995) and in today’s fast-changing and 
turbulent workplace. Indeed, the recognition of these developments by Steers, Mowday,
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and Shapiro (2004) and the groundbreaking works on the world risk society of Beck 
(1999; 2000) and on the “insecure thesis” of Heery and Salmon (2000) all pointed to the 
remarkable aptness and urgency of giving risks a proper role in motivation research.
In the following section, I will review the contributions of this dissertation and explore 
what needs to be investigated beyond this study to improve our understanding of 
motivation under uncertainty and risks.
10.3 Contributions and Directions for Future Research
Advancement in research and theory. Notwithstanding extremely high research 
barriers and the absence of an existing research framework that seemed fitting for the 
situation at hand, this study has fulfilled its mission of providing a firsthand evaluation 
of the dual motivational effects of China’s wage and employment systems reform, by far 
the world’s most substantial and far-reaching workplace reform of its kind.
This dissertation has two main theoretical contributions: (1) the model of 
“environmental perception and adaptive motivation” has yielded more convincing 
empirical support than existing theories, which were tested with the same primary 
dataset of more than 1,000 workers; and (2) the framework may be used to rigorously 
and analytically assess the timely phenomenon of “motivation under uncertainty and 
risks” in work settings with two unique advantages over rival approaches:
(A) The proposed model benefited from the insights of a wide range of social sciences 
literature to bear on individuals’ motivation to adapt to new and changing 
environmental demands and challenges in their jobs; and
(B) It sets a new agenda and direction for future motivation research. Instead of 
dwelling on the long-embraced and seemingly secure premise of a stable and 
predictable environment of existing work motivation theory, it explores issues of 
threats and opportunities facing individuals in the process of adaptation for 
survival and growth in a fast-changing and turbulent workplace.
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Contribution to practice. In the organization’s call for adaptation and survival amidst 
intensifying global competition, rapid technological changes, and increased resources 
constraints, the implementation of workplace innovations that help effectively transform 
organizational members into an “adaptive and flexible workforce” (Pulakos, Arad et al. 
2000) is a pressing issue. A central dilemma seems to be the mismatch between 
management assumptions and employee responses to workplace reforms that are 
typically accompanied by uncertainty and risks.
As experts noted, the lack of theoretical sophistication and clarity behind many of these 
reforms (e.g., performance-related pay) might have contributed to their true impact 
being largely a mystery (Marsden and Richardson 1994; OECD 2005b). This thesis 
represents a key to this worrisome dynamic by providing guidance on the rationale 
behind the success of workplace reforms and the conditions in which success may be 
systematically repeated.
Directions for future research. Risk embodies an element of vulnerability that makes 
noncompliance costly. What then makes noncompliance too costly to bear (or 
compliance particularly worthwhile to pursue)? Although parallel measures of risk and 
cost-bearing and of pressure and support in the research framework (see Chapters 6 -  
Antecedents o f Threat and Opportunity Perceptions,; and Chapter 9 -  Discussion) begin 
to shed light on motivation from the perspective of environmental perception, more 
theoretical and empirical work is needed to identify and measure specific aspects of 
workers’ experiences with risk o f noncompliance and pressure to perform that invoke 
threat perception on the one hand, and with perceived organizational support and 
willingness to bear cost that enhance opportunity perception on the other.
To this end, the characteristics of the changing contemporary workplace, manifestations, 
and examples of risks presented in Table 10.2 could be a useful starting point. Research 
in other professional settings and geographical areas is expected to further enrich and 
extend the proposed line of study.
Much work also needs to be done in terms of exploring the determinants of risk o f  
noncompliance and pressure to perform, which in turn influence threat perception. This
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gap in knowledge is evident when viewed in light of the advancement of knowledge in 
this thesis concerning the antecedents of perceived organizational support and 
willingness to bear cost, which in turn influence opportunity perception (for an 
overview, see Figure 8.3 -  Tested Antecedents o f Environmental Perception and 
Adaptive Motivation). The latter may to a large extent be attributed to existing 
knowledge in the field that can be rather more readily expanded to relate to the dynamics 
of opportunity perception, which incidentally also reflects the entrenched bias toward 
the effects of incentives but not of sanctions in explaining motivation.
In sum, investigating motivation under uncertainty and risks (rather than continuing to 
unrealistically presume stability and security) is especially important today as 
individuals strive to adapt to new and rapidly changing environmental demands and 
challenges in their jobs and employers struggle to cut cost and increase organizational 
flexibility in order to thrive, if not simply survive, in the face of globalization and 
intensifying competition. Given the centrality of uncertainty and risk issues in today’s 
workplace and society at large, and the immediate relevance and demonstrated 
explanatory power of the conceptual approach of this study, further theoretical 
development and empirical studies using this approach are likely to be fruitful.
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Appendix B: English Translation of Questionnaire
R esearch  Q uestionnaire:
Im pact o f C om petition -B ased  E m ploym ent and W age 
R eform s
This questionnaire  is designed for the inv estig a tio n  o f  the 
com petitive  m echanism  w ith in  the en terprise and its im pact on the 
w orkforce. The questionnaire  is m eant to be anonym ous and should 
be sealed  upon return. The envelope w ill be opened and dealt w ith 
independen tly  by the R esearch Team. As such, personal inform ation 
recorded  in the questionnaire  w ill not be ind iv idually  revealed  to the 
m anagem ent.
The questionnaire  consists o f  10 parts and there are no righ t or 
w rong answ ers to the questions asked. We w ill conso lidate  responses 
to the problem s that are id en tified  to be o f com m on concern among 
the w orkers and suggestions w ill be made to the m anagem ent in 
dealing  w ith  these problem s in the hope to enhance po licy  decisions.
Thank you for your cooperation.
The U niversity  R esearch Team
Part A: Opportunities and Threats under “Competition-Based 
Employment” (jingzheng shanggang) and Wage Systems Reform
Questions 1 - 2 0  are about the opportunities and threats brought about by the “Competition- 
Based Employment” (jingzheng shanggang) and wage systems reform at your enterprise. 
Please use the scale below to answer the questions and circle vour answers.
disagree strongly disagree indifferent agree strongly agree 
1___________ 2___________ 3___________4___________5
1. The implementation of (the policy of) “Putting People’s Talents and Capabilities to 
Maximum Use” (renjing qicai) has created better (career) development opportunities 
for me.
2. Since the implementation of the competitive system of “Advancement of the Strong 
and Elimination of the Weak” (yousheng lietai), I have had to face increasingly 
tougher challenges in my job.
3. The enterprise provides training, learning, and development opportunities that help 
increase the chances of my success under the “Competition-Based Employment” 
(Jingzheng shanggang) system.
4. The enterprise policy of opening ranking workers one by one based on the results of 
the “Position and Skill Assessment” (gangwei jineng cheping) has created a lot of 
pressure for me.
5-. The potential of whether or not I can get a renewal for (my) employment contract 
makes me feel insecure about my present job.
6. The establishment of the “Employment Transfer Center” (zhuangang jidi) keeps me 
on my toes in my present job.
7. The current enterprise policies of “workforce reduction, layoff, and staff diversion” 
(jianyuan, xiagang, fenliu) do not pose a threat to me.
8. Being able to raise my current skill level (jishu dengji) would mean a lot to me, 
regardless of how much pay increment I could get as a result.
9. The wage increments associated with skill upgrades are not at all attractive to me.
10.1 would certainly have a sense of satisfaction if I delivered all my assigned production 
targets.
11. The policy of deducting the bonus whenever workers fall short of delivering their 
assigned production targets works as a warning for me.
12.1 don’t care for the amount that would be deducted from my bonus if I could not 
deliver my assigned production targets.
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13. Getting a bigger bonus than others in the work group would give me a sense of 
superiority, regardless of the actual differential.
14. The actual bonus differentials between group members do not do anything to me.
15. Being able to exceed the production target would give me a great sense of 
satisfaction, regardless of the actual amount of extra bonus I might get.
16. The actual amount of extra bonus associated with having delivered above and beyond 
the production targets is certainly attractive to me.
17.1 have been provided the (necessary) conditions and opportunities in my job to fulfill 
particularly difficult work targets that are associated with the offer of an extra bonus 
if and when accomplished.
18.1 have not been provided the (necessary) conditions and opportunities in my job to 
deliver above and beyond the production targets in my job.
19. Overall, the various measures of “Competition-Based Employment” (jingzheng 
shanggang) and wage systems have provided me more opportunities than threats.
2 0 .1 am confident that I can establish a foothold in the current competitive system by 
virtue of my adaptive efforts.
Part B: The Impact of Reform
Sections (A), (B), and (C) below are about “Competition-Based Employment” (jingzheng 
shanggang) and wage systems reform and their impact on the various aspects of work. Please 
use the scale below to answer all of the following questions and circle your answers.
greatly reduced reduced no impact increased greatly increased 
1___________ 2___________ 3___________4___________5________
(A). Esprit de corps (Jingsheng mianmau): Has the implementation of the current 
“Competition-Based Employment” and wage reforms policies at your enterprise had a 
positive impact on workers’ esprit de corps concerning:
1. Workers’ “awareness of competition” (jingzhengyishi)
2. Workers’ “sense of apprehension” (youhuan yishi)
3. Workers’ “spirit of reverence in giving one’s best at work” (jingye Jingsheng)
4. Workers’ pursuit of short-term gains
5. Workers’ enthusiasm toward actively pursuing skill improvement
6. Workers’ loyalty to the organization
7. Workers’ trust in leadership
8. Morale of the “masses” (qunzhongde shiqi)
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(B). Achieving “Tangible (Work) Targets” {zhua yingzhibiao): Has the
implementation of the current “Competitive-Based Employment” and wage systems at
your enterprise had a positive impact on your work in terms of:
1. Your enthusiasm for “cost-cutting and energy-saving” (jiangben jianhao) in the 
production process
2. Your enthusiasm for “quality assurance” in the production process
3. Your enthusiasm for increasing efficiency in the production process
4. Your enthusiasm for cooperating with (people of) related positions and shifts
5. Your overall enthusiasm for achieving tangible goals in the process of production
(C). Achieving “Long-Term Gains” {zhua changyuan liyi): Has the implementation
of the current “competition-Based Employment” and wage systems had a positive impact
on the long-term interests of the enterprise concerning:
1. Your enthusiasm for actively cooperating with or participating in the “development 
and innovation” {kaifa chuangxin) aspects of the production process
2. Your enthusiasm for taking on extra work that is outside the parameters of (your) 
tangible (work) targets
3. Your enthusiasm for taking the enterprise’s long-term interests as your own
4. Your overall enthusiasm for making a contribution to the enterprise’s long-term 
interests
(Page 2 o f Chinese Questionnaire:)
Part C: Effort and Reward
Questions 1 -  17 are about whether your work effort has yielded satisfactory material and 
intrinsic rewards. Please use the scale below to answer the questions and circle vour answers.
disagree strongly disagree indifferent agree strongly agree 
1___________ 2___________ 3___________4___________5
1. Even if it’s solely for the sake of job stability, exerting maximum (adaptive) effort at 
work means a lot to me.
2. If it’s solely for the sake of career development, exerting maximum (adaptive) effort 
in my current job does not make much sense to me.
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3. Even if  it’s solely for the sake of pursuing honors of “Model Laborer” (laomo), etc., 
exerting maximum (adaptive) effort at work is worth it for me.
4. Even if it’s solely for the sake of material gains, exerting maximum (adaptive) effort 
at work is worth it for me.
5. If it’s solely for the sake of contributing to the enterprise or the country, exerting 
maximum (adaptive) effort in my job does not make much sense to me.
6. Even if it’s solely for the sake of job satisfaction, exerting maximum (adaptive) 
effort at work is worth it for me.
7. If it’s solely for the sake of intrinsic reward, exerting maximum (adaptive) effort in 
my current job does not mean a lot to me.
8. I feel that both the material and intrinsic rewards I receive at the enterprise are 
significantly below the level of my input at work.
9. Considering all of the above aspects, exerting maximum (adaptive) effort at work in 
my current job is worth it for me.
10. What is the greatest driving force of your motivation to work hard (to adapt) in your 
current position?
(Please choose 3 items from the list below and then enter them in the boxes provided in 
order of importance to you.)
I I greatest driving force Q  2nd greatest driving force Q  3rd greatest driving force
a. making money
b. keeping my job
c. career development
d. recognition by the masses
e. recognition by the leadership
f. realization of own self worth
g. making a contribution to the enterprise
11. The current methods of (wage) distribution have further satisfied the desires of the 
workers to attain more bonuses by way of their own hard work and capabilities.
12. The establishment of the “Competition-Based Employment” {jingzheng shanggang) 
system has increased job stability for those who are able and willing to work hard.
13. The training and development opportunities provided by the enterprise have further 
satisfied the workers’ desire for career development.
14. The policy of openly ranking workers one by one based on the results of “Job 
Performance and Skill Assessment” (gangwei jineng cheping) has increased the 
masses’ recognition of workers who are capable and willing to work hard.
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15. The current policy of “Advancement of the Strong and Elimination of the Weak”
(yousheng lietai) has further increased management’s recognition of workers who 
are capable and willing to work hard.
16. The policy of “Putting People’s Talents and Capabilities to Maximum Use” (renjing 
qichdi) has further satisfied the workers’ desire for the realization of self-worth.
17. The current implementation of the “position responsibility system” (gangwei zheren 
zhi) has further satisfied the workers’ desire to contribute to the enterprise.
Part D: Effort and Outcome
1. The work assigned to me in my job is within my ability to handle.
2. The work assigned to me in my job exceeds the level required of my position.
3. I experience frequent changes in my work to which I find difficult to adapt.
4. The authority vested in my job is compatible to the level of my responsibilities.
5. I have not yet mastered all the essential skills required in my job.
6. Instructions on work assignments given me by leadership are not clear enough.
7. The equipment (or tools) on which I depend to do my job frequently break(s) down.
8. I have the support and cooperation from the various parties concerned in carrying 
out my duties and responsibilities at work.
9. Taking the above questions 1 - 8  into consideration, I believe I have reasonable 
control over the results of my work.
Part E: Conditions of Work
1. I don’t need to exert a lot of effort in my job in order to answer (to the boss).
2. At present, the only way at for me to have a sense of security is to put forth my best 
(adaptive) effort at work.
3. Even if my work performance was average, I would still be able to keep my job.
4. Under the current management system, workers have the choice to “show up for 
work without putting in (genuine) effort” (chugong buchuli).
5. When it comes to working as a group, there is no monitoring pressure among peers.
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6. The expectations of people important to me (i.e. leadership, family members, etc.) 
often cause me to impose pressure on myself at work.
7. The “position responsibility system” (gangwei zherenzhi) has strict requirements in 
the quality and quantity of the delivery of my work targets.
•8. I have a lot of pressure at work (in terms of workload, quality, task difficulty, etc.)
9. I would not be able to answer to myself if I didn’t put forth my best effort at work.
10. I would easily be eliminated in the process of competition if I didn’t put forth my 
best (adaptive) effort at work.
11. My hopes are not high at all in finding a job that is better than the one I now have.
12. Taking the above questions 1 - 1 2  into consideration I feel that I have no choice but 
to put in maximum (adaptive) effort at work.
13. I feel that I am playing more of an active than a passive role in the process of 
competing for survival.
14. My (motivational) response to the current work situation is due to the demands 
imposed on me rather than what one may call self- initiation or motivation.
(Page 3 o f Chinese Questionnaire:)
Part F: Work Values
1. Since the implementation of the “limited duration contracts” (guding hetong), the 
workers have become more concerned about the amount of reward they get when 
making a contribution to the enterprise.
2. The current “Competition-Based Employment” (jingzheng shanggang) system made 
me realize the importance of developing competitive capabilities rather than 
pursuing short-term gains.
3. Under the current appraisal system, the credit won’t go to the individual even if he is 
more dedicated than others at work.
4. The current reform measures made me realize that the thing to go for is material 
rewards rather than long-term aspirations.
5. My enthusiasm to contribute to the enterprise has reduced since the implementation 
of “limited duration contracts” (guding hetong).
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6. The various policies of the enterprise in workforce reduction and layoff has 
convinced me more and more that “this is not a place for anyone to stay on (for 
long)” (chidi buyi jiuliu); and the earlier the better for me to leave the enterprise.
7. The (enterprise’s) policy of not renewing any of the rural workers’ labor contracts 
are not only hurting those directly concerned but also has an adverse impact on the 
workers’ confidence in management.
8. In the process of the “deepening” of the employment reform, the simple sentiments 
of the workers toward loving the Party and the country have been diluted; leading to 
a crisis in (the workers’) beliefs.
9. Whatever circumstances I am in, I never lose hope of the future.
10. I believe man is subject to the forces of destiny and cannot do anything to change it.
11. Throughout the reform process, I have adopted an attitude of being “the unbeatable” 
(dabushi).
12. It would be regretful indeed for anyone to not be totally immersed in his work.
13. It’d be totally unnecessary to work harder than others if you have a choice not to.
14. I’d rather be making less money than to have to be busy working all day.
15. It is important that we pull together (in heart and might) for the good of the 
enterprise because if  it is the same as working for one’s own future.
16. I am not willing to give more than others for the enterprise.
17. The most important realization of my self-worth is making a contribution to the 
enterprise.
18. The level of my work effort is strongly influenced by whether I think I will be fairly 
compensated for it.
19. When I feel compromised, I will try to suppress the feeling and not let it affect my 
work.
20. It is important to me that I do the best possible job even though I may not always be 
materially compensated for it.
Part G: Leadership and Appraisal
1. While workers are in the process of trying to accomplish their work targets, 
leadership plays an active role in guiding them.
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3. In my workgroup, members are not calculative about individual differences in input 
as long as the group can work as a team and do a good job together.
4. In my workgroup, anyone working extra hard will be considered by others as a 
show-off.
5. In my workgroup, anyone being over-zealous about his work will be considered by 
leadership as totally unnecessary.
6. In my workgroup, the behavior of “showing up for work without putting in 
(genuine) effort” (<chugong buchuli) does not exist.
7. Within my workgroup, competition among individual members is very intense.
8. The competitive atmosphere in my workgroup does more to impede the cooperation 
of the group as a whole than promote the collective advancement of its members.
(Page 4 o f Chinese Questionnaire:)
Part I: Execution of Rewards and Punishments
1 very seldom 2 seldom 3 sometimes 4 often 5 very often
(< 10%) (10-49%) (50%) (51-90%) (>90%) •
1. Someone with good work performance got to keep his job.
2. Someone lost his job because of poor work performance.
3. Someone lost his job for reasons other than having committed an offence, performed 
poorly on the job, having bad human relations, or not being physically fit for the job.
4. Someone managed to keep his job despite poor work performance.
5. Someone did not get a renewal for his contract not so much due to poor work 
performance as to the lack of quota (headcount).
6. Someone managed to master a new skill or capability and as a result achieved a 
competitive advantage in the process of “Competition-Based Employment” 
(jingzheng shanggang).
7. Someone received the honor of “Model Laborer” (laomo) or “Advanced Worker” 
(xianjin gongzuozhe) due to outstanding performance on the job.
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8. Someone received the honor of “Model Laborer” (laomo) or “Advanced Worker” 
(xianjin gongzuozhe) for reasons other than having demonstrated outstanding 
performance on the job.
9. Someone got a bigger bonus than others in the same position because of having 
made a greater contribution at work.
10. Someone got a bigger bonus than others in the same position for reasons other than 
having made a greater contribution at work.
11. Someone got an equal amount of bonus as others in the same position regardless of 
having done better or worse in his job.
12. Someone received management recognition because of having taken up extra 
responsibilities in his work.
13. Someone received management recognition for reasons other than having achieved 
higher skill qualifications, outstanding performance, or having taken up extra 
responsibilities in his work.
14. Someone received preferential treatment in housing allocation because of having 
made a special contribution to the enterprise.
15. Someone received preferential treatment in housing allocation without having made 
any special contribution to the enterprise.
16. Someone received better appraisal results due to better performance on the job.
17. Some received not so good appraisal results due to relatively poor performance on 
the job.
18. Appraisal results are to a greater extent dependent on relationships with the 
superiors rather than one’s performance on the job.
19. Appraisal results are to a greater extent dependent on relationships with one’s 
colleagues rather than one’s performance on the job.
20. Considering the various aspects mentioned above, reward is linked to performance 
on thejob.
21. Considering the various aspects mentioned above, punishment is linked to 
performance on the job.
22. Under the current “Competition-Based Employment” (jingzheng shanggang) 
system, workers have been able to compete on open and fair grounds.
23. Q&A: What is your opinion about the “Competition-Based Employment” and wage 
systems at your enterprise? In addition, are rewards and punishments effective and 
appropriate in their intensity and focus?
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Personal Data (Please do not enter your name) Please circle vour answers.
1. Your position-based pay (gangwei gongzhi): $______
2. Point on position scale {gangwei xishu):
1.0; 1.2; 1.4; 1.6; 1.8; 2.0; 2.2; 2.4; 2.6; 2.8; 3.0; 3.2; 3.4; 3.6; 3.8
3. Your skill-based pay: $ ______
4. Point on Skill scale: 1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12
5. Your average monthly bonus is about: $______
6. Your average monthly income (i.e. total of bonus + other forms of pay) = $
7. Your average monthly income last year: $ _______ ; Your average monthly income
in 1997; Your average monthly income in 1996: $ _______
8. There is no differentiation between group and individual results in work appraisal.
a. strongly disagree b. disagree c. no opinion d. agree e. strongly agree
9. You consider that bonus differentials between workgroup members are: 
a. too little b. about right c. too much
10. The differential as of now is about: minimum $_______ ; maximum $ _______
11. Bonus differentials between workers and supervisor are: 
a. too little b. about right c. too much
12. What is the appropriate wage differential between the supervisor and workers?
1.2.3.4.5.7.8.9.10 times
13. You contract is of: a. rural status (rongmingong) b. urban status (chengzhenggong)
14. The nature of your position is:
a. front line production (yixian) b. secondary line production {erxian)
c. supporting (fuzhu) d. back-room services (houqin) e. professional, managerial or 
technical staff (zhuangye guanli jishu rewyuan) f. {junior) supervisory grade (keji)
15. The degree of coordination between colleagues due to the nature of work: 
a. very low b. low c. average d. high e. very high
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16. Your skill classification: a. elementary school b. secondary school c. high school
d. technician e. assistant engineer f. engineer and above
17. Total number of people in your respective unit (shop floor, operating area, work 
group, or office): _____
18. Number of subordinates: 0.1.2.3.4.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.15.16.17.18.19.20
19. Duration of your employment contract (laodong hetong):
1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10 years; (permanent), open-ended contract (wugongdingqi hetong)
20. Number o f  years and months before the expiry of your employment contract
21. What are the chances of your getting a renewal for your labor contract?
a. no chance at all b. small chance c. average d. big chance e. absolute certainty
22. Gender: a. female b. male
23. Age: a. under 25 b . 2 5 - 3 0  c. 3 1 - 2 5  d .3 6 - 40 e . 4 1 - 4 5  f .4 6 -5 0  g. above 50
24. Marital status: a. single b. married
25. Education: a. elementary school b. high school or technical high school (zhong 
zhuan) c. junior college e. bachelor’s degree f. post-graduate degree
26. Experience in temporary layoff or transfer: a. Yes b. No
27. (Employment) background:
a. open (labor market) recruitment (shehui zhaoping) b. allocated (by the State) 
to this enterprise upon graduation (xuexiao biye fenpei) c. “recovered ex-military 
staff’ (fuyuan zhuanyejiinren) d. transfer from outside this firm (benqiye yiwai 
danwei diaoru) .
28. Years of service:
<1; 1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.15.16.17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.25 years or more
29. Have you been awarded “Model Laborer” (laomo) or “Advanced Worker” (xianjin 
gongzhouzhe)? a. Yes b. No
30. (Communist) Party member (dangyuan) or Young Communist Party Member 
(gongqing tuanyuan): a. Yes b. No
31. Party member trainee (yubei dangyuan): a. Yes b. No
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